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Abstract 
 
This thesis identifies the main characteristics of EU food safety regulation and explores 
its impact on stakeholders in Thailand.  It provides an overview of the principles and 
mechanisms that underpin EU food safety law and presents two detailed case studies in 
the areas of baby corn and poultry.  The account presented is based not only on 
doctrinal analysis and but also upon in-depth interviews with relevant stakeholders in 
Thailand.  
 
The case studies highlight the far-reaching cross-border impacts of both official EU 
food safety regulation and of private standards, such as those put in place by EU 
supermarket chains.  Positive and negative cross-border impacts are identified.  The 
most striking and pervasive negative effects arise in relation to private standards.  The 
thesis argues that this is in part because mechanisms to ensure the external 
accountability of private standard-setting bodies are absent or deficient in several 
respects.  This stands in contrast to the situation in relation to official EU food safety 
regulation where the World Trade Organisation and what is described as the ‘Competent 
Authority Model’ succeed in instantiating effective external accountability relationships 
between the EU and affected stakeholders abroad.  
 
Using insights gained from stakeholders’ experiences and concerns, this thesis evaluates 
the principles and mechanisms that underpin EU official food safety regulation and 
private standards and, crucially, it also puts forward constructive suggestions to help 
resolve or mitigate the cross-border problems that arise.  
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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
 
At the beginning of 2011, the Department of Agriculture (DOA) of the Thai Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives introduced a self-imposed ban on five categories of 
vegetable exports to the European Union (EU).  This was done voluntarily in order to 
address a number of compliance problems regarding traces of prohibited chemical and 
microbial substances found in vegetable consignments from Thailand bound for the EU, 
and in order to preempt the possibility of an EU-imposed ban.1  
 
Although this self-imposed ban caused major disruption to Thai vegetable exporters, it 
was considered necessary by the DOA in order to demonstrate to the EU authorities that 
as a ‘competent authority’ (CA) for the purposes of EU law, it was still able to ensure 
that Thai exports comply with EU food safety law.  This ban lasted for more than one 
month and the resumption of vegetable exports was only permitted by the DOA once 
the source of the problem had been identified and the problem resolved.2 
   
This self-imposed ban is a recent example of the lengths to which Thai governmental 
entities are willing to go in order to secure continued access to the EU market and to 
maintain their status as competent authorities.3  On numerous previous occasions, 
                                                           
1
 Source:  http://www.thaipost.net/news/180111/33007 (in Thai) 
2
 For detailed discussion, see Section 4.1.1.2.2 (infra). 
3There was another more recent incident in July 2011 where a potential EU ban was threatened on Thai 
cauliflowers, aubergines and snake beans. As of 5 July 2011, the DOA has been considering the 
possibility of imposing ban on these vegetable exports to the EU until the source and the cause of the 
breach are found and until the compliance situation is improved.    
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various Thai governmental entities went further than the imposition of an export ban 
and demonstrated a willingness to change their institutional structures, to issue special 
laws and to introduce additional export control procedures in order to ensure that Thai 
food exports could be demonstrated to comply with EU food safety law.  
 
This can be seen, for example, in  the DOA’s introduction of an entirely new export 
certification system for all fresh fruit and vegetable exports to the EU which 
commenced in 2008.  This scheme required quality control of all farm and food export 
establishments.4  In 2003, the Livestock Developments Department (DLD) and  the 
Department of Fisheries (DOF), two other national CAs dealing with products of 
animal origin and fisheries exports respectively, established on-site export laboratories 
and control mechanisms to demonstrate that Thai exports to the EU were free from 
“Nitrofuran”, a prohibited substance under EU law.5 
 
Similarly, following the Avian Flu outbreak in 2004, the DLD established an entirely 
new export control unit to address the EU’s concerns about Thai poultry products.  
This involved placing special quarantine stations at all commercial ports to reassure 
the EU that the risks of Thai poultry exports containing the H5N1 virus were 
negligible as all export consignments had already been tested for the presence of the 
virus.6 
 
While it is governmental entities in Thailand, often under pressure from the EU, that 
take the initiative when it comes to securing compliance with EU food safety law, 
                                                           
4
 See infra, Section 3.2.3.2.3.  
5
 Discussion in Section 3.3.3.2.3. 
6
 See Section 3.3.3.2.3.  
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Thai producers and exporters also need to adapt their infrastructure and operating 
procedures in order to comply with the Thai government’s demands. As a result, 
significant costs are imposed on them and they are required to confront significant 
operational challenges. Needless to say, the compliance costs of securing and 
protecting access to the EU market can be extremely high.  
 
It is understandable why the EU, which is a regional association of developed states, 
with a history of high publicised food safety scares, has strict standards for imported 
food.  However, the costs and consequences of these strict standards for governments, 
producers and exporters in other countries should not, as it often is, be overlooked.  As 
the examples set out above attest, ‘internal’ EU decisions on food safety frequently 
generate far-reaching external effects.  In many cases, these effects may be positive, 
but there is no question that negative effects also arise.  In the case of Thailand, these 
external effects occur because of the importance of the EU market for Thai producers 
and exporters. The EU is a large and expanding market, both in terms of number of 
customers and in terms of purchasing power.  
 
Such is the importance of the EU agricultural market for Thai producers and importers 
that the Thai government will go to significant lengths to secure continued access. 
This is not simply a question of putting new, EU-compliant, laws on Thailand’s statute 
book.  New institutions and monitoring procedures need to be established and new 
principles operationalised.  The scale and complexity of the task involved and the 
crucial EU and Thai interests at stake, create an environment in which cross-border, 
transnational, co-operation is required.  So intense is the resulting cooperation that, 
ultimately, Thai governmental entities end up serving as agents, or competent 
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authorities, of the EU.  This competent authority model will serve as one of the focal 
points for discussion in this thesis and it serves at the outset to exemplify that although 
food safety regulation is highly technical, the study of it has broader global 
governance implications as well.  
 
Alongside official EU food safety regulation, private entities including standard-
setting bodies and supermarkets, increasingly impose their own standards on Thai food 
exports to the EU.  These private standards are frequently stricter and more far-
reaching than EU law.  Consequently, in the area of food safety, the very concept of 
‘regulation’ needs to be redrawn.  It is for this reason that for the purposes of  this 
thesis, the concept of ‘EU food safety regulation’ is taken to include not only laws 
which emanate from the institutions of the EU, but also those private standards with 
which compliance is required by retailers to gain effective market access to the EU. 
 
It is with the effects of EU food safety regulation in Thailand that this thesis is 
concerned.  It highlights both the positive and negative effects and puts forward 
constructive proposals for reform.  It argues, on the basis of interviews and a 
comparison with official EU food safety law, that the negative effects of private 
standards are more pronounced.  This is due, in part, to the absence or insufficiency of 
mechanisms to ensure that those adopting private standards are accountable to those 
whom they effect. Drawing upon experience in relation to official EU regulation, the 
thesis sets out a number of suggestions about how this accountability gap in private 
standard-setting could be mitigated or closed. 
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The thesis is in part doctrinal, setting out the main principles and components of 
official EU food safety law.  It is in part theoretical, exploring the concept of global 
governance in relation to food safety and the concept of external accountability in the 
framework of transnational law.  The thesis is also empirical in that it is based upon 
in-depth interviews with stakeholders in Thailand, about which more will be said 
below.  
 
1.1 CHALLENGES  
 
The study of the external effects of EU food safety regulation in Thailand raises both 
theoretical and practical challenges.  Theoretically, it has often been assumed that 
regulations, whether imposed by a governmental or private entity, will operate within 
their own operational domain.  That is to say, both regulator and regulatee will occupy 
the same regulatory space which is bounded by territory or by organizational domain. 
Decision-making practices frequently reflect this assumption, and make the regulator 
answerable only to individuals and bodies which operate in the same regulatory space.  
However, in the area of food safety, regulation emanating from one country or polity 
is capable of creating external effects which are felt in different countries and 
organizational domains.  This necessitates a re-thinking of the concept of 
accountability and a shift from one-dimensional accountability thinking to pluralistic 
accountability.  It is with this shift that this thesis is in part concerned.  
 
Furthermore, on a practical level, we are also faced with the challenge of 
understanding how cross-border regulations are adopted and enforced and with 
identifying the range and intensity of impacts that they have.  This is complicated in 
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the case of EU/Thai relations in the area of food safety.  Both the EU and Thailand 
operate complex bureaucratic structures, which are relatively dis-aggregated.  That is 
to say, they involve many different governmental entities which are connected in 
different and sometimes subtle ways.  The challenge of understanding the practical 
operation of EU food safety regulation in Thailand is exacerbated by dint of the wide 
range of food exports that find their way from Thailand to the EU.  Because of this, it 
is not realistic in the context of a single thesis, to examine the regulatory framework in 
all agricultural sectors. For the purpose of this thesis, two food product markets are 
examined, concerning poultry meat and baby corn. The reasons for choosing these 
case studies are set out in chapter 3.  
 
1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
So far, existing literature does not offer a clear pathway to meet these practical and 
theoretical challenges.  Firstly, although there are many legal studies which examine 
the regulatory framework for imported products including food, these studies tend to 
be conducted from an importing country’s perspective.  As a result, they often 
conclude that the introduction of stricter import control mechanisms is required to 
ensure that imported products are safe.  Little if any attention is paid to the 
implications of these proposals for stakeholders in exporting countries.  Examples of 
such studies include those conducted by Zach and Bier (2009), Alemanno (2010), 
Kenneth et al (2008).7 
 
                                                           
7
 The issue of the needs for keeping imports safe will be subject to further discussion in Chapter 3, Part 
III.   
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While there are also studies which focus on the impact of food safety regulation from 
an exporting country’s perspective, these studies are not written from a legal 
perspective and they do not consider the implications of their findings for our 
understanding of (transnational) law.  Nor do these studies seek to integrate empirical 
findings with theoretical investigation, for example in relation to concepts of 
accountability or network governance.  
 
Analysis of the de facto impacts of EU food safety law on third countries has been 
offered in a number of studies, including those by Henson and Mitullah (2004) which 
investigate the cross-border impact of EU food safety law in relation to Kenyan Nile 
Perch.   
 
There have also been studies about Thailand’s compliance with specific EU food 
safety regulations, for example with the “HACCP” regulation by Suwanrangsi (2002) 
and Nidhiprabha (2002).  There is also a comparative study examining the impact of 
GlobalGAP, a private certification system, on food exporters in Thailand, Malaysia 
and Vietnam, which was prepared by various authors on behalf of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).  However, while these studies 
examine the actual external effects of EU food safety regulation, they do not address 
the theoretical questions to which these external effects give rise.  This thesis 
demonstrates that theoretical analysis of this kind can shed light on the reasons for 
negative trade effects arising and on the steps that may be taken to resolve or at least 
mitigate these negative effects.  
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There is, however, a separate body of literature which focuses on the theoretical 
dimensions of cross-border regulation.  These studies are often written by legal 
academics and explore concepts such as “global governance”, “external 
accountability” and “global administrative law”.  Many authors have claimed that 
these concepts can be used to explain and to solve emerging problems in cross-border 
regulation.  Good examples include works by Abbott and Snidal (2009), Shaffer 
(2009), Schepel (2005), Jansen and Michaels (2008), and Sabel et al (2011)).  
Specifically in relation to external accountability, there are studies by Keohane et al; 
and on global administrative law, there are works by Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart 
(2005) and Cassese (2005) among others.  This theoretical literature is quite new but 
already it has been used to explain complex institutional structures including those 
created by the WTO.8  However, so far there are no studies which seek to integrate the 
practical/empirical dimension with the theoretical dimension and which examine EU 
food safety regulation from this perspective; let alone specifically in relation to 
Thailand.  Furthermore, while some attention has recently been paid to the WTO as an 
agent of external accountability,9 the role of the competent authority model has been 
entirely neglected to date.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
This synthesis between theory and practice is reflected in the research questions that 
this thesis addresses. These are set out briefly below: 
1) What are the main characteristics of EU food safety regulation? 
                                                           
8
 These include those performed by Stewart and Badin (2009), and Lang and Scott (2009), p. 601-610. 
9
 Ibid.  
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2) What is the scope of the cross-border application of EU food safety regulation 
in Thailand? What legal mechanisms and institutional frameworks are put in 
place to effectuate and sustain this cross-border application? 
3) What positive and negative impacts have emerged from the operation of EU 
food safety regulation in Thailand? To what extent does this differ as between 
official EU food safety regulation and private standards imposed by other 
entities in the EU? 
4) What theoretical frameworks can be used to understand and evaluate the cross-
border effects of EU food safety regulation in Thailand, including in relation to 
the institutional innovations to which this gives rise? 
5) To what extent are these theoretical frameworks suggestive of avenues for 
reform? 
 
1.4 SCOPE 
 
This thesis examines the impact of EU food safety regulation in Thailand.  It is 
concerned with Thai food exports to the EU which are regulated by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC), the constituent departments of which, act as 
competent authorities for the purposes of attesting to compliance with food safety 
regulation under EU law. 
 
The term “food product” in this thesis is used to refer to a specific section of 
“agricultural” exports which falls under the oversight of MOAC.  This captures a large 
volume of food exports to the EU, including (i) fresh fruit and vegetables; (ii) raw, 
cooked, and frozen animal products; and (iii) fisheries products.  However, some 
 18 
specific products such as canned vegetables and dried snacks are excluded from the 
scope of this thesis as their control framework falls under the oversight of the Ministry 
of Industry (MOI) and the Ministry of Health (MOH).  These products are categorised 
as manufactured rather than agricultural products and they are subject to different 
control schemes prior to export.  However, in most cases the control schemes run by 
the MOI and MOH are similar to those run by the MOAC as the manufacturers still 
need to obtain export certificates prior to exportation, and their factories and 
manufacturing processes still require MOI approval and are subject to inspection on a 
regular basis.  However, the schemes run by different departments of the MOAC are 
subject to significantly more frequent and strenuous inspections by EU authorities.10  
 
It should also be noted that the term “food safety regulation” in this thesis primarily 
refers to sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures which aim to protect human, 
animal and plant life and health from exposure to various risks as specified under 
Annex A(1) of the WTO SPS Agreement.11  Most other regulations fall outside the 
scope of this thesis.  However, some regulations are tangentially related to food safety 
and are included in the scope of what the EU regards as food safety law.12  These have 
been labelled by the EU as relating to ‘other legitimate concerns’ and include issues 
such as animal welfare and worker well-being.  To the extent that the regulation of 
‘other legitimate concerns’ forms part of the EU food safety package and is included 
in the activities of private standard-setting bodies which operate in the area of food 
                                                           
10
 In most cases, these bodies are the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO). 
11
 This includes the risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-
carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms; from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-
causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs; from the entry, establishment or spread of pests; or 
to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the entry, establishment or 
spread of pests.  
12
 See Section 2.5 infra (introduction).  
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safety, discussion of these will also be included in the thesis.  We see as a result that 
the line between food safety and non-food safety concerns is fluid and is at times 
difficult to draw.13 
 
1.5 METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
 
The starting point for this thesis was the conduct of empirical research in Thailand. 
Two detailed case studies were undertaken to ascertain the impact of EU food safety 
regulation, including private standards, in Thailand.  This empirical research did not 
only examine the economic and practical consequences of EU food safety regulation 
for Thai producers and exporters, but also the implications of EU food safety 
regulation for governmental structures and practices in Thailand, as well as for Thai 
law.  
 
These case studies investigating the regulatory framework, and the application and 
impact of EU food safety regulation on Thailand, were conducted in relation to two 
selected exports, namely: (i) fresh/chilled baby corn; (ii) cooked poultry meat.  The 
results of this research were obtained during field trips to Thailand during the summer 
of 2008 and in January 2010.  The research findings were gathered in the main from 
personal and group interviews with stakeholders.  It should be noted that the term “Thai 
stakeholders” used in this thesis refers to Thai governmental and private entities who involve 
in food exporting industry and have been regularly affected by EU food safety regulation.   
These interviews were conducted in order to gain insights into the daily, direct 
                                                           
13
 See Section 2.5.1 infra.  
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experiences of these stakeholders in complying with EU food safety regulation, 
including private standards.  The insights and examples gained as a result of these 
interviews were then used to assess the effects of EU food safety regulation in 
Thailand. 
 
Among the interviewees were representatives of governmental entities and private 
organisations.  They ranged from high-and-low ranking government personnel, 
exporting company executives, food exporting business owners, representatives of 
exporters’ associations, individual producers/exporters as well as independent 
researchers.14  Although the interview questions were mostly concerned with the 
products included in the two case studies, where relevant and appropriate additional 
questions were also directed to enhance understanding of the impact of EU food safety 
regulation on other Thai food exports.  These additional questions were posed in order 
to compare and verify the results of the case studies with other food export sectors.15  
In addition, the results of interviews were compared in order to confirm the reliability 
of a given individual source.  
 
In total, 39 separate interviews were carried out; 35 personal and telephone interviews 
with 32 individuals, and a further 4 groups interviews with representatives from 
companies and producers/exporters’ associations.16  All the interviews were 
undertaken in Thai and were either written in shorthand on the spot or, where 
permitted by the interviewee, were taped.  The interviews were subsequently minuted 
                                                           
14
 Appointments were made prior to each interview.  These were mostly arranged by the author but for 
some appointments with company directors and high ranking governmental staff, these were made by 
senior governmental officials acting on the author’s behalf.  
15
 For example, the interviews were also made with stakeholders in the shrimp and fresh fruit industries 
regarding the impact of EU food safety regulation in these sectors.    
16
 The full list of the interviews can be found in the Appendix at the end of this thesis.  
 21 
on the same day.  These interviews were supplemented by further e-mail and 
telephone correspondence with the interviewees to clarify remaining issues or 
questions. 
 
In addition to the interviews, minutes and data obtained from three exporters’ 
meetings prior the EU FVO’s visits were also used to supplement and verify the 
results.  Furthermore, primary and secondary sources were also used to supplement, 
compare and confirm the results obtained in interviews. 
 
In addition to the empirical research, this thesis is also based on doctrinal research and 
analysis.  The core components and characteristics of EU food safety law are set out in 
Chapter 2 and are analysed further in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  A thorough understanding 
of EU food safety law was essential in order to understand the results of the empirical 
research, to verify the validity of the findings and to ensure proper attention to the 
legal dimension of this study.  
 
This doctrinal analysis was conducted on the basis of both primary and secondary 
sources. Where relevant, reference has been made to primary and secondary 
legislation, reports, working papers, and standards adopted by national and regional 
governments, international organisations as well as by private entities.17  In addition, 
numerous academic articles and books, were also been used as sources for the 
theoretical discussion and to conduct detailed evaluation of the case study results.  
 
                                                           
17
 For example, entities involved include the WTO, Codex, UNCTAD, EU, UK, Thailand, and the USA.  
The full list of legislation can also be found in the Appendix at the end of this thesis.   
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The thesis uses the concept of external accountability as the basis for analysis and 
deploys the theoretical model put in place by scholars of Global Administrative Law 
(GAL).  The appropriateness of this concept and model became apparent during the 
course of the empirical research.  As will be discussed in considerably more detail 
below, Thai stakeholders expressed particular concern about the lack of transparency 
of EU food safety regulation and about the absence of opportunities for them to 
influence or contest the standards adopted.  These concerns were especially 
pronounced in relation to private standards.  Though stakeholders did not use the term 
accountability during the interviews, in essence they expressed again and again 
pressing accountability concerns. 
 
1.6 STRUCTURE  
 
The thesis proceeds in three main parts.  The first part identifies the core concepts and 
characteristics of EU food safety regulation.  The second part presents two case studies 
on fresh/chilled baby corn and cooked poultry exports.  In each case study, 
observations are made on how EU food safety regulations, including private standards, 
have been applied in Thailand.  The cross-border effects which have emerged from EU 
food safety regulation are also identified.18  The third and final part of the thesis 
includes a more theoretical analysis of the operation of EU food safety regulation in 
Thailand.  The aim here is to build a theoretical platform to explain the EU-Thai food 
safety regulatory framework in order to put forward proposals for accountability-
enhancing reform.  A summary of each chapter is provided below. 
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 The cross-border effects of EU food safety regulation which are derived from governmental 
regulations are discussed in Chapter 3 whereas those concerning private standards are discussed 
separately in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2: Core Concepts of EU food Safety Regulation 
 
This Chapter identifies the main concepts underpinning the operation of EU food 
safety regulation.  It charts the evolution of EU food safety law since the adoption of 
the White Paper on Food Safety in 2000 and the shift to a management-based style of 
regulation that this entailed.  The concepts of traceability, and Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Points (HACCP) are central this, as is the risk assessment function 
played by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA).  This Chapter also introduces 
the concept of ‘other legitimate concerns’.  
 
Chapter 3: The External Effects of EU Food Safety Regulation on Thailand  
 
The long chapter presents the empirical findings in relation to the two case studies 
highlighted above.  As such, it provides a detailed account of the impact of EU food 
safety regulation in Thailand, both in relation to official EU food safety law and 
private standards.  Given its length, and to assist the reader, this chapter is clearly 
divided into three parts.  
 
Parts I and II present the results of the two case studies on fresh/chilled baby corn and 
cooked poultry exports.  Each case study includes information on historical 
background, production process and export environment in relation to the product 
concerned.  Each case study also identifies the EU food safety regulation that is 
imposed as a condition for EU market access and the control mechanisms put in place 
to ensure that these EU requirements can be met.  
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In Part III, the results of the two case studies will be used to describe in greater detail 
the operation of the “Competent Authority (CA) Model’, the institutional framework 
put in place by the EU and Thai governments to underpin the application of EU food 
safety law in Thailand.    No detailed analysis of this has been made available before.  
Analysis will also be made of how regulation by way of the CA model has created 
positive and negative effects in Thailand.  The CA model is crucial to the theoretical 
discussion which follows as it is a key instrument of external accountability.  It is for 
this reason that it is important to understand its operation in some depth. 
 
Chapter 4: Solving Operational and Trade Problems through External 
Accountability and Global Administrative Law  
 
This chapter presents a theoretical analysis of EU food safety regulation in Thailand.  
Theories of global governance and theories of accountability and global administrative 
law are used to explore and conceptualise the current stage of EU food safety 
regulation in Thailand.   
  
This Chapter argues that EU food safety regulation in Thailand fits neatly into a 
‘global governance’ framework and that this shift from government to governance is 
important to understanding the accountability deficits that arise.  The chapter explores 
the concept of accountability and argues that in a global governance setting, a shift 
from one-dimensional to pluralistic or external accountability is required.  It is only in 
the light of this shift that the existence of accountability gaps between Thai 
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stakeholders and EU regulators can be understood.  The concept of Global 
Administrative Law is then introduced with a view to using this as a framework to 
evaluate accountability relationships and to put forward proposals for accountability-
enhancing reform.  
 
Chapter 5: Closing External Accountability Gaps for Official EU Food Safety 
Regulation in Thailand  
 
This chapter explores the mechanisms in place to secure external accountability as 
between Thai stakeholders and EU regulators and does so in relation to official EU 
food safety regulation.  Discussion of private standards is left to the Chapter that 
follows.  Two sets of mechanism are discussed in detail; those put in place as a result 
of WTO law and governance and those which result from the operation of the CA 
model.  Building on the previous chapter, these mechanisms are appraised from the 
perspective of external accountability and Global Administrative Law. 
 
Chapter 6: Private Standards and External Accountability: A Critique and 
Recommendations for a Way Forward 
 
This chapter returns to the theme of private standards.  Building on the empirical 
findings in Chapter 2, this chapter looks in detail at the external effects of EU private 
standards in Thailand.  It argues that private standards create serious problems for Thai 
stakeholders and that sometimes they are not suitable or necessary to achieve their 
objectives.  The chapter argues that external accountability gaps arise in relation to 
private standards and that these contribute to the operational problems that arise.  
 26 
Drawing on the material in the previous chapter in relation to official EU food safety 
regulation, and upon the theoretical analysis in Chapter 4, this chapter concludes by 
putting forward concrete suggestions as to how external accountability could be 
enhanced in relation to private standards in the area of food safety.  
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CHAPTER 2:  
CORE CONCEPTS OF EU FOOD SAFETY REGULATION 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION  
 
The core concepts underlying any system of food safety regulation are both unique 
and dynamic; they are modified according to changes in the regulatory aims of a 
particular country, its cultural perceptions of what is regarded as “safe food”, and in 
response to its direct experience of food safety scares and outbreaks.  EU food safety 
regulation is no exception.  At the time of the EU’s establishment, the main focus of 
food safety regulation in the EU was to achieve harmonisation of food safety norms in 
order to promote a single market.  However, over the past decade or so the EU’s 
regulatory aims have broadened and the focus has shifted towards ensuring a high 
level of health protection for EU consumers.19  As a result EU food safety laws have 
developed rapidly during this period. 
 
EU food safety standards have long been criticised as being amongst the most 
stringent in the world and they have frequently provoked expressions of concern by 
trading partners.  However, the high level of health protection demanded by the EU is 
understandable as it can be seen, predominantly, as a direct result of its learning curve 
through the history of highly publicised and costly food safety scares and outbreaks 
since the mid-1980s. 
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 Article 114 (3), Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (ex Article 95 (3), Treaty 
Establishing the European Community (TEC)).  See Cardwell (2004), Chapter 1 and Vos (2000), p. 9. 
 28 
This chain of events can be said to have started with several outbreaks involving the 
presence of microbial substances, notably Salmonella and E. coli from the late 1980s 
to 2003, and the major Foot and Mouth outbreak in 2001.  However, the watershed 
event that provoked the realisation of a pressing need for a major change in the EU’s 
approach to food safety came in the aftermath of the BSE crisis (from the late 1980s-
2003) which was the catalyst for major reform of the food safety system in the EU.   
 
An important step that defined EU food safety reform after the BSE crisis can be said 
to be the introduction of the White Paper on Food Safety of 12 January 2000,20 which 
set out the basic principles of EU food safety law.  The White Paper laid out objectives 
upon which subsequent EU food safety legislation would build.  It set high standards 
of food safety and consumer health protection as its goals.21  This was to be achieved 
through a fundamental change to the EU’s approach to food safety through a move to 
a “comprehensive and integrated approach”,22 making the activities of food business 
operators involved in the food supply chain “from farm to table” subject to EU food 
safety control.23 
 
The principles laid down in the White Paper on Food Safety were subsequently 
affirmed in Regulation EC/178/2002,24 which later came to be referred to as the 
“general food safety regulation” or “general food law”.25  Through the application of 
                                                           
20
 This followed the Green Paper on the General Principles of Food Law 1997.  For a full discussion of 
the history of EU food safety reform see Cardwell (2004) Chapters 1-3.   
21
 This is goal in addition to that of the need to promote a single market (The White Paper on Food 
Safety, p. 3).  
22
 Ibid, Chapter 1.4, p. 6.  
23
 Ibid, p. 8.  
24
 Regulation EC/178/2002/, Recital 11.   
25
 The Regulation is referred to as “The General Food Law” by Vos and Wendler, (2006), p. 72 or “General Food 
Safety Regulation” , by for example, the UK Food Standards Agency 
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the equivalence concept, as set out in Article 11, competent authorities of third 
countries which export food products to the EU must ensure that their export food 
safety control systems are of an equivalent level, that is, capable of bringing about the 
same results as those being sought by the EU. 
 
This chapter sets out to highlight some of the key features and core concepts 
underlying EU food safety law in the aftermath of the BSE crisis.  The core concepts 
introduced in this chapter are applicable to food products originating within the EU 
and also to imported food, including food products originating in Thailand.  These 
concepts generate significant cross-border effects, the impact of which is clearly 
evident in Thailand.  Detailed discussion of the nature of these cross-border effects 
will be included in Chapter 3.  First though I will introduce main characteristics of 
contemporary EU food safety law, namely reliance on the hazard analysis and critical 
control point (HACCP) principle, traceability, the risk assessment role of the European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the incorporation of  ‘other legitimate concerns’ 
within the scope of the EU food safety framework. 
 
 
2.2 TOWARDS HAZARD PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT-BASED 
REGULATION: THE APPLICATION OF “HACCP” PRINCIPLES 
 
Prior to its reform in 2000,26 EU food safety law relied mainly on “performance-based 
regulations”.27  The law adopted a “fire-fighting approach” to prevent harmful or 
                                                                                                                                                                       
(see: http://www.food.gov.uk/scotland/regsscotland/regulations/scotlandfoodlawguide/sflg200501/). 
26
 Marked by the beginning of the White Paper on Food Safety. 
27
 This is also known as the “poke-and-sniff” method (Sabel and Zeitlin (2011), p.7). 
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inferior products from entering the food-chain.28  This top-down regulatory approach 
focused on testing whether end-products were capable of meeting certain legal criteria 
or specifications before being allowed into the market.  Examples include, inter alia, 
laws specifying “maximum residue limits” (MRL) of pesticides and the presence of 
microbiological organisms found in food.  
  
Whilst performance-based regulations continue to exist, and do still play a crucial role 
in preventing unsafe food products reaching consumers, the EU and its Member States 
have realised that performance-based regulation is not in itself capable of achieving a 
sufficiently high level of health protection.  This is because the success of 
performance-based regulation is highly dependent upon appropriate sampling 
processes being in place.  The target for food safety performance can be set at the 
highest level when the MRL of an unwanted harmful substance found in food is set as 
close as possible to zero (for example at 0.0001 ppm).  Nevertheless, where a suitable 
sampling process is not in place, laboratory tests on unsuitable samples can still fail to 
detect a minuscule amount of the harmful substance which, if consumed, could turn 
out to be harmful to consumers’ health.  An example of an event where an unsuitable 
sampling process failed to detect accurately a health risk in a food product can be seen 
in the Cadbury’s chocolate Salmonella outbreak of 2006.  At that time the 
heterogeneous sampling process used by the company was found to underestimate the 
actual presence of Salmonella in ready-to-eat chocolate.29   
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 Coglianese and Lazer (2003).  
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 The sampling process used in this case involved the clumping of bacteria to estimate the most 
probable number of bacteria.  This was considered inadequate and could not be relied upon to estimate 
the risk associated with ready-to-eat foods such as chocolate.  Source: the Food Standards Agency 
report; following the meeting with independent Advisory Committee on the Microbiological Safety of 
Food on the 30 June 2006 stated that in fact the acceptable level of Salmonella in a ready-to-eat food 
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Even with the most advanced sampling processes in place, some potentially unsafe 
products may still enter the market under a performance-based approach.  As a result 
this system also relies upon the need to recall products once a hazard has been 
detected.  This can be extremely costly.  In the Cadbury incident the cost of product 
recalls was estimated to be £5 million and the loss of sales due to erosion of consumer 
confidence to be £20 million.  However, in 2007 the loss of sales estimate was raised 
to £50 million.30  In a case involving an outbreak of the Avian Influenza it was 
suggested that Bernard Matthews, the poultry company identified as being the source 
and which had formerly been associated with wholesome family food, suffered a 
significant unquantifiable loss of reputation.31  
 
As a result of the shortcomings inherent in performance-based regulation there has 
been a shift towards “management-based” regulation. 32  Here the regulatory focus is 
upon managing emerging food safety risks at various stages throughout the food 
supply chain, from preparation and production processes to packaging and 
distribution.  This new approach is reflected in EU food safety law by the application 
of HACCP principles.33  HACCP became legally binding throughout the EU, and 
applicable also to imports, on 1 January 2006 following the implementation of 
Regulation EC/852/2004.34 
                                                                                                                                                                       
product such as chocolate is zero.  For further information on this outbreak refer to: 
http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2006/aug/cadbury. 
30
 Shortly after the outbreak occurred, JP Morgan, the consultant company for Cadbury initially 
estimated the costs resulting from the incident. Elamin (2006). 
31
 Elliott, Money (2007). 
32
 Also known as total quality approach, Nicolaides (2000), p.1. 
33
 The concept was one of the key reforms in the White Paper on Food Safety, in the aftermath of the 
BSE crisis (White Paper on Food Safety, p. 38-39).   
34
 Article 10, Regulation EC/852/2004. 
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The concept of HACCP is not new; its origin can be traced back to the space era of the 
1960s when NASA began to adopt this approach to ensure the safest possible food for 
astronauts in space.  HACCP principles were already used in the food industry as part 
of private standards’ requirements prior to their endorsement by the EU regulation.35  
Compliance with these principles was endorsed by the USDA, Codex Alimentarius, as 
well as the WHO well before it became binding in the EU. 36    
  
In the EU context, HACCP became binding as a result of Regulation EC/852/2004 
which imposes responsibility on food business operators to “put in place, implement 
and maintain a permanent procedure based on HACCP principles”. 37   Article 5.2 lays 
down the seven stages of HACCP which comprise:  
(i) identifying possible hazards by evaluating the possibility of their 
occurrence, both quantitatively and qualitatively;  
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 Indeed, in the poultry case study in Chapter 3, Thai producers and exporters stated that HACCP 
principles were incorporated into private standards prior to their becoming binding under EU 
Regulation EC/852/2004 (See infra Section 3.3.4.1).   
36
 For example, Codex Alimentarius has recommended the application of HACCP in the production of 
processed meat since 1985, (Recommended International Code of Hygienic Practice for Processed Meat 
and Poultry Products, Codex, CAC/RCP 13-1976, rev. 1 (1985)) and to be applied by the food industry 
and regulatory authorities generally in 1995 (following Codex Alimentarius’s Guidelines for the 
Application of the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) System (CAC/GL 18-1993).  In the 
US, the programme endorsing the application of HACCP principles as an effective system for food 
safety was published by the National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods in 
1992 and was first used by the FDA in relation to the seafood industry in 1997 (Procedures for the Safe 
and Sanitary Processing and Importing of Fish and Fishery Product).  HACCP was also applied to the 
meat and poultry industry in 1996 following the establishment of the “HACCP regulation” (Pathogen 
Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems of 25 July 1996).   
37
 Food business operators include producers from primary production onwards.  Primary production 
concerns the products of the soil, stock farming (i.e. including farmers and growers), hunting and 
fishing (Article 2 and Annex I of Regulation EC/852/2004). In general, most of post-harvesting 
activities (for example transport storage and handling of products at the place of production) and some 
of pre-harvest activities (for example transport of live animals, seeding and rearing of plants) will be 
caught under this Regulation (Annex (I) Part I)).  There is only small number of exceptions to this, for 
example primary production for domestic or private use, direct supply by producers of small quantities 
to final consumers (for example farm shops) and the handling of raw materials for the production of 
gelatine or collagen (Article 1(2), ibid).  
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(ii) determining the critical control points (CCPs) where each hazard might 
occur;  
(iii) establishing critical limits at each CCP by testing various product 
characteristics such as temperature, pH balance, moisture content and 
additives;  
(iv) establishing a system to monitor the control of the CCPs by designating 
responsible persons and identifying the monitoring intervals and methods 
used;  
(v) establishing corrective actions when a CCP is out of control;  
(vi) establishing procedures to verify the effectiveness of the entire HACCP 
system, especially where there is a change in product composition, 
consumer use or the emergence of new hazards, and  
(vii) establishing suitable documentation and record-keeping systems for these 
procedures and applications that are appropriate to the size and nature of 
the food business in question.38 
 
The use of management-based regulation through the adoption of HACCP has been 
adopted by the EU to complement performance-based regulation.  While performance-
based regulation can still be useful to detect harmful products at the end of the supply 
chain, HACCP aims to identify the hazards associated with a particular food product 
and the health risks that each hazard can generate.  It develops a preventive approach 
to deal with the hazards identified at various stages throughout the food supply chain, 
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 For more information see, to DG-SANGO Guidance Documents: Implementation of Procedures 
based on the HACCP Principles and Facilitation of the Implementation of the HACCP Principles in 
Certain Food Businesses (also found at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biosafety/hygienelegislation/guidance_doc_haccp_en.pdf). 
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and it aims to ensure that the risks associated with these hazards are kept at acceptable 
levels.  In other words, management-based regulation aims to prevent food safety risks 
at source. 
 
HACCP presents some advantages from the perspective of food business operators.  
Food safety risks are often low in probability but significant in consequence.  Where 
food safety outbreaks do occur the resulting costs are often high, not only due to the 
cost of product recalls but also because of the costs involved in regaining consumer 
confidence.  By adopting a management-based system, food business operators can 
detect food safety risks at an early stage and can then take timely and appropriate 
action to control them.  This management-based approach can thus serve to mitigate 
potential losses for food business operators.  
 
In the Cadbury example above, the company did not apply a HACCP monitoring 
process despite this having already being legally binding throughout the EU.39  If the 
company had applied HACCP it would have been more likely to ascertain accurately 
the high level of Salmonella risk, and would have been in a position to take 
appropriate action to control this risk and to detect the affected products before they 
reached end-consumers.  In this incident, the likely cause of product contamination 
was a waste water pipe leaking into the production process area.  If appropriate 
HACCP principles had been applied, the actual risk of Salmonella contamination 
could have been detected during the hazard analysis stage.  By testing product 
characteristics at one of the designated CCPs, Cadbury could have identified the 
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 Following Regulation EC/852/2004 EC and under the Food Hygiene (England) Regulation 2006. 
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unacceptable risk of Salmonella contamination then and could have suspended 
production until appropriate corrective measures were put in place.40  
 
Another interesting feature of management-based regulation in the form of HACCP is 
that food business operators are required to play a proactive role in managing the risks 
associated with their products.  The Regulation grants them considerable flexibility to 
undertake their own analyses, to plan their management strategies and to improve and 
adjust their systems according to their commercial needs.41  To allow flexibility in 
HACCP application, terminologies such as “where necessary”, “where appropriate”, 
“adequate” and “sufficient” is included throughout the Regulation, enabling food 
business operators to decide for themselves what might be considered “appropriate” or 
“adequate” according to their particular situation.42  For example, with regard to 
record-keeping there are no precise formulations as to what type of records are to be 
kept or for what duration they must be stored.  Annex I (7) provides only that food 
business operators must retain records concerning their HACCP plan “in an 
appropriate manner and for an appropriate period, commensurate with the nature and 
size of their business”.  The variation in the form of HACCP records can, for example, 
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 Similarly, in the recent E. coli outbreak in German bean sprouts during May-June 2011, it was 
estimated that there could have been a failure in applying the HACCP principle by German farmers.  A 
detailed investigation of this incident by the German authority and EFSA is currently underway and the 
cause of this outbreak has not yet been determined.  Nevertheless, there is a possibility that had the 
proper establishment of the CCPs during the cultivation process of the bean sprout seeds been put in 
place, the outbreak could have been prevented.  One report pointed out the high temperature (38°C), 
which could have been reached during the cultivation processes in the farmers’ establishment.  This 
would have been ideal for E. coli bacteria to grow.  Consequently, the authorities may well investigate 
whether the farmers maintained appropriate greenhouse temperature limits and demand answers from 
them if this was not the case.  See further, Kennedy and Hughes (2011).  
41
 HACCP presumes that those involved in day-to-day operations are well-placed to understand the 
nature of their own products and are well informed concerning the possible food safety hazards and 
risks.  
42
 These terms are used in the Regulation Annexes.  See also the Guidance document on the 
Implementation of certain provisions of Regulation 852/2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs.  (Can be 
found at: http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/trade/interpretation_imports.pdf).  
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range from paper-based files to computerised documents for small operators and to a 
specialised HACCP system for large producers.  Moreover, the length of time that the 
records are kept can be less for products which have shorter shelf-life and vice versa.43   
 
This flexibility leads to another benefit in reducing the expense required to monitor 
application of the law.  Instead of laying down the exact CCPs for all food production, 
which could be time consuming and difficult to monitor, the Regulation allows food 
business operators to take their local conditions and specific needs into account, and 
urges them to use existing GAP or GMP practices which are known to the industry, or 
are in use in their country, as guidelines in developing their own tailor-made HACCP 
plans.44   
 
Despite the benefit of creating an improved food safety regime for consumers and 
allowing flexible application, it is undeniable that HACCP does come with additional 
costs for food business operators, including those located abroad.  These costs include 
staff training and improvements to factory infrastructure.  For large-scale enterprises, 
including large exporters, a number of studies have indicated that the application of 
HACCP principles has not been problematic since their businesses can absorb the 
implementation costs through their economies of scale.45  However, this is not 
                                                           
43
 It has been suggested that by allowing food business operators to make their own decisions, they are 
more likely to view the rules as being reasonable and therefore more inclined to comply (Coglianese 
and Lazer (2003), p.695). 
44
 As of December 2010, there were over 200 national guides to good hygiene practices to be used as 
guidelines and with further guides being developed at national and EU levels under Article 7-9 of 
Regulation EC/852/2004. 
(At: http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biosafety/hygienelegislation/register_national_guides_en.pdf). 
Most of these good practices have details of hygiene measures that can be applied as part of HACCP.  
For example, these may include the number of hand wash-basins, workers’ equipment, the use of 
chemical disinfectants, or pest control procedures. 
45
 See for example a study by Nidhiprabha, (2002) p. 13-14 on HACCP implementation by Thai 
exporters of processed food.  Large companies such as Dole Thailand Ltd., which exports canned 
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necessarily the case for small and medium sized exporters who are likely to face 
considerable financial challenges, at least in the short term.46   
 
Another remarkable feature of HACCP is that it places direct responsibility on food 
business operators.  Cadbury’s Salmonella incident, cited above, demonstrates how 
management-based regulation can be used as a powerful tool to protect EU consumers.  
Ultimately, in July 2007 Cadbury was held by Birmingham Crown Court to be 
responsible for the Salmonella outbreak caused by their failure to fully observe the 
HACCP Regulation.47  Although the Company was fined only £1 million, the ruling 
acted as a good reminder that HACCP obligations are taken seriously in the EU, and 
that a large established food business operator could be held responsible for failing to 
implement HACCP requirements.48   
                                                                                                                                                                       
pineapples to the EU, were able to adopt an HACCP system in 2002, even well before the Regulation 
came into force.  Similar successful implementation of HACCP is also found in the case of the Kenyan 
horticulture industry which is run by large exporters.  (See a report on Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management, Agriculture and Rural Development, World Bank (2005), p. 6-7.). Similar results have 
also been seen in both case studies selected included in thesis (See infra, Chapter  3, Part I and II)   
46
 Small and medium-sized holders are likely to face short-term problems but are capable of complying 
in the longer term. (See, for example, the studies by Brown and van Midwoud (2006) and Ellis et al 
(2005) in relation to food producers’ adjustments in the UK and the Netherlands).  This is also the case 
in relation to Thai producers’ adjustments, for example in the shrimp industry, where small producers 
were faced with short-term financial and operational constraints but who, after receiving assistance 
from the Thai governmental entities, were able to adjust to the HACCP regulations in time 
(Suwanrangsi (2002)). However, not all third country producers exporting to EU markets were able to 
adjust to this change. The attempts of the Bangladeshi shrimp industry, for example, to comply with the 
EU HACCP standard changed the industry’s entire structure and its people’s livelihood (Khatun (2004), 
p. 11). In this case, when HACCP became an EU import requirement, only large factories in urban areas 
could comply; the majority of small shrimp factories in rural areas were unable to comply and had to be 
closed down. 
47
 The charge was brought by Birmingham City Council.  The case was held on 16 of July 2007. 
Cadbury admitted to having failed to identify hazards from ready-to-eat chocolate products 
contaminated with Salmonella and to identify CCPs and corrective actions in line with HACCP 
principles, a charge under the Food Hygiene (England) Regulation 2006, implemented to fulfil the UK’s 
HACCP obligations under Regulation EC/852/2004.   
48
 The statement was made David Jukes, a Senior Lecturer in Food Regulation at the University of 
Reading (El Amin (2007). Similarly, Sallie Booth, a solicitor at Irwin Mitchell, stated that “the 
sentence…sent a clear message to companies … (that they) cannot afford to ignore a potentially 
dangerous situation and cannot take risks with the public’s health” (McCathie (2007)). In the more 
recent E. coli outbreak it is up to the German authorities to investigate further whether its domestic law 
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With the introduction of HACCP it can be said that EU law has moved away from a 
purely performance-based “fire-fighting” approach toward a proactive approach based 
on hazard prevention and management-based regulation.  Nevertheless it should be 
noted, as mentioned earlier, that this shift toward HACCP principles does not 
completely displace performance-based regulation.  Rather it complements 
performance-based hygiene laws so as to ensure a high level of health protection for 
those living in the EU. 
 
2.3 TRACEABILITY: MONITORING FOOD SAFETY FROM FARM TO 
TABLE 
 
The concept of traceability was also introduced in the EU White Paper on food safety.  
The concept later became legally binding upon the entry into force of  Regulation 
EC/178/2002 on 21 February 2002.49  It is defined under Article 3 (15) of the 
Regulation as “the ability to trace and follow a food, feed, food producing animal or 
substance intended to be or expected to be incorporated into food or feed through all 
stages of production, processing and distribution process”.  In other words,  food 
business operators are now obliged to keep  a systematic record of their supply chain 
information so that in the event of any food safety incident, harmful products can be 
swiftly located, isolated and removed from the supply-chain. 
 
Traceability systems were originally used in other industries, including the automobile 
and pharmaceutical industries, to ensure rapid identification of defective products.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
regarding the application of HACCP principles has been followed or breached by the food business 
operators linked to this incident. 
49
 Applicable from 1 January 2005. 
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More recently they have gained world-wide recognition and have become a 
prerequisite for attaining international manufacturing standards, including ISO 
certification.50  The concept was introduced into the food industry over the past two 
decades.51   
 
Traceability is a key tool for managing and dealing with food safety outbreaks.  As 
more food ingredients are obtained from different sources, with some being imported 
from third countries, gaining information on product origins and their destinations has 
become increasingly complex.  Without a traceability system it would be almost 
impossible to perform fast and effective product recalls in the event of food safety 
incidents.  As more high profile food safety incidents have occured the application of 
the traceability concept has become widespread and is now generally accepted as a 
legal requirement by many developed countries including the United States, Japan, 
Australia and New Zealand. 52   
 
Traceability comprises three  main elements:  
(i) identification of units/batches of all ingredients present in the products, and 
of the products themselves, 
                                                           
50
 Traceability requirements are present throughout the ISO series, including ISO 9001 (2000), ISO 
8402:1994 and ISO 22000.  The concept is defined under ISO 9001 (2000) as being the ability to trace 
history, application or location of whatever is under consideration.  ISO 8402:1994 defines it as the 
ability to retrieve the history and use or location of an article or an activity through registered 
identification.  In ISO 22000, Clause 7.5.3, it is defined as the identification of product lots and their 
relation with batches of raw materials, processing and distribution records.  
51
 Even before Regulation EC/178/2002 came into force, the traceability concept was applied by many 
food manufacturers. 
52
 In the US, this is mainly applied with different objectives in order to deal with bio-terrorism (Section 
306 of the Bio-Terrorism Act 2002). In Japan, traceability law has been applicable to particular products 
since the early 2000s.  For example, a pilot traceability system for beef products was applied in 2003 
and a full traceability system begun in 2007. 
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(ii) information on  how, where and when these batches/units have been moved 
or transported,  
(iii) a record-keeping procedure, such as a bar code or radio frequency system, 
to show the path of batches/units from the suppliers, through all the 
intermediate steps in food production and in some cases to the ultimate 
consumers.53  
 
Combined with the HACCP concept discussed above, traceability forms part of a 
dynamic supply chain mangement system that aims to protect consumers.  It should be 
noted that although traceability and HACCP remain distinct concepts, they are closely 
related and are both key in the formation of an effective risk management system.  
HACCP principles are used to identify hazards and to prevent the emergence of risks, 
and are applied prior to any food safety outbreak.  Traceability, on the other hand, 
provides a back-up methodology to create systematic records of supply chain 
information so as to enable a prompt response to food safety outbreaks that have 
already occurred.  Moreover, as traceability is used to identify the source of an 
unacceptable level of food safety risk, it can also contribute towards improving the 
application of HACCP principles, as it can highlight where the current CCP is at fault 
or where additional CCP should be incorporated into the food production line in order 
to prevent similar future recurrences.  The combined system of traceability and 
HACCP principles offers some elements of the “root-cause” analysis put forward by 
Simon (2006) to tackle production line faults at source.  The system required by the 
EU involves an application of the traceability data to analyse the cause of the problems 
                                                           
53
 Source: A Preliminary Study “Traceability in the Food Chain”, Food Chain Strategy Division, Food 
Standard Agency (2002), p. 2.  
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at source, and subsequently to consider how these can be overcome through an 
improved application of HACCP principles.  This root-cause analysis should be made 
following every food safety outbreak and after the source and the cause of the 
outbreaks have both been established. 54   
 
From the business perspective a traceability system can be considered  as beneficial 
for all food producers in the relevant product sector.  Since traceability can be used to 
trace back and identify the source of a food safety problem, and to pinpoint exactly 
where a fault has occurred, it can protect other producers and retailers by ensuring that 
responsibility and liability are correctly assigned.  This can be seen from the Sudan I 
dye incident in 2005, where the source of the health risk was a red dye used in 
“Oriental Spices” which were subsequently used as ingredients by a manufacuter of 
Worcester Sauce.  The sauce was in turn used as an ingredient in many food products, 
including snacks and ready meals.55  The use of a traceability system to track the 
source of harmful substances in this case not only allowed appropriate and correct 
product recalls to be performed, but also enabled a number of  food manufacturers to 
                                                           
54
 For example with a food safety risk associated with the presence of dangerous Sudan 1 red dye found 
in many ready meals, traceability systems offered the answer that that the root cause of the problem was 
imported spice used in the production of the Worcester sauce which is one of the common ingredients in 
many ready meals.  Here, the cause of the problem was it not being subject to an appropriate control.  
Following this incident, all subsequent spice imports to the EU had to be tested for any presence of the 
dangerous dye (See further discussion on the following page).  In a more recent E. coli outbreak, during 
May-June 2011, according to EFSA’s report published on 5 July 2011, the likely source of the problem 
was believed to be contaminated bean sprout seeds (“fenugreek seeds”) imported from Egypt used in a 
farm in Lower Saxony, Germany.  The cause of the problem was widely suspected to be (although this 
is yet to be confirmed) the inadequate microbial testing of imported seeds.  To prevent a similar 
outbreak in future, more rigorous checks on imported seeds for the presence of E. coli may need to be 
imposed at the EU border.  
55
 See further:  Rapid Alert for Food and Feed Meeting of 22 February 2005 “Contamination of 
Worcester sauce by the unauthorised colour Sudan I” ( Found at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/62&format=HTML&aged=1&lan
guage=EN&guiLanguage=en) and the National Archives for Sudan I contaminated Products as of 21-22 
February 2005 (Also found at 
http://tna.europarchive.org/20110405190838/http://tna.europarchive.org/20110116113217/http://www.f
ood.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2005/feb/update).  
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establish legal claims against the manufacturer of the Worcester Sauce to recover the 
costs of these product recalls.56   
 
Furthermore, as traceability systems enable food business operators to keep 
information concerning product distribution and current product locations, they can be 
useful in targetting the withdrawal of faulty products before they progress along the 
food production chain.  Consequently traceability systems can be beneficial even for 
food business operators who create a risk.   The disruption due to the recall of their 
products can be mitigated by accurately locating where the  potentially harmful 
products are and by allowing for their targeted withdrawal.57  Without the presence of 
a traceability system there could be a need for food business operators to incur the 
substantial expense of withdrawing an entire product range.58 
 
Moreover, a traceability system can be beneficial for the competent authorities when 
dealing with the emergence of a food safety risk.  The information maintained in the 
system by food business operators can be passed on directly to the relevant competent 
authority so that sufficiently prompt and widespread action can be taken throughout an 
entire country or region.  In an emergency, traceability information can even be  
passed or exchanged with consumer and other relevant bodies.  This methodology has 
been used frequently in the EU  through the triggering of the Rapid Alert System for 
Food and Feed (RASFF) where information regarding food safety risks can be passed 
on to a national or third country competent authority, to other EU entities or in some 
                                                           
56
 See for example, Watson “Supermarkets hold suppliers to ransom over Sudan 1 recall” (2005) Article 
found at http://www.foodmanufacture.co.uk/Business-News/Supermarkets-hold-suppliers-to-ransom-
over-Sudan-1-recall. 
57
 This aim is laid down under Recital 28 of Regulation EC/178/2002.  
58
 Ibid. 
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cases to end-consumers.  After the notification of an occurrence of a food safety 
incident is distributed, it will be the responsibility of the competent authorities in each 
member state and third country to perform the traceability task in order to locate the 
products at risk in its territory and to try to find the source and cause of the incident.  
In the next chapter I will observe the circumstances and manner in which EU 
traceability information has been passed on to food safety authorities in Thailand.  
 
In the EU,  traceability gives rise to an horizontal obligation that bites throughout the 
food supply chain.  Article 18 of Regulation EC/178/2002 imposes a direct obligation 
on food business operators at every stage of production, processing and distribution,59 
with the exception of retailers selling to final consumers,  to trace a history of their 
food products and ingredients “one step back and one step forward”.  This requires the 
keeping and maintainance of proper records of the physical flow of each product.  In 
order to fulfil this obligation, each company must be able to identify immediately the 
names and addresses of suppliers and buyers of their products and keep records of 
which items/batches have been bought or sold, as well as transaction records for 
supply and delivery dates.60   This information must also be readily accessible to the 
                                                           
59
 Food business operator is “a natural or legal person, includng companies and wholesale suppliers” (in 
the case studies, these include EU importers) who must ensure that “the requirements of food law are 
met within the food business under their control” (Article 3.3).  The concept is applied as a general food 
law, covering  a wide range of undertakings, including those carrying out any of the activities related to 
any stage of production, processing and distribution of food and feed (Article 3.2).  These cover those 
engaged in transportation of food, storage of food, brokers, agents and importers where the products 
come from a third countries since they are involved in distribution of food (Guideline to the Regulation 
EC/178/2002, p. 12).  Thus it covers all food business operators, including primary producers and 
transporters, and apples from producer to retailer (except in the case of imports, where it applies from 
importer to retailers - Article 11)   
60
 In addition, the Guidelines relating to Regulation EC/178/2002 also state that other types of 
information that, although not compulsory, are highly recommended for retention by food business 
operators including volumes, batch numbers and a detailed description of products. 
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national competent authority.61  Although the Regulation does not specify precisely 
the duration that records must be kept, as a general rule laid down by the 
Commission’s guidance, traceability records for food products with a shelf-life or use-
by date, should be kept for the duration of the entire shelf-life plus 6 months.62  
Alternatively, for perishable products which have a use-by date of less than 3 months, 
records are required to be kept for 6 months.63  As all food business operators have 
their own traceability systems in place at each stage of production, both nation-wide 
and EU-wide systematic records have been established and they are accessible upon 
demand to facilitate effective product recall, or to support emergency action should a 
food safety outbreak occur.64 
 
Since their launch traceability systems have succeeded in preventing potentially 
harmful products reaching consumers on numerous occasions.  For example, in the 
Cadbury Salmonella incident mentioned previously, despite the company’s failure to 
comply with HACCP requirements the  traceability system was used to recall the 
potentially harmful products and to mitigate the risk of a major Salmonella outbreak.  
                                                           
61
 Ibid. Article 18.2 and 18.3.  The current practice is to make  traceability information clearly visible on 
products sold in the market.  Nevertheless, this is often known to the food business operators and 
entities in the food supply chain but not to consumers.  Such traceability information is often printed in 
the form of simple labels, bar codes or, for large consignments, RFID tags.  
62
 Can also be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/foodlaw/guidance/guidance_rev_7_en.pdf.  This 
obligation applies to the cooked poultry products from Thailand as discussed in Chapter 3.   
63
 This applies to fresh/chilled baby corn products.  It should be noted that for food products that do not 
have expiry date or shelf-life, the records must be kept for 5 years.  In other words, depending on the 
product types, the traceability records must be kept for a minimum of 6 months (for perishable goods) 
and for a maximum of 5 years.  Source: Commission’s Guidance on the Implementation of Article 
11,12,14,17, 18, 19 and 20 of Regulation EC/178/2002 (Also found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/foodlaw/guidance/guidance_rev_8_en.pdf). 
64
 As a general rule food business operators must take preliminary action to recall or withdraw products 
they consider to be unsafe and to notify the competent authority accordingly (Regulation EC/178/2002, 
Article 19(1)).  Such an obligation would be rendered impossible without having a traceability system.  
When a food business operator finds that its product may be unsafe, traceability will help it to trigger 
risk communication down the supply chain and to perform an effective product recall. 
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Also, even in a complex food safety incident when high levels of dioxin in milk were 
discovered on a farm in the Netherlands in 2004, the traceability system allowed the 
competent authority to trace the origin of the dioxin contamination back to the clay 
used in processing potato peel that had been used as animal feed.  The traceability 
information also enabled the identificaiton of the exact locations to which the 
contaminated potato peel had been delivered.  This resulted in 200 farms in the 
Netherlands, France, Belgium and Germany being prohibited from trading.  Although 
the consequence of this event was severe for those producers affected, it would have 
been more serious if contaminated products had reached the consumer and caused 
actual harm.65   
 
However, in a more recent E. coli outbreak during May-June 2011 in German 
beansprout seeds imported from Egypt, even the strict EU traceability system has been 
subject to criticism.  In particular, it has been criticised as being too slow to identify 
and to react to this severe public health risk.66  There was a relatively long period67 
before the likely source of the outbreak was pinpointed,68 sparking widespread 
consumer fears, both within and outside the EU.  Similar to the outcomes in previous 
EU food safety crises, the sale of fresh vegetables in many EU member states fell 
                                                           
65
 This has been confirmed in Food Traceability Factsheet June 2007, p. 2.  
66
 Addy (2011), Alemanno (2011).  
67
 It was taken approximately 6 weeks before the official source of the incident was confirmed by 
EFSA.  See further EFSA’s report on this issue. This can be found at 
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/supporting/pub/176e.htm)  
68
 The source was eventually identified to be bean sprouts farmed in Lower Saxony, Germany.   
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dramatically.  In addition some non-EU countries decided to ban fresh produce from 
the EU.69 
 
Some voices from the food industry and consumers have demanded that an even more 
strigent and detailed traceability sytem be imposed on all EU food business operators, 
for  example,  by having a “serialised identification” system, similar to those used in 
pharmaceutical industry.   Under this system, not only the source and destination of 
the each product would be traced back and forwards, but all information regarding 
each products’ ingredient and its packaging, or the “data trail”, would also be carried 
forward along the food supply chain.   It is claimed that this kind of system could have 
helped the authorities to more swiftly identify the source of contamination in the 
beensprout case.70   However, such a rigid and detailed system would impose an 
extremely high finanical burden on food business operators.   Moreover it might not be 
practical to be applied to wholesalers and to smaller  businesses. 
 
Against this backdrop of calls for a more stringent EU traceability system, it can 
equally be argued that the traceability problems highlighted by the E. coli outbreak did 
not invalidate the effectiveness of the current EU system since ultimately the source 
and cause of the indient were found.  The problem was the improper application of the 
system by the German authorities in hastily identifying the incorrect source of the 
outbreak before carrying out a thorough investigation.71  At the beginning of the 
outbreak many erroneous claims were made linking the outbreak with different 
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 Some countries notably Russia decided to ban all the EU vegetable produce - a ban which was 
criticised by the EU Commission as disproportionate.  (See for example Gutterman (2011). 
70
 In other words, if the barcode or RFID is scanned, it will present the full data trail of the product, its 
history and packaging.  (See Addy (2011))  The article is found at:  
http://www.foodmanufacture.co.uk/Supply-Chain/E.coli-reveals-traceability-poor-in-many-categories 
71
 And also before EFSA’s confirmation was published. 
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sources both within and outside Germany.   These included lettuce from Bavaria and 
organic cucumbers from Spain.  By the time the initial allegations were withdrawn 
severe trade repurcussions had already been felt.72   One important lesson that can be 
learnt from this incident regarding the traceability system is that a thorough 
traceability investigation takes time and the proper idenfication and publication of the 
source of food safety outbreaks by the relevant authority is crucial.  Instead of 
applying a stricter traceability system in the EU, resources could be targeted at 
improving application of the current system.  One suggested improvement has been 
put forward by Alemanno.  He proposes that when faced with an emergency or with a 
serious food safety outbreak,  the EU could consider assign a central role to the 
“European Food Safety Authority” (EFSA) in carrying out the traceability 
investigation instead of Member States’ authorities.73 
 
With regard to imports, Article 11 of Regulation EC/178/2002 states that for products 
originating in third countries, the traceability obligation commences only once the 
product enters EU territory.  Indeed the Directorate General for Health and Consumers 
(DG-SANCO) has confirmed on several occasions that the traceability obligation ends 
at the EU’s border and that it is not the intention for EU law to impose responsibilities 
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 For example, the declaration by the German authorities, linking the outbreak with organic cucumbers 
from Spain made Spanish vegetable unsellable.  After this accusation was retracted, Spain considered 
demanding compensation from the German authorities (Mallet (2011)).   
73
 This argument is about the Commission’s use of EFSA for crisis management and this issue will be 
explained further in the following section on EFSA’s duties.  This would have several benefits: firstly 
EFSA has more resources at its disposal, and secondly it can be considered as being less susceptible to 
political pressure.  In fact EFSA has been entrusted with the power to establish a crisis management unit 
in cases of emergency (Article 56, EC 178/2002).  However, so far the crisis management unit has not 
been established by the Commission (Alemanno (2011)).   
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on overseas food business operators.74  Thus, in theory, the EU obligation is imposed 
on importers of food products, while exporters in third countries are not legally bound 
to fulfil traceability requirements.75   
 
It  is questionable whether the traceability chain in such cases can provide adequate 
protection to EU consumers, and whether it constitutes a comprehensive and 
integrated approach to food safety which is one of the main aims of the EU food safety 
reform.  This is significant in that many food-borne diseases originate in third 
countries.76  In practice, however, these concerns have been significantly allayed by 
regulation in the form of private standards.  Major EU food importers impose a 
contractual obligation on exporters in third countries to provide them with traceability 
information in relation to their products.  For example, private standards such as those 
adopted by GlobalGAP are required as part of the supply contract by many EU 
supermarkets and have played a crucial role in creating a market incentive for food 
producers in third countries to comply with EU traceability requirements.   
 
As most EU supermarkets now require their suppliers to comply with these private 
standards, companies in developing countries have installed their own traceability 
systems so that they can continue to supply EU supermarkets.  In addition the 
governmental entities of many third countries may decide to impose traceability 
requirements on their own domestic producers and exporters.  This has occurred in 
Thailand, and will be discussed in relation to the case studies in the next chapter.   
                                                           
74
 Guidance on Implementation of Articles 11, 12,  16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of Regulation EC/178/2002 on 
general  food law: Conclusions of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health, p. 27. 
(Also found at: http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/foodlaw/guidance/guidance_rev_7_en.pdf) 
75
 This is the case except in the event of bilateral agreements concerning particular sensitive sectors or 
where there are specific legal requirements, for example in veterinary sectors . 
76
 A clear example of this is Avian Influenza.  
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2.4 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY AUTHORITY 
(EFSA) AS THE CENTRAL RISK ASSESSMENT BODY 
 
Risk assessment is a core concept in the regulation of food safety.77  It involves a 
process of identifying the probability and consequences of a food safety hazard arising 
and is based on a review of scientific data and studies.78  Under Article 3 (11) of 
Regulation EC/178/2002 EC, risk assessment consists of four steps: hazard 
identification, hazard characterisation, exposure assessment and risk characterisation.79  
The principal aim of risk assessment is to lay down in a scientific manner the level and 
nature of the risks associated with a particular food (or feeds).  The intent is to assist 
risk managers in making rational and reasoned decisions that are based upon scientific 
evidence rather than being driven purely by political or economic considerations.   
This is particularly important in fulfilling the EU’s obligations as a WTO member, as 
the SPS Agreement requires that any food safety measure must rest upon a sound 
scientific basis.80   
 
Implementation of the concept of risk assessment originally began in the EU with the 
regulatory comitology process whereby the Commission (DG-SANCO) relied upon 
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 Risk is different from hazard.  A hazard is something that can cause harm, whereas a risk is the 
likelihood of actual harm to human health caused by such a hazard.  Food safety regulation is 
sometimes referred as risk regulation (Vogel (2001)).  
78
 In the Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council of the European Union (2002), para.154-156, the definition 
of risk assessment was also laid down.  It stated that risk assessments made by the EU institution shall 
include information on the possibility of hazard, the exposure to such hazard and the kind of risk the 
hazard may pose to human health.  The concept of risk assessment can be juxtaposed with that of risk 
management, which relates to taking decisions that will reduce or eliminate the risk, taking into account 
other legitimate interests in society (See also Vos (2000) p. 229).  
79
 This definition is identical to the definition under the General Principles of Codex which were set out 
during its 1211 Paris session, on 25 - 29 November 1996.  
80
 The EU’s obligations under WTO’s SPS Agreement will later be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 50 
risk assessment reports from various committees to assist it in exercising its executive 
powers.81  In 1974 the Scientific Committee on Food was established as the first 
formal and permanent risk assessment body in the field of food safety and was charged 
with providing expert advice to the Commission.82  Since then further permanent 
committees have been founded in specific areas of food safety.  As the comitology 
committees grew in number, problems emerged as the system became too complex 
with various committees having overlapping responsibilities.  In 1997 this resulted in 
the re-organisation of the comitology committees into nine risk assessment bodies.  
Six of these dealt with food safety issues, namely the Scientific Steering Committee,83 
the Scientific Committees on Food, Animal Nutrition, Animal Health and Animal 
Welfare, Veterinary Measures relating to Public Health, and Plants.84 
 
For many years it was considered appropriate and adequate for these six committees to 
undertake the risk assessment function in relation to food safety.  Moreover it was 
thought that this system was in keeping with the unique character of the EU, as an 
entity that combines elements of inter-governmentalism and supra-nationalism.85  The 
concept of regulatory committees in which the Member States could participate via 
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 Article 207 TEC (now 240 TFEU) and Council Decision 1999/468/EC as amended by the Council 
Decision 2006/512/EC. However, following the “new comitology regulation” (Regulation 
EU/182/2011, which came in to force on 1 March 2011), this procedure is now called “the examination 
procedure”. 
82
 Article 2 of Commission Decision 74/234/EEC as later amended by Commission Decision 
95/273/EC. This committee comprised expert scientists and was one of the earliest risk assessment 
bodies. 
83
 Commission Decision 97/404/EC. 
84
 Commission Decision 97/579/EC. The other three Scientific Committees address consumer health 
and include Scientific Committees on Cosmetic Products and Non-Food Products Intended for 
Consumers, and Medicinal Products and Medical Devices. 
85
 Decisions at EU level are made by both Member States as well as delegated regional entities.  See: 
Craig and De Búrca (2007), p. 8-12 , Craig and De Búrca (1999), Chapter 1 on The Nature of the 
Community: Integration, Democracy and Legitimacy, p. 1-50, especially p. 30-35. 
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their national representatives was also credited with maintaining a fine balance 
between scientific justification and the right of Member States to participate in this 
politically sensitive area of law.86  However this view changed following the BSE 
crisis when the deficiencies of this system were widely realised.  This led to severe 
criticism and to calls for fundamental reform.  One of the strongest criticisms was that 
risk assessment and risk management functions had become dangerously entangled.87   
 
The report by the Temporary Committee of Inquiry into the BSE crisis revealed that 
British officials of the Scientific Veterinary Committee, which is supposed to be an 
independent risk assessment body, might have influenced the views of other 
committee members in a way that led to a neglect of the dangerous link between BSE 
and Creutzfeldt - Jakob disease.  This brought about a realisation of the need to reform 
food risk regulation so as to emphasise a clear-cut functional separation between risk 
assessment and risk management.88  In theory, risk assessment tasks should be 
assigned to a body of expert scientists who focus exclusively on the task of scientific 
evaluation without being subject to political pressure.  Conversely, risk management 
tasks should be undertaken by the legislature or executive, since it is directly or 
                                                           
86
 Vos and Wendler (2006), p. 67.   
87
 This criticism continues, even after the establishment of the EFSA.  Some critics, including Kanska 
(2004) p. 727, criticised EFSA as not being entirely free of the Commission’s and member states’ 
influence as it has been overwhelmed with the questions posted to it by these bodies rather than being 
able to conduct risk assessments on its own initiative.  However, it should be noted that it is difficult for 
a body such as EFSA to be entirely free from any influence by other risk management bodies.  This is 
because the very essence of EFSA’s role is to deliver its opinion so as to assist risk managers.  (See 
further Alemanno 2006, p. 12).  
88
 Alemanno (2007) p. 7.  The approach of having this clear separation between risk assessment and risk 
management originated in the US National Research Council (NRC) with the publication of “Risk 
Assessment in the Federal Government: Management” in 1983.  This concept later became influential in 
US risk regulatory regimes, especially in environmental & food safety issues and in some international 
organisations including Codex Alimentarius, Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) 
and the World Health Organisation (WHO). 
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indirectly accountable to the public and is better placed to balance the results of 
scientific risk assessment with other legitimate interests.  
  
As a consequence of this line of thought, EFSA was established, by Regulation 
EC/178/2002, as the EU’s central and independent scientific risk assessment and risk 
communication body.89  It is to provide independent “scientific advice and scientific 
and technical support for the Community’s legislation and policies in all fields which 
have a direct or indirect impact on food safety”,90 and to serve “as a point of 
reference”, acting in close cooperation with the risk assessment bodies of Member 
States and other EU institutions.91  It has taken over from the original six permanent 
comitology food safety risk assessment committees that existed prior to its formation 
in May 2003.92  In turn, nine specific scientific panels have been established, each 
comprising independent experts on particular issues, covering;  (i) Food Additives, 
Flavouring, Processing Aids and Materials in Contact with Food, (ii) Biological 
Hazards, (iii) Contaminants in the Food Chain, (iv) Genetically Modified Organisms, 
(v) Additives and Products or Substances Used in Animal Feed, (vi) Dietetic Products, 
Nutrition and Allergies, (vii) Plant Health, (viii) Animal Health and Welfare, and (ix) 
Plant Protecting Products and Their Residues.  
 
                                                           
89
 The intent for this had been indicated in the wording of the White Paper on Food Safety, in which 
EFSA’s goal is clearly set out in Paragraph 35. 
90
 Article 22 (2) of Regulation EC/178/2002.  
91
 Ibid, Article 22 (7). 
92
 Under Article 62 (ibid), all references in the EU legislation to the six committees must now refer to 
EFSA. 
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2.4.1 Risk Assessment Roles 
 
Article 23 of Regulation EC/178/2002 provides that EFSA is to perform three different 
roles.  First, EFSA performs an advisory role involving the provision of scientific 
advice and technical support to the EU institutions in their decisions regarding food 
safety measures.93  It can do this upon request by one or more of the institutions or 
upon its own initiative.94  Moreover it can also be requested by the Commission to 
interpret and consider scientific opinions of other risk assessment bodies,95 and to 
provide scientific and technical assistance in crisis management situations.96  Although 
EU risk managers are not obliged to follow EFSA’s advice and can choose to use 
scientific evidence from other sources, the scientific advice provided by EFSA is still 
significant.97  Under Article 6 (3) the risk managers are obliged to pay particular 
attention to EFSA’s opinions, alongside other legitimate factors, in the adoption of 
food safety decisions.98 
 
Secondly, EFSA is to facilitate the creation of a framework for scientific cooperation 
with itself at the centre of the scientific network.  According to Article 36 of 
Regulation EC/178/2002, this is to be achieved by co-ordinating activities, exchanging 
                                                           
93
 Article 23 (a), Regulation EC/178/2002.  The term “institutions” here refers to the European 
Commission, Parliament and Member States.  However the Commission makes most of the requests.  
94
 Article 23 (a), ibid. EU institutions and Member States can request EFSA opinions under the 
procedure laid down by Regulation EC/1304/2003.  It should be noted that to date EFSA has not fully 
used these powers to initiate the tasks on its own initiative.  The main reason for this is likely to be that 
it has been overwhelmed by the Commission’s questions on risk assessments. 
95
 Article 23 (c ), ibid. 
96
 Article 23 (h), ibid. 
97
 For example, in relation to GMOs (Section 2.5.2) or health claim authorisation.) See further Chalmers 
(2005) in relation to EFSA’s scientific influence in GMO authorisation.  
98
 The legitimate factors here can include the need to use the precautionary principle.  However, if they 
decide not to adopt EFSA’s opinion, the risk managers must provide “a statement of reason” explaining 
their decision.  In so doing, the statement of reason must be “of a scientific level at least commensurate 
with that of EFSA” (Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council of the European Union (2002), para.197-199). 
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information, expertise and best practices, and by developing and implementing joint 
actions among its network of institutions.99  Consequently EFSA must develop 
uniform methodologies,100 data collection,101 commissioning of scientific research 102 
and must perform its duties with a view to improved co-operation between the 
Member States, international organisations and third countries.103  There are currently 
more than 200 institutions within EFSA’s risk assessment network.104  These comprise 
national risk assessment bodies, scientific research centres, governmental departments, 
local authorities and leading universities.  Since most of the institutions are well-
equipped with laboratory facilities, whereas EFSA is not, this collaborative network 
enables EFSA to access and share scientific information with pan-EU resources whilst 
performing its risk assessment tasks.  This central network responsibility further 
cements EFSA’s position at the heart of the EU risk assessment system.  Furthermore, 
institutions in the network can express their emerging concerns to EFSA thus leading 
EFSA to investigate the issues further, often by urging a wider EU investigation.   
 
Thirdly, EFSA participates in the operation of the EU’s RASFF, laid down under 
Articles 50-52 of Regulation EC/178/2002.  The RASFF itself is a food safety 
information network that allows for a quick and effective exchange of information 
                                                           
99
 Article 36, ibid. 
100
 Article 23 (b), ibid.  
101
 Article 23 (e), ibid.  
102
 Article 23 (d), ibid.  
103
 Article 23 (i), ibid.  
104
 Including 30 from the UK. The list can be found at : 
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/art36grants/docs/art36listg.pdf 
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among its members, namely the Commission and national competent authorities,105 
EFSA and other relevant parties in the food supply chain.106  Once a food safety 
incident is notified to the Commission by a Member State’s national competent 
authority it will be validated and analysed by EFSA before a report is distributed to the 
other members in the network.  In this way the information regarding a food safety 
incident can be quickly circulated and can speedily be used in reacting to the 
incident.107    
 
Under this system, EFSA acts as a central source of scientific reference in the EU’s 
food safety information network.  Article 35 of Regulation EC/178/2002 provides that 
EFSA shall receive all the information passed through this system from the 
Commission so that it can analyse, assess the risk, and return its comments to assist 
other members of the network in fulfilling their risk management tasks.108  An 
example of this can be seen from concerns about high levels of potentially genotoxic 
and carcinogenic Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons in fisheries products.  Here the 
Commission recommended that the Member States collect data through the RASFF 
and send these to EFSA for further investigation.109   
 
                                                           
105
 The information in the RASFF can be passed on to the competent authorities of EFTA countries, 
Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland.  If appropriate the information can also be passed on to the CAs of 
third countries. 
106
 Other relevant parties in the food supply chain include manufacturers, consumers and the general 
public (who can sign up to obtain both on-line and telephone text alerts).  In addition all the 
notifications triggered by the use of this system are published weekly on the DG-SANCO website. 
107
 For discussion of how Thai entities have dealt with the notifications via the RASFF concerning Thai 
food products, see the baby corn case study in Chapter 3 regarding notification of the Shigella incident 
in Denmark (see infra Section 3.4.2.2).  Also see Alemanno (2009) for a detailed discussion on the 
operation of this system.  
108
 It can also supplement the information received with additional technical and scientific information 
that it considers to be appropriate.   
109
 Commission Recommendation 2005/108/EC.  
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In the more recent “Melamine Dairy Scandal” DG-SANCO frequently re-assessed the 
level of risk posed by a number of food products containing contaminated milk from 
China following Member States’ reports and EFSA’s advice.110  Also in the recent “E. 
coli outbreak in Germany in May-June 2011, EFSA shared information and 
cooperated with DG-SANCO and other institutions of the EU and Member States to 
frequently monitor the event and reassess the risks to human health.111   
 
EFSA is also responsible for gathering information in a crisis management unit set up 
by the Commission.112  The operation of this crisis management unit, which comprises 
EFSA, the Commission and the Member States’ institutions, is different from the 
RASFF.113  The crisis management can be triggered when there is an imminent food 
safety risk with the potential to create widespread and serious adverse effects to 
human or animal health or the environment, and is considered by the Commission to 
be so complex that it cannot be adequately managed by other risk managers.  This 
would cover an exceptional situation, similar to the BSE crisis, or an uncontrollable 
outbreak of an epidemic such as foot and mount disease, Avian Influenza or E. coli.114  
To date, the Commission has not established a crisis management unit and it has been 
criticised for this, especially following the recent E. coli outbreak, by Alemanno who 
has suggested that this should have been done.115  Had such a unit been established, 
EFSA would have been entrusted with a more proactive role in risk assessment and 
                                                           
110
 See the analysis of this incident in Alemanno (2010), p. 212-5.   
111
 Source: http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/press/news/110527.htm. 
112
 This is governed under Article 56-57, Regulation EC/178/2002 and the Commission Decision 
2004/478/EC.   
113
 Both are based on similar procedures to establish networks of information and warning throughout 
the EU but the crisis unit will also be able to adopt emergency measures to manage the risk at hand. 
114
 A recent EFSA’s report on the E. coli outbreak can be found at :  
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/supporting/doc/176e.pdf.  
115
 See Alemanno (2011).  See also discussion on this issue in the previous section. 
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associated tasks.  For example, it would not only have been responsible for verifying 
the validity of the Member State’s risk information, as requested by the Commission, 
but also would have played a leading role in supervising the Member States’ 
traceability investigations to establish the source and the cause of incidents.   
  
2.4.2 Risk Assessment and Authorisation  
 
Certain food safety regulations have further entrusted EFSA with fulfilling a 
comprehensive risk assessment function whereby it is called upon to advise the 
Commission on the authorisation of certain food products.  One notable piece of 
legislation that grants EFSA broad and significant risk assessment powers in product 
authorisation is Regulation EC/1829/2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed.  
Here EFSA is responsible for conducting risk assessment reviews to provide scientific 
opinions on whether to grant market access to Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) 
products.116  The Commission is responsible for final product authorisation after 
taking EFSA’s opinion into account and after consulting with Member State 
representatives in the Standing Committee on Food Chain and Animal Health under 
the examination procedure.117  The Commission is under an obligation to pay 
particular attention to EFSA’s opinions and must provide an explanation if its final 
conclusion differs from that of EFSA.  
                                                           
116
 Article 6, Regulation EC/1829/2003. 
117
 Under the GMO Food and Feed Regulation in Article 7(3) for food and Article19 (3) for feed, the 
reference is made to the regulatory committee process mentioned in Article 35(2) of the same 
Regulation.  Under Article 35(2) the regulatory committee procedure is conducted in accordance with 
Articles 5 and 7 of Council Decision 1999/468/EC as amended by Council Decision of 17 July 2006.  
However, following the new comitology regulation (Regulation EU/182/2011), this process has been 
replaced by the so-called examination procedure which grants more power to the Commission. Even if 
the relevant committee (here the Standing Committee on Food Chain and Animal Health) delivers a 
negative opinion, the Commission may adopt the measure if non-adoption would pose a risk to the 
safety of humans among other things. In this case, the Commission must send the measure back to the 
committee and if a negative opinion is still delivered, the measure must be repealed.  
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2.4.3 Risk Communication Roles  
 
In addition to its risk assessment function EFSA is entrusted with the task of 
communicating its scientific opinions and conclusions on food safety risks to the 
general public and interested parties, so as to ensure that these groups receive “rapid, 
reliable, objective and comprehensible information”.118  
 
EFSA communicates its risk assessments to the public by making most of its 
documents publication available and by allowing enhanced public involvement in its 
scientific forums.  To achieve this it uses its website where the majority of its 
documents and webcasts of its meetings are made available. 
 
2.5 OTHER LEGITIMATE CONCERNS IN THE AREA OF FOOD 
SAFETY 
 
The concept of risk management in EU food safety regulation is broader than might 
generally be anticipated.  As previously discussed, the risk assessment function is 
performed by EFSA and is based upon scientific analysis of whether a food product is 
safe.  On the other hand the risk management role, as performed by the political 
entities of the EU, namely the Commission, Council and Parliament, can also involve 
consideration of a range of additional issues that go beyond food safety.  These are 
known as ‘other legitimate concerns’. 
 
                                                           
118
 Ibid, Article 23 (j).  EFSA has also established a specific Advisory Group on Risk Communication to 
provide advice to its Executive Director regarding best practice and communications strategies. 
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The EU’s willingness to incorporate ‘other legitimate concerns’ in its food safety 
regulatory framework and processes can be seen from the White Paper on Food Safety 
which establishes that the EU shall take a comprehensive and integrated approach to 
food safety regulation from farm to table and shall consider “other legitimate factors 
pertaining to food safety”.119  A precise definition of “legitimate factors” was not laid 
down.   However, the White Paper provides a non-exhaustive list of the kind of factors 
that may be taken into account by the risk managers during the risk management stage.  
These include “environmental considerations, animal welfare, sustainable agriculture, 
consumers’ expectation regarding product quality, fair information and definition of 
the essential characteristics of products and their process and product methods”. 120   
A similar approach was also adopted in Regulation EC/178/2002, where Recital 19 
makes similar reference to ‘other legitimate concerns’ that are deemed as important 
and may be considered by risk managers along with EFSA’s risk assessment and the 
possibility of using the precautionary principle.121   
 
The EU has used different mechanisms to regulate these broad ranging legitimate 
concerns.  Some and especially those that are strongly associated with food safety, 
such as animal welfare, are dealt with as part of the EU food safety regulatory 
framework itself and are given expression as minimum conditions for EU market 
access.  Others, deemed to be related less directly to food safety, including issues of 
                                                           
119
 The White Paper on Food Safety, p. 9. 
120
 Although it is accepted by the Codex that countries have a right to consider other legitimate factors 
in reaching their risk management decisions, the scope and exact issues that might be regarded as 
legitimate concerns are, as yet, not agreed internationally.  There has been an ongoing debate between 
the US and the EU on the precise scope and definition of other legitimate factors.  Some critics and 
countries have argued against the expansive scope of legitimate concerns taken by the EU (See, for 
example, the Criteria of Consideration of the Other Factors Referred to in the Second Statement of 
Principles:  The 24th Sessions of Committee session in 2001).   
121
 Here, these include issues of “societal, economic, traditional, ethical, environmental factors and the 
feasibility of controls”.  Also Ibid, Article 13 (2). 
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environmental production and worker welfare, are governed through different 
labelling schemes, so as to ensure that consumers are well informed.122  The 
discussions in the following sub-sections exemplify how various legal mechanisms 
have been used to address these different types of legitimate concerns. 
 
2.5.1 Using Animal Welfare as a General Market Access Condition 
 
Animal welfare is a long-standing concern in the EU.123  It is considered to be directly 
linked to food safety because improper animal welfare conditions can cause harm to 
human or animal health.124  However, there is also a moral dimension to animal 
welfare.125 
 
Since the 1970s the EU has imposed many specific laws that lay down minimum 
standards for the protection of animal welfare.126  More recently the importance of 
animal welfare protection has been affirmed by the Treaty of Lisbon which inserted a 
Protocol on the Protection and Welfare of Animals (1997) into the final text of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  It officially recognises that animals 
                                                           
122
 These labelling schemes are operated by either public or private entities. 
123
 The scope and concept of animal welfare remain unsettled.  See for examples, discussions in the 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Animal Welfare 
Legislation on farmed animals in Third Countries and the Implication for the EU.  
124
 Notably poor animal welfare conditions for cattle kept for meat production were said to contribute to 
the outbreak of BSE. The British inquiry into BSE chaired by Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers and 
published in October 2000 confirmed that the spread of the disease was caused by cattle being fed 
remnants from other cattle in the form of meat and bone meal.  Also in the more recent Avian Influenza 
outbreak the high density of farmed poultry was seen as a contributing factor. (Levitt (2011), Berg 
(2009)).  
125
 Following the 1978 European Convention for the Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes, 
EU legislation stressed that, inter alia, farmed animals should be subject to humane treatment and 
allowed to express their natural behaviour. 
126
 These include the Directive 93/119/EC, the European Convention for the Protection of Animals Kept 
for Farming Purpose and Council Decision 78/923/EEC.  The latter establishes as a framework 
document of animal welfare, especially those in intensive production.  Under the Convention five 
freedoms of animals were laid down, including freedom from; (i) hunger and thirst, (ii) discomfort, (iii) 
pain injury and disease, (iv) to express normal behaviour, and (v) fear and distress. 
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are sentient beings and that the EU institutions as well as Member States are obliged to 
pay full respect to animal welfare requirements in the formulation and implementation 
of various EU common policies.127  Currently EU extensive animal welfare laws cover 
animal conditions on farms,128 during transport129 and at the time of slaughter.130  
There are also detailed rules concerning species-specific animal welfare including egg-
laying hens,131 pigs,132 calves133 and chickens raised for meat production. 134   
 
 In general, for imported animal products only animal welfare rules relating to 
slaughter and transportation are regarded as conditions for EU market access.  
However, following the introduction of Directive 2007/43/EC there is an exception for 
poultry production with additional animal welfare requirements being imposed for 
high-density farms including those situated outside of the EU.  This will further be 
discussed as part of the poultry case study in the following chapter.   
 
                                                           
127
 Article 13 TFEU provides that “in formulating and implementing the Union’s agriculture, fisheries, 
transport, internal market, research and technological development and space policies, the Union and 
the Member States shall, since animals are sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements 
of animals, while respecting the legislative or administrative provisions and customs of the Member 
States relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage”.  
128
 The general legal document on this is the Council Directive 98/58/EC concerning the protection of 
animals kept for farming purposes.  
129
 For example, Council Directive 91/628/EEC. 
130
 Directive 93/119/ EC.  
131
 Directive 1999/74/EC. 
132
 Directive 91/630/EEC.  
133
 Directive 97/2/EC. 
134
 Directive 2007/43/EC.  
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2.5.2 Labelling Schemes: Mandatory Labelling for Genetically Modified Food 
and Feed 
 
‘Other legitimate concerns’ that are less directly related to food safety are governed 
through various food labelling schemes.135  The regulatory aim of these is to ensure 
that EU consumers receive adequate and accurate information about products, 
including information reflecting those legitimate concerns that find expression in EU 
law.  There are many examples of EU interventions in food labelling to protect ‘other 
legitimate concerns’.  By way of illustration, Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) 
labelling is highlighted briefly below, and the hybrid public-private organic labelling 
scheme is discussed towards the end of this chapter. 
 
Currently GMOs in food and feed are subject to a strict authorisation and labelling 
scheme.  GMO food or feed which has been authorised by the Commission under 
consultation with EFSA is deemed not to have an adverse effect on human health, 
animal health and the environment.136  Nonetheless, genetically modified (GM) food 
products are still required to be labelled.   To date there are 38 authorised GM food 
products allowed in the EU market and the number of authorised products is gradually 
increasing.137   
 
                                                           
135
 These are issues that are not linked to the causes of harm to human or animal life or health but rather 
relate to moral and social values and to consumer preferences, et cetera.  
136
 Article 4(1) (a), Regulation EC/1829/2003. In addition it must not mislead the consumer, and must 
not differ from the food which is intended to replace so that normal consumption would be nutritionally 
disadvantageous to consumer. 
137
 As of April 2011, an update of information can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/dyna/gm_register/index_en.cfm.  
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Under Regulation EC/1829/2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed, all food and 
animal feed products containing or produced from GMOs must state that they contain 
GMOs.  Additional labelling information must also be provided on the packaging if 
the GMOs concerned differ from their conventional counterpart in nutritional value, 
composition, intended use, health implications, or may give rise to ethical or religious 
concerns.138  Furthermore, if the product is not labelled as containing GMOs, the food 
producers must be able to show that appropriate steps have been taken to avoid the 
presence of GMO contamination in their products. 
 
This requirement for GM food to be labelled is indicative of prevailing consumer 
concerns.  GM food has long been a cause of considerable concern for EU consumers, 
especially in the early years of its introduction.139  Even today EU consumers continue 
to be sensitive about the use of GM technology in food production, and have on 
numerous occasions voiced their concerns regarding the possible long-term health 
impacts of GM food as well as the potential negative effects that GM technology could 
have on the environment.140  Hence the labelling of GM food is intended to empower 
consumers by allowing them to decide whether and when to reject the technology 
concerned. 
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 Article 25 (c), (d), Regulation EC/1829/2003. 
139
 Such concerns have been expressed by risk managers.  In the early years, it resulted in lengthy delays 
for GM product approval that adversely affected exporting countries.  It was estimated that the US has 
lost over $1 billion since producers in the EU and other countries switched to non-GM soya in animal 
feeds in order to secure access to the lucrative EU market; a consignment of canned Thai tuna was also 
rejected from Dutch and Greek ports because of suspicion that it might have contained oil produced 
from GM soya.  This led to Thai manufacturers switching to vegetable oil that was guaranteed to be GM 
free.  Source: http://archive.greenpeace.org/geneng/reports/food/lostmarkets2.htm. 
140
 In the Euro-barometer survey in 2005, although about half of the citizens surveyed recognised the 
benefits of biotechnology, especially in the fields of medicine and industry, most of them expressed 
concern when the technology is used for food production.  The average support for GMO in the EU was 
only 27 percent.  Only 42 percent considered GM foods as acceptable.  However, this was an 
improvement on the survey conducted in 2001 when the dislike of GMOs was at its peak.  That survey 
found that over 94 percent wanted to have the right to choose whether or not to buy GM products.  
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2.5.3 Private Regulatory Mechanisms: the Main Controlling Body of Legitimate 
Concerns 
 
‘Other legitimate concerns’ are also heavily governed by private mechanisms, 
whereby private EU importers and retailers require that imported food products must 
be certified or registered as complying with certain private standards.  These standards 
are applied separately and in addition to EU food safety laws.  In this thesis, the 
concept of EU food safety regulation covers official EU legislation and private 
standards of the kind introduced here.141  Private standards can exert considerable 
influence in the food sector and can act as “tickets to trade” in the EU market.142  The 
influence of private standards upon Thai exporters will be highlighted in detail in 
relation to the selected case studies in Chapters 3 and 6.  This chapter merely provides 
an introduction to private standards, specifically in relation to issues of ‘other 
legitimate concerns’.  It is important to note at this point that the more traditional 
concerns on food safety are also regulated through private standards.  This became 
apparent in the discussion of HACCP and traceability earlier in this chapter and will 
be confirmed also in the following discussion.143  
 
The concept of private standards covers all quality assurance certification schemes that 
are primarily created or managed by private rather than governmental bodies.144  A 
requirement to comply with private standards is generally imposed by contract law.145    
                                                           
141
 Private regulation means regulatory programmes that are not created or managed primarily by 
governmental entities (see supra, Havinga, (2006), p. 520 and Meidinger (2009), p. 2) 
142
 Lee (2006). 
143
 See infra Chapter 6.  
144
 A similarly broad definition has also been used by other academics.  Many commentators have taken 
the view that private standards are different from governmental standards although occasionally it is 
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Since the BSE crisis many standard schemes have been introduced by EU private 
entities.  It is estimated that there are currently at least 400 of these in operation in the 
EU.146  These consist of what can be described as “universal standards” which are 
widely, or in some cases “universally”, accepted by different retailers within particular 
food sectors.  Examples of these include GlobalGAP standards which are widely 
recognised in the fruit and vegetable retail sector throughout the EU, the British Retail 
Consortium (BRC) and International Food Standard (IFS) which are accepted as 
standards for manufacturing and packaged food in the UK and continental Europe 
respectively.147   
 
 In addition private standards also include “supermarket-own standards” which are 
introduced under “bespoke” certification schemes put in place by individual EU 
supermarkets.  Examples of these include, Albert Heijn supermarket standard in the 
Netherlands or Tesco’s “Nature’s Choice”, Marks and Spencer’s “Field to Fork” and 
“Plan A” in the UK.  Compliance with supermarket standards can be required 
alongside compliance with more universally recognised private standards.  
 
This section will highlight those aspects of EU private standards that have been used 
to deal with ‘other legitimate concerns’.  Examples include GlobalGAP and two sets 
of standards put in place by particular supermarkets: “Nature’s Choice” and “From 
                                                                                                                                                                       
difficult to separate private and governmental elements in the standards.  (See further, Schepel (2005), 
Havinga (2006), p. 517 and Meidinger (2009, p. 139-142). It should be noted that in reality it is difficult 
for private standards to be entirely free from governmental intervention as there are many ways that 
governments can exert their influence over the operation of standards.  This ranges from giving direct 
funding, publishing guidelines or giving indirect government loans or advice to farmers wishing to join 
such standards.  However, so long as the dominant actors are private bodies, the regulatory schemes 
requested by the EU supermarkets should be considered as falling within this definition of private 
standards. 
145
 This will be further discussed in Chapter 6.  
146
 Lee (2006), p. 9. 
147
 See further discussion in Chapter 3. 
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Field to Fork”.  A full discussion of private standards, their impact and examples of 
their adoption in Thailand is presented in Chapters 3 and 6. 
 
2.5.3.1 GlobalGAP  
 
Previously known as EurepGAP,148 GlobalGAP was established in 1997 by the Euro-
Retailer Produce Working Group that comprises large retailers and supermarkets in 
the EU that control over 80 percent of the EU retail food market.149  It was established 
to provide a quality assurance scheme to enhance consumer confidence in food safety 
and ‘other legitimate concerns’ following several food safety outbreaks.  Although 
established as a voluntary standard, it has been criticised as acting as the de facto 
requirement for access into the EU retail market.150  GlobalGAP members and some 
other retailers151 set GlobalGAP as the minimum standard to be met by producers 
supplying agricultural products to the EU.  Consequently there is a significant 
incentive for producers in third countries to comply with GlobalGAP so as to be able 
to supply the EU retail market.  
 
The current auditing system of GlobalGAP it is conducted by using a checklist of over 
200 major and minor points as well as compliance with recommendations relating to 
food safety and ‘other legitimate concerns’.  At present these checklists and 
                                                           
148
 On 7 September 2007 during its annual conference in Thailand EurepGAP changed its name to 
GlobalGAP so as to reflect its true global scope.  
149
 Muaz (2004), p. 14. The members of GlobalGAP include large supermarket chain such as Ahold, 
Carrefour and Auchan. In the UK members include SPAR, TESCO, Waitrose, Sainsbury and 
Morrisons.   
150
 See UNCTAD’s country case studies on GlobalGAP (also found at:  
(http://www.unctad.org/trade_env/test1/meetings/eurepgap/Draft%20Final%20Report%20GAP%20vs
%20EGAP.pdf), and the baby corn case study results (see Chapter 3 and 6).  
151
 The German fresh fruit market has only accepted GlobalGAP-certified products from 2006 onwards 
(Lee, 2006 p. 17). 
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certifications are renewed every four years.152  Currently the Integrated Farm 
Assurance Standard, to which producers must be certified, is at Version 4 which 
becomes binding in 2011.  To be compliant with GlobalGAP producers must achieve 
all major points and 95 percent of the minor points. 
 
The regulatory scope of GlobalGAP covers food safety issues including HACCP, 
traceability, allowable chemical usage as well as ‘other legitimate concerns’.  The 
‘other legitimate concerns’ covered by GlobalGAP are stated in the Terms of 
Reference and cover a wide range, including issues which are well beyond the scope 
of EU food safety regulation.  Such issues include the occupational health, safety and 
welfare of farm workers, and plans for environmental protection, site history and land 
management, waste management and wildlife protection.153   
 
2.5.3.2 Supermarkets’ Own Standards 
 
In addition to the universal standards of GlobalGAP, ‘other legitimate concerns’ are 
also regulated under supermarkets’ own standards.  These standards are imposed on 
those who supply the supermarkets in question, including suppliers based abroad.  
Some of the requirements in place are wide in scope and contain stringent and detailed 
conditions.  For example, Tesco’s Nature’s Choice standard requires that suppliers 
comply with a set of “best agricultural practices” that relate to food safety and include 
requirements on HACCP, traceability, chemical usage as well as ‘other legitimate 
                                                           
152
 Major changes to the standard took place every three years prior to Version 4.  
153
 For example, when producers in third countries apply for certification they have to comply with at 
least 95 percent of the “minor must” points.  Examples of these requirements are that workers are 
provided with adequate safety equipment, habitable living quarters and workers’ rest areas on the 
plantation sites, and wildlife conservation (including having to write farm and conservation plans, 
having to use cultivation technique to avoid soil erosion).  Source: GlobalGAP.  See also (Lee (2006), p. 
51 onwards). 
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concerns’ associated with sustainable farming.  Among the latter are standards 
concerning the adoption of management plans for crops, waste, the environment and 
plant protection.  These are said to be imposed so that consumers can be assured that 
Tesco products are “safe” as well as “environmentally friendly”.154   
 
Similarly Marks & Spencer’s “From Field to Fork” scheme, introduced in 2002, 
covers issues of food safety as well as ‘other legitimate concerns’ relating to labour 
welfare and environmental protection.  It is applicable to all fruit and vegetable 
products supplied to M&S.155  The extent to which these supermarket standards are 
applicable to Thai producers will be further discussed in Chapter 3.   
 
2.5.4 Organic Labelling: Public-Private Regulation  
 
While organic labelling is subject to private regulation, this private regulation is also 
subject to minimum standards set out in EU law.  Consequently the area of organic 
labelling offers an example of a regulatory hybrid that crosses the public/private 
divide.156 
 
The promotion of organic farming was originally established as part of the EU’s 
agricultural and rural policy in the context of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
                                                           
154
 Source: http://www.tesco.com/talkingtesco/response/?page=article21 
155
 From 1 June 2007, additional and more detailed standards regarding environmental protection have 
been introduced and farmers supplying food products to M&S must also follow the M&S Farm 
Environmental Standard.  
(Source: http://www.agrifoodstandards.net/es/news/global/m_s_revises_field_to_fork_assurance.html). 
156
 See further the work by Meidinger (2006) for a discussion of the different ways in which public and 
private entities can interact in the context of private regulation. 
 69 
reform.157  However, organic farming touches upon many ‘other legitimate concerns’.  
These include the sustainable use of resources, high standards of animal and worker 
welfare, environmental protection and land management.   
 
In recent years the regulatory objective of organic labelling in the EU has moved 
towards consumer protection so as to allow consumers to make an informed choice 
about the type of food they choose to consume.  In the wake of multiple food scares 
and concerns about the negative effects of intensive farming on health and the 
environment, it has been suggested that EU consumers have come to associate organic 
products with food safety as they generally consider organic produce as being safer.158  
This is due to the fact that, inter alia, it is subjected to limited chemical usage and 
does not include GMOs.  As a result, the demand for organic foods has consistently 
grown at a high rate in the EU over the last decade.  This has resulted in a premium 
market price for food bearing organic logos.  
 
Different organic labelling schemes have been set by various private standardising 
bodies.  Nevertheless, there is also EU regulation that lays down a minimum standard 
for organic products.  The first EU organic regulation was Regulation EEC/2092/91 
that lays down a legal framework, covering inspection requirements for organic 
certifying bodies, farm conversion to the use of organic status, and organic labelling.  
The second “organic” regulation is EC/1804/1999 that lays down a comprehensive 
                                                           
157
 Which was originally promoted in order to reduce the EU’s agricultural produce surpluses. Agenda 
2000, see: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/agriculture/general_framework/l60002_en.htm. See 
further, Cardwell (2004), p. 38-39. 
158
 It has been stated that the food market in the EU has reached, or at least is very close to, the “hybrid 
level” where consumers draw a strong connection between food safety and the environment in which 
the food is produced; they tend to believe that the closer the food is to nature the safer it is (Echols 
(2001)). In 2006 the EU organic food market was reported to have exceeded the £2 billion threshold and 
has, on average, grown by £7 million every week.  
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baseline standard for organic production159 and includes standards relating to 
particular animal species.160  The legislative framework for organic food is now 
governed under Regulation EC/834/2007,161 Regulation EC/889/2008 and Regulation 
EC/1235/2008.  
 
As a general rule only food products satisfying the minimum criteria for organic food 
under EU law and containing more than 95 percent organic ingredients can be labelled 
as organic.162  Supervision of the use of organic labels is conducted by the competent 
authorities of the Member States.163  EU Regulations have also established an 
authorisation scheme for imports.  To be able to be labelled as organic in the EU 
imports must comply with the EU organic criteria and be certified by an authorised 
organic certification body.164   
 
In practice EU requirements for organic food simply constitute a baseline, with private 
standards often imposing additional and more stringent demands.  Many of these 
additional demands relate to ‘other legitimate concerns’.  For instance the animal 
welfare standards of the Soil Association (SA), a widely recognised and well-
respected UK body, have gone significantly beyond those imposed by EU law.  
Although EU law imposes animal welfare conditions that should be observed when 
raising poultry in high-density establishments,165and whilst EU law establishes a 
maximum flock density for free range birds, the SA standard has gone further to 
                                                           
159
 Such as disease prevention, veterinary treatment, animal welfare and farm management. 
160
 The scope of this includes, for example, cattle, sheep, goats, horses and poultry. 
161
 This Regulation superseded the previous organic Regulation EEC/2092/91.  
162
 Regulation EC/834/2007, Article 23 (4). 
163
 Ibid, Article 27. 
164
 Ibid, Article 33.  
165
 Directive 2007/43/EC. 
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include limits on the number of birds in a flock.  Similarly, with regard to the presence 
of GMOs, the SA standards only allow for 0.1 percent in their final products, 
compared to the EU’s organic limit of 0.9 percent.  As a result there are numerous 
different standards applicable to organic food and numerous different logos available 
for use by producers who comply with these standards.  Some of these logos are set 
out below.166 
 
 
Figure 1  EU Organic Logo 
 
 
            
Czech Republic France  Germany Denmark  
Figure 2  Examples of National Organic Logos  
Source: http://www.organic-europe.net 
 
                                                           
166
 To display the EU’s organic logo (see Figure 1), the ingredients and the product origin on the 
product labels are necessary, though producers have a choice whether to display their national logos 
(see  
Figure 2) or private logos (see  
Table 1) (Article 24, Regulation EC/834/2007). 
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Organisation Country     Logo 
Soil Association UK 
 
Organic Farmers and Growers UK 
 
Bioland  Germany 
 
Skal's 'eko' Netherlands 
 
The Irish Organic Farmers 
and Growers Association  
Ireland 
 
EcoCert France 
 
 
Table 1: Examples of Organic Certification Bodies  
Source: http://www.naturalcollection.com/organic/organic-certification.aspx 
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2.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
The EU’s approach to food safety regulation has evolved rapidly as a result of its 
experience in handling serious and less serious food safety incidents and scares.  It is 
both likely and necessary that its food safety regulation will continue to evolve.  The 
recent E. coli outbreak in Germany was a poignant reminder that despite having a 
system with stringent food safety requirements based on performance and 
management-based regulations, the EU system is far from infallible.  Consequently it 
must be further developed so as to be able to adapt to and handle existing and new 
multifarious risks to which the production and consumption of food products may give 
rise. 
  
This chapter has provided an overview of the core concepts underpinning EU food 
safety regulation, both in official EU legislation as well as in private standards.   
It gives a taste of the complexity of the regulatory environment that Thai stakeholders 
involved in exporting food products to the EU have to face.167  It is vital that Thai 
stakeholders come to grips with this complex regulatory environment so that they are 
able to respond rapidly to the challenges that it presents and intervene in its evolution 
so that due consideration may be given to their interests and concerns.  Only then will 
they be able to safeguard and expand Thailand’s share in the EU food market. 
 
                                                           
167
 The term “Thai stakeholders” in this thesis refers to Thai governmental entities, and producers and 
exporters to the EU.   
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After presenting two detailed case studies relating to fresh and chilled baby corn and 
cooked poultry meat, the next chapter will examine the impact of EU food safety 
regulation in Thailand and the nature of the interactions between the Thai and EU 
competent authorities and other actors in the food export industry.  Further on in this 
thesis, it will also demonstrate that trade between the EU and Thailand has served as a 
powerful driver for regulatory change, not only in Thailand but also in the EU itself. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
THE EXTERNAL EFFECTS OF EU FOOD SAFETY REGULATION 
ON THAILAND 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The EU is a well established and expanding food market for Thai food producers and 
exporters.  With significant income generated from food products exported to the EU, 
Thailand has begun to entrench the EU’s food safety concepts to ensure compliance 
with demanding EU requirements and to maintain its reputation as one of the leading 
food-exporting countries in the world.  Thai stakeholders, both governmental and 
private entities, have put great effort into achieving compliance with EU food safety 
standards.  These efforts have, to a significant degree, been carried out by the three 
departments of the Thai Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC) acting as 
competent authorities (CA) for the purposes of EU law.  The Department of Agriculture 
(DOA) is charged with overseeing vegetable and fruit exports; the Department of 
Livestock Development (DLD) is responsible for products of animal origin and the 
Department of Fisheries (DOF) for aquatic products.  In general Thai CAs are required 
to ensure that their export control procedures are equivalent to those of the EU.168  
 
There have been many initiatives taken by Thai governmental entities in efforts to fulfill 
their roles as CAs for the EU.  To ensure that Thai food exports comply with the 
relevant EU food safety law, Thai CAs have introduced new mechanisms to enhance 
export quality and institutionalise additional food safety checks before the food products 
                                                           
168
 Article 2 (14) of Regulation EC/882/2004 states that ‘equivalence’ means the capability of different 
systems or measures to meet the same objectives. 
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can be given the “all clear” for shipping to the EU.  These mechanisms include both 
voluntary and mandatory programmes, some of which have also been applied to 
products destined for consumption on the domestic market or in other export markets.  
However, there are many mechanisms that are applied specifically to food products 
exported to the EU.169  In recent years Thai food producers and exporters have 
encountered a daunting new challenge, that of achieving compliance with private 
standards as well as with EU law.  As a result, as noted previously, the concept of EU 
food safety regulation is defined here as comprising both legal requirements imposed by 
EU law and private standards that form the basis for access to the EU market. 
 
In light of the diversity of Thai agricultural exports, this chapter examines in detail the 
cross-border effects of EU food safety regulation in the two selected food export 
industries in Thailand, namely fresh or chilled baby corn and cooked poultry meat.  It is 
a lengthy chapter that covers the majority of my empirical work; and is divided into 
three parts:  
Part I comprising a detailed case study on fresh and chilled baby corn; 
Part II comprising a case study on cooked poultry meat; 
Part III in which I will draw upon the results from the two case studies to describe the 
operation of the “Competent Authority (CA) model” which is the regulatory structure 
set up by EU and Thai entities to underpin the cross-border regulation of EU food safety 
law in Thailand.  
 
                                                           
169
 Clear examples include the traceability programmes for EU markets which have been established to 
support the EU RASFF or the special DOA-GAP which is now pre-requisite for all fresh fruit and 
vegetable exports bound for the EU market (See infra, Section 3.2.3.2.3). 
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It should be noted that the focus of the two case studies in Parts I and II is upon issues 
of market access and the nature of the adjustments made by Thai stakeholders, including 
governmental entities, producers and exporters so as to ensure compliance with EU food 
safety standards.170  The specific products featured in the case studies have been 
selected because of their high EU export growth rates.  These two examples cover 
products of non-animal origin and products of animal origin respectively, and the two 
categories are subject to different sets of EU food safety requirements.  Given the 
significance to Thai exporters of the EU market for these products, the two case studies 
will clearly demonstrate the nature and extent of the cross-border impact of EU food 
safety regulation.171  Moreover, since substantial proportions of the selected products 
are bound for the retail and consumer market, they can be found on supermarket shelves 
across the EU172  and are good examples of Thai food exports which are subject to EU 
supermarket controls.  By ascertaining and analysing the experiences of Thai 
stakeholders, it will be possible to identify the positive and negative cross-border effects 
                                                           
170
 It should also be recalled that the term stakeholders is used to refer to those Thai entities, be they 
governmental or private, that are potentially affected by EU food safety regulation.   
171
 The EU market comprises approximately 80 percent of the total Thai export volume of fresh/chilled 
baby corn and 45 percent for poultry products.  Both of these products are also export-oriented; 
approximately 80 percent of baby corn and 40 percent of poultry products produced in Thailand are for 
export.  The importance of EU markets for these selected products is significant when compared with 
other food products.  For example the EU market accounted for approximately 5 percent of total Thai rice 
exports by volume in 2010 (Source: http://www.thairiceexporters.or.th/) and for 10 percent of Thai frozen 
shrimp (Source: http://www.thai-frozen.or.th).  More detailed discussion of the significance of the 
selected products is given as part of the case study introduction below.  Given the significance of exports 
to the EU market for these two selected products, it is possible that the extent of cross border effects of 
EU food safety regulation found in the two case studies is likely to be greater than for exports of food 
produce that have less EU or export significance.  Nonetheless, similar overarching effects of EU food 
safety regulation are expected to be found, although their extents may vary.  In fact, during interviews 
with staff from the Department of Fishery, in relation to frozen shrimp (which has not been selected as a 
case study for this thesis), similar accounts were given regarding the regulatory pattern of EU food safety 
regulation.  This is quite surprising given that only 10 percent of Thai frozen shrimp are exported to the 
EU market.  Further discussion of the general models of EU food safety regulations in Thailand is 
presented in Part III below.  
172
 Fresh baby corn products are packed and flown to be sold in the EU.  In contrast Thai poultry exports 
are packed and sold by the supermarkets themselves, or are included in the supermarkets’ ready meals.  
 78
of EU food safety regulation in Thailand.  Ultimately it will be possible in the light of 
this to put forward constructive proposals to mitigate the adverse effects that occur.  
 
3.2 PART I-   BABY CORN CASE STUDY 
 
3.2.1 Introduction: Fresh/Chilled Baby Corn from Thailand  
 
Baby corn173 was introduced to Thailand by the MOAC in the 1970s.  When originally 
introduced it was intended to be an off-season crop for Thai rice farmers.  However, 
since 1990 it has gained increasing significance and has quickly become one of 
Thailand’s main vegetable exports in its own right.  Thailand has also quickly 
established itself as the world’s top baby corn exporting country with a global market 
share of approximately 70-85 percent.174  Compared with other exports in the fruit and 
vegetable category baby corn has generated a high annual income amounting to US $ 
7.5 million in 2008.175  It is an export-oriented product with over 80 percent of the 
production being bound for export markets.176  Thailand has exported three types of 
baby corn products; fresh or chilled, canned and frozen baby corn.  In this case study the 
focus is on the first fresh or chilled category.177  It should be noted that although a 
smaller proportion of baby corn is exported fresh or chilled under customs category HS 
                                                           
173
 Zea mays L. Family: Gramineae, Genus: Zea. 
174
 The market share varies each year. For example in the year 2004 it held more than 80% of the world 
market share with the highest annual growth (9 percent) in the period 1997-2003 (UNCTAD).  Other 
main exporting countries for baby corn include Sri Lanka, Taiwan, China, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Indonesia, 
South Africa, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Honduras. May 1995,  
175
 223,888,620 Baht (source: The Custom Department, Thailand www.custom.go.th)  US $ 1 = 30 Thai 
Baht.  
176
 Source: http://cm.nesdb.go.th/cluster_baseinfo.asp?ClusterID=c0023 (in Thai). 
177
 In the customs category HS 07099090 (Other vegetables, fresh or chilled, young corn) Source: 
http://exporthelp.europa.eu/index_en.html. 
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0709.90.90, and that the majority of baby corn is exported as canned product,178 the 
fresh or chilled baby corn has become increasingly popular in the EU with the result 
that demand for Thai fresh or chilled baby corn from major EU supermarket chains has 
increased rapidly over the past few years.  It has now become a regular vegetable on 
supermarket shelves and has gained in popularity among EU consumers.179 As a result, 
fresh baby corn now generates around 70 percent of the total income from Thai exports 
of fresh fruit and vegetables to the EU.180 
 
The EU has always been the main market for Thai fresh or chilled baby corn, 
accounting for a market share of around 80 per cent.181  In 2007-8 over 70 percent of all 
fresh or chilled baby corn destined for the EU was for the retail market.182  Within the 
EU, the UK is the leading importing country, accounting for approximately 60 percent 
of the EU demand.183  (See Table 2 below)   
 
                                                           
178
 This is under the customs category HS 0710.80.00.  Canned baby corn exports account for 80 percent 
of total export volume whereas fresh or chilled baby corn accounts for 15% of export volume and the 
frozen category 5% of total export volume. 
179
 Rakpong J., personal interview held during meeting with the Thai Fruit and Vegetable Producer 
Association, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand, 9/07/2008).  
180
 This is in the category “other vegetables, fresh and chilled” (HS 070990) originating in Thailand.  
181
 There has also been an increasing growth in export volumes.  In 2006 the EU imported more than 
1,700 tonnes of fresh baby corn from Thailand, worth around US$5m.  This was a 50 percent increase 
over imports in 2005.  Source: Data obtained from Office of Agricultural Economic Thailand.    
182
 The remaining exports are destined for wholesale markets as manufacturing ingredients, or for ethnic 
markets (such as stalls located in “Chinatowns”).   
183
 The second and third importers are Denmark and Germany.  
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Table 2: Thai Baby Corn Exports 2007-8  
 
Fresh or chilled baby corn is a good example of an export product of “non-animal 
origin”.  Being fresh produce it has a short shelf-life and thus carries higher food safety 
risks than the other two categories of baby corn products.184  As such it has been subject 
to strenuous governmental and industry control.  Further, small farmers in Thailand are 
significantly involved in the production of fresh baby corn, and hence this case study 
can serve as a means of exploring the impact of EU food safety upon small farmers as 
well as upon large agricultural undertakings.185  
 
Fresh or chilled baby corn is currently available in the EU in a variety of forms.  It may 
be freshly packed in plastic packaging, offered as a ready-to-eat vegetable in 
                                                           
184
 They are susceptible to microbial contaminants and residues of chemical substances from the 
production and distribution processes. (Source: Interviews with Associate Professor Vicha Sardsud, 
Director of Post-harvest Institution, Chiang-Mai University, field trip to Wieng-gan, Chiang-Rai, 
Thailand, 1/07/2008 and with Thai Fruit and Vegetable Producer Associations’ representative, Mr. 
Pratom Tankum, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand, 10/07/2008. 
185
 Due to the nature of the plantation procedure, baby corn is planted in rice fields as an off-season crop, 
the majority being run by small-scale rice farmers.  However, in recent years larger scale producers have 
set up their own plantations in order to keep up with the export opportunities. Source: interview with 
Associate Professor Vicha Sardsud, Director of Post-harvest Institution, Chiang-Mai University, field trip 
to Wieng-gan, Chiang-Rai, Thailand, 1/07/2008.  Vicha Sardsud is a leading academic at the Post-harvest 
Institute at Chiangmai University and is an expert on private standards.   
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microwavable packaging, mixed with other vegetables for freshly-prepared products for 
stir-fry, or as a side-vegetable.  Examples of baby corn products found in the fresh 
produce sections of EU supermarkets are depicted below.  
 
  
  
Picture 1: Different Types of Fresh or Chilled Baby Corn Products 
Source: www.ocado.com, www.sainsburys.com, www.tesco.com 
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Baby Corn Production in Thailand  
 
Baby corn plantations produce a high yield and are suited to many rural areas across 
Thailand.  The baby corn is generally planted in local rice fields as small-scale 
plantations.186  Depending on the region, it can be planted from October to May as a 
post-rice harvest crop.   However, there is increasingly large-scale cultivation of baby 
corn and in these circumstances it tends to be planted as the main crop rather than as a 
complement to rice.  It is a short-life crop with a plantation period of around 50 days.  
In a calendar year, a farmer can grow up to three crops of baby corn per plantation.187   
 
Although baby corn can be planted throughout Thailand, the highest density of crop 
plantations is in the western and central parts of the country, and especially in 
Kanchnaburi and Nakhon Pathom provinces where there are large plantations owned 
and run by exporters, most of the output of which is destined for the EU market.188  
Substantial quantities are also grown in the valleys of Northern Thailand, especially in 
Chiangmai189 and its surrounding provinces.  The plantations in Northern Thailand tend 
to be smaller than those in the western and central parts and are generally owned by 
clusters of individual small-scale farmers.  As of 2008 the total estimated plantation 
area in Thailand had increased to in excess of 300,000 hectares.190 
                                                           
186
 Between 0.24-0.32 hectare. UNCTAD (2007), p. 55. 
187
 Rakpong J., personal interview held during meeting with Mr. Namjan the leader of Mae Ta 
cooperative, Mae-on sub-district 21/07/2008).  
188
 These provinces are located approximately 30-60 miles from Bangkok. The western area of Thailand 
is one of the country’s main areas for fruit and vegetable exports.  The DOA’s survey conducted in 2005 
reveals that the plantation area in Kanchanaburi was 122,934 hectares with produce yields of 1,409.29 
kilograms per hectare.  This is significant as compared with the second largest baby corn province, 
Rajchaburi, which has 16,457 hectares under cultivation and produces 1,071 kilograms per hectare 
(source: Department of Agriculture, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives). 
189
 Which is the second largest city in Thailand 
190
 Interview with Associate Professor Vicha Sardsud, The Director of Post-harvest Institution, Chiang-
Mai University, field trip to Wieng-gan, Chiang-Rai, Thailand, 1/07/2008.  
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Picture 2, 3, 4: Baby Corn Plantation Chiang Mai, Thailand 
Source: Author’s own camera 
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3.2.2 Distribution Channels for Fresh/Chilled Baby Corn  
 
3.2.2.1 International Distribution Channels  
 
In the early years supply was through a system of brokers.  However, with more 
demanding export regulation and with the need for exporters to conduct thorough 
quality control in order to win supply contracts with EU importers, the distribution 
channels have changed.  They are now largely controlled and run by exporters, either 
through contract farming with small farmers or through their own large scale 
plantations.191  In the latter case the move towards exporters’ own plantations has only 
recently occurred in an endeavour to keep up with export demand and in order for 
exporters to have some control of their supply volume.  This proportion has been 
growing, but still represents a small portion of baby corn export production. 
 
With respect to contract farming, which is the principal distribution channel for baby 
corn exports, exporters will provide the small-scale contract farmers with essential raw 
materials for their baby corn plantation including seeds, fertilizers and chemical 
substances permitted under EU law.  They will also guarantee a minimum price to be 
paid.  The minimum price is conditional upon specified product quantity and quality.192  
Failure to meet these specifications can result in an exporter rejecting a farmer’s 
produce, or in the farmer’s produce being bought at a much lower price.193  This type of 
                                                           
191
 Source: Rakpong J, personal interview with Mr. and Mrs. Nikorn (fruit and vegetable brokers), Lanna 
Frozen Co., Chiangmai, Thailand, 23/06/08. 
192
 In September 2008, the guaranteed price per kilogram for baby corn exports was around 15 Baht 
(around 30 pence, £1= 50 Baht) whereas the retail price in the UK is approximately £ 8 for ordinary baby 
corn and £ 12 for organic baby corn.  Rakpong J., group interview with baby corn farmers, Mae Ta, Mae-
On sub-district Chiangmai 27/07/2008.  
193
 Around 7 Baht (Around 14 pence) per kilogram, source: data provided during a group interview with 
baby corn farmers, at Mae Ta, Mae-On sub-district Chiangmai 27/07/2008. 
 85
contract arrangement, without the intervention of a broker, involves direct contact 
between an exporter and a farmer.194   This system gives large exporters considerable 
control over the production process and over product quality. 195  Since they provide the 
farmers with the main materials for production they also have better records of product 
history in relation, for example, to seeds, chemical and fertilizer use, and harvesting and 
packaging.  Where a quality condition is placed upon final products, exporters and 
occasionally DOA staff are allowed to make regular visits to the plantations to comment 
upon farmers’ production processes and to suggest any corrective methods required to 
ensure compliance with EU food safety regulation. 
 
As for small farmers, securing contract farming arrangements with large exporters is a 
significant achievement.  It can provide them with access to the international market and 
guarantee a reliable income in a given season.  It can also offer them some access to 
training and knowledge transfer from the exporters, including in relation to specific 
food safety issues and in up-to-date EU food safety requirements.  This is especially 
important in relation to chemical pesticide residue levels and to the “critical control 
points” for HACCP, procedures which needed to be established during the packaging 
stage.  However the farmers must accept that they can be subject to rigorous exporters’ 
controls and if they cannot meet the qualitative or quantitative standards set by the 
exporters they may need to repay the cost of seeds and other raw materials to the 
exporters.  As noted above, exporters may also reject sub-standard products or buy them 
at a significantly reduced price.  This is especially serious in the baby corn sector where 
                                                           
194
 Rakpong J., personal interviews with Mr. Rattanasirimontri, Chatchawan Import Export and 
Packaging, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand, 8/07/2008. 
195
 Examples of such exporters include Swift Co, River Kwai and KC Fresh.  
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there is limited domestic demand in Thailand where the home market is already over-
supplied. 
 
This system, despite creating a higher standard of quality control, leaves small farmers 
in a position where they can be exploited by exporters who may reject produce using the 
pretext that it is of low quality.  In recent years rural farmers have had to follow ever 
more strict and rigid sets of rules imposed upon them by exporters in their endeavours 
to ensure that the products comply with demanding private standards – for example 
GlobalGAP standard – as well as with the demands imposed by EU law. 
 
It has been argued by many domestic non-governmental organisations (NGOs)196and by 
academics197 that this process of contract farming has also created negative effects on 
the livelihood and lifestyle of small farmers.  Planting baby corn requires considerable 
attention and manual work, especially towards the harvesting period when the 
“masculine buds” have to be manually removed daily.   This is in order to prevent cross-
pollination which would otherwise result in low productivity and uneven “odd-shape” 
corn which would be also unsuitable for the EU retail market.198  Thus for about one 
month from the date that the masculine buds start to appear, baby corn farmers have to 
stay constantly at the plantation to tend the crop day and night to ensure that the 
                                                           
196
 Including the FTA Watch Group, the Green World Foundation, People Democratic Society and 
Prachathai Group. Sources consecutively (all in Thai):  
 www.ftawatch.org,http://www.greenworld.or.th/1_news_sakop_10.htm, 
http://www.prachatai.com/journal/2005/05/4127.  
197
 See for example, Delfroge (2007), Sukhpal (2005)  
198
 Usually these masculine buds start to appear from clusters of young leaves at the tip of the stem when 
the trees reach the age of 38 days.  Usually they can harvest the corns 5-10 days after removing the 
masculine buds.  The farmers are required to try to remove these masculine buds by hand and must do 
this in the early morning every day until the end of the harvesting period (which lasts for approximately a 
month). Source: information provided during a group interview with baby corn farmers, at Mae Ta, Mae-
On sub-district Chiangmai 27/07/2008. 
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masculine buds are removed early in the morning and that their baby corn is harvested 
before becoming too large or overripe.  This is the reason that baby corn has been 
dubbed by NGOs and local villagers as an “anti-social plant” – one which prevents 
farmers from joining village fairs or social gatherings.199  
 
EU supermarkets require that baby corn is between 4-9 centimetres in length with the 
radius of a corn between of 1-1.5 cm.  The shape of the cob must be perfect.    
As noted, it must be light yellow colour and have straight lines of small seeds.   
It should be stressed that these specific requirements regarding the size, colour and 
shape of baby corn are imposed by the supermarkets themselves and are passed up the 
supply chain by exporters to farmers.200 
 
 
Picture 5: Perfect Baby Corn Fit for the EU Market 
Source: Author’s own camera 
Location: A farmers’ house, Mae Ta, Chiang Mai  
                                                           
199
 Source: Thai articles e.g.  http://advisor.anamai.moph.go.th/tamra/decen/mitre08.html, Rakpong J., 
Personal interviews with Mr. Apaimool, Mae Ta, Mae-On sub-district Chiangmai 27/07/2008. 
200
 Baby corn is not included in the “Carrots or Apples Legislation” where EU governmental Regulation 
requests 26 fruits and vegetable products to be of certain size, colour or shapes.  e.g. Regulation  
EC/730/1999 laying down the marketing standard for carrots and Regulation EC/85/2004 for apples or 
European Union Commission Regulation EC/86/2004 ,for pears. 
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Once the products have been harvested and brought to the packaging house by farmers 
or exporters they will be cleaned and graded.201  Only those of the highest grade will be 
sold as fresh baby corn to the export retail market.  Products of a lesser quality but of 
the correct size will be passed on to manufacturers of canned or frozen baby corn.202  
Products which do not meet these specifications will be sold on the domestic market or 
used as animal feed.  Thereafter fresh baby corn will be packed and branded.  Most 
fresh baby corn is placed in perforated plastic clamshells or in plastic trays wrapped 
with cling-film, punnets or thick plastic bags to be sold on the EU retail and wholesale 
markets.  The individual package size sold by the EU supermarkets is between 120-250 
grams (See Picture 1 above).  After packaging processes the baby corn will be sent to be 
stored in a cold packaging house ready for transportation.   
The transportation means for fresh/chilled baby corn from Thailand to the EU is by air.  
Altogether the process from harvesting to export takes just 36-48 hours.  
   
From a number of interviews conducted with groups of baby corn producers it is clear 
that producers are not primarily concerned about the demanding requirements imposed 
by EU food safety regulation.  On the contrary, the farmers accept that quality 
requirements are a pre-condition to achieve a constant and augmented income.  Over the 
years the farmers have become familiar with the demands imposed by official EU food 
safety regulation, and they have a good knowledge of what they have to do in order to 
comply with it.  For example, they are cautious in respect of chemical usage prior to the 
                                                           
201
 Here, the HACCP process would start to be applied.   
202
 In most cases this still belongs to large exporting companies such as Swift, River Kwai or KC Fresh. 
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harvesting period, are aware of the need to establish a HACCP programme after primary 
production,203 and are attuned to the need to maintain traceability records.204 
 
However, farmers and baby corn exporters did express concerns about additional 
requests by EU supermarkets to obtain certification of compliance with private 
standards.  Certification of this kind involves meeting even stricter food safety 
requirements. For example, with regard to traceability the GlobalGAP and SA standards 
require the recording of considerable additional information.  They also impose 
requirements in respect of ‘other legitimate concerns’ such as environmental and 
wildlife protection.  These requirements are constantly evolving and compliance 
involves significantly higher production costs, more manual labour and they can be 
impractical to implement locally, especially in rural areas of Thailand.205 This is a point 
to which I will return in Chapter 6. 
 
3.2.2.2 Domestic Distribution Channels  
 
There are different distribution channels for domestically consumed and exported baby 
corn.  There are two types of domestic distribution channel: the more lucrative giant 
supermarket chains on one hand and local markets on the other.  Domestically 
consumed products are not subjected to the same level of food safety control as 
products bound for the EU.  However, the products destined for large domestic 
                                                           
203
 Upon visiting packaging factories during the field-trips, some HACCP practices could be observed, for 
instance workers had to wear gloves and use sterilised hand gel, the designated packaging areas were 
sealed-off, and the knives used to cut baby corns and the baskets used to pack the corns were sterilised. 
204
 Although in theory a traceability requirement does not apply across the border, (see supra, Section 2.3, 
the DOA has, on its own initiative, introduced traceability schemes for baby corn and other important 
fruits and vegetable exports (see further discussion in Section 3.2.3.2.3)    
205
 Rakpong J. Personal interviews with Mr. Apaimool, Mae Ta, Mae-On sub-district Chiangmai 
27/07/2008.  This will be discussed later in Section 3.2.5.  
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supermarkets are likely to be of higher quality and to achieve a higher food safety level 
than those sold at local markets.  The baby corn available in Thai supermarkets is 
increasingly supplied by the same large exporters that supply the EU market.  In 
addition, a number of giant supermarket chains in Thailand such as Top Supermarket, 
Tesco Lotus and Carrefour increasingly demand that fresh baby corn products meet 
defined standards.  At a minimum they require fresh baby corn to be certified by DOA-
GAP, a governmental food safety certification introduced by the DOA.206  Some 
domestic supermarkets, including Top supermarkets and the Mall, also prefer fresh baby 
corn products to be certified with the “Q” mark, another good agricultural practice 
certification which is granted by the National Bureau of Agricultural Commodity and 
Food standards (ACFS) of the MOAC.207   
 
On the other hand products supplied to local markets are still provided through the 
broker system whereby local brokers collect fresh produce from a number of small 
farmers.208  These can be the “left over” supply of low-quality graded products which 
have been rejected for supply to export markets or those which are not subject to 
rigorous food safety controls.  The prices at local markets are therefore lower.  (See 
picture 6 and 7 below) 
                                                           
206
 This is a first step towards obtaining official export certification for the EU. 
207
 Q mark is generally considered to be a more rigorous standard than DOA-GAP certifications. 
208
 Almost 99 percent of small growers rely on brokers to collect their products and deliver them to 
packinghouses (UNCTAD 2007).  
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Picture 6: Vegetable Stall in a Local Market 
Source: Author’s own camera 
Location: Chiang Mai  
 
Picture 7: Vegetable Section in Thai Supermarket  
Source: Author’s own camera 
Location: Chiang Mai  
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3.2.3 Regulatory Environment for Exports to the EU market  
 
3.2.3.1 Control Mechanisms and Import Checks in the EU   
 
Once the products reach EU ports, compliance with these requirements will be checked 
by the border inspection post (BIP) officers and/or by customs officers in the Member 
States.  Records of non-compliance by specific categories of products, producers and 
countries will also be generated.  In practice, however, it is impossible for the BIP to 
carry out full compliance checks for every consignment entering EU territory.  Thus 
systematic random checks are carried out by them; these rely on (I) the export certificate 
issued by the Thai DOA, (II) the compliance history of a particular country, a particular 
product or a particular exporter.  Once baby corn products pass these border checks they 
are treated as if they are EU products and may be traded throughout the EU.  
 
3.2.3.2 Control Mechanisms in Thailand  
 
3.2.3.2.1 DOA as a Competent Authority for Baby Corn Exports to the EU  
 
In the case of fresh fruit and vegetables, including fresh or chilled baby corn, the main 
responsibility for conducting the CA’s work is vested in the DOA.  Under the MOAC’s 
framework, the DOA is responsible for “the control of marketing and use of plant 
protection products and the controls of pesticides used in foodstuff of plant origin 
intended for export”.  It has also been regarded as being the main national plant 
protection organisation.  In other words the DOA is responsible under national law for 
all sanitary and phytosanitary controls of fruit and vegetable products bound for high 
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value markets, including the EU.  The DOA holds regular meetings with exporters to 
present them with up-to-date information on importing countries’ requirements209 and to 
address any pressing compliance issues.210 
 
Within the DOA there are two sub-departments responsible for export controls: 1) 
Office of Agricultural Regulation – which performs inspections of vegetable exports, 
and 2) Plant Protection Research and Development – which provides scientific support, 
diagnostics and accreditation facilities.211  With regards to baby corn exported to the 
EU, the CA’s work is directed towards guaranteeing that exported products destined for 
the EU comply with relevant EU food safety regulations.212   The DOA can issue export 
and plant certificates attesting that Thai exports comply with relevant EU food safety 
law.  In turn, Thai baby corn producers are able to enjoy presumed equivalency status 
and are only occasionally subject to full checks by the BIPs at EU borders.213   
                                                           
209
 During these meetings the DOA will also be able to answer questions posed by exporters.  In cases 
where the Department is unable to provide answers, further efforts can be made either by the DOA itself 
or by Thai Embassy in Brussels to seek an answer from EU entities.  This issue is discussed further as 
part of network communication in Chapter 4 and 5 (see infra, Section 4.1.1.2.2 and Section 5.2).   
210
 These are conducted under the DOA’s own initiatives for important vegetable exports, including baby 
corn.  The meetings are scheduled for every 6-8 weeks.  However, special meetings can take place when 
emergencies arise.  For example, during the periods pre- and post-FVO’s visits, or when the DOA has 
been notified through the RASFF of food safety incidents concerning Thai vegetable exports.  This has 
occurred, for example, in the case of Shigella incident and the recent microbial contamination (late 2010-
early 2011).  
211
 However it is not directly responsible for establishing conditions for export products. This 
responsibility belongs to the DFT of the MOC.  This fragmentation of responsibility has created problems 
for the CA in conducting its duties.   
212
 As required under Article 11, Regulation EC/178/2002, food imported into the EU must comply with 
the relevant requirements of food law or with conditions recognised by the EU to be at least equivalent to 
the EU standards.  
213
 Complete checks at EU border are performed routinely through a sampling process, depending on 
which areas of food safety are likely to be in breach and the compliance history of the export country and 
producers.  This is considered advantageous as in normal circumstances the products bearing export 
certification from the Thai CA will only be subjected to partial checks, for instance appearance and 
phytosanitary checks at the EU borders.  In some importing countries with which the Thai government 
does not have such arrangements, products could be subject to comprehensive and thorough border 
checks.  
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Likewise, producers and exporters in Thailand who wish to export their food products 
to the EU must comply at the outset with specific sets of regulations issued by the DOA.   
 
As a third country CA, the DOA is subject to inspections by the EU’s Food and 
Veterinary Office (FVO) to ensure that effective SPS control mechanisms have been put 
in place.214  The frequency of these FVO inspections and the issues raised will vary 
depending on the FVO’s planned inspection programmes, which are reviewed every 6 
months, according to the FVO’s food safety priorities and the compliance record of the 
country concerned.  So far, the FVO has carried out six specific missions to assess the 
DOA’s competence on issues relating to the control of pesticides215 and plant health.216   
 
During each FVO inspection DOA staff arrange for FVO inspectors to visit an 
exporter’s plantations and processing establishment and will accompany them 
throughout such visits.  During and after the visits FVO and DOA staff are able to 
exchange information and concerns on the issues unearthed during the mission.  Such 
communication may be conducted verbally, on-the-spot, during the course of the 
inspection, or the DOA may be requested to submit written reports to the FVO.  During 
FVO visits, farmers or exporters can also be called upon to explain their practices.  A 
number of planned visits are usually organised by the DOA prior to the arrival of the 
inspectors.  However, FVO inspectors are able to make additional requests for 
                                                           
214
 FVO inspections are conducted under the framework laid down under Article 46 of Regulation 
EC/882/2004 and in agreement with the Ministry of Commerce, Thailand.  
215
 The missions were carried out in January 2006 and March 2008 and most recently in March 2010. 
216
 These missions took place in November 2006 and September 2008 addressing certification of plant 
health, and more recently in September 2010 on general export controls.   
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spontaneous visits to inspect other premises not included in the planned inspection 
programmes.   
 
After the inspection visit a draft FVO report is written by FVO staff and is presented to 
the DOA.  This report contains FVO conclusions on specific issues raised during the 
visit.  It often specifies the exact control points that need to be addressed by the DOA 
and also contains detailed recommendations on specific actions which should be taken 
by the DOA in order to fully comply with EU food safety law.  The DOA will have 
opportunity to provide information and explanations and to comment on the draft FVO 
report prior to the final report being compiled and subsequently published on the FVO 
website.  Meetings between the DOA and Thai exporters are usually conducted before 
the DOA’s response is sent to the FVO so that the exporters will have an opportunity to 
explain their compliance record to the DOA.  The final FVO report evaluates the 
DOA’s ability to control export product quality in accordance with relevant EU food 
safety standards.  The content of these can vary widely, depending upon the severity of 
non-compliance.  They may contain subtle recommendations for behavioural change, 
request the establishment of additional action plans, impose a temporary import ban or 
even bring about a temporary or permanent revocation of CA status.  EU 
recommendations relevant to Thai exporters’ compliance are presented and explained to 
producers and exporters during the regular meetings which take place subsequent to the 
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inspections.  To date no temporary import ban or revocation of CA status has occurred 
in relation to the Thai DOA in respect of baby corn exports to the EU.217   
 
3.2.3.2.2 Legal Mechanisms and Export Procedures:  
 
All Thai baby corn exported to the EU is subject to three tiers of regulation (See Table 
3, below).  Firstly, all Thai baby corn is subject to general domestic food laws which are 
applicable to all food products produced or marketed in Thailand regardless of their 
destination or origin.218  This includes legislation which regulates production processes, 
namely the Plant Seed Act B.E. 2518 (1975),219 the Fertilizer Act B.E. 2518 (1975) and 
the Dangerous Substance Act B.E. 2535 (1992)220  as well as domestic post-harvest 
legislation including the National Food Act B.E. 2522 (1979), the Agricultural 
Standards Act B.E. 2551 (2008)221 and Consumer Protection Act B.E. 2522 (1979) plus 
                                                           
217
 Despite this, there have been cases where FVO reports have led to temporary imports bans covering 
the entire agricultural industry from other countries.  For example, this occurred in respect of Pakistani 
marine products in April 2007 (Source: http://www.financialexpress.com/news/eu-ban-on-pakistan-
marine-products-to-benefit-india/194842/). The temporary suspension of CA status was recently 
threatened for the DOA in December 2010, upon the occurrence of high levels of chemicals found in Thai 
vegetables in 2010-2011.  However, this did not actually occur since the DOA took steps to demonstrate 
to DG-SANCO that it was still able to control the quality of exports to the EU, even though this did 
involve a voluntary ban being imposed.  See further discussion in Chapter 6.1.2 infra. 
218
 These domestic laws have been proposed by the Department of Agriculture and approved by the 
Parliament through the normal legislative procedure. Source: 
http://www.doa.go.th/th/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51&Itemid=74 (“Knowing 
the Department”  (in Thai),  
219 
 B.E. is the abbreviation for Buddhist Era, the system of year numbering used in Thailand.  The 
corresponding B.E. year is mostly 543 greater than the equivalent A.D. year.  This Act prohibits the 
importation of GM seeds for commercial purposes. Source: common knowledge in Thailand.   
220
 The 1992 Act was directed towards controlling the use of dangerous chemical fertilizers, pesticides 
and herbicides.   Source: www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th (in Thai). English translation of the Act is available 
at: http://www.diw.go.th/law/hazae.html. 
221
 This requires that some food producers, exporters and importers must obtain certification from the 
ACFS or the certifying bodies which are approved by the ACFS. Source: www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th (in 
Thai). English translation of the Act is available at: 
http://www.acfs.go.th/km/download/AGRICULTURAL_STANDARDS_ACT.pdf.  
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other relevant ministries’ announcements.222  This domestic legislation lays down, as a 
first tier of regulation, basic standards on food safety hygiene for all food products 
commercially produced or sold in Thailand.  Compared with the rigorous food safety 
laws applicable in the EU, this Thai legislation falls far short of delivering the food 
safety standards required by the EU.  As a consequence fresh or chilled baby corn 
exported to the EU market is subject to further requirements.  These additional 
requirements can be seen as a second tier of regulation applicable to Thai exports.  They 
have been mainly implemented by the DOA, and to a lesser extent by other sub-
departments of the MOAC and other ministries.  
 
Compared to other fresh fruits and vegetables baby corn is regarded by the DOA as an 
important export crop and is subject to particularly rigorous controls.  The control 
processes for exports are divided into phytosanitary and sanitary controls.  
 
For phytosanitary controls the consignment must be accompanied by a Phytosanitary 
Certificate (PC) issued by the DOA.  The PC will be given if the DOA is satisfied that 
the exported products do not show any signs of plant diseases or pests.  In general 
exporters must send samples of baby corn to be exported to the phytosanitary control 
department of the DOA a few days prior to exportation so that appropriate checks for 
insects and any plant diseases can be carried out.  
                                                           
222
 These include, for example, the Ministry of Health’s Announcement No. 288, B.E. 2548 concerning 
dangerous substances in food.  The Annexes to the Act provide a list of maximum residue limits of some 
dangerous chemical substances, including Carbaryl Methomyl and Cypermethrin that can be found in 
fresh baby corn.   Source: www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th, http://www.fda.moph.go.th/fda-
net/html/product/food/ntfmoph/ntf288.pdf (in Thai).  
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With regard to sanitary checks, baby corn products destined for the EU market will be 
subject to various checks by the DOA and other governmental agencies.  The 
requirements on sanitary issues are quite extensive considering that products sold 
domestically or to many other export markets such as the USA do not have to pass the 
same level of pre-export inspections. 223  Nonetheless, in such cases these products are 
still subject to Thai general domestic food law, some domestic law applicable to exports 
to all countries and will be subject to even more rigorous checks at importing countries’ 
borders.  
 
Firstly the sanitary checks concern maximum residue limits (MRL) of chemical 
substances.224  Specific Thai laws have been passed to enable the DOA to carry out 
these tasks, including the Plant Quarantine Act 1964 (amended 1 March 2008) and the 
Ministry of Commerce Announcements (of 11 April 2003, 23 February 2009 and 4 
August 2009) specifying commodities that need to obtain a health certificate prior to 
                                                           
223
 For example US-bound baby corn exports are not subject to a similar level of DOA checks mainly 
because there is no CA system in place between the US and Thai authorities.  Thai baby corn exports are 
still subject to food safety inspection at the borders.  US import controls for non-meat, poultry and egg 
products are not based on the presumed equivalency status of third countries CA and food safety systems, 
unlike the CA model.  Instead the import food safety inspections are performed by the Food and Drug 
Agency (FDA) at the border rather than through external inspection “missions” in third countries which is 
the case with the EU FVO.  However, US controls of food safety for imports are different and more 
rigorous for poultry, meat and egg products where the system is under the responsibility of the USDA 
(United States Department of Agriculture).  In such cases import controls are, by and large, similar to the 
CA model.  The inspections are carried out both in third countries, based upon their ability to ensure 
satisfactory food safety levels for exports to the US, and at the US border (called the re-inspection).  (See 
Zach and Bier (2009), p. 153).  
224
 The checks are for 30 groups of pesticides within the Organochlorines groups (13 chemical types), 
Cypermethrin group (6 types), Carbamates group (4 types) and Dithiocarbamates groups ( 4 types) and 
Benzimidazoles group (3 types) and 4 other types of herbicides.  
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exportation.225  Up to two weeks prior to exportation exporters must submit samples to 
one of the three DOA-owned laboratories226 or to another DOA-certified laboratory so 
that checks can be carried out on the level of controlled chemical and microbial 
substances.  If the samples pass this test they will be issued with the DOA’s MRL 
approval form.227  Once this form has been granted exporters must present it to the 
Department of Foreign Trade (DFT) of the Ministry of Commerce in order to obtain a 
health certification.  This process is, to a significant extent, merely procedural.  As long 
as the products are approved by the DOA export certificates are generally issued.   
 
Additional checks will also be carried out by a DOA-approved laboratory to ensure that 
the product is free from microbial contamination, especially from E. coli and 
Salmonella which are commonly found in fresh produce from tropical and sub-tropical 
countries.  This is especially important given Thailand’s poor record in respect of 
microbial contamination of vegetable products.228  Only products which show no trace 
of the microbial substances in question will be issued with the DOA’s Certificate of 
                                                           
225
 The new process supplements Ministry of Commerce Announcement B.E. 2546 (2003).  Under this 
process fresh and chilled baby corn exported to the EU and six other countries (Singapore, Malaysia, 
Japan, China, Hong Kong and the US) must obtain export certificates before it can leave Thailand for the 
destination countries.  This legal arrangement between the DOA and DFT has been conducted in an 
unusual manner to grant the DOA power quickly so that they could use their expertise and CA status to 
control issues regarding chemical MRL “though the back door”.  Following several breaches of EU rules 
on MRL of chemical and biological substances, the DOA needed to be able to establish appropriate 
systems promptly to comply with the request of the FVO.  It would have taken a long time for new 
legislation to confirm that the power of regulating MRL of chemical substances was vested with the 
DOA.  Hence it made an official request to the DFT which, at that time, had discretion to impose 
additional qualifications for export.     
226
 This is called the Agricultural Production Sciences Research and Development Office of the DOA. 
227
 This is issued by the Plant Standard Certification Office of the DOA. 
228
 Department of Agriculture Notification on 18 August 2005 requires that 9 types of vegetable exported 
to the EU must bear a certificate of E. coli and Salmonella Analysis. 
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Approval.229  This is required to be presented to the customs staff along with the PC and 
DFT’s export certifications. 
 
At the ports and prior to the consignments leaving the country baby corn is randomly re-
checked by Thai customs officers.   This on-the-spot custom check is conducted to 
detect any visible insects, plant diseases or unauthorised consignments.  However, it 
does not involve additional laboratory checks.230  Once the products reach the port of 
arrival in the EU, they will be randomly checks by the BIP.  Here the checks can be 
carried out for both phytosanitary and sanitary purposes and to verify that the proper 
paperwork has been completed.  
 
The third tier of regulation is in relation to private standards and will be discussed in 
Section 3.2.4 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
229
 Issued by the Plant Standard Certification Office of the DOA. 
230
 The check will be conducted at least 3 hours before the product departure.  Since October 2007 the 
DOA has introduced a strict blacklist procedure for those who breach the PC requirements.  In severe 
cases where Thai customs staff find unregistered products in a consignment, the unregistered products 
will be removed.  In the case of a recurrence the PC will be revoked for the whole consignment and future 
consignments from breaching exporters will be subject to 100% checks.  If the recurrence takes place 
three times, the PC will be revoked and a PC will not be issued for the applicable exporter for at least 30 
days.  This results in the exporter’s total inability to export products to the EU.  If the breach is found at 
EU ports and is notified to the DOA, the PC to the notified country will not be issued for the breached 
exporters for 30 days, meaning they are suspended from exporting.   
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3.2.3.2.3 Compliance with EU Regulations  
 
The main EU management-based regulations as discussed in the previous chapter, 
namely those regarding HACCP and traceability must also be complied with by all 
exporters to the EU.    
 
The DOA has made HACCP compliance part of the DOA-GAP and GMP programmes 
which were established in 2008.  The programmes are based on management-based 
food safety principles and include compulsory compliance with HACCP.  
 
Since 1st January 2008 Thai baby corn exporters have been required to obtain products 
only from DOA-GAP certified farms and if their products are sold as ready-packed 
products their factories must also be certified under a DOA-approved GMP 
programme.231   To a large extent the DOA-GAP is drawn from the main GAP and 
GMP principles which are similar to those featured in many private standards including 
GlobalGAP.  These DOA-GAP and GMP requirements are imposed in addition to the 
requirements that they must be registered with the DOA, must obtain a PC, an export 
certificate and also satisfy the required MRL limits of chemical and microbial 
substances.  Failure to comply would result in their products being refused export 
certification, to the exporter being placed on a negative list and if repeated infractions 
are recorded exporters may be subject to a long-term ban.232    
                                                           
231
 As well as 32 other fresh fruits and vegetable products to the EU.  Currently there are about 60 
approved exporters.  Most of these supply fresh or chilled baby corn to the EU.  About 10 of these 
companies export in large quantities.  
232
 This abrupt change can be problematic for small and medium –sized producers, at least in the short 
term (see further Section 3.5, infra).  Nevertheless, it was claimed by the DOA’s staff at the time of the 
interviews in 2008 that such changes were necessary to limit compliance problems at EU border.  It was 
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Regarding traceability, the EU claims that the traceability regulation does not apply 
externally as part of the EU’s food safety import regime.233  In practice, however, 
traceability has been applied by the DOA to all baby corn exports to the EU as a 
condition to obtain its GAP and GMP certifications.  This traceability requirement is 
imposed on Thai producers and exporters on the DOA’s own initiative despite the fact 
that they are, in theory, not obliged to comply since traceability obligations only 
commence once imports enter EU border.234 
   
To supplement the traceability obligation required under the DOA-GAP and GMP 
scheme the DOA has also established its own traceability database to keep records for 
all important fruit and vegetable exports, including fresh and chilled baby corn, 
exported to the EU market.235  This DOA’s database is aimed at enhancing the DOA’s 
CA role.  As a result of this development prompt detection of the source of food safety 
deficiencies concerning Thai exports has been possible.  At present, fresh or chilled 
baby corn exporters and their contracted farmers are expected to have effective 
traceability systems in place.236  Most of these systems are paper-based, but larger 
exporters tend to use specialised traceability software.   
                                                                                                                                                                          
claimed that as a result of the Department’s Announcement, Thailand had not received any Rapid Alerts 
on Salmonella or E. coli in vegetables in 2008 up to mid-year, and that the use of management-based 
regulations had reduced food safety incidents in Thailand’s exports. However, this claim is questionable 
as there have been recent frequent incidents at the during 2010 which have led the Thai CA to impose an 
export ban during January – February 2011 on the majority of its fresh vegetable exports to the EU.  (See 
infra Section 3.4.2.2). 
233
 See supra, Chapter 2 (Section 2.3) Traceability obligations theoretically start once imports reach the 
EU, i.e. in the supply chain it is imposed first on EU importers.  In practice, however, traceability has also 
been applied to Thai baby corn producers and exporters through private standards and through voluntary 
efforts of the Thai CA in establishing its own system.  
234
 Source: supra, fn 74. In addition traceability records have also been required by EU importers as part 
of private contractual obligation since the regulation came into force in 2003.  This will be discussed in 
relation to private standards in Section 3.2 below 
235
 Namely, for the PC and export approval.  
236
 Although these are not officially required to secure EU market access.  
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3.2.4 Private Regulation  
 
This is a third tier of regulation mentioned earlier.  As has already been made clear, 
Thai baby corn producers and exporters also have to comply with various private 
standards imposed upon them by EU importers.  These act as a third tier of regulation.  
The three tiers of regulation are captured by Table 3 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Three tiers of food safety regulation applicable to Thai baby corn exports 
to the EU 
 
Private standards are considered to fall outside the scope of either EU governmental 
food safety regulation or the CA model, and are considered by the EU and the Thai 
government to be private dealings since they are established, managed, certified and 
mutually accepted by private parties.237  With this type of regulation, producers and 
exporters agree with their EU business counterparts, as part of their contractual 
                                                           
237
 DG SANCO has distanced itself from private standards, stating that it is “part of a commercial 
agreement between two voluntary parties in a free market, and as such is not subject to regulatory 
intervention”. Evidence can be seen in many of its documents on this issue, for example on its website 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/organisations/sps/otherissues_en.print.htm (See also Lee (2006)).  
In relation to Thai governmental entities’ views on private regulation, sources are the interviews with a 
number of Thai officials.  
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obligations, that they will obtain relevant private certification prior to supplying their 
goods to EU importers.   
 
Private regulation has recently come to attention since its influence upon Thai producers 
and exporters has grown tremendously.  This can clearly be seen in the case of fresh or 
chilled baby corn.  It can be said that nowadays almost all EU importers of baby corn 
require that Thai exports be certified in accordance with a variety of private standards.  
As such these standards have become de facto conditions for access to the EU market.   
 
In this chapter the main private standards applicable to Thai baby corn exporters to EU 
markets will be set out.  However, because of various important issues that have arisen 
through the application of private standards, the impact that these standards have had on 
Thai producers and exporters will be subsequently presented in Chapter 6. 
 
3.2.4.1 GlobalGAP: A New Condition for EU Market Access 
 
Two main types of private standards operate as EU market access conditions for Thai 
baby corn.  As a minimum the majority of fresh or chilled baby corn destined for the 
EU market has to be certified in accordance with the ‘GlobalGAP’ standard.238   
 
GlobalGAP standards cover two types of requirements, SPS and non-SPS issues.  SPS 
requirements concentrate on HACCP, traceability and MRLs of microbial and chemical 
substances.  In other words it incorporates most food safety issues that have already 
been covered by EU food safety law.   However, the requirements under GlobalGAP are 
stricter and are often laid down in more specific terms.  For example, GlobalGAP 
                                                           
238
 For description of GlobalGAP see supra, Section 2.5.3.1.  
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specifies the exact CCPs and procedures for producers to comply with at each CCP.  It 
also requests additional traceability information and requires that this be kept for a 
longer period. 239     
 
Moreover it encompasses many additional requirements on non-SPS issues in relation to 
‘other legitimate concerns’, including the protection of the environment and wildlife, 
improvement of workers’ health conditions and welfare.  Many GlobalGAP 
requirements are beyond the scope of official EU food safety regulation under the CA 
model.  However, they are treated as integral requirements in order to obtain 
GlobalGAP certification.   
 
GlobalGAP standards were originally requested by large supermarket retailers in the 
Eurep Group which are the main importers of Thai fresh or chilled baby corn.240  
However, it has recently begun to be requested by other wholesalers and smaller 
importers which are not members of the Eurep Group, including supermarket importers 
which specialise in ethical products.241  Thai producers and exporters must therefore 
strive to obtain GlobalGAP certification in the event that they wish to export to the EU.  
Failure to do so is likely to mean that EU importers will turn to other suppliers who can 
readily provide them with GlobalGAP-certified products at a similar, or in some cases 
                                                           
239
 Under the traceability regulation, only the name, address and date of the products, “one step up, one 
step down” are required along the supply chain. Source: GlobalGAP, integrated farm Assurance Version 
4 for Fruits and Vegetable Certification (checklists, control points and compliance criteria). 
240
 To which all the main UK supermarkets are party, including Asda, Cooperatives, Marks and Spencer, 
Tesco, Sainsbury, Waitrose, Morrison and some large continental EU supermarkets such as Migros, 
Carrefour, Wegmans. (For full list of GlobalGAP retailers see 
http://www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=23).  
241
 For example oriental supermarkets.  Evidence of this is from interviews. Rakpong J., personal 
interview held during meeting with the Thai Fruit and Vegetable Producer Associations’ representative, 
Mr. Pratom Tankum, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand, 10/07/2008 and with Mr. Suppakit Rattanasirimontri, 
09/07/2008. 
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lower, price.  For example, it is often the case that baby corn producers in other 
developing countries, including Kenya and China, are able to do so and recently EU 
importers have started to obtain some of their supplies from these countries.242  
 
3.2.4.2 A Variety of Supermarkets’ Own Standards 
 
In addition to obtaining GlobalGAP certification, Thai baby corn producers and 
exporters are usually required to obtain further quality assurance certifications 
belonging to individual supermarket chains.  These assurance schemes are based on 
good agricultural practice principles similar to those that underpin GlobalGAP, but still 
there are variations between them.  In general they are usually stricter, more specific 
and cover divergent issues pertaining to ‘other legitimate concerns’.  Although in theory 
the supermarkets’ own requirements are voluntary, in practice they have become 
another mandatory regulatory tier for market access to the EU.  Again, this is a theme to 
which I return in Chapter 6 below.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The baby corn case study illustrates the manner in which EU food safety requirements 
can be imposed upon an important Thai food export of non-animal origin.  Attempts by 
the CA in Thailand to comply with EU food safety regulations have created new market 
conditions for Thai baby corn exports to the EU.  These attempts by the DOA to fulfil 
its CA role have played a part in altering the industrial structure, promoting a suitable 
                                                           
242
 Source: stakeholders’ experience mentioned during the interviews.  Rakpong J., personal interview 
held during meeting with the Thai Fruit and Vegetable Producer Associations’ representative, Mr. Pratom 
Tankum, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand, 10/07/2008 and with Mr. Suppakit Rattanasirimontri, 09/07/2008. 
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structure for contract farming and bringing to an end the broker system for export 
distribution.  Further, the dynamic development of private regulation has been extensive 
and has opened the door to a wider range of issues than governmental regulation.  These 
are the issues that have caused most concern among Thai producers and exporters, and 
they will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.    
 
3.3 PART II - POULTRY CASE STUDY 
 
3.3.1 Introduction: Poultry in Thailand  
 
In this case study, the term “poultry” is used to cover chicken meat (raw and cooked) 
and excludes other poultry products such as duck meat, which represents only 5 percent 
of Thailand total poultry production.243  Poultry has been a primary agricultural export 
for Thailand for the past three decades.  Since the commencement of poultry meat 
exports in the early 1970s, Thailand has rapidly established itself as one of the top 
poultry-exporting countries, and one with a widely-recognised competitive advantage in 
producing both raw and cooked poultry meat.  Poultry generates a significant proportion 
(about 10 percent) of the export income in Thailand’s food sector.244 
 
                                                           
243
 Source: data from the Thai Poultry Association and also in the FVO report (DG-SANCO 2009-8061). 
The term “raw poultry meat” refers to products within in customs category 0207.110-140 (meat and 
edible offal of poultry of heading 01.05, fresh chilled or frozen fowl of the species Gallus Domsticus), 
disregarding other poultry products including turkey (HS 0207.240-270), duck (HS 0207.320 -350) and 
other fowl (HS 0207.360). The term “cooked poultry meat” refers to meat within the 1602 customs 
category (other prepared or preserved meat, meat offal or blood – of poultry under heading 01.05).   
244
 It is within the top ten list of the most important agricultural exports (including food and non-food 
products such as wood, rubber and paper) and within top six of food agricultural exports from Thailand 
(after rice, fish, shrimp, tapioca, sugar and fruits).  In 2008 it generated an export income of US $ 1.1 
billion or about 10 percent of all food products. 
(Source: http://www.phtnet.org/news51/view-news.asp?nID=336). 
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From the outset, the Thai poultry industry has been export-oriented with 40 percent of 
total domestic production bound for export markets.245  At the peak of the export boom 
in 2003,246 Thai poultry exports reached 500,000 tonnes.  At that time Thailand was 
ranked as the fourth largest poultry exporter, after the USA, Brazil and the EU.   Poultry 
ranked as Thailand’s fourth highest income-generating agricultural export,247 generating 
revenues of more than US$ 1.2 billion and with an annual growth rate of 15 percent.248  
Even at this present time, poultry exports continue to make a significant contribution to 
the country’s economy.  Thailand still ranks as the seventh largest poultry producer and 
the third largest exporter.  
 
The EU has always been an important market for Thai poultry exports.  It continued to 
be the largest export market in 2010,249  - accounting for around 45 percent of total 
exports.  This means that any change to EU food safety regulation is extremely 
important for Thai poultry exporters.  Amongst EU member states the UK is the leading 
Thai poultry importer, accounting for around 70 percent of EU imports by volume.  The 
second and third largest importers are the Netherlands and Germany, which account for 
15 and 9 percent of imports by volume respectively.250  The size of the UK import 
market has contributed to the significance of some private standards, including those 
laid down by the British Retail Consortium (BRC) and the Assured Chicken Production 
(ACP) standards. 
                                                           
245
 Source:  www.usdathailand.org and www.thaipoultry.org.  
246
 This was just prior to the first national outbreak of Avian Influenza. 
247
 After rubber products, rice and shrimp (source: http://www.depthai.go.th/). 
248
 Source: http://www.thaipoultry.org. 
249
 The second is Japan which accounted for around 44% of exports in 2010.  Source ibid.  
250
 Prior to the Avian Influenza incident in 2003, the UK accounted for 41 percent, Germany for 25 
percent and the Netherland for 23 percent respectively.  It should be noted that exports to the latter two 
countries continue to fall whilst exports to the UK have generally increased. 
 109
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Thai Poultry Export Destination 2010 
Source: www.thaipoultry.org 
 
Thai poultry exports have, as for baby corn, been chosen as a case study for specific 
reasons.  Firstly, the EU has always been an important market for Thailand’s poultry 
industry.  Consequently the case study can reveal the significance of any changes in EU 
market access conditions for Thai exporters.  In addition, with the long-term problems 
regarding the ban on Thai raw poultry meat as a result of the occurrence of Avian 
Influenza, the case study can demonstrate how these issues have been addressed by the 
Thai government and by poultry exporters.  It is interesting to note that despite several 
disruptions caused by food safety incidents, including the major Nitrofuran crisis and 
more notably the Avian Influenza crisis, Thailand’s poultry industry has recovered its 
EU market share and has maintained its position as one of the world’s leading poultry 
exporters. 
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Poultry Production in Thailand 
 
Thailand began to export poultry products in 1973, with the first batch of merely 163 
tonnes containing frozen raw poultry meat being exported to Japan.  The exportation of 
processed poultry meat began later in 1991, with an initial volume of 4,000 tonnes.  
Thereafter, export volumes and revenues increased significantly, mainly in response to 
the increasing global demand for poultry meat.  Improvements in large-scale production 
and manufacturing processes, integrated contract farming arrangements and in 
government support all contributed towards making poultry farming and manufacturing 
attractive to Thai farmers and exporters. 
 
However after the first case of Avian Influenza, which was confirmed on 23 January 
2004, growth of Thailand’s poultry industry halted due to the introduction of total 
import bans on fresh meat both by the EU and other markets.  The term “Avian 
Influenza”251 used here refers to “highly pathogenic avian influenza” (HPAI), a serious 
illness caused by “A/H5N1” virus strain which normally infects birds but occasionally 
other species, including humans who may have been in close contact with birds.  After 
the first human infection in 1997 in Hong Kong, the disease quickly spread through the 
East Asia region during 2003/2004, reaching Europe in 2005 followed by Africa and the 
Middle East in 2006. 252   Since the 2003 outbreaks, the disease has raised health alarms 
worldwide,253 particularly in light of the possibility that it can mutate into a new, deadly 
                                                           
251
 Also known as “Bird Flu”, “Avian Flu” Source: 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/H5N1_avian_influenza_update.pdf 
252Source: 
http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/avian_influenza/basic_facts/Pages/QA_avian_influenza.aspx  
253
 The disease is covered by the Global Alert and Response scheme, under the auspices of the World 
Health Organisation (WHO).  This means that any outbreaks have to be reported to the WHO which will 
 111
strain of human influenza that could be easily passed on from human to human causing 
a widespread influenza pandemic.254  Many countries have imposed preventive 
measures to curb national outbreaks, including import bans from countries where the 
epidemic has been found.255  At the pandemic’s peak Thailand was one of the countries 
at the centre of the early outbreaks.  When the total of human infections reached a 
reported 25 cases the EU and other countries imposed bans on poultry products from 
Thailand.256 
 
Today, the rate of Avian Influenza outbreaks in Thailand has passed its peak and the 
overall global occurrence of new outbreaks has somewhat subsided.257  The last 
recorded outbreak of Avian Influenza in Thai chicken occurred in 2008.  Despite a 
reduced rate of occurrence, the risk that Avian Influenza can reach a “pandemic” level 
continues to be high.  In addition, numerous new outbreaks have continued to occur in 
the East Asian region including in the countries neighbouring Thailand,258  In 
consequence, the EU considers that countries in the east Asian region, including 
Thailand, still present a high risk of Avian Influenza recurrence and that export bans on 
these countries should continue. 259   
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
subsequently notify other member states. For further information on this point, see: 
http://www.who.int/csr/en/. 
254
 The disease itself has a high mortality rate in human, resulting in death in 50 per cent of cases in Asia.  
However, at present it cannot be transferred between human and the main cause of the infection in human 
occurs when a person is in close contact with birds or poultry. Source: Ibid. 
255
 This includes the EU’s ban on Thai poultry meat and feathers.   
256
 The last case of human infection occurred in September 2006. Source: 
http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/avian_influenza/H5N1_avian_influenza_update.p
df. 
257
 The last large scale outbreak happening in Europe was in found 2006. This occurred in Bulgaria, Italy 
and Slovenia.  The last single case occurred in wild bird in Bulgaria in 2010  
258
 For example, in Indonesia and Vietnam.  The last cases in these countries occurred in 2011.  
259
 Commission Decision of 30 November 2010 extended the ban until the end of 2011.  
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The occurrence of Avian Influenza was considered the most serious food safety incident 
ever to have hit Thai poultry exports, and indeed Thai food exports in general.  Previous 
food safety incidents concerning Thai poultry exports related to an excess of MRL of 
arsenic contaminants found in products exported to Czech Republic in 1998, the 
discovery of Salmonella and Cholera contamination and the Nitrofuran crisis which 
occurred in 2002-3.  These incidents resulted in 100 percent checks at EU borders 
regardless of the DLD’s export certificates.260  However, none of these incidents 
resulted in a widespread, long-term import ban as was the case with Thai raw poultry 
products following the Avian Influenza incident.  As a result of this crisis, which started 
in December 2003, Thai raw poultry exports are still banned in all major importing 
countries, including the USA, Japan, the Middle East, South Korea, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Canada, South Africa, and of course the EU.  Only those poultry exports from 
Thailand that have been cooked are allowed, and even then only by some of these 
countries.261  
  
The outbreak was also widely publicised in the EU as it occurred just after the DLD 
pronounced Thailand as an Avian-Influenza-free country, and after Thailand’s food 
safety system had been praised by the EU Commissioner during his visit to Thailand.262  
Upon learning of the Avian Influenza outbreak, DG-SANCO took immediate action to 
ban all raw poultry meat products as well as all untreated feather products from 
                                                           
260
 This can be viewed as a temporary suspension of the DLD CA status as it does not guarantee that 
products are subject to reduced food safety checks at EU borders.  For example, in relation to the 
Nitrofuran crisis the 100 percent check began in March 2002 and continued throughout that year and 
subsequently caused considerable delays and significant difficulties for Thai exporters.  
261
 Some countries, including Malaysia, Taiwan and Turkey, also still ban both cooked and raw poultry 
products from Thailand.  Currently some countries in the Middle East are the only ones to allow 
importation of raw poultry meat from Thailand under compartmentalisation arrangements. 
262
 David Byrne made a 6 day visit in late 2003.  He stated that there was no evidence of Avian Influenza 
in Thailand.  
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Thailand; this ban continues to be enforced today.263   In 2004, shortly after the 
outbreak, annual poultry export volumes dropped by nearly 60 percent from around 
550,000 tonnes to 200,000 tonnes, with a 40 percent reduction in export volume to the 
EU.  Export revenues fell by 47 percent as a result of this interruption.264 
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263
 Commission Decision 2005/692/EC which states that poultry meat products from Thailand must be 
heat treated according to Point 4 of the Decision.  The latest extension to this legislation is Commission 
Decision of 30 November 2010 amending Decisions 2005/692/EC, 2005/734/EC, 2006/415/EC, 
2007/25/EC and 2009/494/EC as regards Avian Influenza where the ban on raw poultry meat from 
Thailand and other South-east Asian countries is extended to the end of 2011.  
264
 Source : http://www.thaipoultry.org/. 
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Thai Chicken Export Revenue 2003-2004
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Table 5: Changes in Thai Poultry Export: Pre and Post Avian Influenza 
Source: www.poultry.org 
Despite this disruption, poultry farming has continued to be popular in Thailand, with 
currently around 15,000 registered poultry farms and 3,000 abattoirs nationwide.265  
Poultry production is concentrated in central Thailand in the provinces around Bangkok, 
the country’s capital including Lop-Buri, Suphan-Buri, Chai-Nat, Chon-Buri and also 
some provinces in the North East.  Approximately 40 percent of farm production is still 
aimed at the export market.  However, despite the high number of farms and abattoirs 
there is only a small number of establishments certified to process poultry for export.  
Currently there are 23 certified abattoirs and 79 meat-processing plants that meet the 
DLD’s export standards.  Most of these belong to five poultry conglomerates including 
Charoen Pokphand (CP), Saha Farms, GFPT, Chaweewan Farm and Betagro.  All 
                                                           
265
 Source: Thai DLD.  
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export farms must operate under a closed system and be registered with and certified by 
the DLD.  
 
As with baby corn, there are two sources of poultry for export; through contract farmers 
and from exporters’ own farms.  A significant proportion of exports still come from 
contract farming.  However, following the Avian Influenza crisis there has been an 
increase in the proportion from exporters’ own farms due to exporters concerns over 
their ability to fully control food safety and animal movements for the purpose of 
disease prevention.266  Both sources are still used by most Thai exporters to the EU 
market, although their proportion varies.  For example, CP raises about 30 percent of its 
production from contract farming whereas the proportion is 50 percent for Saha Farms.  
Conversely, all products from GFPT and Chaweewan Farms come from their own 
farms.267  Poultry exporters nonetheless do operate their own abattoirs and processing 
factories so that they can oversee the entire curing and processing phases and can 
control the supply to their customers.  
 
Altogether around 30 percent of certified farms are under contract farming 
arrangements whereby an exporter, often a large conglomerate, imposes strict quality 
control on its contracted farmers.  The exporter supplies the contract farmers with 
everything they need for raising chicken, including chicks, feed and medicines, and 
appoints a team of on-site managers.  The large poultry conglomerates, including as 
Saha Farms, Betagro and CP, also have integrated facilities to cover the entire 
                                                           
266
 Rakpong J., personal interview held during meeting with the Thai Broiler Processing Exporters 
Association and staff from GFPT, Bangkok, Thailand 7/08/2008.  Rakpong J., personal interview held 
during meeting with Mr. Nathsak Pattanachaikul (Chief Operating Officer of Saha Farms) and Mr. Kasem 
Trakoonlerswilai (Deputy Director Saha Farms) See also: http://www.food-
resources.org/news/20/09/07/8203. 
267
 Source: interviews. 
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production line including their own “parent” and in some cases “grandparent” stock 
farms, hatcheries, feed factories, processing plants and animal medicine facilities as 
well as the broiler farms themselves.  
 
Most of the broiler farms are of medium to large size with a capacity to raise 5,000 to 
10,000 birds for a medium-sized farm and over 300,000 birds for a large farm.268 
Chickens are fed for up to 50-60 days before being taken to the abattoir.  After slaughter 
the poultry meat will be packed, chilled or frozen and supplied as raw meat products, or 
alternatively sent to a processing plant to be processed and exported.  Broiler farms for 
export markets are equipped with DLD and EU approved automated raising systems for 
ventilation, humidity and temperature control.  At the farms DLD staff observe the 
production process on-site.  At each farm there is also a team of on-site managers who 
are made responsible as the first point of contract with DLD staff.  They provide 24 
hour surveillance and are responsible for ensuring strict access procedures and sterilised 
conditions for purposes of disease control.269  Farm conditions are cross-inspected daily 
by the on-site DLD staff.   
 
                                                           
268
 A large farm belonging to a conglomerate poultry company such as Saha Farms can house around 
340,000 chickens.  The total daily production of a conglomerate firm with several large poultry farms can 
be over 120,000 birds.  (Source: Saha Farms Introduction to the company video, also available at 
www.sahafarm.com).  Intensive “farming” has also brought about additional export conditions by way of 
animal and poultry welfare that must be complied with by the poultry exporters.   
269
 Such as the wearing of protective gear and the introduction of new flocks.   
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3.3.2 Distribution Channels   
 
3.3.2.1 International Distribution Channels 
 
In contrast to fresh baby corn the production of cooked poultry exports requires large 
production and integrated manufacturing operations that exist only in conglomerate 
firms.  This involves not only poultry farms and abattoirs but also large-scale processing 
plants, packing factories and cold-chain management.  Moreover, importing countries’ 
rules on animal products are generally more numerous, complex and demanding than 
for non-animal products since they are considered to carry higher food safety risks to 
both humans and animals.  The EU is no exception.270  As a minimum the meat must 
come from certified countries and Thailand is included on the EU list of certified 
countries under Part 2 Annex II of the Commission Decision 2007/777/EC.  In addition, 
exporters to the EU market must be registered with the CA – i.e. the DLD, must have 
satisfied all the relevant regulations and certification requirements and, unlike products 
of non-animal origin, they must also be on an official list of approved establishments 
published by the DG-SANCO under EU Commission Decision 97/4/EC.  
 
The industry is oligopolistic as there is only a small number of companies that export 
the bulk of poultry meat.  In the export sector poultry production is carried out in an 
intensive ‘closed’ system.  Amongst the exporters, the Thai Broiler Processing 
Exporters Association, which comprises around 10 large exporters, is the central point 
of contact for information.  Even though not all top exporters have joined the 
                                                           
270
 Recital 2 to Regulation EC/853/2004. The existence of higher risks is due to the nature of the products; 
apart from being prone to microbial and chemical contaminants they can be susceptible to life-threatening 
pandemic diseases (to both human and animal) such as  Avian Influenza or Foot and Mouth disease,  BSE 
(the mad-cow disease).  (See also Alemanno (2009), p. 13). 
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association (for example, Chaweewan Farm and Saha Farms, which is the second 
largest poultry exporter after CP) those who are not members do have strong links with 
the Association and are often present at exporters’ meetings. 
 
Since the Avian Influenza outbreaks overall around 70 percent of total meat production 
for export originates from exporters’ own farms rather than through contracted farms, 
whereas prior to the outbreaks the proportion was around 50 percent.271 CP Group 
which previously obtained most of its raw poultry meat from its contracted farms has 
changed its practice since the Avian Influenza crisis to source the majority of its 
supplies from its own farms.    
 
Similar to the international distribution channel of baby corn, there used to be a broker 
system whereby the broker collected live chickens from local farms and sold them to 
exporters at the exporter’s abattoirs.  However, after the occurrence of major food safety 
outbreaks, including the 2003 Nitrofuran the 2004 Avian Influenza crises, the broker 
system came to an end for poultry exports.  
 
Concentration in the industry has become especially acute since the EU now only 
allows the importation of cooked poultry products from Thailand.  Any producers 
wishing to export to the EU must have links with the processing plants, all of which 
belong to large exporters.  Hence small and medium-sized farms, which could not make 
the significant investments required to have their own processing factory, have had 
                                                           
271
 As previously stated, the proportion of this varies amongst different exporters. 
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either to enter into contracts with larger exporters in order to survive, or to divert their 
products to the local market or to less lucrative markets of neighboring countries.   
 
Picture 8: Poultry farms  
Source: Nation Multimedia www.oknation.net 
Production-Line  
 
Once chickens have been brought to the abattoir, they are electrically stunned and then 
slaughtered.272  Thereafter the chicken will be plucked, cleaned, divided into different 
cuts, graded, packed and stored – chilled or frozen.  Some meat will be sold in the 
domestic market and some will be used as raw material for cooked or semi-cooked food 
                                                           
272
 This technique is also known as “electric bath” whereby live chicken will be hung up side down with a 
moving rod and are moved through water kept at a high electric voltage.  The animal is stunned for about 
10 seconds, long enough for the slaughtering process.  Although this process is allowed under EU law 
(Directive 93/119/EEC) the issue of animal welfare has been raised by many non-profit organisations 
including People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and UK importers (including Morrisons 
and Sainsbury). There have been discussions and requests by EU supermarkets whether the slaughtering 
process should be restricted to Controlled Atmosphere Stunning (CAS).  At the time of my interviews the 
issue had not been resolved.  However it has created great concern amongst Thai exporters as switching 
to the CAS technology would involve major investment. 
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products for export markets.  Once the products are cooked or processed they will be 
packed chilled or frozen in the exporters’ cold storage.   
 
 
Source: Reuters  
 
 
Source: Business Development Service Network  
 
Picture 9, 10: Poultry Production Line 
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Since the import ban introduced after the Avian Influenza outbreaks EU-bound products 
must all be in a cooked or processed form.  It is noteworthy that Thai exporters took 
only 6 months to expand the capacity of their processing plants, to divert their raw 
poultry meat into processed products and were quickly able to export new batches of 
cooked poultry meat to the EU.   The top Thai exporters have also benefited from 
economies of scale in producing processed meat and have been able to win long-term 
supply contracts with leading EU supermarkets.  For instance there is a business 
partnership between the CP Group and Tesco that CP chicken would be used in most of 
Tesco’s own line ready-meals.273  
 
Thai exporters have created a wide variety of processed cooked products from raw 
poultry meat, ranging from steamed meat to more sophisticated value-added products 
such as fried chicken steaks, sausages, ready-to-eat chicken tikka or nuggets. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
273
 CP even has a distribution centre in the UK.   
Source: http://www.mfa.go.th/web/852.php?id=24362 (in Thai),   
http://www.cambridge-news.co.uk/Business/An-appetising-prospect-in-the-food-industry.htm. 
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Picture 11: Various Poultry Products 
Source: Saha Farms 
 
3.3.2.2 Domestic Distribution Channels  
 
As with baby corn, the two domestic distribution channels are top-end supermarket 
chains and local markets.  There is a significant quality gap between these two markets.  
The former is produced and supplied mostly by large poultry conglomerates274 who also 
supply the international market.  It is therefore considered to have better food safety 
quality than the latter.275  Meat sold in supermarkets is often checked by the DLD as 
well as by district municipality staff.    
 
                                                           
274
 The reason for this is that large conglomerates, such as CP and Saha  Farms, have a significant 
shareholding in large domestic supermarkets.  For example CP owns 51% of Tesco Lotus, one of the top 
supermarket chains in Thailand (the remaining 49% being owned by Tesco UK). 
275
 This will be discussed as part of positive spill-over effects derived from the CA model in part III of 
this chapter.  
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However, quality controls are considerably lower for products sold in local markets.  
The supplies are mostly provided by local small or medium-sized farms that use an 
open farming system.  The regulation of local markets is run by sub-district 
municipalities and falls under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior as well as 
the DLD.  There have been attempts by the DLD to run a voluntary Hygienic Meat 
Scheme for meat sold locally but the scheme has not been widely recognised.  In recent 
years there has been an expansion by large conglomerates, such as CP and Saha Farms, 
in the supply of products to local markets.  However, these supplies are not always 
reliable in terms of their availability and are only provided when there is a surplus to 
their export requirements. 
 
 
Picture 12: Poultry stall in a local market  
Source: Author’s own camera 
Location: Chiangmai 
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Picture 13: Meat Section in Thai Supermarket  
Source: Author’s own camera 
Location: Chiangmai 
 
3.3.3 Regulatory Environment for Exports to the EU Market 
 
3.3.3.1 Control Mechanisms and Import Checks in the EU  
 
Being a product of animal origin, poultry is regulated differently and more strictly than 
products of non-animal origin on the basis that it is considered to be susceptible to a 
broader range of risks to human and animal health.276  In consequence the EU only 
allows poultry imports from certified establishments and countries.  To obtain certified 
country status, a third country must take steps to show to DG-SANCO that its poultry 
products are subject to the same or equivalent food safety standards as those applied in 
the EU.  Upon applying for certifying country status, official requests will be made by 
the EU to exchange information, for consultations and for on-site checks by a team of 
                                                           
276
 See supra Section 3.3.2.1 (International Distribution Channels).  
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FVO staff.  The following issues will be considered; the third country’s animal health 
situation;277 the capacity and reliability of the competent veterinary authority; 
compliance with relevant EU animal health conditions; residual monitoring and 
microbial contaminant control programmes; and, animal welfare provisions at the time 
of transportation, slaughter and at farms so as to determine whether they are equivalent 
to, and capable of delivering the same food safety standards, as those in the EU.278   
Once the authority is satisfied with the third country’s food safety conditions an official 
announcement will be made by DG-SANCO adding the country to its approved list.  
Thereafter an animal health certificate form for the approved country to export will be 
drawn up and an initial list of approved establishments will be created.   
 
Thailand has been on the list of certified countries under Annex I of Commission 
Decision 94/85/EC since 1994.  Despite the Avian Influenza outbreaks Thailand 
remains on the list of certified countries.  The DLD has been declared as the national 
CA.  It can issue health certificates to guarantee that exported products comply with 
relevant EU food safety and animal welfare requirements.279  Certification is made by 
way of an official attestation by DLD veterinary staff that the details stated on the 
certificate are correct, that the products satisfy EU requirements, and that they are free 
from Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease.280   
                                                           
277
 This must pass the requirements under Regulation EC/854/2004 and be free from Newcastle Disease 
and Avian Influenza. 
278
 See for example DG-SANCO document: General guidance on EU import and transit rules for live 
animal and animal products from third countries. This is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/trade/guide_thirdcountries2006_en.pdf. 
279
 According to Model B of Decision 94/85/EC. 
280
 Under Annex II of Decision 94/984/EC, specific details to be included on the certificates are, for 
example, the name and Health Certification Number of the consignors, product origin and region, CA 
(both central and local), address, place of loading, slaughterhouse, cold storage and cutting plant, 
transportation details, weight and packaging, consignment identification details (these are essential for 
products to be traced back). The animal health attestation by the official veterinarian on behalf of the CA 
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As with the DOA’s approval certificates and PC, the DLD has flexibility to grant export 
certificates and can propose that new establishments be included on the DG-SANCO 
list.  At the outset only 70 certified establishments were listed as approved 
establishment in Commission Decision 97/4/EC whereas the number currently exceeds 
100.  As with the DOA in the case of baby corn, the benefit of “presumed equivalency 
status” can pass down from the DLD to Thai poultry exporters.  Achievement of this 
status in most cases results in products from certified establishments being subject to 
fewer (i.e. random) checks at EU borders.  However, this presumption of equivalence 
can be rebutted and a full check on product consignments can be performed if the BIP 
or a member state’s CA suspects that the products do not comply with certain EU 
regulations.   
 
Importation Processes at EU Borders for Products of Animal Origin 
 
Special export procedures apply for products of animal origin.  Prior to the arrival of a 
product consignment at an EU border the exporter or his agent must notify the approved 
a border inspection post inspector (BIP) 24 hours in advance.  Upon arrival the product 
is subject to a systematic official check covering documentation, product identity and 
the product’s physical characteristics.  Further sampling checks can also be carried out.  
However, the frequency of this will depend on the record of a particular exporter, the 
country of origin and the risk associated with the particular product.  After these checks, 
the exporter must fill in the veterinary entry document, the details of which will be 
                                                                                                                                                                          
that the meat is free from Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease and includes attestations that the 
surrounding areas where the animal was raised are sufficiently free from Avian Influenza outbreak, with 
no diseases present in 10 km radius in the last 30 days, did not come into contact with infected poultry 
during the transportation or whilst at the slaughtering house.  
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stored in the EU’s main electronic traceability system (called the Trade Control and 
Export System), before the consignment can be released.  If the consignment does not 
comply with any aspect of EU law it will either be sent back to the country of origin281 
or, if it poses a risk to animal or human health, it may be destroyed.282  Once the product 
has passed the checks at the port of entry it is free to be transported throughout the 
European Union.  Nevertheless, if breaches of food safety law are later found or if the 
product subsequently presents a risk to human or animal health, the CA in the member 
state must trigger a RASFF and recall the product through the EU’s traceability system.  
Information regarding such food safety incidents will then be reported back to the CA in 
the third country which will be able to inform the producer/exporter through its records 
contained in the official health certification and the DLD traceability system.  
 
3.3.3.2 Control Mechanisms Used in Thailand and their Effects on Poultry 
Farmers and Exporters 
 
3.3.3.2.1 The Role Played by the DLD as a Competent Authority for Thai Poultry 
Exports to the EU  
 
The DLD is the principal CA to control food safety in respect of poultry exports.   
It is responsible for issuing export certificates to accompany export consignments to the 
EU. 283  It is also responsible for establishing regulatory controls so as to ensure that 
Thai exporters comply with relevant EU food safety law.  However, if the DLD were to 
                                                           
281
 In such an event the Thai exporter will be liable to pay for transportation costs. 
282
 P. 15, General Guidance on EU Imports and transit rules for live animals and animal products from 
third countries.  Also available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/trade/guide_thirdcountries2006_en.pdf. 
283
 Annex I of Commission Decision 94/85 EC, applicable since 1994. 
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fail to demonstrate to the EU authority that it is capable of putting in place an equivalent 
food safety system for exports, Thailand could, in principle, be removed from the 
certified country list.  In practice this has never happened, though less stringent actions 
have taken place including: an import suspension in relation to particular certified 
establishment; product recalls; 100 percent checks at EU borders;  and import 
suspensions in relation to certain poultry products.  The most recent occurrence was 
when the importation of raw poultry meat was banned as a result of Avian Influenza.  
As with the DOA, the DLD runs regular meetings with exporters in order to give them 
opportunities to exchange information, to produce more up-to-date accounts of export 
and compliance conditions, and to communicate with them urgent issues that need to be 
addressed. 284  
 
The FVO is responsible for checking DLD’s competency in this respect.  The DLD 
must send reports to DG-SANCO.  However, it is the FVO that carries out its mission 
through on-the-spot checks in Thailand.285  The frequency and agendas of the FVO 
missions vary according to Thailand’s ability at any given time to control food safety 
and animal health conditions for poultry exports.  As with the case of baby corn, the 
FVO’s reports following its missions often serve to identify areas of EU concern that 
the DLD should address.  To date there have been five FVO missions specifically 
carried out in relation to poultry exports to the EU.  These took place in 1999 and 2001 
for poultry meat production,286 in 2005 for cooked poultry meat export and Avian 
                                                           
284
 The meetings run every 4-6 weeks.  
285
 The on-the-spot-check is governed by the Commission Decision 98/140/EC laying down certain 
detailed rules concerning on-the-spot checks carried out in the veterinary field by Commission experts in 
third countries.  
286
 DG-SANCO 1999-1214 and 2001-3310. 
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Influenza control,287 and there were two missions in 2009 for poultry meat and poultry 
meat products288 and animal health conditions.289  The FVO’s recommendations are 
considered as detailed guidance for the Thai DLD, indicating to it what exactly has to be 
done in order  to maintain CA status.290  These recommendations are generally given 
serious consideration by the DLD, with most of them being promptly adopted.291  Most 
of the recommendations applicable to Thai producers will be passed on to them during 
the meetings of the DLD with exporters.  
 
Some FVO recommendations have led to major reforms of the DLD.  For example, 
following the first FVO mission, and in light of the FVO’s many comments on epidemic 
control, the DLD established the National Institute of Animal Health as a stand-alone 
central laboratory body for checking animal diseases including Newcastle Disease and 
Avian Influenza.292   Similarly, following the FVO’s comments on stunning equipment 
in 2009 the DLD later launched an additional national plan to improve animal health 
and welfare.293  Indeed, following the FVO’s comments made in 1999 on the further 
steps the DLD needed to take to comply with EU legislation on laboratory processes for 
detecting Newcastle Disease, the DLD appears to have followed virtually every FVO 
published recommendation.294  
 
                                                           
287
 DG-SANCO 2005-7554. 
288
 DG-SANCO 2009-8061. 
289
 DG-SANCO 2009-8266. 
290
 For example in the recent 2009 mission on poultry meat inspection, the recommendation on the 
collection of sampling methods for detecting Salmonella was to change from the collection from “carcase 
rinse” to “neck skin”, (DG-SANCO 2009-8061,p. 6) and has been followed by the DLD. 
291
 For those where compliance is not complete, steps towards compliance have already been initiated by 
the DLD. See the FVO reports above. 
292
 Reference: interviews with various stakeholders 2008 
293
 DG-SANCO 2009-8061. 
294
 For example, it followed the FVO’s recommendation that samples should be taken at farms and not at 
the abattoir.  
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The DLD can use this FVO mission process to communicate back to the EU, to attest to 
its willingness to comply with the recommendations and issues raised during the FVO 
inspections, and to raise any concerns regarding the impracticality of the 
recommendations or the time frame for compliance.  This is because after the draft FVO 
mission is released, DLD is able to comment on the reports, to give explanations or to 
propose suitable amendments with regard to FVO’s statement of facts.   
 
During interviews, a commonly expressed view amongst the Thai CA and exporters is 
that they share the objective of maintaining EU confidence in Thai poultry products.  
They therefore strive to accommodate EU demands despite the additional costs of 
compliance.  These additional costs are considered by exporters to be a long-term 
investment.   
 
3.3.3.2.2 Legal Mechanisms and Export Procedures 
 
As with baby corn, poultry exports are subject to a number of Thai food laws including 
the National Food Act B.E. 2522 (1979) and the Consumer Protection Act B.E. 2522 
(1979).  There is also a further extensive list of government legislation that governs 
products of animal origin.295   
 
For products exported to the EU, additional measures set out in EU law must be 
complied with.  The DLD has been granted administrative powers under national law to 
                                                           
295
 These include the Animal Epidemics Act B.E 2499 (1956), amended in B.E. 2542 (1999), the Food 
Act B.E. 2522 (1979), the Slaughtering and Meat Market Control Act B.E. 2535 (1992), the Drugs Act 
B.E. 2510(1967), the Feed Quality Control Act B.E. 2525 (1999) and the Poultry Meat and Poultry Meat 
Product Inspection Regulations B.E. 2548 (2005).    
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lay down export conditions and quality control procedures in order to ensure that EU 
conditions are met for all poultry exports.296   
 
In general DLD activities can be divided into three categories; (i) quality control and 
inspection, (ii) accreditation, and (iii) animal disease control.  These are dealt with by 
separate departments and sub-departments of the DLD.  The Bureau of Livestock 
Standards and Certification is responsible for approving export establishments for 
quality control and inspection proposes.  Inter alia, it observes that proper compliance 
with HACCP principles is achieved in these establishments.  The Bureau of Quality 
Control of Livestock Products is responsible for laboratory tests and accreditation work.  
The Bureau of Disease Control and Veterinary Service is responsible for disease control 
issues and for conducting pre-export checks for animal diseases.  
  
With regard to export procedures, the first stage involves the acquisition of an export 
certificate issued by the DLD. 297   This certificate operates in a manner similar to that 
for the PC granted by the DOA.  There are two stages of food safety and animal health 
checks before cooked poultry products can be exported to the EU; (i) on-site checks by 
the DLD veterinaries for animal health and food establishments’ records and (ii) 
laboratory checks for MRL of microbial and chemical substances.  
 
                                                           
296
  This arrangement differs from the DOA which oversees Thai fruit and vegetable exports, including 
baby corn, where the responsibility for control of fruit and vegetable exports is vested in different 
government entities, the DOA and the DFT of the Ministry of Commerce.  However, in both cases 
customs-related issues are under the control of Customs Department, Ministry of Finance.   Issues on 
factory standards are governed by the Ministry of Industry.  
297
 This is governed by Decision 94/85/EC.  
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Whereas farms and other establishments have to be GAP and GMP-approved in order to 
obtain a PC from the DOA, the DLD has a team of on-site staff to oversee the whole 
production process at the exporters’ establishments.298  As such the DLD can exert 
direct and continuous checks on quality control in relation to food safety and animal 
welfare issues regarding poultry exports as and when needed.  It can also advise on, and 
assist in addressing, any compliance points that have been overlooked by exporters.  
The checks are carried out by DLD staff at least once a week and weekly reports are 
sent directly to the central DLD office in Bangkok.  In addition the on-site team is also 
responsible for approving samples sent to the central DLD laboratories.  This 
introduction of on-site DLD staff allows a better and quicker exchange of information 
since direct communication between the DLD, site managers/workers and owners of the 
approved establishments can take place on a daily basis.  Any compliance issue that 
arises can thus be dealt with promptly.  This is unlike the DOA control procedures 
which are carried out only through exporter meetings, official announcements or when 
inspections for the DOA’s GAP or GMP schemes are required.  
 
In addition to the checks by on-site DLD staff, the ante- and post-mortem inspections of 
poultry are also carried out by different units of a local/municipal team according to 
Thai domestic law.299  Farm owners must notify the local provincial veterinary office at 
least 5 days prior to any intended slaughter date so that the DLD’s local staff can visit 
farms, check the condition of animals and, if satisfied, grant approval for slaughtering.  
                                                           
298
 This is usually a team of three personnel, employed by the Bureau of Livestock Standards and 
Certification, to work alongside private veterinarians employed by the exporters. 
299
 This procedure is governed by the Slaughtering and Meat Market Control Act B.E. 2535 (1992), 
Animal Epidemic Act B.E. 2499 (1956) and B.E. 2542 (1999) The Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperative’s Regulation No.29 (B.E. 2534 (1991)), No. 35 (B.E. 2537 (1994) and Poultry Meat and 
Poultry Meat Products Inspection Regulation B.E. 2535 (1992). 
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The health conditions of the animals will be checked by the local staff once they arrive 
at the abattoir and again pre- and post-slaughtering.  
 
With regards to the second stage for obtaining export certification, poultry products are 
subject to the CA’s laboratory checks for MRL of chemical and microbial substances to 
ensure compliance with EU regulations.  This is carried out by the DLD’s own 
“Veterinary Public Health Laboratory”, belonging to the Bureau of Quality Control and 
Livestock Products.  Satisfactory laboratory results are also necessary in order to obtain 
export certification.  Instead of a single check prior to the date of exportation, the 
checks are carried out regularly by the DLD’s own or DLD-approved laboratories.  
Samples from animals, products and food establishments are tested throughout the 
different stages of poultry raising until 10 days before slaughter in order to determine 
the animal health and establishment’s hygiene conditions.300  These tests aim to detect 
the presence of, inter alia, Newcastle Disease, Avian Influenza and residues for 
pesticides, anti-biotic and microbial substances.  The documentation and samples must 
be approved by the on-site DLD staff before being sent to the laboratories.  If the 
laboratory results are satisfactory, an approval document will be issued to support the 
application for an export certificate.  As stated above, this certificate is granted by 
another department of the DLD, namely the Livestock Certification Division of the 
Bureau of Livestock’s and Standard Certification.   
 
Once the export certificated is grated, additional checks for disease control purposes 
will be also carried out at quarantine stations before any consignment leaves the port.  
                                                           
300
 Samples include swabs from the factory surface and ice and water used in the processing of poultry 
meat. 
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This process will be explained as part of compliance with EU regulations as set out 
below.  
 
3.3.3.2.3 Compliance with EU Regulations  
 
Compliance with the main EU management-based regulations, as identified in Chapter 
2, is a pre-condition for export to the EU.  HACCP is imposed upon manufacturers and 
exporters as part of the DLD’s approval of food establishments.301  The accreditation of 
compliance with HACCP can be made by the DLD or by another approved external 
accreditation body and must be conducted every three years.   Once accreditation is 
achieved, a report indicating exporters’ HACCP compliance will be issued by the 
Bureau of Livestock Standards and Certification.302  Daily compliance with HACCP 
principles is also monitored by the DLD’s on-site staff.   In addition, the processing 
plants of exported products must obtain additional the Ministry of Health’s GMP 
standard.303  However these only cover basic GMP principles and thus poultry 
manufacturers who export their product to the EU will be subject to a more rigorous 
HACCP approval scheme.   
 
As for baby corn, traceability has now become compulsory for all poultry exports to the 
EU.  This is as a result of an additional scheme voluntarily run by the DLD, despite the 
fact that traceability is not yet a requirement for meat products sold domestically, and 
                                                           
301
 As a matter of fact, HACCP had been incorporated as part of compliance with other private standard 
schemes including Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), ISO9000, ISO 14000, and Standard Sanitising 
Operating Procedures (SSOP) long before HACCP became an EU legal requirement in 2006 under 
Regulation EC/852/2004).  References: Interviews with various producers/exporters conducted in 2008. 
302
 By its Livestock Certification Division Unit.  
303
 This applies to export processing plants to all countries and not just to the EU (Ministry of Health 
Announcement No. 193, B.E. 2543 (2000)). 
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that EU law states that the traceability obligation for imports begins once a product 
enters the EU.  There are at least three traceability systems that operate as part of the 
DLD’s programme.  
 
Firstly, the DLD devised its own trace-back system back in 2003 following the 
Nitrofuran crisis.304  The traceability information is stored at DLD headquarters and is 
integrated with the system put in place by major exporters to the EU.  The information 
stored at DLD’s trace-back system includes bar codes or Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID) codes with digital references back to export consignments.  This allows the 
DLD to track export consignments back to the farm level.  Taken together with the 
traceability systems put in place by exporters, it is possible to trace-back products to 
individual flocks.  
 
Secondly, following the Avian Influenza outbreaks additional traceability requirements 
on animal movements were imposed by the DLD.  These were designed to facilitate a 
rapid response in the event of an Avian Influenza alert by allowing the source of the 
disease to be identified more promptly.  As a result, all movements of live birds and 
poultry meat intended for export must be recorded. Additionally public health 
movement certificates must be obtained for movements of live birds and consignments 
of poultry meat from farm to abattoir and from abattoir to processing plant.   
 
Thirdly, and especially for products bound for the EU market, there is a further check 
for animal health and disease conditions (especially for the Avian Influenza and 
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 DLD’s Regulation B.E. 2546 (2003).  
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Newcastle Disease) at quarantine stations located at Bangkok and Chon-Buri, near 
Thailand’s main ports.  
 
Exporters and the DLD consider that the DLD integrated traceability system, first 
introduced following the Nitrofuran crisis in 2003, has helped to ensure prompt and 
precise product recalls during the later Influenza crisis.  This traceability system has 
helped to enhance the reputation of the Thai poultry industry among EU authorities and 
importers, and is considered to have been a major factor in re-establishing Thailand as a 
supplier to the EU market after the Avian Influenza crisis, albeit only in relation to 
cooked poultry meat.  It is also hoped that the use of such an advanced traceability 
system would bring the poultry industry into line with the EU’s compartmentalisation 
scheme, bringing with it the realistic prospect of Thailand being the previously Avian 
Influenza-affected country to resume exports of raw poultry products to the EU.305   
 
In addition to food safety requirements, controls on animal welfare have also been 
imposed on poultry destined for the EU market.  According to EU legislation, poultry 
welfare must be observed at three main different stages: at the time of transportation,306 
at the time of slaughter307 and in respect of ‘broiler welfare’ at farms.308   
                                                           
305
 Source: ACFS news (in Thai: http://www.acfs.go.th/news_detail.php?ntype=09&id=3145) 
306
 Regulation EC/1/2005.  
307
 Directive 93/119/EC, which mainly concerns proper stunning of animals. 
308
 Directive 98/58/EC, concerning the protection of animals kept for farming purposes and Directive 
2007/43/EC, which requires special provisions to ensure the proper welfare of poultry in high density 
establishments (where the stock density exceeds 33 kg per square metre). Stocking density refers to total 
live weight of chickens which are present in house at the same time per square metre of useable area 
(Article 2(1) (i)). In practice Thai producers have claimed that their animal welfare treatment is better 
recorded than in many EU countries.  These claims have been matched with other media reports (see for 
example http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1326657/RSPCA-say-chickens-better-lives-Thailand-
Brazil-Britain.html.  
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Following the FVO missions in 1999 and 2001, the DLD launched a comprehensive 
action plan to further improve poultry welfare conditions.  It drew up detailed animal 
welfare guidelines to be complied with by exporters and trained exporters’ personnel to 
use information provided by the FVO.  It should be noted that DLD animal welfare 
requirements are applied despite most exporters having already complied with the 
stricter animal welfare policies required by private standards.   
 
Animal welfare conditions are first checked by exporters’ own veterinarian staff with 
cross-checks being made by on-site DLD staff.  These checks are carried out seven days 
before slaughter and are recorded in the ante-mortem inspection forms.  In addition, 
another inspection is made by the DLD’s official veterinary staff working at the abattoir 
immediately prior to the commencement of slaughtering.309  If animal welfare 
conditions are found to be inadequate the on-site DLD staff can inform the plant 
managers and report this to the DLD.  In theory the DLD can refuse export certificates 
to establishments that fail to meet animal welfare standards.  Cross-checks of the DLD’s 
ability to monitor animal welfare conditions are, of course, conducted by the FVO 
during its visits to Thailand. 
 
3.3.4 Private Regulation   
 
Similar to the case of baby corn, the proliferation of private standards, especially in the 
form of supermarket standards, has become a major concern for Thai exporters.  In 
addition to national food law and EU food safety regulations operated via the CA 
model, Thai exporters must comply with several sets of private standards as the third 
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 Usually samples of 300 birds will be inspected.  
 138
tier of regulation if they are to meet all of the demands of EU importers.  It has also 
become a common business practice for different types of private standards to be 
imposed upon exporters as parts of their contractual obligations with EU supermarket 
importers.  Different private certifications are required, depending on the importers’ 
preferences.  These include, inter alia, ACP, BRC, International Food Standard (IFS) as 
well as supermarkets’ own standards.  It is also interesting to observe that the DLD has 
completely excluded private standards from the scope of its work, as was the case for 
the Thai CA in relation to baby corn, although significant parts of private standards 
duplicate existing EU regulatory requirements for food safety and animal welfare.310  
 
3.3.4.1 Variety in private standards  
 
Similar to the case of baby corn, private standards applicable to Thai poultry exports 
can also be sub-divided into two categories; 1) universal standards which have received 
some shared recognition amongst groups of EU importers, and 2) supermarkets’ own 
standards.  Compliance with a variety of private standards may be requested by EU 
importers.  These tend to vary among importers in different countries.  In contrast to the 
situation in relation to baby corn, where GlobalGAP operates as an EU-wide standard, 
there is no single universal private standard for Thai poultry exports to the EU.  In the 
UK, where the majority of Thai poultry products are destined, most supermarkets use 
the BRC standard.  In France and continental Europe most importers prefer IFS 
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 Rakpong J., personal interview with Director Cherdchai Thiratinnarat, Director of Bureau of Disease 
Control and Veterinary Service Bangkok, Thailand 20/08/2008.  
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standards.  Nonetheless, BRC has occasionally been requested by Dutch supermarkets.  
The ACP standard is often requested by German and UK importers.311 
 
Many private standards for poultry address food safety and ‘other legitimate concerns’.  
Initially Thai exporters were only required to be certified for standards addressing food 
safety concerns. 312   Prominent among these were BRC and IFS standards that mainly 
target the application of good hygiene practices and the application of HACCP 
principles and traceability throughout the supply-chain.  However, in recent years EU 
manufacturers have required exporters to comply with standards targeting animal 
welfare and factory workers’ living conditions.  Examples include the ACP, Freedom 
Food and supermarkets’ own standards.313  In addition to animal and workers’ welfare 
there is an increasing tendency for other issues of legitimate concern to be addressed 
including sustainable agriculture, environmental and wildlife protection, recycling and 
waste management.  As with baby corn, these standards are prone to constant change by 
the standard-setting bodies. 
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 Rakpong J., personal interview held during meeting with the Thai Broiler Processing Exporters 
Association, Bangkok, Thailand 7/08/2008. 
312
 Namely, back in 2001-2003.  
313
 For instance, the standards belonging to TESCO, Marks & Spencer and the Co-op.  
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Table 6: Three Tiers of Regulation Imposed on Thai Poultry Exports to the EU 
 
Similar to the case of baby corn, and as a result of special regulatory control imposed by 
the DLD and by private standard entities, there are three levels of EU food safety 
regulation applicable to Thai poultry exports to the EU (Table 6).  First, Thai national 
laws are applicable to both domestic and exported products.  Second, for exports to the 
EU market, Thai poultry exporters have to comply with EU governmental regulations.  
Compliance with these is largely overseen by the DLD, subject to the EU’s approval.  
Third, private standards are also applied for exports to the EU.  These private standards 
can be divided into either universal or supermarkets’ own standards.  
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3.4 Part III - Operation of the Competent Authority Model  
 
The case studies on fresh and chilled baby corn and cooked poultry products in Parts I 
and II of this chapter illustrate how significant the cross-border effects of EU food 
safety regulation in Thailand have been.  In both case studies these cross-border effects 
were initially brought about through the arrangements between Thai and EU 
governmental entities.  Here, I call these arrangements the “Competent Authority (CA) 
model”.  However, in recent years cross-border effects have also been brought about by 
the operation of private standards.   
 
In Part III of this chapter I will highlight the structure of the CA model and the 
advantages to both Thai and EU entities that this regulatory model has brought.  I will 
discuss private standards separately, returning to this issue in Chapter 6.  
 
3.4.1 Structure of the Competent Authority Model  
 
This regulatory model involves an official arrangement between EU and Thailand 
whereby Thai governmental entities act as competent authorities for the EU in issuing 
export certificates to attest that particular Thai exports comply with relevant EU food 
safety laws.  As explained in the introductory part of this chapter, this CA role for food 
exports is carried out by three main departments, each of which is under MOAC, 
depending upon the type of product being exported.314  From time to time the 
competence of the Thai CA is checked by the FVO, which undertakes ‘missions’ to 
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 See supra, Section 3.1. 
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Thailand to monitor particular food safety issues relating to products where there may 
be EU concerns.  The EU and Thai governmental entities involved in this regulatory 
arrangement are illustrated in Table 7 below.  
 
Governmental Institutions 
    
* DG-SANCO              * Thai MOAC (main CA) 
* FVO         * Product-based CA 
 - DOA 
 - DLD 
 - DFT 
Table 7:  Illustrating the Government Institutions under the CA Model 
 
3.4.2 Quid-Pro-Quo Benefits to the EU and Thailand  
 
3.4.2.1 Benefits to the EU  
 
Under the CA model a transnational “quid pro quo” relationship is created between the 
EU and Thailand.  For EU authorities, compliance with its food safety regulation is 
assured by the Thai authorities even before exports leave Thailand for the EU.  Since 
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the model seeks to ensure the equivalence of the CA’s export monitoring and quality 
control systems, the EU authority carries out additional monitoring checks in Thailand 
both before and after equivalence status has been granted.315  “On-the-spot” checks, 
conducted by the FVO during its various “missions” to Thailand, are performed at CAs’ 
units, the working departments of the DOA, DLD and DOF, and at farms and food 
establishments.  The frequency of inspections and any issues arising from inspections 
are published in the FVO inspection programmes which are dependent upon the 
performance of the CAs, the product records and prevailing food safety concerns.  
Following each inspection the FVO drafts a report containing its opinions on the issues 
addressed in the inspection.  Thereafter the CAs have an opportunity to comment on the 
draft prior to the publication of the final report which sets out the inspection results and 
recommendations to be followed by the CA.  
 
Through this CA model, and particularly as a result of FVO inspection programmes, 
Thai authorities have to be able to ensure that exports comply with EU food safety law 
prior to products leaving Thailand.  In addition, as a result of the FVO’s ability to 
comment upon the overall effectiveness of the Thai CAs’ export controlling systems 
and to make recommendations on matters of concern, the EU is able to exert 
considerable influence over Thai food safety policies and Thai administrative 
arrangements.  It is clear that Thai CAs are compliance-oriented and that they have 
earnestly endeavoured to follow the FVO’s advice in order to maintain their CA status 
with the EU.  In practice the CAs in Thailand can be said to act as “de facto” agents of 
the EU in ensuring respect for EU food safety regulation.   
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 Regulation EC/882/2004, particularly Article 23 for Approval of pre-export checks by third countries 
and Article 46 for EU Control in third countries.  
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Thai CAs have, on many occasions, used their legislative powers and resources to 
amend domestic laws and to put in place new institutional arrangements in order to 
bring compliance with EU food safety regulation.  An example of the lengths to which a 
CA is willing to go in this respect is seen in the poultry case study.316  Here, a 
significant upgrading of laboratory infrastructure and a re-organisation of the DLD’s 
working departments took place following the FVO’s poultry export inspection in 
1999.317  This led to the establishment of the National Institute of Animal Health Unit, a 
new stand-alone department with its own independent laboratory that was established to 
deal with animal health issues, and specifically charged with checking for Newcastle 
and other animal diseases for all animal products exported to the EU.318   
 
The DLD has sought to follow every FVO recommendation regarding sampling 
processes for pre-export disease inspection, including the recommendation that regular 
samples should be taken at the farm and not solely during a single inspection at 
abattoirs.  In keeping with this compliance-orientation, the DLD has assigned 
responsibility for approving all laboratory samples to its on-site staff.  This is a major 
endeavour given the training that has to be given to DLD on-site staff who are located 
in every export establishment.319   
 
                                                           
316
 See supra, Section 3.3.3.2.2.   
317
 The comment was on the DLD’s lack of sufficient epidemic-controlling facilities.  
318
 Subsequently the work on this animal health unit was extended to cover products bound for other 
markets and occasionally those sold domestically.   
319
 Substantial time and financial resources were devoted to train workers in approximately 100 export 
establishments.  Source: interviews. 
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Another significant change stemming from EU recommendations can be seen in the 
management quality systems relating to the adoption of DOA’s GAP and GMP 
certification schemes, which are now essential conditions for fruit and vegetable exports 
to the EU markets.320  These schemes were adopted by the DOA in a bid to maintain its 
CA status and as a direct result of a number of official “serious warnings” from the 
FVO following the occurrence of several food safety incidents in the period 2005-
2007.321  Under these schemes management-based practices similar to HACCP and 
traceability must be put in place in order to obtain export certification.  This led to 
major reforms, taking place over a period of several years, to procedures for certifying 
Thai fresh fruit and vegetable exports to the EU.   
 
As a result of these measures being put into place, food safety conditions of Thai 
exports to the EU were gradually improved.  Although occasional food safety outbreaks 
do occur, these CA arrangements have been working effectively in ensuring that Thai 
exports comply with EU food safety law in a clear majority of cases.  Under the 
operation of the CA model, Thai food exports have progressed greatly since the period 
when they regularly failed to pass basic EU sanitary requirements, and indeed when 
product quarantine was significantly more commonplace.   
                                                           
320
 The DOA has issued an announcement that most of fruits and vegetables exports (158 types) to the EU 
must only come from DOA-approved GAP DOA (Announcement on Food Safety, No. 125/71, of 11 
April 2008). This can be found at: http://www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/DATA/PDF/2551/E/071/9.PDF (in 
Thai).  For the updated list of vegetables and fruits that are subject to this announcement see 
http://gap.doa.go.th/gap/cer_crop.html (in Thai).  
321
 In the interviews with MOAC staff, it was said on numerous occasions that the particular warnings by 
the FVO in relation to the DOA’s breaching of “equivalence” can be said to have been the main driving 
force to make the DOA introduce its GAP scheme.  The FVO issued an annual report in 2005 that there 
was an unacceptably high number of RASFF concerning Salmonella and E. coli found in fresh vegetables 
from Thailand (52 out of 87 cases) resulting in the DOA being requested to issue an official guarantee to 
the FVO that appropriate measures would be taken in order to reduce this type of incident. The 2007 FVO 
report also expressed similar concerns regarding the 8 cases between July-December 2007.  These led the 
DOA to change its approach for controlling export products to the EU market so as to rely on 
management-based systems as well as the regulatory-based systems of quality control checks for MRL of 
chemical and microbial substances.  
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Since the CA model has been mostly effective in bringing about a day-to-day 
compliance with EU food safety regulation, it reveals one significant regulatory 
dimension that has often been neglected by many academics, but which deserves further 
attention.  It is often believed that mechanisms to ensure exports’ compliance with 
importing country’s food safety law commence once the exports reach the importing 
countries’ borders.  However, as the case studies have shown with regards to Thai food 
exports to the EU, a significant level of compliance has already been achieved in 
Thailand, and assured by the Thai CA, even before products leave Thai ports to 
countries of destination.322 
 
Many recent studies by different academics have focussed on identifying lapses in 
import quality and have put forward proposals to “keep imports safe”.323   For example, 
an interesting proposal has been put forward by Bamberger and Guzman, who argue in 
favour of strict liability for importers as an alternative method to be deployed by the US 
government to ensure that imports comply with relevant domestic laws.324  Although 
they are aware that such a radical measure is likely to be challenged as breaching 
various WTO obligations,325 they have insisted that such measures are necessary for 
compliance with national laws and that there are no alternative measures available to 
secure a similar level of compliance.326  However, the case studies presented here 
                                                           
322
 In addition, significant levels of compliance have also been achieved by private entities’ regulations as 
will later be discussed in Chapter 6.  
323
 This is the term used by Bamberger and Guzman (2008)  
324
 They argue that this strict liability is necessary to correct market externalities as importers often obtain 
economic benefit without considering the potential social costs of risks to human health that imported 
products may pose (Ibid, p. 1433).  
325
 For example under Article III GATT (Ibid, p. 1440).   
326
 Ibid, p. 1142-43 
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suggest the contrary.  They demonstrate that a less trade-restrictive alternative is 
actually available through the application of a regulatory scheme similar to the CA 
model arrangement between the EU and Thailand.  As a result, the possibility of 
establishing this kind of regulatory arrangement should also be explored by importing 
countries in a bid to ensure recourse to the least trade restrictive means.327  This CA 
arrangement could be applied between other importing and exporting countries not just 
by the EU.   
 
In addition to the idea of imposing strict liability on importers, other academics have 
suggested various stringent import safety requirements.  Examples include a proposal 
by Zach and Bier for a risk-based approach which introduces different levels of import 
safety control according to the risk that attaches to different types of imports.328  
Alemanno argues in favour of stricter traceability obligations for importers and 
distributors.329  Whilst it may be useful to consider such proposals in that they address 
compliance problems from the perspective of importing countries, they do not 
acknowledge the significant degree of compliance that exporting countries have hitherto 
achieved.  Nor do they mention that their proposals may themselves be difficult or 
impractical to apply.  For example, with regard to applying a risk-based approach for 
different imports, the variety of food imports entering a particular country, and given 
that the same type of produce originating in different countries or regions can pose 
                                                           
327
 In fact Bamberger and Guzman have considered the possibility that import compliance may derive 
from the regulation by foreign governments.  However they reject this option on the grounds that different 
governments are pursuing different regulatory goals and there are no, or very limited, ways in which the 
US government can compel exporting countries’ governments to participate in ensuring that their exports 
comply with US law.  However, from the case study results it can be seen that this is in fact possible by 
having a CA model arrangement.   
328
 Zach and Bier (2009).  This involves a quantitative assessment of the import life cycle and the design 
of import control mechanisms according to the risk of a particular import.   
329
 Alemanno (2009). 
 148
different level of risks, it can be anticipated that this proposal would be difficult to 
implement in practice.  Moreover, it is also possible that by the time the overall risk of a 
particular import is calculated on a life cycle basis, a new risk may have emerged or the 
old one may have subsided, resulting in the possibility that whole risk assessment 
process will have to be constantly updated.  Similarly, the proposal for stricter 
traceability obligations has to be approached with caution as it could potentially impose 
an excessive financial burden on food business operators.330  Regulatory practicality and 
costs are factors that need to be kept in mind.  
 
Against this backdrop, the case studies provide another dimension of import safety – 
they present the issue from an exporting country’s’ perspective.  They demonstrate how 
the governmental entities of exporting countries such as Thailand, through the operation 
of the CA model, have played a crucial role in securing export compliance with EU 
food safety law.   In addition, they also show the levels to which Thai entities are 
willing to go to maintain their CA status and to ensure that Thai exports continue to 
gain EU market access.    
 
Thus, instead of importing countries rushing to develop entirely new control 
mechanisms, alternatives should perhaps be considered first.  In particular, importing 
countries should consider the option of developing and improving a model based on a 
CA approach.331   
 
                                                           
330
 See supra, section 2.3 in the traceability –E. coli discussion whether stricter “serialisation” process 
should be deployed in the EU. 
331
 This has to be done on a case-by-case basis. In addition, this is not to suggest that the current CA 
model is perfect. In fact, the system should be further improved. However, the results of the case studies 
provide a platform for introducing improvements.  
 149
 
3.4.2.2 Benefits to Thailand  
 
Despite the intrusive inspections associated with it, the CA model provides tangible 
benefits to Thailand.  As demonstrated earlier in the two case studies, the DOA and 
DLD, which operate as Thai CAs for fruit and vegetable and for animal product exports, 
enjoy “presumed equivalency status” and are allowed to issue phytosanitary and export 
certificates attesting to the fact that Thai exports comply with relevant EU food safety 
laws.  Furthermore, this is also the case for the DOF, in respect of fisheries products.332  
This benefit of presumed equivalency status is significant for Thailand since once 
certificates are issued by one of the Thai CAs, there is generally no need for a full 
sanitary and phytosanitary check at the EU border.333  The frequency and intensity of 
inspection procedures at EU borders are greatly reduced allowing accelerated access to 
the EU market.334  By contrast to some agricultural exports to other countries, where no 
arrangement of this kind is in place, the complexity and duration of import procedures 
at EU borders are reduced and Thai exporters benefit accordingly.335   
 
In addition to the presumed equivalency status granted to Thai exports, the CA model 
also provides benefits to other Thai stakeholders.  Firstly, the CA model has served as a 
due-diligence defence and, as such, has assisted Thai entities in putting forward claims 
                                                           
332
 The EU market share has been less for fisheries products compared with the products in the two case 
studies (personal interviews with Dr. Jirawan Yamorayoon, Deputy Director of the Ministry of Fisheries, 
Bangkok, Thailand, 09/09/2008). 
333
 However, there may be a need to perform full sanitary and phytosanitary checks at the EU border at 
the discretion of the Border Inspection staff should, for example, they suspect a breach of EU food safety 
law. 
334
 Unless there are concerns regarding the compliance of a particular Thai export at a particular time.  In 
such a case the product will be subject to more rigorous inspections at the border.  
335
 For example, fisheries exports to the US do not have to pass third country approval by the FDA and 
hence there is no presumed equivalency status.  Instead, more rigorous inspections of the consignments 
are performed at the US border. 
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to limit the scope of EU import bans.  Although occasional food safety outbreaks 
continue to occur, Thai stakeholders, and in particular the CAs, know how to react, and 
how to ascertain the source of the outbreak and what corrective measures to take.  In 
this way, they are able to enjoy the continued confidence of the EU food safety 
authorities.  
 
In both case studies it was stressed by exporters and CAs that the measures put in place 
by the CAs have provided significant support to producers and exporters when food 
safety incidents emerge. This was demonstrated in the following incidents: (i) the 2007 
“Shigella outbreaks” in baby corn;  (ii) the 2010-2011 case of pesticide residue 
excesses, Salmonella and E. coli found in Thai vegetables; and (iii) the 2004 Avian 
Influenza outbreak highlighted earlier in the poultry case study.336  
 
The first case concerning the “Shigella outbreaks” in Thai fresh baby corn products took 
place in August 2007.  The Danish authorities reported the incident and triggered the 
Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) as a result of outbreaks of food 
poisoning, allegedly caused by Shigella Sonnei infections in 45 patients who had 
consumed fresh baby corn from Thailand.337  Once the DOA was notified of this 
incident the products were traced back through the DOA traceability system.  The 
source of the infected products was eventually found to be a particular packing house 
that belonged to one exporter.  This occurrence of Shigella in Thailand was of a 
particular concern to both the DOA and to Thai baby corn exporters since the strain of 
Shigellosis allegedly found was rare in Thailand.  However, following the DOA’s 
                                                           
336
 See supra, Section 3.3.1.  
337
 On 21/08/2007. 
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laboratory tests carried out at the source of the incident, it was revealed that the cause 
was not, as feared, the Shigellosis bacteria but instead strains of Salmonella and E. coli 
which are more common in Thailand.  Indeed, the DOA’s test results matched the 
subsequent findings of the Danish laboratory.338   
 
In explaining to DG-SANCO339 and to the FVO, the DOA and staff at the Thai embassy 
in Brussels used this accurate traceability information as a defence in insisting that the 
source and cause of the incident were now known and that such incidents were 
preventable.  In light of the fact that the ban had already been imposed on the specific 
establishment that caused the incident, and that corrective measures had been put in 
place for fresh baby corn exports, the DOA convinced the EU that the overall food 
safety level of Thai baby corn exports was still under control.  This, together with the 
DOA’s proposed prevention plans to control microbial contaminants and to subject a 
large number of baby corn exporters to HACCP audits,340 led the EU to decide to take a 
more lenient approach and to refrain from imposing an outright ban on all fresh or 
chilled baby corn from Thailand. 
 
More recently, rigorous mechanisms implemented by the DOA also protected the 
majority of the vegetable export industry from an outright EU ban following discoveries 
                                                           
338
 Later laboratory tests in Denmark also confirmed that the contamination was Salmonella instead of 
Shigella as initially suggested. However, the link between the food poisoning and the microbial 
contaminants from Thai baby corn could not be disputed (Lewis et al. 2007).  
339
 Directorate General for Health & Consumers. 
340
 The laboratory tests revealed that there were some contaminants found in stool samples taken from the 
factory workers. There was a counter-claim by the exporter that although the cooking instruction clearly 
stated that the product should be washed and cooked prior to consumption, consumers could have ignored 
such advice.  In the DOA and Ministry of Commerce’s official visits after the incidents to the problematic 
packing house, the DOA ordered the owner to introduce a stricter hygiene procedure and to provide 
specific instructions to be followed by the owners. The packing house was later checked by the DOA 
prior to allowing it to resume its export business. (Rakpong J., personal interview with Mrs. Tippawan at 
the Ministry of Commerce, Department of Foreign Trade, Nontaburi, Thailand (21/08/2008). See also the 
official investigation reports from the Ministry of Health and MOAC (Tikhamram et. al 2007). 
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of pesticide residue excesses, Salmonella and E. coli in Thai vegetables.  Following 
several “warnings” from DG-SANCO341 the triggering of many RASFFs and the fact 
that half of Thai vegetable exports to the EU were already subject to additional MRL 
checks at EU borders in December 2010, the Thai CA implemented a self-imposed ban 
on most vegetable exports to the EU from January 2011.  The ban was kept in place 
until the source and causes of the incident were identified and a review of vegetable 
export controls had been undertaken.342  Using the traceability systems put in place as 
part of the CA procedures, the source of the incident was identified as a particular group 
of herb and spice producers.  The cause of high MRL of pesticides, Salmonella and E. 
coli was thought to be the result of mixing non-DOA-GAP certified products with 
certified products.  Consequently a ban on plant certification was imposed upon the 
sources.  Thereafter the DOA continued to carry out on its own initiative 100 percent 
checks on EU vegetable consignments.343  In this incident, while the EU initially issued 
warnings to the Thai CA, no ban has yet been imposed by the EU.  Because Thailand 
proffered explanations for the source and causes of the problems and introduced its own 
strict control procedures, keeping the EU fully informed at all times, the EU was 
persuaded not to issue a ban.344 
                                                           
341
 For example, clear warnings had been presented in the FVO mission reports on the systems for 
controlling pesticides in food of plant origin and the prevention contamination in fresh herbs and spices 
(DG SANCO 2010 8575), p. 3 where the FVO asserted in its record that Thailand had the highest number 
of RASFF concerning microbial contaminations of product from third countries in 2008, and second 
highest with regard to pesticide residue in 2008-9 and that some of pesticides found were not authorised 
to be used in the EU.  
342
 The ban was imposed until mid February 2011.  Over 20 types of vegetable were subject to this ban.  
This caused great disruption to the entire vegetable export industry.  (www.krobkruakao.com, the new 
reports from the Ministry of Agriculture dated 6/1/2011. See also 
http://thairecent.com/Business/2011/813630/, news report stating that the EU accepts the Thai CA’s 100 
percent checks in place of an import ban.  
343
 As of April 2011, this 100 percent check was still on-going.  
344
 The reports made by Thai DOA to the EU related to the cause and the source of the incident.  In 
addition, the detailed explanation on the 100 percent check framework was also included.  Information 
regarding this incident can also be found at www.matichon.co.th (in Thai) (report dated 6/1/2010 and 
28/1/2010).   
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Similarly in the poultry case study, following the Avian Influenza incident the DLD’s 
decision to impose exacting pre-export checks for the H5N1 virus in all export 
consignments to the EU and to put in place rigorous traceability demands ensured that 
cooked poultry exports to the EU have remained Avian Flu-free.  The poultry export 
ban in this case continues to be limited to fresh poultry, because the EU continues to 
feel that a risk of Avian Influenza outbreaks is still present in the south-east Asian 
region.  However, as explained in the previous chapter, Thailand has been able to both 
retain and regain EU markets in relation to cooked poultry meat subsequent to the 
Avian Influenza outbreaks.  It was stressed by the DLD staff, poultry producers and 
exporters that the existence of the rigorous measures put in place by the DLD will be 
beneficial in supporting Thai exporters’ forthcoming application to attempt to resume 
the export of fresh poultry products to the EU under the compartmentalisation 
scheme.345   
 
Another benefit that this CA model has brought to Thailand is its contribution to the 
expansion of good EU food safety practices in Thailand.  As was illustrated in the two 
case studies,346 many exporters supply not only the EU but the domestic and other 
export markets as well.  It is therefore expedient for these companies to comply with the 
most stringent food safety standards, as set by the EU, throughout their entire supply 
                                                           
345
 Under Regulation EC/411/2009, which sets out a list of third countries, territories, zones or 
compartments from which poultry and poultry products may be imported into and transit through the EU; 
it also specifies the veterinary certification requirements. 
346
 See supra, Section 3.2.2.2 and 3.3.2.2 (domestic distribution channels)   
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chain.347  Claims have been made by the Thai CAs, producers and exporters that EU 
food safety regulation has operated to improve the quality of food products sold on the 
Thai market and exported throughout the world.  
 
One positive spillover effect of complying with EU food safety laws can be seen in the 
application of HACCP principles and traceability systems across the supply chain 
regardless of product destination.  Despite their widespread international acceptance,348 
these two food safety practices are not a legal requirement for food products sold in 
Thailand.  However, they are applied and inspected by the Thai CAs as an export 
condition to the EU market.349   
 
To a lesser extent there have been positive spillover effects concerning the regulation of 
MRL of chemical and microbial substances.  In such cases, exporters’ products are 
subject to similar treatment, regardless of product destination.  However, only those 
“batches” to be exported to the EU are subject to rigorous laboratory checks.  This is not 
necessarily the case for products bound for other destinations. In interviews with poultry 
exporters, for example, it was stressed that the application of best EU practice, including 
                                                           
347
 In the case of baby corn, producers state that it “makes sense” for them to apply “best EU practice” 
because most products they produce are for export markets, mainly for the EU.  Rakpong J., personal 
interview held during meeting with the Thai Fruit and Vegetable Producer  Association, Nakhon Pathom, 
Thailand, 9/07/2008 and the owners of two exporting companies (9-10/07/2008, Nakhon Pathom and 
Bangkok, Thailand). Also, in a manner which is similar to the baby corn example, poultry exporters claim 
that it is simpler for them to apply EU “best practices” in their establishments Rakpong J, personal 
interview held during meeting with the Thai Broiler Processing Exporters Association, and the staff from 
GFPT, Bangkok, Thailand 7/08/2008. 
348
 They are being used as basic food safety requirements for many importing countries including the EU, 
the US and Japan, and have been recommended for use by international organisations such as Codex and 
WHO (See supra, Chapter 2). 
349
 In the case of baby corn, HACCP principles have been applied as part of the DOA’s GAP and GMP 
programmes. Traceability is applied both at the supplier level as part of the GAP and GMP programmes 
and as part of the DOA’s own traceability system for high-value fruit and vegetable exports.  For poultry, 
HACCP and traceability are required for approval of the export establishment.  The DLD also operates 
various traceability systems for all consignments to the EU (see infra discussions in Chapter 3) 
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chemical control and good hygiene practices, are pursued in the poultry export industry 
regardless of product end-destination.  This was because it was possible for different 
parts of the same chicken to be destined for different parts of the world depending upon 
consumer preferences.350 
 
In certain situations the changes brought about by the need to comply with EU law have 
led to a change in Thai national law.  This can be seen from the adoption by the DLD of 
steps to control Nitrofuran following the Nitrofuran crisis of 2002-3.351  Previously the 
substance was commonly used as a growth promoter for chickens.  However, since 
Directive 2004/62/EC prescribes maximum levels for Nitrofuran in poultry meat due to 
its possible carcinogenic and anti-biotic resistance properties, in 2003 the DLD banned 
the use of Nitrofuran in poultry feeds and established a comprehensive monitoring 
system.352  This Nitrofuran ban was then issued as Thai national law and still applies to 
all domestic poultry raised, produced or sold in Thailand.  
 
3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This chapter has set out in detail the nature and operation of EU food safety regulation 
in the baby corn and poultry sectors.  In both case studies, EU food safety law has 
created profound cross-border effects in the relevant export industries.  Initially such 
cross-border effects were brought about through EU arrangements with Thai CAs - such 
                                                           
350
 Ibid. For instance consumers in Japan are said to prefer processed products in smaller cooked pieces 
such as drumsticks or wing parts, whereas the EU consumer prefers chicken breasts).  Thus the source of 
the products is the same regardless of product destination.  
351
 The exporters considered it to be a second major crisis.  
352
 Including the introduction of the DLD’s Veterinary Public Health Laboratory, as discussed earlier in 
Part II. 
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arrangements having been termed “the Competent Authority model” as explained in 
Part III of this Chapter. 
 
In recent years, exporters have also seen a significant proliferation of private standards.  
These constitute another tier of regulation with which Thai producers and exporters 
must comply.  Although meeting such standards is nominally voluntary, the case studies 
reveal that these standards have come to operate as de facto conditions for EU market 
access.  The rise of private standards presents a new challenge for Thai stakeholders.  
Their introduction also represents a major development in transnational food safety 
governance - an important theme addressed in detail in Chapters 4 and 6.  
 
With the extra-territorial application of EU food safety laws and private standards, spill-
over effects are inevitably generated in Thailand.  From the point of view of Thai 
stakeholders, some of these cross-border effects are positive, serving to strengthen 
Thailand’s position in the global economic environment.  It has been demonstrated in 
this Chapter that the CA arrangement has created benefits for both the EU and for 
Thailand.  This arrangement has been largely responsible for ensuring Thailand’s 
compliance with EU food safety requirements and for improvements in the overall Thai 
food safety system.  It has also had concomitant benefits for consumers in Thailand and 
in third countries, and has served to assist Thailand when faced with accusations 
regarding food safety outbreaks.   
 
Conversely, some cross-border effects have been viewed as being negative.  
Compliance with EU food safety regulation through the CA arrangement is invariably 
costly and sometimes difficult for small and medium-sized producers and exporters to 
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adjust to in the short-term.  Problems often arise during the CAs’ quests to secure rapid 
compliance with EU food safety standards.  For example, compliance problems arose 
following the DOA’s introduction of compulsory GAP and GMP schemes for all fruit 
and vegetable exports to the EU, the details of which were explained in Section 
3.2.3.2.3.  The introduction of these measures was problematic for small-scale 
producers as they were unable to upgrade their facilities immediately in order to secure 
the necessary export certification.  Similarly, some exporters and product distributors 
experienced interruptions as they were unable to secure sufficient supply following the 
introduction of the necessary export schemes because sources of certified products were 
initially limited.  Similarly, in the poultry case study, the imposition of stricter export 
requirements by the DLD in order to secure EU market access following the major 
Avian Influenza outbreak in 2003,353 created short-term compliance problems for small-
scale contract poultry farmers as they found it difficult to adjust to these abrupt 
regulatory changes.354  However, in the longer term efforts to adjust to the regulatory 
changes in both industries were overall successful.  While some small producers and 
exporters had to stop supplying the EU market temporarily, many small producers and 
exporters were able to adjust to the regulatory changes and to continue exporting to the 
EU. 355   
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 In less than a year following the main outbreak in 2003, the DLD had introduced its pilot traceability 
system incorporating the producers’ and exporters’ traceability systems at farms and processing plants 
into the DLD’s database, additional facilities were also required to enable on-site DLD staff to execute 
their increased responsibilities  (See supra Section 3.3.3.2.2 and 3.3.3.2.3).  
354
 This, together with the exporters’ preference to obtain the meat supply from their own farm were 
considered the main factors that led to a temporary decline in a number of contracted poultry farms in the 
aftermath of the 2003 Avian Influenza outbreak.  However, the information provided by Saha-Farm in 
2008 demonstrated that the number of contracted farms has gradually resumed (Rakpong J., personal 
interview with Mr. Nathsak Pattanachaikul, Chief Operating Officer of Saha Farms, Bangkok, Thailand, 
02/09/2008).  See previous discussion in supra Section 3.3.1 “Poultry Production in Thailand”.  
355
 For example, even after the rigorous changes brought about by both DOA’s schemes, small producers 
in Mae-Ta Co-operative and “pomelo growers” in Wieng-gan District were able to adjust to these changes 
and continue supplying their fresh produce to the EU.  From the interviews, it also emerged that in order 
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When compliance problems emerge between Thai stakeholders and EU regulators there 
are a number of mechanisms which have been used by Thai entities to mitigate these.  I 
will examine these mechanisms in detail in subsequent chapters and will appraise these 
in relation to official EU food safety regulation and private standards in turn.   
 
Before so doing, however, I will introduce the concept of accountability, as this will 
form the theoretical basis for my evaluation of current circumstances and of my 
proposals for reform.  I will situate the discussion of accountability in the context of 
academic literature on global governance and global administrative law.  While the next 
chapter is theoretical in its orientation and scope, Chapter 5 begins the task of 
integrating theory and practice in putting forward proposals for reform.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
to adjust to regulatory changes, it is often crucial for small producers to quickly obtain low-interest loans 
from the government-run “Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives” (BAAC) to update their 
facilities (Source: interviews). 
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CHAPTER 4:  
SOLVING OPERATIONAL AND TRADE PROBLEMS THROUGH 
EXTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND GLOBAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Using examples drawn from the two case studies, the previous chapter illustrated the 
operation of EU food safety regulation in Thailand, looking at the CA model and private 
standards.  EU food safety regulation creates external effects and these have been a 
major cause of concern for Thai entities.356  This is particularly the case with regard to 
private standards introduced by EU supermarkets and standard-setting bodies.  Over 
time, rules set up by private entities have grown in number and significance, completely 
changing the regulatory landscape in terms of the food safety requirements to be met by 
Thai exports to the EU.  Many complaints have emerged from Thai stakeholders, 
particularly in relation to the application of various private standards in Thailand, and 
questions arise as to how the trade and operational problems experienced by Thai 
stakeholders may be mitigated or resolved.   
 
In order to answer these questions, it is important to introduce and to explore two 
fundamental theoretical issues.  The first concerns the conceptualisation of 
contemporary EU food safety law and its cross-border operations in Thailand.  
Exploration of this issue is important in order to understand better the origins of the 
                                                           
356
 Part III of the previous chapter discussed external impacts of the CA model.  Detailed discussion of the 
impact of EU private standards in Thailand will be presented in Chapter 6. 
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problems highlighted in the case studies so that appropriate solutions to these problems 
can be proposed.  The second issue concerns the concept of accountability as between 
Thai stakeholders and EU regulators, both governmental and private.  It is important to 
address this issue in order to explain why the activities of EU standard setting bodies 
should be subject to control.   
   
This chapter is divided into three parts as follows: 
 
Part I examines the character of EU food safety law, demonstrating that its current 
operation constitutes a clear example of global governance.   
 
Part II introduces and examines the concept of accountability.  Using Keohane’s 
concept of external accountability and the theoretical perspective provided by Global 
Administrative Law (GAL), this explains how an understanding of EU food safety 
regulation as global governance can help us to overcome the accountability problems 
highlighted in the case studies.  Drawing upon GAL, this part will also explain why EU 
regulators should be accountable for their actions and decisions where these impact 
significantly upon entities outside the EU, including in Thailand. 
 
Finally, Part III will make recourse to GAL as an external accountability standard with a 
view to evaluating EU food safety regulation.  The purpose here is to identify the 
existence of external accountability gaps between EU regulators and affected entities in 
Thailand.  In this part, the concept of GAL will be disaggregated and the individual 
criteria that underpin the concept of external accountability will be set out.  This part 
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will also consider how the external accountability gaps that are identified may be 
mitigated or overcome.  
  
Before proceeding it is appropriate to explain why GAL was selected as the dominant 
theoretical perspective to frame the discussion that follows.  Other theoretical 
perspectives, including global legal pluralism and network governance, were considered 
as alternatives for addressing the accountability issues that arise in the context of global 
governance.  As such, it is not only important to explain why GAL was selected as the 
main theoretical framework but also why these alternatives were dismissed along the 
way. 
 
There are many theories that could help us to understand global governance better.  
Legal pluralism, for example, may provide an explanation as to why private standards 
can be viewed as ‘law’ and why private standards exist, and operate alongside, 
governmental regulation.357  Network governance, as will be further explained in 
Section 4.2.3 below, can provide an explanation for the increase in multi-level and 
transnational interactions between different global governance actors.   Although useful, 
these theoretical perspectives tend to deal only with the descriptive aspects of global 
governance.  Their role is to help us form a better understanding of how global 
                                                           
357
 Under this legal pluralism concept, the co-existence of public and private regulators does not imply a 
competition between them.  Although in theory private regulation may be subordinate to state regulation, 
in practice it can be said to have co-existed and interacted with state regulation and can be regarded as 
law.  Both types of regulation can be viewed as operating in their own arena but pluralism recognises that 
in some instances, there can be communication and interaction between them.  For theoretical works in 
relation to co-existence of public and private regulation, see further: Twining’s explanation on pluralism 
(2002) also Jansen and Michaels (2008) p. 527, Meidinger (2009), Schepel (2005), especially Chapter 1.  
Also see Cafaggi (2006) in relation to the role of private regulation in the EU.  With regard to the co-
existence of public-private entities, he points out that the involvement of private entities does not 
necessarily lead to a lower degree of governmental regulation.      
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governance operates and how the different actors interact with one other.  However, 
these theoretical perspectives do not provide us with a normative viewpoint that is 
capable of identifying and responding to the problems that arise.  There are three 
primary reasons why GAL may be considered to be a more suitable theoretical 
framework for the purpose of the discussion that follows. 
 
 First of all, the main focus of GAL is upon external accountability relationships 
between different global governance actors, including multi-level and transnational 
relationships and hybrid relationships between public and private bodies.  As will be 
explained later in Parts II and III, it is precisely external accountability relationships of 
this kind that are at issue in the Thai case studies presented in the chapter above.   
 
Second, and perhaps most crucially, GAL comprises both a descriptive and a normative 
dimension.  GAL is descriptive in that it provides a language that permits us to describe 
whether external accountability relationships are present, and if so in what ways and to 
what extent.  However, GAL is also normative in that it provides a benchmark for 
evaluating the adequacy of these external accountability relationships and, crucially, for 
proposing future reform.  
  
The third reason that GAL provides an appropriate theoretical perspective is that the 
methodology for identifying GAL criteria is defined by a ‘bottom-up’ approach that is 
based upon ascertaining the de facto experiences of international institutions and of 
distributed administrations in global governance settings.   The criteria that underpin the 
operation of GAL are formulated by observing institutional practice across a wide range 
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of diverse global governance settings.  This ‘bottom-up’ approach ensures that the 
criteria endorsed by GAL are capable of being operationalised in practice and that the 
normative benchmarks that they form are realistically capable of being achieved.  A 
more complete explanation of the origin and the establishment of GAL is given in 
Section 4.4.1, Part III below.   
 
It should be stressed that my aim here is to use GAL as an accountability measuring 
‘tool’ rather than to develop a new theory of GAL as such.  However, by exploring and 
analysing the external accountability relationships between EU regulators and affected 
Thai entities through the lens of GAL, I will be able to contribute to the elaboration of 
the GAL criteria which, in the existing literature, remain somewhat vague.  I am also 
able to identify and to evaluate concrete mechanisms to promote compliance with GAL. 
Thus, while my study does not develop GAL theory as such, it does have the potential 
to deepen our understanding of the individual components that make up the concept of 
GAL. 
  
4.2  Part I: GLOBAL GOVERANCE ASPECTS OF EU FOOD SAFETY LAW  
 
In this section I will explain that EU food safety law is an example of global 
governance.  This is because it is imbued with three characteristics closely associated 
with global governance, namely: (i) increased participation by private actors, (ii) 
intensive interactions between public and private actors, and (iii) multi-level and 
transnational interactions between various actors. 
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4.2.1 From Government to Governance: Increased Participation by Private Actors    
 
The concept of global governance is considered a departure from conventional 
understanding of administration which associates regulators with states and the 
governments of those states.358  According to this conventional understanding the term 
“governance” is used as a synonym for “governing by government”.  In other words, 
state governmental bodies are deemed to enjoy a monopoly in performing regulatory 
functions and to exercise these functions in a top-down, hierarchical way.359  However, 
this original association between regulation and states/governments has changed as non-
state regulators have begun to assume regulatory functions.  Consequently a new 
understanding of “governance” has emerged, according to which, non-governmental 
bodies can also perform regulatory roles.360   
 
Although private entities have a long history of participating in the regulatory process 
together with governmental entities,361 the shift from “government” to “governance” is 
relatively recent.  It first emerged with the privatisation boom and the deregulation of 
public infrastructure in the 1960s and 70s; a phenomenon which started in Western 
                                                           
358
 This is also referred to as the “old governance” theory by Abbott and Snidal (2009). 
359
 Mayntz (2006), p. 1.  This governmental regulation is often conducted through legal rules backed by 
sanctions, usually by means of legislation.  See further Black, Julia (2002), p. 20 and Havinga (2006), p. 
516. 
360
 Rhodes (1997), in by Mayntz (2006), p. 1.  
361
 The early form of private bodies’ involvement in taking on regulatory roles can be seen in their 
indirect involvement in the exertion of influence upon governmental entities during various regulatory 
and decision-making processes through lobbying, collaborating and participating with governmental 
entities. The full extent of private bodies’ influence is beyond the scope of this thesis and on its own 
would require thorough study of the dynamic interactions between public and private entities in various 
situations.  For further reference see Shaffer (2009) p. 147. 
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Europe and then expanded worldwide.362  There has been a fragmentation of state power 
as governmental entities have delegated their regulatory powers to designated private 
entities.363  However, over time other mechanisms have been introduced by private 
entities in their assumption of regulatory roles.  Private bodies can also assume 
regulatory powers for themselves by becoming directly involved in creating and running 
their own regulatory systems and standards.364  In addition, they can continue to 
perform indirect regulatory functions by influencing governmental entities that make 
and apply the law.365  The various features of this shift from “government” to 
“governance’ will be explored below, making use of examples drawn from the case 
studies presented earlier in this work.  
 
We can see examples of the direct involvement of private bodies in regulation as a 
result of the emergence of private standards of the kind discussed in the previous 
chapter.  This type of private body involvement is similar to privatisation, except that 
here regulatory power is neither handed-over by governmental entities to private actors, 
nor is it directly controlled by them.366  The initiative for this kind of private regulation 
often originates from within the private bodies themselves in circumstances where they 
wish to address specific issues that they perceive to be inadequately covered by 
governmental regulation.  Private regulation is especially prevalent in respect of highly 
                                                           
362
 As society began to realise the advantages of non-state body regulators in processing information more 
quickly through more flexible and adaptable processes, See further, Mayntz (2006), Schepel, (2005), p. 
13), Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (2005). 
363
 Here governmental regulators usually make private entities subject to certain criteria. In such 
situations, private bodies are considered to be organs of the state and are subject to strict controls under 
administrative law.   See further, Picciotto (2008), p. 315-318.   
364
 Lex mercatoria and the establishment of private arbitral bodies can be considered as early forms of 
this.  However, in the recent past, it has significantly evolved through the establishment of private 
standards.   
365
 See further Shaffer (2009), p.147.  
366
 It can be said that here, the regulatory power claimed by private entities is “devolved” from 
governmental entities to be performed by private regulators. As a result there are no direct controls 
exerted by governmental entities on private bodies’ regulatory systems.  
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technical issues because governmental entities are often not equipped with the 
knowledge, time and resources required to issue detailed rules covering all specific 
subjects for all industries.367  On the contrary, private entities operating in the sector 
concerned are often more familiar with the industry’s own needs, and thus are better-
placed to regulate themselves and their counterparts.  Not only do they have greater 
expertise, they also have more information and knowledge, lower monitoring costs and 
generally demonstrate greater flexibility.  
 
Evidence of the increased direct involvement of private bodies in performing regulatory 
roles can be seen from both the universal and bespoke supermarket standards in the case 
studies presented earlier in this work.  As these case studies suggest, Thai government 
competent authorities are no longer the only bodies to regulate Thai producers and Thai 
exports to the EU market.  The case studies show that the requirements imposed by 
private standard have been just as effective in altering the behaviour of Thai 
producers/exporters as the requirements imposed via the competent authority model.  
Consequently the regulatory scope of EU food safety regulation in Thailand is no longer 
limited to rules drawn up by the EU and Thai governments but also incorporates private 
standards.368  This phenomenon can be considered as an example of private regulation 
taking the form of rules which are established and applied by “a network of 
                                                           
367
 Schepel (2005), p. 13. 
368
 It should be noted that an increase in private bodies’ involvement is also apparent within EU food 
safety regulation.  Tim Lang has suggested that there are now three kinds of regulatory body in the EU: 
first states through EU and national food safety law; second firms and supply chain associations through 
company regulations; and third civil society through their demands and campaigns. The latter two prongs 
are regulation by private entities (Lang, Tim (2006), p. 30-31). Originally, food safety regulation by the 
state may have been at the top of the hierarchy.  However, at the present the roles of these three prongs of 
regulation are equally important and they should be considered as co-existing in an horizontal manner 
rather than in a hierarchical form.  
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homogenous community of likeminded merchants”.369  The increasing regulatory role 
of private bodies in issuing, and demanding compliance with, various standards can be 
said to have moved EU food safety regulation in Thailand away from pure 
“government” under the CA model towards “governance”.  
 
4.2.2  Intensive Interactions between Public and Private Actors 
 
With the increase in self-regulation by private entities, the regulatory landscape has also 
changed, as we see public and private entities interacting more intensely, and beginning 
to influence one another’s decisions.  For example, private entities are able to support or 
resist governmental law by “expanding” or “curtailing” the reach of the law.370  They 
can, for instance, pick and choose between various governmental requirements and 
include some as part of their self-regulation schemes.  As such, the operation of private 
entities is clearly influenced by governmental law.  Similarly, private regulation can 
also operate to support the application of governmental law.  When private entities 
demand compliance with such law by suppliers who are located beyond the reach of 
governmental regulation, they serve to expand the reach of the law and in turn to 
influence the application of governmental rules and policies.   
 
This can be seen from the two case studies in which EU supermarkets use EU regulation 
of non-food safety ‘other legitimate concerns’ as the basis for their standards.  For 
example in relation to labour law some private standard schemes, including GlobalGAP, 
                                                           
369
 See Jansen and Michaels (2008), p. 531 referring to Riles (2008). 
370
 Shaffer (2009), p. 165-8. 
 168
Co-Operatives and Tesco’s Nature Choice, have adopted EU health-and-safety laws as 
their standardised criteria to be applied by their suppliers at home as well as in 
Thailand.371  Further examples include numerous additional requirements regarding 
environmental and wildlife protection, where standards such as those adopted by 
GlobalGAP already have provisions on waste management and on wildlife 
conservation.  This represents an expansion in the EU standards applicable to Thai 
products as there is no equivalent Thai law, and compliance with these criteria is not 
required by the EU itself to secure market access under the CA model.372 
 
On the other hand it has been pointed out by other commentators that private entities 
can also influence governmental law by curtailing the reach of the law through their 
self-regulation, for example by pre-empting judicial processes through the provision of 
complaint and arbitral procedures which are required to be applied to resolve disputes 
before the counterparty can go to court.  Examples of curtailment are often seen in 
employment disputes and in contract law.373   Although the extent of the curtailment 
may vary, the courts will generally defer to an organisation’s internal procedures and be 
ready to dismiss any claims which have not been referred first to available alternative 
dispute settlement systems that have been established in-house.374  It is noteworthy that 
while the case studies show clear evidence of private regulation operating to extend the 
reach of the law, no significant evidence has emerged of private standards serving to 
curtail the reach of the law. 
                                                           
371
 Examples can be seen from the baby corn case study with regards to GlobalGAP requirements.  (see 
supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4.1) 
372
 See supra, Chapter 3, Part I (baby corn case study).  
373
 See further Resnik & Curtis (2011), Chapter 14.  
374
 Shaffer (2009), p. 171.  
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In addition to private entities’ role in expanding or curtailing the application of 
governmental law, they are also increasingly involved in the making of decisions by 
governments and legislatures.  As governmental bodies have begun to appreciate the 
expertise of private bodies they have invited these entities to participate in various 
regulatory processes.  This is conspicuously the case in those areas in which the 
regulatory issues demand specific expertise and information from the pool of 
knowledge across technical fields.  The participation of private entities commonly 
occurs during the drafting stages of new legislation where the representatives of the 
relevant industries submit their opinions and share information and expert practices with 
government agencies.  In some cases the private entities may even lobby for the 
recognition of existing industrial practices as law.  Over time communication and 
information networks between public and private entities can emerge from this kind of 
interaction.  Such networks can be established on a permanent or ad hoc basis and serve 
in the establishment of forums for discussion, information and reference-sharing during 
professional conferences, workshops and similar such events.  Shaffer has stated that 
through the emergence of networks of shared expertise (epistemic communities), staff in 
private and public organisations often share references, a common pool of knowledge, 
including texts and journals, and they often attend the same conferences and workshops.  
Over time private entities can also influence and put forward what is considered to be a 
normal, reasonable or rational practice in a particular field.375  This discussion of 
networks of private and public entities will be revisited below in examining 
transnational interactions in global governance (Section 4.2.3).  
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 Ibid. 
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We have seen evidence of private entities influencing governmental decisions in the 
case studies presented earlier in this work.  Thai and EU private bodies have often been 
consulted by governmental bodies during the various stages of the regulatory process.  
For instance, in the DOA-GAP example set out in the baby corn case study in Chapter 
3, Thai CAs specifically referred to the concept of good agricultural practices and to 
information used by the standard-setting bodies, including GlobalGAP and indeed have 
adopted some of these concepts as forming the basis for their own regulations.376  In 
addition we have seen the adoption of ISO standards by the Bureau of Quality Control 
of Livestock Products of the DLD to monitor laboratory establishments in checking for 
animal diseases.377  Similar phenomena have also occurred in the EU where, during the 
drafting stages of legislation, EU and member state governmental bodies have often 
consulted and drawn upon information from industry.  Occasionally EU governmental 
entities have even used existing industrial practice as a framework for implementing 
legislation.  For example, Article 7-8 of Regulation EC/852/2004 permits various 
industries in different member states to play a significant role in establishing national 
guidelines for the adoption of HACCP principles.  Once food business operators in the 
country concerned comply with the relevant guidelines they are presumed to have 
                                                           
376
 Supra, Section 3.2.3.2.3, this can be illustrated from the close affinity of DOA’s GAP compulsory 
requirements for good agricultural practices of high value fruits and vegetable exports and GlobalGAP 
standards.  From interviews with DOA staff it has also been noted that the Thai competent authority often 
refers to several good agricultural practices featured in GlobalGAP and other private standard standards 
as a guideline in developing the DOA-GAP.  In addition it has also been discovered from interviews in 
both case studies that private entities, including the main exporters, are involved and are able to assert 
their opinions during the drafting stage of new Thai legislation that is applicable to Thai exporters.  They 
are often invited to comments on new Thai food safety regulations.  The CAs often refer to common 
practices, including those under GlobalGAP standards, as being reasonable and common practices for 
Thai exporters (see also supra, Chapter 3)  
377
 Supra, Section 3.3.3.2.2  
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complied with EU Regulation EC/852/2004 (although this presumption can be 
rebutted).378   
 
4.2.3  Multi-level and Transnational Interactions between Various Actors  
 
The term “global” in global governance has been specifically chosen by academics 
rather than “international” in order to reflect the complex, fluid and non-territorially 
bounded nature of new forms of regulatory interaction.379  Rules and standards 
governing particular issues and entities may emanate not only from public and/or 
private bodies, but can also originate from anywhere in the world as a domestic public 
or private body may refer to international or foreign rules, vice versa.  As a consequence 
the ‘global’ feature highlighted here refers to situations in which global governance 
entities engage not only in “multi-level” interaction (i.e. those in which domestic 
entities refer to international standards or vice versa) but also in “transnational” 
interactions where public and private entities co-operate, refer and adapt to regulations 
and practices prevalent in other countries.  
 
In terms of multi-level interaction, we often see interactions between entities operating 
domestically and at the international level.  Consequently domestic regulators 
sometimes adopt international standards as their own and global and international 
regulators sometimes look to domestic regulation to frame the development of their own 
                                                           
378
 Examples of national guidelines in the UK can be found at: 
http://www.food.gov.uk/foodindustry/guidancenotes/. See further supra Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1 Towards 
Hazard Prevention: the application of HACCP principles. 
379
 The term “international” is used to juxtapose domestic and international law division in the classical 
model of regulation.  In the classical model there is relatively clear separation of the “domestic” and 
“international” regulatory spheres.  However, in global governance situations there is no such clear-cut 
separation.  Domestic law can be interwoven with international regulations by various entities and in 
various forms and vice versa.  See further, Krisch and Kingsbury (2006), p 2, also Jansen and Michaels 
(2008), Mayntz (2006).   
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standards.  Evidence of this can be seen from many food safety regulations in the EU 
and Thailand where EU and Thai government entities, as members of international 
organisations, have adopted numerous international food standards as their own; at the 
very least they often refer to international standards in order to constitute their own 
minimum requirements and use international standards as reference points for their own 
legal developments.  Evidence of this can be seen in the references to international 
standards contained in the preambles to various EU and Thai legislation, and in the 
consultation papers that precede the adoption of this legislation.  For example, the Thai 
Ministry of Health Announcement on food labelling B.E. 2541 (1998) refers to Codex 
Alimentarius’s guidelines in setting out details of its own food labelling 
requirements.380  Similarly in the revision of EU Directive 90/496/EEC on Nutrition 
Labelling for Foodstuffs, the Commission also looked to the most recent Codex 
guidelines as a source of reference in relation to certain technical issues.381 
 
Similarly, over time the domestic laws of large economies, including the EU, can also 
influence the development of international standards in certain areas.  For example, the 
EU’s endorsements of the traceability principle and emphasis upon animal welfare 
protection have both greatly influenced the development of corresponding international 
standards.382   
 
                                                           
380
 Source: http://www.fda.moph.go.th/fda-net/html/product/food/ntfmoph/ntf182.htm- in Thai. 
381Source: 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/labellingnutrition/nutritionlabel/discussion_paper_rev_tech_issues.pdf. 
382
 See, for examples, the exchange of letters between the EU Commission and the OIE 2004/c 215/03 & 
04 (at; http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:215:0003:0004:EN:PDF ). 
 173
As for transnational interactions in global governance, a domestic regulatory framework 
originating in one state can be applied transnationally to regulate activities outside its 
original territorial domain.  As the case studies in the previous chapter have shown, this 
has occurred in respect of the cross-border application of EU food safety law and 
private standards in Thailand.   
 
This multi-level and transnational application of rules operates as a catalyst for 
increased interactions between various entities across borders.  Consequently, public 
and private entities at different levels of governance which may also be located in 
different countries begin to exchange information, refer to the norms and practices of 
one another, and to be influenced by one another through “networks” of information, 
co-operation and shared-practices.383  The term “network” in this context is used to 
capture the notion of governmental networks384 comprising “disaggregated”, or sub-
                                                           
383
 One recent example of the transnational application of law through a network of public-private 
entities’ interactions, in addition to those emerging in the case studies, is the transnational application of 
the EU’s REACH Regulation (Regulation EC/1907/2006).  Although REACH is intended to be applied to 
chemical substances produced in, or imported into the EU, it has transnational significance in relation to 
import/export restrictions and also has influence in the development of other countries’ regulations and 
industrial practices. Studies in relation to the transnational application of REACH have been conducted 
by various prominent academics, including work on the impact of REACH in the US by Joanne Scott and 
in Japan by Yoshiko Naiki. See Scott, (2009) and Naiki, (2010). 
384
 This concept has been introduced in Anne Marie Slaughter’s 2004 work on global government 
networks where she attempts to establish this as an alternative to solve the globalisation paradox whereby, 
on one hand, there are pressing needs for collective action and collaboration on the global scale, but on 
the other hand there is a need to retain the state’s sovereignty and freedom.  This has been  presented as 
an alternative doctrine to liberal internationalism (collective action by states through treaties and 
international institutions to promote a liberal world order) and new medievalist (where globalisation has 
brought an erosion of state sovereignty as its political authority are exercised by many non-territorial and 
overlapping agents – See further Hedley Bull’s work (2002)).  In her work, Slaughter rejects the concept 
of global governance as a theoretical solution for these problems as it is inconsistent with state 
sovereignty and democratic accountability.  However, this will depend upon how one defines sovereignty 
and even in her definition of sovereignty, Slaughter has been criticised as drawing a narrow, “de-fanged” 
sovereignty definition (Slaughter (1997), p. 267. See also the book review by Anderson (2005), p. 1267).  
In this context, however, the concept of global governmental networks is relevant in demonstrating the 
global feature of global governance where different sub-agencies of central government in different 
countries interact with one another.  
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governmental agencies, regulators and officials from different states, as well as 
transnational public/private networks. 385  
  
In each type of network, interactions occur as state agencies and non-state entities 
engage in informal, flexible and dynamic interactions with one another.  The existence 
of these networks creates forums for discussion, information exchange and reference 
sharing, and co-ordinated activities to address pressing global problems.  More 
importantly they often lead to technical assistance, technology transfer and experience-
sharing that flows from developed to developing countries.386  These activities usually 
take place through informal forums, during conferences, joint research activities, 
workshops, exchange visits, et cetera.  Over time the transnational interactions between 
network entities also tend to increase as entities in the networks gain trust and establish 
long-term co-operative relationships with each another.387  
 
Several networks have emerged as a result of transnational and multi-level interactions 
between global governance entities.  First, during multi-level interactions, various 
governmental networks, comprising domestic and international entities, began to 
exchange information and interact with one another.  They do so in an attempt to 
address global problems by ascertaining what other international or governmental 
entities regard as good practice or rules.  This can be seen, for example, in the co-
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 Ibid. The emergence of networks also confirms the move form government to governance as explained 
in the previous section.  Not only is the central government important in taking on regulatory roles and 
interacting with other central governments to combat regulatory problems, but these roles are also shared 
by “disaggregated” agencies and private entities.  In such cases, Slaughter suggested that it does not mean 
that the sovereignty of the state is either diminished or decentred.  This is because the state is not a unitary 
but is disaggregated in the first place. 
386
 With this co-operation and information exchange, network entities can be said to have helped to 
further expand regulatory reach and to close regulatory gaps between jurisdictions.  Ibid, p. 3-4.  
387
 Examples of these transnational networks are wide-ranging; from cross-border law enforcement (e.g. 
Interpol), networks of finance ministers and central bankers (e.g. finance ministers in G8) to technical 
environmental agencies. 
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operation between various domestic and international entities, headed by the OIE, 
which was designed to combat the spread of Avian Influenza.388  Further examples of 
networks arising from multi-level interactions between governmental entities and 
international communities can also be seen in relation to WTO SPS Committee’s 
complaints procedure which is discussed later in Chapter 5.389      
  
Secondly, transnational operation of EU food safety law via the CA model has created 
trans-governmental networks comprising various EU and Thai governmental agencies.  
Within these networks Thai CA and EU FVO staff exchange information on food safety 
and other related issues in both formal and informal ways.  Formal information 
exchange can be illustrated by the practice of written communications between the Thai 
CA, FVO and the Commission.  This usually occurs when the Thai CA provides written 
explanations in the event that food safety concerns are raised in FVO draft reports.  To a 
large extent, however, interactions in governmental networks of this kind have occurred 
informally through day-to-day communications between the staff of Thai and EU 
entities.  Such informal transnational interactions are not officially reported.  
Nonetheless, some illustrations can be seen from the case study interview records. 
 
Thai CA staffs serving at posts in both Bangkok and in Brussels acknowledge that 
through their acquaintance and interactions with EU personnel they can contact the EU 
authorities directly and seek clarification of new EU food safety regulations, or 
conversely provide first-hand explanations of emerging food safety issues affecting Thai 
                                                           
388
 International entities involved in this network include the OIE, WHO and other international health 
organs as well as relevant governmental entities in a number of countries.  By organising conferences and 
receiving information put forward by entities in this network, OIE is able to publish Avian Flu reports and 
recommendations on a regular basis. See further:  http://www.oie.int/animal-health-in-the-world/update-
on-avian-influenza/2011/. 
389
 See below, Section 5.1.2.3.  
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exports.  This type of informal interaction between different sub-governmental entities 
in the network has been very valuable on numerous occasions in enhancing mutual 
understanding between the EU FVO and Thai governmental entities, especially where 
food safety incidents have occurred.  This was demonstrated in the case studies 
concerning the Thai government’s handling of the Shigella and the Avian Influenza 
incidents, where both formal and informal governmental networks facilitated the 
emergence of consensual and mutually satisfactory solutions.  The discussion regarding 
the significance of the EU-Thai network interactions will be revisited in Chapter 5. 390 
 
Thirdly, transnational interactions between the FVO, the CA and private entities in 
Thailand via the CA model have also created another form of transnational networks 
comprising public and private entities on both sides.  Although the occurrence of these 
networks has been of an even lower profile than the governmental networks discussed 
above, the transnational networks between the Thai CA and producers/exporters have 
been formed out of their day-to-day interactions and in the performance of the CA role.  
As stated in the previous chapter, DOA and DLD staff run regular and ad hoc meetings 
with those producers and exporters supplying the EU market.391  As a result, Thai CA is 
able to pass on to the producers and exporters useful information received via their 
governmental networks interactions with EU staff and entities.  This can result in a 
useful exchange of information between the parties and lead to technical assistance 
being provided in an effort to solve pressing problems, as was the case for example in 
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 See infra, Chapter 5.2. 
391
 The frequency of the meetings varied.  Regular meetings are held monthly between the DLD and 
poultry exporters.  For baby corn exporters, meetings between the DOA and fruit and vegetable exporters 
are held every 6-8 weeks.  In both cases additional “special” meetings take place between the Thai CA, 
producers and exporters pre- and post-FVO inspections.   
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relation to the efforts to combat the Shigella incident and the Nitrofuran and Avian 
Influenza crises discussed earlier in Chapter 3.392  The significance of these network 
activities in addressing the operational problems which emerge from the application of 
EU food safety regulation in Thailand will be further explained in Chapter 5.393  
 
4.3 Part II: THE CONCEPT OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Having established that EU-Thai food safety regulation fits the global governance 
framework, I will now turn to the issue of accountability.  The main question arising 
here is whether EU public and private regulators are accountable to Thai stakeholders 
and, if so, how this accountability relationship is or may be instantiated.  This will be 
difficult because the EU regulators and Thai stakeholders are situated in different 
countries and there is no direct political or even sometimes organisational, relationship 
between them.  The concept of accountability is crucial, as are mechanisms for giving it 
effect, if EU regulators are to consider the needs of Thai stakeholders and if solutions 
are to be found to attenuate negative external effects.   
 
The main difficulty in establishing an accountability relationship between EU and Thai 
stakeholders is the extra-territorial nature of EU food safety law.  When problems 
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 See supra Chapter 3 Reference interviews: Rakpong J. personal interview held during meeting with 
Mr. Nathsak Pattanachaikul (Chief Operating Officer of Sahafarm) and Mr. Kasem Trakoonlerswilai 
(Deputy Director Sahafarm building, Bangkok, Thailand). 
392
 See supra Section 3.4.2.2.  However, this type of interaction in transnational networks is rarely present 
in the case of private standards.  To some extent there have been domestic network interactions between 
the Thai CA and Thai producers/exporters.  This occurs during their meetings.  Here, further training and 
technical assistance are both provided by the Thai CA.  To a lesser extent further technical assistance, 
training and exchanges of information can be conducted by the main exporters with their contract farmers 
(see the case of baby corn, Chapter 3).  
393
 Section 5.2.  This concerns the role of networks as “accountability fora” which can support 
communication between EU and Thai entities and contribute to closing the “external accountability gaps” 
that emerge from cross-border regulation.  
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emerge inside the EU there are established mechanisms for EU stakeholders to raise 
their concerns and to hold regulators to account.  However, although EU regulation is 
often binding on Thai stakeholders and has significant consequences for them, because 
of the geographical disjuncture between regulators and regulated, it is often not obvious 
where Thai stakeholders should turn.394  
 
The widespread presence of trans-boundary external or “spill-over” effects creates a 
disjuncture between the locus of decision-making and the place where the impact of the 
decisions is felt.  Where disjunctures of this kind arise it is frequently the case that those 
experiencing the effects of external regulation enjoy no opportunity to shape or 
influence the content of the regulations in question, and nor are they able to ensure that 
those adopting the regulations have taken their interests or concerns into account.  It has 
been suggested that the existence of a disjuncture of this kind gives rise to a serious and 
pressing normative problem; a problem that a prominent academic, Robert Keohane and 
his colleagues have sought to capture through recourse to the concept of an ‘external 
accountability gap.395  While this key concept is introduced here, I will turn to it in more 
detail below. 
 
It is clear that an external accountability gap has emerged in the case studies and that it 
has contributed to the various operational problems described therein.  While the 
language of external accountability was not used by the Thai stakeholders when they 
referred to the cross-border effects of EU food safety regulation, it was clear that they 
                                                           
394
 This disjuncture may also be organisational rather than geographic. For example, a company 
regulation can create effects outside of the company adoption the regulation. 
395
 Grant and Keohane (2005).  In other words an external accountability gap exists where there is a 
disjuncture of regulators’ and regulatees’ localities and when the regulators, being power-wielders, are 
not accountable to the regulatees (who are remote from their locality) despite them being bound by the 
regulators’ rules and decisions.   
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were worried about this accountability deficit, perhaps even more than they were about 
the economic and social effects of EU regulations.396  They voiced strongly-felt 
concerns about their exclusion from EU regulatory processes, and about the absence of 
opportunities for them to shape or contest the contents of regulation which, although 
enacted elsewhere, exerted significant effects upon them. 
 
Keohane’s concept of external accountability provides a useful framework to evaluate 
the operation and impact of EU food safety regulation in Thailand.  In the discussion 
which follows this concept of external accountability will be explained and will be 
fleshed out through recourse to the concept of “Global Administrative Law”.  Before 
arriving at that stage, however, it is necessary first to introduce the concept of 
accountability so as to explain and justify the application of Keohane’s approach. 
 
4.3.1 Definition 
 
Before exploring the external accountability gaps arising from the case studies, it is 
appropriate to explore the concept of accountability in a more general way.  This 
concept must first be carefully defined because the term is contestable in that it is 
capable of carrying different meanings within different settings, for example in politics, 
ethics/morality, law or governance.397  The word originates from the Latin ‘accomptare’ 
                                                           
396
 See Infra Chapter 6 (especially Section 6.1.4).  From interviews with Thai stakeholders it is evident 
that the real essence of their concerns is not in the main the negative economic and social effects that they 
have experienced, but rather their inability to engage EU private regulators in some form of 
communication and to hold them accountable for the negative effects their actions have had in Thailand.  
397
 The need to define the term has also been observed up by other academics.  For instance Bovens 
(2007), p. 105 refers to the different usage of the term in different EU documents. 
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which means to ‘account’.398  It has been widely used as a synonym and umbrella term 
to cover other equally contestable concepts; transparency, participation, trustworthiness, 
responsibility, answerability, liability, and so on.  However, in this context it is a narrow 
definition of accountability, familiar from administrative law, which is most relevant.  
Here the definition of accountability is closer to ‘responsibility’.399  It can be defined as 
being a relationship between power-wielders and affected entities,400 whereby the 
affected entities have a right to hold power-wielders to account by reference to a set of 
standards, to contest their claims that these standards have been met, and to see 
sanctions imposed when they have not. 401   
 
In essence therefore, accountability consists of three elements.402  First, there must be 
minimum standards of conduct that the power-wielders are expected to fulfil.403  
Second, information must be made available regarding the conduct of those exercising 
power, in order to facilitate the evaluation and contestation of this conduct in the light 
of these standards.  Consequently, there must also be a forum for discussion or a 
communication channel which permits the power-wielders and affected entities to 
exchange information, to raise questions and initiate debates.  Third, affected entities 
must be able to initiate proceedings which can result in the imposition of sanctions 
when established standards of behaviour are not fulfilled. 404  It is important to note that 
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 ‘Accomptare’ has the origin from the word ‘computare’ which mean to calculate and which in turn has 
an origin from the word ‘putare’, which means to reckon. (Oxford Dictionary (1981)).  
399
 Buchanan and Keohane (2006), p. 426.   
400
 These can be individuals, groups, or other entities (Keohane (2002), p.12.  However, in his 2005 
article Keohane refers to the term actors instead of entities.  See for example, Grant and Keohane (2005). 
401
 Grant and Keohane (2005), p. 29.  
402
 Buchanan and Keohane (2006), p. 426.  
403
 These minimum standards will differ depending upon the relationships between power-wielders and 
affected entities. This is a point explored below.  
404
 The need for sanctions has been confirmed by other academic studies in relation to non-electoral 
democratic accountability (for example, Macdonald and Macdonald (2006), p. 89-110).   
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accountability operates as a two-way concept.  Power-wielders must accept the 
obligation to fulfill standards and to provide information; likewise the affected entities 
must be aware of the existence and scope of their own rights, and be willing and able to 
exercise them.405     
 
4.3.2 One-Dimensional Accountability Concept  
 
The traditional concept of accountability is one-dimensional in that it applies within a 
nation state or organisation and has a strong link to what is known as the principal-agent 
model.406  “Principals” possess power but choose to delegate it to “agents”, or “power-
wielders”.  These power-wielders exercise power on the principal’s behalf and are 
accountable to them.  Here the role of the agent is to deliver on the principal’s will and 
to operate within the scope of its delegated powers.  Where the agent fails to do so, 
sanctions can be imposed upon it by the principal.407  This type of relationship is often 
linked to direct democracy where the actions of representatives (as agents) are required 
to reflect the interest, beliefs and wishes of their constituents (principal).408  
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 Keohane (2002), p. 12.  
406
 Ibid, p.4 and Grant and Keohane (2005), p.30.  The realisation of the principal-agent model in giving 
rise to an accountability obligation has also been applied by other academics, for example by 
Vandenbergh (2007) who explains that citizens are the principal accountability holders of different agents 
including governmental entities and non-governmental organisations.  See also Macdonald and 
Macdonald (2006), p. 93-95 in relation to democratic accountability.  
407
 Keohane (2002), p. 13-14 referring to Hobbes and Held (2002.  
408
 Alternatively, the populist idea would hold that the traditional accountability concept can be based on 
a “trustee relationship” through the delegation model.  Here the affected entities are considered to be 
delegating their powers to be assumed by the power-wielder “trustees” with the aim of achieving certain 
goals.  The “trustees” in this case are treated as “discretionary authorities” that can, with discretion, 
exercise actions within the scope of their delegated powers.  Consequently the trustees’ actions are 
legitimate as long as they exercise their discretion within the delegated power, even though this may be 
against the power-holders’ wishes.  An accountability standard for this model is thus based upon whether 
or not the trustees exercise their discretion within the scope of their duties in reaching the goal.    
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This principal-agent model of accountability is “one-dimensional” because the party 
exercising power is accountable only to one set of affected entities - those who have 
granted it the power.  Typically both the principal and agent will operate in the same 
political or organisational domain, and nearly always within the same state.  
Consequently procedural arrangements and sanctions will operate in a manner internal 
to that political domain.   
 
Arrangements for achieving accountability based on a principal-agent relationship in 
EU food safety regulation are relatively straightforward.  Under the CA model, EU 
governmental regulators may be viewed as agents who are accountable to principals 
operating within the EU political domain.  These principals include Member States, 
other EU institutions and EU citizens.   
 
Similarly, depending on whether private standards are universal or are “bespoke” 
supermarket standards, the standard-setting bodies or supermarkets may be viewed as 
agents accountable to their own principals - which in this case are members of the 
company’s board and/or their shareholders.  In both situations, the principal can revoke 
the delegated powers and/or withdraw their support from the agent.  In both cases 
various internal procedural arrangements will be put in place to ensure that the agent’s 
accountability obligations are secured, although the strength and formality of these 
arrangements may vary.  Within the EU there are various institutional arrangements 
which allow principals to hold agents to account.  These include courts of law, 
ombudsmen at different levels, and electoral processes.  For private entities there are 
company rules, voting procedures and guidelines to ensure that internal accountability 
can be secured.  
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However, a one-dimensional concept of accountability based on the principal-agent 
model is not suited to complex global governance situations.  This is because it cannot 
capture all of the parties’ relationships and interactions.  In global governance, the 
exercise of power within one political or organisational domain may spill-over in 
significant ways to a different domain.  However, in a principal-agent model, the 
principal and agent operate within the same domain.  This then generates a bias in 
favour of ‘internal’ as opposed to ‘external’ accountability.  To give an illustration from 
the case studies: A multi-national company such as a large EU supermarket can issue its 
own standards laying down import requirements to be met by their Thai suppliers.  Thai 
suppliers will in turn demand that these requirements are met by small farmers in 
Thailand.  In this situation the lives and working conditions of the Thai farmers will be 
greatly influenced by the EU supermarket’s demands.  However, the lack of a direct link 
between the EU supermarkets and the Thai farmers means that there is, in effect, no 
principal-agent relationship between them that could give rise to an accountability 
relationship according to the one-dimensional model.  EU supermarkets exercising 
power in such cases cannot be deemed as “agents” of the Thai farmers; likewise Thai 
farmers cannot be deemed to be “principals” of the EU supermarkets.   
 
4.3.3 Pluralistic System of Accountability   
 
Since a one-dimensional concept of accountability is not capable of achieving external 
accountability and is thus not appropriate for application in a global governance setting, 
an alternative approach to accountability has to be pursued.  Keohane has proposed a 
new concept which has been said by other academics to give rise to a “pluralistic 
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concept of accountability”.409  According to this understanding, accountability has two 
dimensions, internal and external, the applicability of which depends upon the identity 
of the party holding the power-wielder to account.  Internal accountability is considered 
to apply where the power-wielder is required to account to affected entities within the 
same political or organisational domain.  This accountability dimension tends to be 
given expression through a principal-agent model.  However, the focus here is upon 
external accountability since it is this concept that can serve to ground accountability 
relationships even when the parties operate within different political or organisational 
domains, and crucially even when they operate in different states.  
 
The relationships which give rise to external accountability obligations are not based on 
a principal-agent model.  On the contrary, external accountability relationships arise 
whenever a decision by one party generates effects for another party.  Minimal or 
remote effects will not suffice and external accountability obligations will depend upon 
there being evidence of ‘significant’ effects.410  Of course, ambiguity remains regarding 
the extent of the effects required, and indeed the nature of these effects will depend 
upon the nature of the relationship between the parties concerned.  
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 Keohane’s separation of internal and external accountability has been referred to by Lang and Scott 
(2009) and other academics including Benner, Reinicke and Witte (2004) who have named it “the 
pluralistic system of accountability”.  It should be noted that, in addition to Keohane, other academics 
also prefer a more pluralistic approach to accountability and have used this to clarify other normative 
issues in global governance, in particular with regard to its relationship with Global Administrative Laws 
which will be revisited in Section 4.4.  For example, in the context of WTO governance, various 
prominent academics, including Lang & Scott and Stewart, have adopted this pluralistic accountability 
model and have argued that powerful WTO member states should also be externally accountable to those 
operating in other political domains, including in other states.  (See further, Lang and Scott in their work 
relating to WTO Services Council and SPS Committee (2009) p. 606 also p. 1073) and Stewart and Badin 
(2009).   
410
 For Keohane, the affected entities are not “any random outsiders who are minimally or remotely 
affected” but are “sufficiently affected” by rules, decisions or actions taken by the power-wielders.  Here, 
“sufficiently affected” includes being subject “to a rule or regulation promulgated by a transnational 
organisation” or another state.  (Grant and Keohane (2005), p. 34).  
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For example, it would be relatively easy for affected “outsiders” to be viewed as being 
in an accountability relationship and to hold those exercising power to account where 
their relationship is clearly defined.  This will be the case, for example, where there are 
pre-existing contractual agreements which confirm the presence of an accountability 
relationship, or where the accountability relationship is laid down by law.  On the other 
hand, short of legal acknowledgment and clear procedural arrangements, affected 
outsiders are likely to face questions about the basis of their external accountability 
claims. 
 
In the context of the case studies described in this thesis, and building on Keohane’s 
analysis, Thai stakeholders should be able to hold EU regulators to account when they 
are bound by their decisions, or when they are significantly affected by them.  On this 
basis it will be relatively more simple to establish an accountability relationship under 
the operation of the CA model because EU law clearly states that exports from third 
countries to the EU market must comply with EU food safety rules, and that specific 
departments of the Thai Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives must act as national 
CAs.411  Furthermore, it should be relatively easy for large exporters/producers to show 
that they incur contractual obligations with EU supermarkets in order to comply with 
their private standards.   
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 For example under Article 11, Regulation EC/178/2002, food imported into the EU must comply with 
the relevant requirements of food law or conditions recognised by the EU and must at least be equivalent 
to the EU standards.  Commission Decision 94/85/EC establishes Thailand as a certified country.  
Moreover, Article 46 of Regulation EC/882/2004 lays down that the FVO inspectors, subject to the 
agreement with the Thai CA, can inspect the premises of the Thai CA and the food export establishments.  
Moreover, for products of animal origins, specific  procedures are laid down  under the Commission 
Decision 97/134/EC, laying down certain detailed rules concerning on-the-spot checks carried out in the 
veterinary field by the Commission Experts in third countries.  
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However, it is likely to be more difficult for smaller Thai producers or contract farmers, 
who have no direct contractual obligations with EU supermarkets, to demonstrate that 
they are significantly affected by EU food safety law.  Nevertheless, small Thai 
producers and farmers can use other factual evidence, similar to that presented earlier in 
the case studies, to demonstrate that the EU rules and decisions in question exert 
significant effect upon them.   
 
It should be noted that the concept of external accountability is highly pertinent to the 
situations occurring in the case studies.  As will later be seen in Chapter 6, more 
pressing external accountability gaps arise in respect of the operation of EU private 
standards than in respect of the CA model.  These gaps contribute to unresolved 
operational and proliferation problems experienced by significantly affected entities in 
Thailand who have no or few means to hold EU private regulators to account.  They are 
unable to require private standard setters to make information regarding their decisions 
available to them, or to require them identify and mitigate negative external effects.  
However, when it comes to external accountability in relation to EU regulation via the 
CA model, significantly fewer external accountability gaps occur.  This is as a result of 
concrete attempts to introduce procedural mechanisms that instantiate the external 
accountability obligations of EU power-wielders, both under the CA model itself and as 
a result of the WTO.  The existence of these mechanisms will be discussed in detail in 
the next Chapter.   
 
 187
It should be noted that an endorsement of Keohane’s pluralistic approach to 
accountability does not of course imply a negation of the importance of internal 
accountability.  Rather, it suggests that internal accountability is capable only of 
capturing one dimension of the accountability paradigm.  There is also an external 
accountability dimension that has gained increasing importance as the shift from 
government to (global) governance has intensified.  
 
4.3.4 New Mechanisms and Standards for External Accountability 
 
Having established the new type of accountability relationship required for external 
accountability, it is important to turn now to the other elements of accountability.  New 
standards to underpin the accountability relationship will need to reflect the shift from a 
one-dimensional to a pluralistic conception of accountability.  Similarly, new 
accountability mechanisms and sanctions will have to be considered as we move away 
from a top-down, principal-agent approach.412  
 
4.3.5 Seven Accountability Mechanisms   
 
Keohane has already proposed new accountability mechanisms, identifying seven types, 
the applicability of which will depend upon the nature of the accountability relationship 
in question.  These he labels as: hierarchical accountability, supervisory accountability, 
fiscal accountability, legal accountability, market-based accountability, peer 
accountability and reputational accountability.  Depending on the circumstances of each 
case, these mechanisms may operate on an ex ante basis, to make the power-wielders 
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 Or otherwise, trustee. 
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adhere to existing standards of conduct prior to or in the course of decision-making or, 
ex post, to evaluate the power-wielders’ compliance with existing standards after their 
decisions have been made.   
 
Although Keohane is vague about the specific procedural arrangements which could be 
put in place in order to enhance external accountability, he has suggested that these 
seven accountability “mechanisms” are capable of generating the influential force 
necessary to hold power-wielders accountable.413  Of his seven accountability 
mechanisms, three are particularly suitable for securing external accountability.  
Market, peer and reputational accountability mechanisms can be applied even where 
affected entities do not operate in the same political or organisational domain as the 
power-wielders.414   These three are set out in more detail below.  
 
(i) Market-based accountability mechanisms: These arise when consumers and 
investors are empowered to hold those exercising power to account.  They 
may do so by exercising market power to stop, or to threaten to stop, buying 
from, or investing in the activities of those power-wielders who fall short of 
meeting the relevant standards.  The sanction for failure to comply with 
accountability standards here is a loss of revenue.415  In this instance the 
accountability holders who evaluate the power-wielders’ actions may be 
located outside the political or organisational domain of the power-wielder, 
but still they may be significantly affected by the power-wielders’ actions and 
decisions.  
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 Grant and Keohane (2005), p. 35.  
414
 Benner et al. (2004) See further also Grant and Keohane (2005), p. 36.  
415
 Similar to legal mechanisms explained below, market mechanisms can be imposed ex post or in the 
case of threat to market sanction, the threat can operate ex ante. 
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(ii) Peer accountability mechanisms: These often exist within global governance 
networks where the behaviour of those exercising power is judged by their 
counterparts, including by other firms, organisations or governments, against 
established and mutually recognised accountability standards.  These 
mechanisms or the standards to which they give rise may be self-imposed, for 
example through professional codes, or they may be imposed by law.  This 
mechanism is driven by peer pressure and the ex post sanctions that the 
power-wielders face are discredit, condemnation, loss of support from their 
peers or ultimately expulsion from peer networks.  In sectors where peer 
pressure is strong, peer accountability can also operate ex ante to deter power-
wielders from departing from accepted accountability standards.   
(iii) Public reputational accountability mechanisms: These mechanisms 
supplement and exist alongside the other accountability mechanisms.  If 
power-wielders fail to comply with the standards underpinning the relevant 
accountability relationship, they may suffer a loss of reputation and 
credibility among the public, consumers or peers.  This type of mechanism 
works well when power-wielders operate in reputationally sensitive markets, 
including the food business, where “naming and shaming” can create long-
term damage to companies or governments.  Similar to the peer 
accountability mechanism, the threat to public reputation can act as an ex ante 
mechanism to deter power-wielders from departing from accepted 
accountability standards.  
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Another accountability mechanism identified by Keohane which is applicable to the 
EU-Thai situation is legal accountability.  This arises when power-wielders are bound 
by formal rules to justify their actions according to standards laid down in law.  Courts 
or tribunals are established to hold the power-wielders to account.  Depending on how 
this mechanism is established, it may operate to re-enforce internal and/or external 
accountability.416  In respect of the latter, national and international law can set 
standards to govern the exercise of power by state entities with regard to their 
operations abroad.  Governmental regulators are often subject to specific standards, 
including those existing under international law.  
 
In the context of this thesis; peer, market, reputational and legal accountability 
mechanisms constitute the relevant tools available to mitigate the external 
accountability gap which emerges from the application of EU food safety regulation in 
Thailand.  The next section will discuss the standards of conduct that underpin the 
functioning of these accountability mechanisms.  I will argue that the doctrine of Global 
Administrative Law (GAL) can be applied to provide appropriate substantive and 
procedural standards. 
 
4.4 Part III: GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND EXTERNAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
The previous sections laid out several findings as regards the nature of the 
accountability relationship between Thai and EU entities.  By adopting Keohane’s 
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 A further difference between legal mechanisms and peer, reputational and market mechanisms is that 
in the case of the former, sanctions are imposed by courts/tribunals whereas for the latter, affected entities 
can directly impose sanctions upon the power-wielders. 
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approach it has been suggested that a pluralistic understanding of accountability should 
be applied in situations of global governance, including in respect of EU food safety 
regulation in Thailand.  The previous section also clarified that there are different 
accountability mechanisms which could be used by affected Thai entities to bring EU 
power-wielders “externally” to account.  Moving on, this section will explore the 
question of which standards should underpin an accountability relationship of this kind.   
 
Keohane has suggested that accountability standards can be derived from norms which 
command widespread acceptance in transnational civil society.417  He suggests that 
these could include human rights norms, the principles inherent in democracy and the 
principle that extreme economic inequality should be avoided.418  He suggests also that 
this is a non-exhaustive list.  However this list of possible norms to underpin an external 
accountability relationship seems to be both vague and broad, and Keohane stops short 
of specifying concretely how the norms in question could be applied.  In the search for 
standards to underpin the external accountability relationship it is arguably more 
productive to turn to the concept of global administrative law (GAL).  Many academics 
have previously looked to this source for the same reasons.419  GAL can yield 
accountability standards that will then serve as a procedural and substantive benchmark 
to narrow the external accountability gap.   
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 Grant and Keohane (2005), p. 35.  
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 Ibid.  
419
 Other prominent academics have also made recourse via GAL to examine the accountability and other 
theoretical problems that feature in global governance situations.  These include Lang and Scott (2009) 
and Stewart and Badin (2009) who looks into the GAL concept in relation to WTO governance and 
Meidinger (2006) who considers the application of GAL in relation to International Forestry 
Management.  Also see other case studies in Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (2005). 
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4.4.1 GAL : Origins, Definition and Sources  
 
The concept of GAL was developed during the current century in order to capture the 
reality of new regulatory developments associated with the shift from government to 
global governance.  Working from the bottom-up, scholars of GAL observed that 
similar norms and mechanisms to secure accountability were being deployed across 
many different international institutions, operating in an extraordinarily broad range of 
policy spheres.420  Often these norms and mechanisms mimicked those used in domestic 
administrative law.  These scholars argued that this reality of a shared “synthesis of 
practices” has come to constitute a new and specific field of law, which they labelled 
GAL.421    
 
Various definitions of GAL have been put forward by prominent academics,422 
including Lorenz von Stein,423 Bogdandy et al.424 and Cassese425.  Here though, I will 
                                                           
420
 This can range from financial security and banking, environmental protection, natural resources 
management, criminal law enforcement and international trade (see for example, Kingsbury, Krisch and 
Stewart (2005)). 
421
 Some academics have used other terms to label this new legal field.  For example, Cassese has referred 
to this as “global public administration” (Casese 2005), p. 663.   
422
 And for some academics, the use of the GAL concept as a separate legal doctrine is still questionable.  
Some have argued that the existence of global administrative space could perhaps be explained as an 
exceptional case in existing national or international administrations and hence there is no requirement to 
establish a separate field of legal practice to explain it.  See discussions in Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart 
(2005), p. 18. 
423
 Lorenz von Stein (1882), referred to in Kingsbury (2009), p. 24, expresses the doctrine as an ensemble 
of legal rules based on international and domestic sources to deal with administrative activities in the 
international field. 
424
 Bogdandy, Dann and Goldman, (2008), p. 1390.  The authors propose a “public law approach” based 
on “consitutionalisation, administrative law perspective and international institutional law” in order to 
analyse and create discipline in global governance regulatory regimes.    
425
 Cassese (2005), expresses this as the influence of global norms of regulatory due-process upon 
domestic administration.   
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refer to one of the most widely accepted definitions as laid down by Kingsbury, Krisch 
and Stewart.  This definition is accepted as seminal by many prominent academics.426   
 
Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart explain that global governance regulation can often be 
categorised as being administrative in nature, and that as such it can be disciplined and 
shaped by various principles of administrative law.427  GAL comprises administrative-
type mechanisms, principles and practices which have been lifted from the 
administrative law of advanced democratic countries and from the universally accepted 
practices of the international community.428  The main sources of GAL are the 
administrative law of the US and/or the EU, and to some extent, ius cogens or general 
principles of international law.429 
 
From the outset, the main objective of GAL, as identified by Kingsbury, Krisch and 
Stewart, was to serve as an “accountability tool” – that is to promote fulfillment of the 
accountability obligations of global administrative bodies.430  Because GAL standards 
do not rely upon there being a principal-agent relationship in place, GAL can be used to 
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 For example, Lang and Scott (2009), Stewart and Badin 2009) and Meidinger (2006).  In addition this 
definition has also recently been developed and appears to have captured the shared elements across the 
different definitions. 
427
 Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (2005), p. 15. 
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 Ibid p. 30-32, See further Stewart (2009).  Hence this is also the cause of critics’ objections and 
criticisms of GAL – that GAL is largely based on the practices of advanced democratic countries, 
including those in the Western and Northern world.  The procedural models which derived much from 
American and EU origins can be politically biased if applied in developing countries.  (For further 
discussion, see Kingsbury Krisch and Stewart (2006) p. 13). 
429
 Recently there have been debates as to whether private practices could also be a source of GAL.  See 
the discussions in Krisch and Kingsbury (2006) on this point with reference to the global forestry 
certification regime (Meidinger (2006)) and garment industry (MacDonald and Macdonald (2006)). 
430
 Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, (2006), p. 17.   
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provide standards for external as well as internal accountability.431  There are slight 
differences of opinion between various academics as to the administrative principles 
that constitute GAL and hence in the definition of the resulting accountability 
standards.432  Consequently, the concept of GAL is still considered to be fluid and in the 
process of development.  As such, it is difficult to pinpoint definitively all of the 
doctrinal elements of GAL.  However, there is some general agreement regarding the 
substantive and procedural norms which form the essence of GAL.433   To a large extent 
these norms are captured in Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewarts’ article, when they identify 
transparency, participation, reasoned decision-making, proportionality and rationality as 
being the key principles of GAL.  Nevertheless, variation remains regarding the 
mechanisms through which these GAL norms should be applied in any given 
situation.434 
 
The term “global administrative bodies” referred to in the paragraph above is intended 
to capture a broad range of public, private and hybrid or public-private entities operating 
in global governance situations.  These entities are all capable of assuming regulatory 
                                                           
431
 The accountability obligation referred to here is based on the ability of global administrative bodies to 
adhere to certain standards of conduct.  There is no specific reference to the principal-agent model, but 
only to the status of global administrative bodies as power-wielders. 
432
 For example Cassese (2005) introduced similar, although not identical, GAL criteria as those posed by 
Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, including transparency, harmonisation, equivalence and the need for 
notification.   
433
 This point has been made by Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (2005), p. 37.  
434
 In other words, there is a shared general agreement regarding the “main” GAL criteria and that GAL 
can be used as an accountability tool.  However, variations remain regarding the degree to which each 
concept and the actual mechanisms can be applied in any particular global governance situation.  It is 
likely that these will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis and will vary depending on, inter alia, the 
extent that each affected entity is bound/affected by the power-wielder’s rules/decisions as well as the 
interplay of bargaining powers between the different entities in a particular regime, and the unique 
character of each global administrative body.  For example, participation in WTO framework is limited 
for NGOs and individuals.  It is unlikely that they will be given a direct involvement (i.e. can vote) in 
WTO meetings, although they may have observer status or be invited to present their arguments (See 
Benvenisti (2005), p. 21.  
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roles, of making decisions on issues of global concern and, of creating rules and 
decisions which may bind entities outside of their political or organisational domains.  
In reality, however, their regulatory activities will often overlap.435   
 
The list of global administrative bodies as suggested by Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart 
includes;436  
(i) Administration by international organisations:  Administrative actions are 
undertaken by intergovernmental regulatory bodies, established by 
international agreement between states including the UN Security Council 
and High Commissioner for Refugees, the WHO, the IMF and the WTO; 
(ii) Transnational networks: These comprise co-ordination arrangements 
between actors operating at different levels or in different countries and are 
similar to those which characterise global governance explained above.437  
The networks may be informal but are sometimes formed as a result of 
treaties, as in the case of the Basel Committees and the WTO’s SPS and TBT 
committees.   
(iii) Distributed administration conducted by national regulators under 
treaties, networks, or other co-operative regimes:  The concept of 
distributed administration captures the exercise of power by national 
governments or agencies when their actions spill-over, generating significant 
effects beyond their own national sphere.  When a national government acts 
as a so-called “distributed administration” it generates external effects outside 
                                                           
435
 For example in the issue of food safety, the WTO shares authority with the Codex and OIE and 
frequently co-operate with the FAO.  
436
 Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (2005), p. 20.  
437
 Supra, Section 4.1.1.2.2. 
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of its own political domain.  It is for this reason that external accountability 
obligations may arise.    
(iv) Hybrid public-private administration: This arises where the administrative 
bodies are composed of public and private actors.  Codex Alimentarius 
(Codex) is a relevant example of a global governance body of this kind.  In 
the case of Codex, members include domestic public entities from 180 
countries.438  However, other international organisations and NGOs can also 
participate as observers.439   
(v) Private regulatory bodies exercising transnational governance functions: 
This would include private standard regimes where the activities of the 
standards in question spill-over beyond the standard-setting bodies’ internal 
organisational domains.   
 
EU governmental regulators, including DG-SANCO and the FVO, are distributed 
administrations falling within point (iii) above.  As will be discussed later, WTO 
frameworks impose administrative-law type rules, procedures and practices to control 
the external effects of the activities of this kind of body.  Consequently these apparent 
‘domestic’ bodies can be considered to be global administrative bodies of the kind that 
are disciplined by GAL.    
 
Private regulators, such as EU supermarkets, that impose requirements on Thai 
stakeholders, fall within point (v) above.  However, here the application of GAL is less 
                                                           
438
 This includes the EU acting as a member organisation.  
439
 See further: Codex’s Principles concerning the Participation of International NGOs (available at : 
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/ngo_participation.jsp).  As of July 2011, 138 NGOs have observer 
status at Codex meetings.  The lists of NGOs and international organisations that can assume observer 
status can be found at: http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/organizations.jsp. 
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settled and may be more controversial.440  It might be argued that private standards are 
not “law” as they are accepted voluntarily by affected entities.  In principle Thai 
stakeholders may decide to adopt or reject the standards in question.  According to this 
argument, recourse to GAL is not appropriate in this setting as it would impede the 
enforcement of private contract between power-wielders and the affected entities.  
 
The issue of the legal status of private standards has long been debated by academics 
and could merit a thesis in itself.441  For the purposes of this discussion it will be argued 
that given the increasingly prominent role of private bodies in global governance, they 
should be considered to be global administrative bodies for the purpose of GAL.  This is 
a proposition widely accepted by many academics writing on this theme.442 
 
The argument in favour of conceiving private regulators in this way is two-fold.  The 
first aspect concerns the equivalence in impact of decisions adopted by public and 
                                                           
440
 This question has been raised by various academics, including Kingsbury himself. See further 
Kingsbury (2009). 
441
 For example, there have been debates on whether private regulation should be counted as “law” and 
subject to the same accountability and legitimacy controls given its democratic deficiencies.  It can be 
deemed that there are two main schools of thought on this.  On one hand, there is a doctrine of “legal 
pluralism” which is more liberal and inclined to accept the existence of ‘private ordering’ as an 
independent source of law.  Under this doctrine it is thought that there can be multiple legal systems in 
one territory and this readily accepts private standards as law (for further discussion, see, Berman (2007), 
Twining (2002), Benner, Reinicke and Witte (2004)). On the other hand there is a school of thought 
requiring certain elements of “publicness” from “private ordering” before it can be counted as “law” 
within the scope of GAL. This concept was introduced by Kingsbury in his later work.  For him, private 
standards would be considered as falling within the scope of GAL only when they interact with public 
institutions (Kingsbury (2009)), for example through hybrid public-private partnership activities.   
442
 A reply to Kingbsury by Kuo (2010) argues that Kingsbury’s demand for publicness in law would not 
help us to resolve the current challenges facing global administrative law.  In fact, contrary to 
Kingsbury’s insistence on publicness there have been studies whereby academics highlight the significant 
regulatory functions of private entities in other areas of regulations, EU - Thai food safety being just only 
one of many examples. Some of these examples have been subject to long-term studies by prominent 
academics, including for example product specification and product process standards (the ISO series), 
environmental protection and natural resources management (See Meidinger 2006 and 2009), Labour 
Associations (governed by Fair labour Association), sports (International Olympic Committee, World 
Anti-Doping Agencies) et cetera.  In some of these studies GAL has been applied to purely private 
entities (for example Meidinger (2009) in relation to forest certification programmes).  For overall 
discussions on the importance of private entities’ regulations vis-à-vis governmental regulation, see, for 
example, Freeman (2000). 
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private bodies.  We can see this clearly from the case studies presented earlier, where 
private bodies have unequivocally been exercising regulatory functions and producing 
rules and decisions that have a de facto binding effect on Thai producers and exporters.  
For example, in relation to HACCP principles and traceability, the impact of EU private 
regulations has been as significant, if not more significant, than the rules adopted by EU 
governmental entities.  Private standards imposed by EU supermarkets have, in the two 
case studies, been treated as being mandatory by those seeking to enter or to remain in 
the EU market.443  Consequently, despite their original de jure voluntary status, private 
entities have now come to be perceived by affected entities in Thailand as de facto 
sources of law.  The degree of regulatory significance of private standards certainly 
varies, but in the case of EU private regulators it is enhanced by the very magnitude of 
the EU market.444  
 
The second argument in favour of treating private regulators as global administrative 
bodies for the purposes of GAL stems from the fact that many of the private bodies 
concerned already acknowledge that it is incumbent upon them to put in place 
accountability-enhancing measures and mechanisms of the kind associated with GAL.  
These are mainly introduced as institutional or organisational norms and practices by 
either the private bodies themselves or by their business counterparts.  Typical examples 
include requirements for expanded transparency and participation445 and the 
incorporation of proportionality and other substantive norms into the decision-making 
framework of these bodies.  One example of specific regulatory frameworks that inject 
GAL criteria into private regulatory schemes in the area of food safety is the 
                                                           
443
 See supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4 and 3.3.4. 
444
 See supra Chapter 3.  
445
 See Meidinger (2009), p. 6.  
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International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance (or 
ISEAL), which applies to environmental certification regime.446  This private regulatory 
scheme has put in place elaborate consultation procedures with selected groups of 
affected entities.  We see this also in relation to GlobalGAP which has included 
participants from the African Task Force, and in relation to the Soil Association which 
requires the board to consult farmers and retailers before any substantial amendments to 
the relevant standards are made.  We will return to issues surrounding the role of GAL 
in relation to private regulators in Chapter 6.  
 
4.4.2 GAL Criteria as Accountability Standards: Achieving Accountability 
through the GAL Criteria  
 
As suggested by Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, the application of GAL in global 
governance situations requires respect for certain core administrative principles, 
including transparency, participation, reasoned decision-making, proportionality, and 
opportunity for appeal or review.  This chapter will conclude with a brief overview of 
the concepts that make up this account of GAL.447  It is important to stress that each of 
these concepts is open to being understood in very different ways, and that they may be 
operationalised in a wide variety of ways.  The aim here is to distill the essence of these 
concepts.  As will become clear, although the different elements will be presented 
individually they are in fact inter-linked.   
                                                           
446
 See Meidinger (2006).  
447
 It should be noted that the meaning of the term “administrative principles”, categorised here as GAL 
criteria, has varied amongst academics although to a large extent the central themes have been adequately 
captured by Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewarts’ version.  For example, Benvenisti talked about provisions 
for “transparency, voice to affected groups, review mechanisms and judicial review”  (Benvenisti (2005), 
p. 2), whereas Cassese’s list includes “transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and 
reasonableness”. Cassese (2005), p. 691. 
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4.4.2.1 Transparency 
 
Occasionally referred to as “publicity” or “openness”, transparency is derived from a 
principle of administrative law that is widely accepted in advanced democracies and in 
international law.448  Transparency is a crucial first step towards accountability.  Only 
when an adequate degree of transparency is secured, or when the right kind of 
information is made available at the right time and to the right person, will affected 
entities be able to take further action to hold power-wielders to account, either by 
participating in the power-wielder’s decision-making processes or by challenging the 
decision concerned.449   
 
Transparency can be said to consist of two main elements; i) the availability of 
information and, ii) the quality & accessibility of information.450  Each is explored 
briefly below.  
 
4.4.2.1.1 Availability of Information  
 
The first issue that arises concerns the question of to whom the information should be 
made available.  In keeping with the earlier analysis, in an external accountability 
                                                           
448
 See Craig (2008), p. 350, 352 and 359 in relation to the EU.  See also Sabel and Zeitlin (2010)  p. 18.  
In her recent piece, however, Fisher (2010) warns against the acceptance of transparency as an 
unqualified good for public administration (ibid, part 3).   
449
 In other words it is a pre-condition for participation and for appeal/review.  However, transparency is 
insufficient on its own to ensure an adequate degree of accountability.  To do so it must also be 
accompanied by other GAL criteria (Kant (1795), p. 175 in p. 49 Kingsbury (2009)). 
450
 Transparency itself is a complex administrative ideology.  Here I have reduced the concept to its main 
features that are relevant in serving external accountability.  For further discussion see, for example 
Fisher (2010) who lists seven questions for administrative lawyers to ask when dealing with transparency 
(ibid, part 2- part 3) .   
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setting information must be available to those significantly affected by the decision at 
hand.  This remains the case even where those so affected operate in a different political 
or organisational domain. 
 
The second issue arising concerns the type of information that should be made available 
and rendered accessible to affected entities.  As a minimum, the following information 
should be made available.  
(i) The content of the actual law/decision: Least controversial is the claim that 
information regarding existing laws, decisions and rules must be made 
publicly available.  This is essential for the effectiveness of law as it is a 
pre-condition for securing widespread compliance. 
 However, in order for transparency to fulfil its accountability function, the 
following three additional types of information will also be needed, in order 
to allow affected entities to call power-wielders to account.   
(ii) Proposals for changes to existing rules:  The information required here 
includes proposed rule changes, their rationale451 and their potential 
impact.452 This information will assist significantly affected entities in 
evaluating whether they are likely to be adversely affected by proposals and 
in constructing reasoned arguments to influence or oppose these.453  
                                                           
451
 This is because it is “the citizen’s right to know not just what the authorities are deciding but also the 
evidence and arguments motivating their decisions” (Sabel and Zeitlin (2010), p. 18).  See also Craig 
(2008), p. 350.   
452
 This can include studies and research conducted as part of impact assessments prior to the regulatory 
decision being made in order to calculate the costs and benefits of the proposed regulation as well as the 
potential adverse impacts that could derive from it (Craig (2008), p. 345).   
453
 Ibid. 
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(ii) Existing participation procedures:  Information about decision-making 
procedures, as well as about opportunities for participation, enable affected 
entities to decide whether they should take steps to participate, and if so 
how this can best be achieved.  
(iii) Positions of other affected entities:  Likewise, the provision of information 
on the different positions taken by other participants in the decision-making 
process, and on the actual impact that the rules and decisions have had on 
different entities, can help affected entities to evaluate the actual impact of 
decisions that have already been made.454   This, in turn, can help them to 
decide whether it would be appropriate or fruitful to challenge a decision.   
 
As different types of information can serve to facilitate realisation of different GAL 
criteria, this leads to a third issue regarding when information should be made available, 
and for how long.455   
 
With regards to already existing laws or decisions, information must be provided 
sufficiently well in advance of any implementation date, so as to allow those who are 
potentially bound or significantly affected by these to understand fully and to make any 
necessary adjustments to achieve compliance.  Hence a reasonable time lapse must be 
allowed between the publication date of a law or decision and the date from which the 
law or decision will be enforced. 
 
                                                           
454
 This can include impact assessments conducted after the implementation phase of the power-wielder’s 
decisions.  
455
 See Craig (2008) p. 365 onwards. For example, of the “principles of access” in the EU context.  
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Information can also help affected entities in the exercise of their participation rights.  
As a result, this should be made available prior to the participation stage and certainly 
before any decision is made.  It should also be made available for a reasonable length of 
time so as to allow affected entities to understand its content and to take advantage of 
the information in the exercise of their participation rights.456   
 
Information can also help affected entities to assess the actual impact of the power-
wielders’ decisions, and in taking steps to contest these decisions or to challenge them 
in law.  Information which serves this purpose may be made available after a decision is 
reached but before the affected entities’ right to challenge the decision has expired.457   
 
4.4.2.1.2 Quality and Accessibility of Information  
 
The information made available should be clear and readily understandable by affected 
entities.  In consequence, power-wielders may need to provide various kinds of 
information, some highly technical, some less so.  They should not assume that 
information that is ‘transparent’ for one group of affected entities will necessarily be 
understood by all.458  In addition, information must also be accurate and sufficiently 
detailed to allow different entities to assess properly whether they are likely to be 
affected by the proposed measure.   
                                                           
456
 The availability of this information prior to the decision-making process is also the “first generation of 
participatory rights” (Bignami (2004), p. 63-7 referred to in Sabel and Zeitlin (2010), p. 19).  This also 
fits with the informing steps in Arnstein’s participation ladders.  She points out that some information (for 
example about rights, responsibility and participation options) if provided at a late stage would not be 
beneficial for affected entities (or “citizens” in her terms) as they will have “little opportunity” to use this 
information in the participation processes and thus “to influence the outcomes for their benefits”(Arnstein 
(1969), p. 13).  
457
 Usually the affected entities will be subject to a time limit during which they can apply for an 
appeal/review of the decisions in question.  
458
 Fisher (2010), p. 294 “what is being made transparent is not transparent to everyone”.   
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With respect to the manner in which information should be divulged to “significantly 
affected entities”,459 if the information is not provided directly to them, for example 
through direct distribution, a press-release or publication, then this information should 
be available on request.  In this case, the information should be made available at a 
reasonable cost so as to not to impose an excessive financial burden.460  Information 
should also be integrated, in that it should be available from one accessible source.  In 
recent times, efforts to enhance the quality of information and the manner in which it is 
made available have been made by many global administrative bodies through 
publications on their websites and through the webcasting of their proceedings.461  
 
4.4.2.2 Participation  
 
This concept of participation has two main dimensions.  The first is the right of 
potentially affected entities to get involved in decision-making processes.  The second is 
the power-wielder’s obligation to take into consideration the views of potentially 
affected entities.462   
 
Participation is a key facet of accountability because it creates an accountability 
“forum”, which forms the essence of an accountability relationship.463  Participation 
must occur before decisions are reached, because only when affected entities have an 
                                                           
459
 Sabel and Zeitlin (2010), p. 19 “for transparency to serve as an effective tool for public 
accountability…information…must not only be open, in the narrow sense of not closed, but freely and 
widely available”.  
460
 Buchanan and Keohane (2006), p.427. 
461
 For example, in various Committee meetings of WTO and EU (e.g. EFSA).  
462
 Dutta (2010), p. 17. 
463
 See supra, Section 4.2.1 on the three elements of accountability 
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opportunity to participate are they able to influence final decisions.  Participation allows 
potentially affected entities to present their views and relevant information, to challenge 
factual inaccuracies, to highlight negative effects and to put forward suggestions for 
change.  
 
When discussing participation it is helpful to turn to the classic participation model “A 
Ladder of Citizen Participation”.464  This was proposed by Arnstein back in 1969 and it 
remains “the core of many approaches to participation” and indeed is widely referred to 
by many academics and practitioners in different area of legal studies.465  From 
Arnstein’s classic model it can be observed that mechanisms for participation operate on 
a spectrum since the level of involvement in the power-wielder’s decision-making 
process enjoyed by each affected entity can vary.466  At one end of Arnstein’s 
participation spectrum, affected entities can participate through “notice and comment” 
procedure while at the other end they can cast a vote to decide on the final outcome.  In 
between, affected entities have a right to be consulted by those wielding power.467 
 
                                                           
464
 Here Arnstein proposed that there are eight levels of participation, ranging from non-participation 
(manipulation & therapy) to tokenism, where the elements of citizens’ participation emerge (informing, 
consultation, placation), to citizen power where citizens will be able to influence outcomes directly 
(partnership, delegated power and the ideal situation of citizen control).  See Arnstein (1969), p. 13 
onwards.  
465
 See for example, Collins and Ison (2006), p. 1. 
466
 In other words, the power of affected entities (or citizen in Arnstein’s term) to affect the outcome of 
decisions will vary (Arnstein (1969), p. 2).  
467
 Arnstein (1969), p. 5.  With regards to “notice-and-comment”, power-wielders are merely required to 
listen to the feedback from affected entities and to consider it. They may have to provide a reason for 
rejecting such feedback. However, the decision-making process still essentially rests with the power-
wielders. For “consultation”, a more active role in decision-making processes can be expected. When 
affected entities have a right to be consulted, they are invited to not only put forwards their ideas, but 
when such ideas conflict with those of the power-wielders, alternative options and compromises are 
expected to be discussed.  In such cases, the final outcome decided by the power-wielders are expected to 
reflect some (or all) of the affected entities’ feedback.  In other words, consultations is closer to the 
power-wielders and affected entities “jointly making decisions together”; but for notice and comment, the 
power-wielders merely “listen and consider” to the affected entities’ opinions.  
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However, even “notice-and-comment” type participation will allow for an exchange of 
information to take place between power-wielders and affected entities.  In such 
circumstances, the power-wielder is bound to take the affected entities’ comments into 
consideration and may be called upon to provide reasons should they decide to 
disregard the comments made.  Consequently, even by providing “notice and comment” 
procedures, affected entities can seek to influence the outcome of power-wielders’ 
decisions and laws.  
  
 
4.4.2.3 Reasoned Decision-Making 
 
It is a well-established principle of administrative law that decision-makers must state 
reasons for their decisions.468  This applies not only to the judiciary but also equally to 
legislatures and regulators.  Reasoned decision-making helps to promote accountability.  
As explained previously, the rationale for the decisions should be divulged to affected 
entities at the time that the decision is proposed and/or adopted.   It is only as a result of 
this that potentially affected entities can evaluate the proposed or actual decision and 
assess its weaknesses and strengths.  If the reasons given appear to be unsound or 
unconvincing, affected entities may explore the reasons for this and/or endeavour to 
challenge the decision by way of appeal or review.469 
                                                           
468
 This is also called “the principle of rationality” (Kingsbury (2009), p. 33). 
469
 Dutta (2010), p.17.  
 207
 
 
4.4.2.4 Proportionality and Other Related Substantive Standards  
 
GAL also requires that decisions conform to certain substantive standards.  A non-
exhaustive list of these substantive standards is put forwards by Kingsbury Krisch and 
Stewart.  This includes proportionality, means-end rationality, and the avoidance of 
unnecessary restrictions.  These standards are given clear expression in WTO law and 
their meaning and implications will be discussed further in the next chapter.  
 
4.4.2.5 Opportunity to Appeal or to Seek Review of Rules and Decisions 
 
GAL prescribes that decisions must be open to appeal or review.  This is fundamental 
for establishing an accountability relationship as an opportunity to contest a decision 
creates a forum for discussion in which power-wielders’ actions can be assessed 
according to accountability standards that have been laid down.   
 
The right to appeal involves a process whereby an affected entity calls for a formal 
change to a previous decision.  For administrative decisions, domestic legislation often 
provides for an individual’s right to appeal to an administrative panel, court, tribunal or 
governmental entity.470  In limited cases an appeal can be made to international 
bodies.471   The appeal process is aimed at providing a means to rectify or change an 
earlier judgment or decision.  It endeavours to ensure that, as far as possible, a correct 
                                                           
470
 In the context of a judicial decision an appeal is often conducted through a higher court.   
471
 For example, upon the parties’ agreement, an appeal in sports disputes can be made to Internal Court 
of Arbitration for Sport.  
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decision is derived.  By having an opportunity to appeal, affected entities that consider 
an administrative decision to be unsatisfactory are able to have the merits of the 
decision reconsidered by independent judges or panels.  If the appeal is successful, the 
earlier decision will be overturned and will be replaced by a later one.    
 
A separate, yet related, right of affected entities is their ability to seek review of an 
administrative decision.472  This is a well-established principle of domestic 
administrative law,473 is confirmed by international bodies,474 and increasingly is 
framed in the language of human rights.475  In the domestic context, a review of an 
administrative decision can be conducted by the judiciary476 or by other independent 
tribunals.477  In certain circumstances, it is also possible for individuals who have been 
affected by domestic administrative decisions to call for review by an independent 
international tribunal.478    
 
                                                           
472
 The right to call for a review of the decision is derived separately.  Even where legislation does not 
provide a right to appeal, the right to call for a review can be initiated (unless stated to the contrary) 
(Elliott and Beatson (2005), p. 6.) 
473
 Dowdle (2006), p. 4-5.  It should be noted that some variations remain regarding the type and nature of 
the decisions that can be subject to review.  In most advanced democratic countries there exists some 
form of review of administrative decisions.  However in some countries, notably the UK, the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty applies and primary legislation is not reviewable. 
474
 Shirmp/Turtle, para 180. 
475
 For example, Article 14 ICCPR and Articles 6 and 13 of ECHR.  
476
 That is by “courts” in the form of judicial review.  In some countries, such as the UK and the US, this 
is performed by “ordinary courts” but in some countries, including France, Germany and indeed in 
Thailand, this is performed by special “administrative” and/or “constitutional” courts.  
477
 This can, for example, be conducted by ombudsmen or by special enquiries.   
478
 For example, an individual or organisation whose assets have been frozen by EU member states under 
Terrorism Acts may be able to call for a review by the European Court of First Instance, or in visa 
application cases, applicants who have been denied a Schengen visa may call for a review by the 
Schengen Information System. (Kingsbury (2009), p. 42 onwards).  
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The fundamental difference between appeal and review is that the latter often concerns 
the administrative process of deriving the decision rather than the final decision itself.479  
One of the primary aims is to ensure that the outcome has been appropriately achieved 
and that no “illegality”, “irregularity” or “procedural impropriety” has been associated 
with the decision-making process.480    Where an action for review is successful, the 
relevant decision may be declared unlawful, but the reviewing body will not adopt a 
new decision itself.  
 
4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The principles which make up GAL may be viewed as being constituting standards to 
underpin the external accountability relationship which should exist between Thai 
stakeholders and EU regulators.  Having set out these core principles, the next chapter 
will examine the accountability mechanisms in place to ensure respect for them in the 
context of the application of EU food safety law in Thailand.  These mechanisms will 
be evaluated in order to assess the extent to which they are adequate to secure external 
accountability.  Proposals for accountability-enhancing reform will also be made. 
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 Consequently, an evaluation of whether substantive standards such as proportionality and 
unreasonableness have been met by the power-wielders when delivering their decisions may also be 
relevant in the review process.  
480
 Lord Diplock’s judgment in the Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service [1985]. 
(GCHQ Case)  
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CHAPTER 5:  
CLOSING EXTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY GAPS FOR 
OFFICIAL EU FOOD SAFETY REGULATION IN THAILAND 
 
The previous chapter explored the concept of external accountability in global 
governance settings.  It set out the different dimensions of accountability and explored 
different mechanisms through which external accountability can be achieved.  This 
chapter will explain and evaluate the mechanisms in place to secure external 
accountability in the relationship between Thai stakeholders and EU governmental 
regulators, and consider the way in which these serve to give concrete effect to the 
principles of global administrative law (GAL).  Starting with the WTO, it will then turn 
to the operation of entities in the CA model.  Furthermore, to the extent that deficiencies 
are identified and an external accountability deficit is found to remain, this chapter will 
also make forward-looking suggestions for constructive improvement to existing 
frameworks to ensure enhanced external accountability. 
 
5.1 EXTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY OBLIGATIONS IN THE WTO  
 
WTO law and governance provide a framework for establishing an accountability 
relationship between WTO Member States, including the EU and Thailand.481   Further, 
WTO law and governance provide the additional elements necessary to secure external 
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 External accountability relationships emerge between power-wielders, being those member states that 
instigate food-safety measures, and the affected entities which are those situated in other Member States.  
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accountability, including standards, fora and sanctions.482  As will be shown, WTO 
standards closely resemble those associated with GAL.  Over time these WTO-GAL 
standards have gradually been incorporated into the domestic structures and procedures 
of power-wielding Member States.483  The WTO framework also establishes different 
fora in which these standards can be invoked and in which claims of non-compliance 
can be heard.  In each forum different accountability mechanisms operate to ensure that 
power-welding members are obliged to account for their actions and decisions insofar as 
these affect other members.  Finally, depending upon which of the various 
accountability mechanisms is at play, WTO law and governance establish different 
kinds of sanctions to deter power-wielding members from neglecting their external 
accountability obligations or to punish those that have done so.  Each of the elements of 
external accountability (standards, fora and sanctions) will be discussed below with 
specific reference to the WTO.    
 
5.1.1 Application of GAL Criteria as Standards for External Accountability in 
WTO Law and Governance 
 
Although the term “GAL” is not explicitly used in the WTO Agreements, elements of 
GAL can be seen in the functioning of the WTO system and in the interactions between 
Member States to which this gives rise.  As a result of WTO obligations and processes, 
power-wielding Member States come to be judged against standards that give effect to 
GAL norms.  
                                                           
482
 See supra, Section 4.2.1 
483
 Stewart and Badin (2009), p. 3. 
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In consequence, GAL and WTO law and governance are strongly connected.  GAL 
provides a normative foundation to assess the role of WTO in mitigating accountability 
gaps between Member States.  Meanwhile, since the content of GAL norms is in part 
derived from an examination of the overlapping practices of international and global 
institutions, the WTO’s instantiation and application of GAL principles can serve also 
to elaborate and re-enforce the concept of GAL. 
 
There are three different means through which GAL criteria are given expression as 
external accountability standards in WTO law and governance.  Firstly, GAL criteria are 
frequently referred to in the text of the various WTO agreements.  Consequently they 
are imprinted as ex ante legal obligations or “hard law” which must be complied with 
by WTO members.  Secondly, WTO adjudicatory bodies, including dispute-settlement 
panels and the Appellate Body, are seen to apply GAL criteria as the standards 
applicable in disputes between members.  As a result the WTO operates to hold 
Member States to account ex post when their actions or decisions are challenged by 
another Member State.  This may be the case even when the specific WTO obligation 
being applied does not explicitly give effect to GAL criteria.  When the dispute 
settlement bodies incorporate GAL criteria into existing WTO obligations, or where 
they require Member States to adhere to GAL criteria, these will consequently shape, ex 
ante, the governance practices of WTO members.484   
                                                           
484
 Reports of the dispute-settlement bodies form part of WTO law. The dispute settlement bodies can 
also expand or narrow the GAL elements of legal provisions and occasionally they ensure that GAL 
criteria are incorporated into existing WTO law. Clear examples of this can be seen in a series of WTO 
cases where the power-wielding member state is deemed to have a duty to negotiate with all affected 
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Thirdly and finally a similar role is also performed, albeit in a very different way, 
through “soft law” instruments that take the form of non-binding guidelines, decisions 
and recommendations issued by WTO administrative bodies, especially the SPS 
Committee.485  Although these soft law instruments are theoretically non-binding, in 
practice they play a crucial role in strengthening the position of GAL by providing 
standards of conduct to underpin external accountability.  For example, the SPS 
Committee’s “Recommended Procedures for Implementation the Transparency 
Obligations of the SPS Agreement (Article 7)” 486 and the Secretariat’s Handbook on 
“How to Apply the Transparency Provisions of the SPS Agreement”487 serve as a soft 
law interpretation of a hard law obligation.  They are an important way of informing 
power-wielding members what precisely they need to do in order to discharge their hard 
law obligations relating to notification and consultation.488  These soft law documents 
are useful for Member States since many parts of WTO law are only loosely defined 
and are unclear; and further, elaboration through adjudication can be slow and 
ineffective.  These soft law instruments can act as a safe-harbour clause inducing 
Member States to comply on the basis that it seems less likely that a power-wielding 
                                                                                                                                                                          
WTO members.  This was first laid down in the Shrimp/Turtle case, and later its scope was narrowed in 
the US-Gambling case. 
485
 These are termed by Footer as “soft rules with soft to hard content” whereby non-binding documents 
can still serve to influence the actions of Member States in applying WTO rules (Footer (2010), p. 9, see 
also Scott (2007), p. 72) 
486
 Thereafter the SPS Committee’s Recommended Procedures (G/SPS/7/Rev.2). 
487
 Thereafter the Secretariat’s Handbook on Transparency, (September 2002).  
488
 Under Article 7 and Annex B SPS Agreements (para. 4, G/SPS/7/Rev. 2) 
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member would be found to be in breach of a WTO obligation if it has complied with the 
relevant soft law. 489   
  
It is possible to divide these WTO GAL standards into two broad categories, substantive 
and procedural.  A theoretical debate regarding the relationship and distinctions between 
substantive and procedural law is complex and beyond the scope of this thesis.490  The 
categories are used here to emphasise the two different ways in which GAL standards 
featured in WTO law can be applied.  In general substantive standards are applied as 
foundational principles that are used to appraise the actual content of decisions reached.  
In contrast, procedural standards impose procedural or process-related obligations on 
Member States.  The two types of standard are closely inter-related and in some 
instances there will also be an overlap between substantive and procedural standards.  
Procedural standards are sometimes used as a means to promote respect for substance 
standards.  For example, the requirement that power-wielding members have to give 
reasons for their decisions can be viewed as a procedural standard.  However, by 
providing reasons, other substantive standards, such as means-end rationality, can also 
be fulfilled.491   
 
                                                           
489
 The fact that a soft law instrument can act as a safe-harbour clause supporting affected members or 
defending power-wielders in disputes has been observed by academics in different fields of law (For 
example, Scharge (2003) in relation to corporate breaches of human rights in US courts).  However, the 
legal position of soft law instruments in the WTO context is somewhat unclear.  Although they have 
played a significant role in inducing member states to comply, their role in WTO disputes remains to be 
determined since case law on these issues has not been fully developed.  To some extent, however, it can 
be argued that recognition of these soft law instruments has been expressed by the Appellate Body in EC-
Sardines (see for example, Scott (2007), p.192. This will be discussed Section 5.1.2.3), and more recently 
by the Panel in the US-Clove Cigarettes case (This will be discussed in Section 5.1.1.2.1).  
490
 See for example, Morgan (1957), Black (2000, 2001), Redish and Murashko (2008).  
491
 For further discussion, see for example Scott (2007), Chapter 6 p. 216.  
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The next part of this chapter will set out the main GAL-type standards that are 
embodied in WTO law and governance, deploying this distinction between substantive 
and procedural standards.  
 
5.1.1.1 Substantive Standards  
 
5.1.1.1.1 Means-end Rationality  
 
The “means-end rationality” test, also known as the “nexus” test in the WTO,492 is 
recognised as one of the major substantive GAL standards which WTO members are 
bound to respect.493  There must be a rational relationship or a causal connection 
between a trade measure and the objective that it purports to pursue.  That is to say the 
trade measure must be capable of making a genuine contribution to its stated goal.  
 
In the context of food safety,  the requirement for means-end rationality is given effect 
in WTO law in two main ways: firstly as a condition for invoking the general 
exceptions to the rules under Article XX GATT, and secondly as part of the rules 
themselves under Articles 2.2 and 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. 
 
                                                           
492
 Trachtman in Scott (2007), p. 28 “it  may . . . be concluded that the new test under (GATT) Article XX 
calls for an actual balancing of the degree to which the challenged measure contributes to the end 
pursued.”  
493
 It should be noted that in some accounts, the rational relation test has been referred as part of the 
proportionality criterion.  For example, in the context of the WTO and the EU, means-end rationality has 
also been discussed alongside the requirement to use the least trade-restrictive means. This has been 
viewed by some as being incorporated into the necessity test (see further the use of the doctrine in the EU 
in the discussion by Hofman in Barnard and Odudu (200), p.54 (fn 34), see also Von Harten, (2008).  In 
the WTO context, see for example Ortino (2004), p. 455.  However, means-end rationality is placed here 
as a separate requirement. This is because it was at first considered as a stand-alone substantive criterion 
by GALs’ founders. Secondly, WTO provisions include means-end rationality as a stand-alone criterion 
(for example, Article 2.2 SPS).    
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In the former, case law has established that power-wielding members are allowed to 
depart from existing WTO obligations provided that their trade measures are 
“necessary” or “relate to” one of the general exceptions.494  The main general exception 
relevant to food safety is framed in terms of measures “necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health”.495  To demonstrate that a measure is “necessary”, a 
minimal degree of means-end rationality is required.  There must be a plausible causal 
relationship between the Member State’s measure and the stated objective of protecting 
the life or health of a human animal or plant.496   
 
The “nexus” test also forms the basis of Member States’ positive obligations under 
Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.  Power-wielding members adopting an SPS measure 
must ensure that the measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect the life 
and health of humans, animals and plants.  It also must be based on scientific principles 
and be supported by adequate scientific evidence.497  Similarly, to demonstrate that the 
measure is necessary a low, but nonetheless essential, means-end rationality test is 
applied.  It must be shown that the measure can make a contribution to the end being 
pursued.498  In addition, to demonstrate that the measure is based on scientific evidence, 
                                                           
494
 Article XX GATT.  
495
 Article XX (b) GATT. 
496
 As long as the connection between the means and the end is “material” and “not marginal or 
insignificant”, then it is likely to be sufficient - Brazil-Tyres (para. 210).  To be able to claim the 
exception however, Member States may have to face a “strong proportionality test” where the goal of the 
regulation will be weighed and balanced against other factors.  This will be discussed in Section 5.1.1.1.2 
(B) below.   
497
 Article 2.2 is also founded on the proportionality principle, another main substantive standard of GAL.  
This will be discussed in the next section.  
498
 Korea-Beef (para. 161).  
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there must be a rational and objective relationship between the SPS measure and the 
scientific evidence upon which the measure is based.499 
 
Prima facie, this nexus test under Article 2.2 appears to be easy to satisfy as the power-
wielding Member State can pursue the highest level of health protection500 and can refer 
to minority scientific opinions in support of its measure.501  It is merely required that the 
risk assessment “reasonably support” the measures taken, and hence with minimal 
scientific evidence the nexus test can be fulfilled.502  However, in practice the nexus test 
has proved difficult to fulfil.503  For example, in EC-Hormones 504 it was held that the 
scientific evidence relied on by the EU could not reasonably support the measure taken 
as it related to the existence of a general risk of cancer, but not to the specific risk at 
stake, i.e. the risk of carcinogenic or genotoxic hormone residues found in cattle meat 
when used for growth promotion proposes.505   
 
A similar result also occurred in Japan-Varietals.  Although the data provided by Japan 
hinted at product variety differences, they did not provide a justification as to why 
                                                           
499
 EC-Hormones (1997 AB) para. 193, in order to show that the measure is based on risk assessment, “a 
rational relationship between the measure and the risk assessment is required”.  
500
 It is a low threshold to establish even when the highest level of production is sought.  See for example 
in Australia-Salmon, EC-Hormones (1997 AB), Japan-Apples.  
501
 EC-Hormones (1997-AB), para. 193 and Japan-Varietals para. 77  
502
 Andenas and Zleptnig (2007), p. 414. 
503
 In other words it is a low but difficult threshold to meet, or one “too strict and too lenient”, Scott 
(2007), p. 79.   
504
 AB (1997), WT/DS26, DS48/AB/R. 
505
 EC- Hormones (1997-AB), para. 200.  In addition, the scientific evidence was based on the opinions of 
Dr. Lucier and was made in relation to the scientific studies not carried out by him nor under his 
supervision.  Further, the study focuses on the possibility of hormonal residue left in cattle meat rather 
than the risk to human health.  Thus there was no rationality between the scientific case used by the EU 
and the conclusion used to support the ban.  
  
218
different tests were required for different varieties of the same product.506  Additionally, 
in Japan-Apples, the fact that Japan neglected other possible risks of fire-blight disease 
led the Panel to conclude that there was no rational relationship between the measures 
and the scientific evidence in question.507   
 
Further, in EC-Biotech the scientific evidence relied upon by Austria was found not to 
constitute sufficient scientific evidence to support its safeguard measures taken against 
the introduction of T25 maize.508  The two reports used by Austria failed to refer to the 
probability of the potential risk of negative long-term ecological effects stemming from 
the cultivation of this crop, and instead only made a general evaluation of the 
“possibility” that such a risk could occur.509 
 
5.1.1.1.2 Proportionality: (weak and strong)    
 
Proportionality is one of administrative norms explicitly identified by GAL.510  In 
joining the WTO Member States retain considerable discretion to adopt trade measures 
in order to achieve, or contribute towards, legitimate objectives.  These objectives may 
be set out in the WTO Agreement or they may be recognised by the dispute settlement 
                                                           
506
 For example, where test results demonstrate that a similar test could lead to different results when 
applied to different product.  Japan-Varietals (Panel) para. 8.42-43 affirmed by the AB report para. 83.  
507
 Japan-Apples (AB report, p. 7 at para. 14). The measure involves a series of demanding requirements 
including designated disease-free areas in the export countries, to be surrounded by with 500 metre buffer 
zones, to be inspected tri-annually, and to be subject to special disinfection treatments for imported 
apples, and so on.  
508
 EC-Biotech, (Panel), para.7.3046. 
509
 Ibid, para.7.3044.  Although it has been stated elsewhere that the risk can be quantitatively as well as 
qualitatively defined (Australia-Salmon (para. 124)) and confirmed in EC-Biotech (para. 7.3027), 
following EC-Biotech, there was a suggestion by the dispute settlement bodies to favour quantitative 
demonstration of risk. See further Scott (2007), p. 93-94. 
510
 See supra, Section 4.4.2.4. 
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bodies.  However, Member States may do so only on the proviso that the measures 
taken are proportionate. 
 
The proportionality principle comes into play after the rationality test has been met and 
can be considered to consist of two main components.  Firstly, there is the “least trade 
restrictive means” component where the power-wielding member has to demonstrate 
that the measure is applied only to the extent necessary to achieve the desired objectives 
or outcomes.  Secondly, there is an element of “weighing-and-balancing” inherent in 
proportionality whereby the negative trade effects created by the measure are weighed 
and balanced against the importance of the objective pursued by the measure and the 
degree to which it contributes to realising this goal.  
 
These two distinct components of proportionality are very different in terms of the 
intensity of scrutiny of Member State measures that they imply.  To capture this, they 
have been described by Scott as constituting “weak” and “strong” proportionality 
tests.511  With regard to the least-trade-restrictive means test, proportionality is applied 
in a “weak” form because WTO law relates only to the means used by a Member State 
in adopting a trade measure without considering the value of the objective or the “end” 
being pursued by that Member State.512  However, when it comes to the “weighing-and-
balancing” test, the value or weight of the objective pursued is also considered, relative 
at least to the level of trade restriction that the measure implies.  In this case, both the 
                                                           
511
 Scott (2007).  
512
 This is, of course, subject to the end in question being one that is recognised as being a legitimate one 
by the WTO Agreements or by the dispute settlement bodies.  
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“ends” and the “means” will be subject to scrutiny under WTO law.513  Strong 
proportionality is often known as proportionality “stricto sensu”.514 
 
A:  The Least Trade Restrictive Means (Weak Proportionality)  
 
As with the rationality requirement, weak proportionality is inherent in the necessity 
test, whether in relation to the exception in GATT Article XX or in the rules, for 
example under Articles 2.2 and 5.6 of the SPS Agreement.515  The concept consists of 
two parts.  First, there must be no “less trade-restrictive” alternatives available which 
are, second, capable of achieving the member’s goal.516  Trade measures have been 
found to be inconsistent with a weak proportionality test in a number of important cases 
including: Thai-Cigarettes, Korea-Beef, Japan-Apples and US-Section 337.517  Here, 
less trade restrictive alternatives such as labelling and policing were deemed to be 
available and were judged to be capable of achieving the various members’ goals.  
 
However, it should be noted that following US-Gambling the scope of the least-trade-
restrictive means test has been significantly narrowed.518  The term “least-trade-
restrictive alternatives” has been deemed to cover only those measures that are 
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 The Appellate Body’s introduction of proportionality criteria into the WTO law Korea Beef  has been 
subject to scrutiny by some academics including Regan who considers this as “a serious intrusion on the 
Members’ regulatory autonomy” (Regan (2007), p. 349).  
514
 See Andenas and Zleptnig (2007) and Von Harten (2008). 
515
 Australia-Salmon and Japan-Varietals. 
516
 Ortino (2004), p. 471, referred to in Andenas and Zleptnic  (2007). 
517
 Thai-Cigarettes (Panel Report para. 75), Korea-Beef (para. 63) US-Gambling (para. 304). 
518
 In US-Gambling, in deciding whether the online-gambling ban by the US was necessary to protect 
public morals or to maintain public order, the possibility that the US could further engage in consultation 
with Antigua was construed as not being a reasonably available alternative to the prohibition of online-
gambling since the results from any negotiation would be uncertain and might not have led to the level of 
public morals that was being sought by the US.  
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“objectively available” and not to include all “readily available” means.519  Similarly, an 
alternative will not be deemed to be available if it would imply substantial additional 
costs for the regulating members, lead to uncertain outcomes,520 or be beyond the 
technical, economic or financial reach of the regulating state.521   
 
A similar approach has been taken by the dispute settlement bodies when interpreting 
the proportionality standard under Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement, which also 
specifies that the SPS measure in question should only be applied to the extent 
“necessary” to protect human animal or plant life and health.  Further, Article 5.6 states 
that SPS measures should not be “more trade-restrictive than is required to achieve an 
appropriate level of …protection, taking into account technical and economic 
feasibility”.522  In the footnote to this Article, a three part interpretation of the least-
trade-restrictive-means requirement has been included to further clarify that for an 
alternative to be available it must (i) be “reasonably available” taking into account 
technical and economic feasibility, (ii) be capable of achieving the member’s 
“appropriate level of …protection” and, (iii) be “significantly less trade-restrictive”.  All 
of these conditions have to be fulfilled in order to strike the measures down as being 
disproportionate, as confirmed in Australia-Salmon523 and Japan Varietals.524   
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  US-Gambling (para. 317).  
520
 Ibid. 
521
 Brazil-Tyres (para. 171).  
522
 The two provisions should be read together (EC-Biotech – para. 7.1430 and Japan Varietals, para. 
8.71). 
523
 Para. 194. 
524
 Para. 8.72. In the recent Tuna/Dolphin (DS 381) dispute, the need to apply this three-pronged test for 
establishing weak proportionality was confirmed.  The obligation which has arisen in this case was in 
relation to Article 2.2 TBT.  However, the panel drew an analogy to the interpretative principles 
established in Article 5.6 SPS (para. 7.461) and the relevant case law (for example, to Australia-Apples in 
para. 7.468) in determining the US’s obligation under Article 2.2.TBT. 
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B: Weighing and Balancing: (Strong proportionality) 
 
This element of proportionality involves the process of “weighing and balancing” of the 
different rights and interests that interplay in the WTO framework.  On one hand, there 
is the right of Member States to take measures to protect the life and health of humans, 
animals or plants.  On the other hand, there are the legitimate interests of other WTO 
Member States in being free from unnecessary trade restrictions.  By introducing a 
weighing and balancing test, the WTO dispute settlement bodies have strengthened the 
proportionality standard to ensure that the protective measure in question is not 
excessively onerous or restrictive of trade.  The ‘excessive’ standard will be judged 
relative to the good that the contested measure seeks to pursue. 
 
Strong proportionality applies to food safety measures in the WTO context under GATT 
Article XX and under the SPS Agreement.  With regard to the former, the use of the 
weighing and balancing approach is relevant when determining whether the measure is 
necessary.  This approach was initially used in Korea- Beef and later confirmed in EC-
Asbestos and in Brazil-Tyres.525  In applying this approach, different factors are taken 
into account in the weighing and balancing formula.  These include: (i) the importance 
of the interest being pursued, (ii) the extent to which a measure contributes to the 
realisation of the end pursued, and (iii) the degree of disruption to imports or exports 
that it implies.526  
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 Korea-Beef (para. 164), EC-Asbestos (para. 172), Brazil-Tyres (para. 142). 
526
 Korea-Beef (para. 162-4). 
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Each factor is determined individually and is then weighed and balanced against other 
factors.  However, from the power-wielding Member States’ perspective, the first two 
factors are relatively easy to satisfy.  For a food safety measure it is always the case that 
the protection of the life or health of humans is considered as being of the utmost 
importance and hence one in relation to which Member States’ discretion should be 
respected.527  Furthermore, as mentioned earlier in relation to means-end rationality,528 
only a minimal degree of contribution by the measure to the end being pursued is 
required.529   
 
What is likely to be decisive in the weighing and balancing formula is, instead, the 
extent to which the measure is trade-restrictive.  There are, however, no hard and fast 
rules about this.  In general it can be deduced that if the measure contributes so little to 
the level of health protection sought, and if the measure is very demanding, then the 
measure is more likely to be struck down as disproportionate.   
 
With regard to the element of weighing and balancing under the SPS Agreement, 
evidence of a strong proportionality can be seen in the dispute settlement body’s ruling 
on Article 2.2 and Article 5.7.530  As discussed earlier, Article 2.2 provisions require, 
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 This has been confirmed in Brazil-Tyres where the risk was life-threatening infectious diseases 
including dengue fever and malaria (para. 176) or in EC-Asbestos (para. 172), where the risk arose from 
the carcinogenic properties of the banned substance. 
528
 Supra Section 5.1.1.1.1.  
529
 In other words, it is sufficient if the measures make a material contribution (Brazil-Tyres (para. 210). 
530
 To some extent it can be argued that Article 5.4 also carries some elements of strong proportionality 
because when “determining the appropriate level of SPS protection” Member States should “take into 
account the objective of minimising negative trade effects”.  In doing so it is possible that the Member 
States will have to weigh and balance other members’ interest with their own.  However, it has been 
clearly laid down in EC-Hormones that the word “should” under Article 5.4 does not impose a positive 
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inter alia, that the SPS measure should be applied only to the extent that it is 
“necessary” and is commensurate with the nature of the risk presented in each case.531  
In deciding whether a measure is necessary, the nature and level of the prevailing risk 
will be weighed against the nature and level of trade restriction that the measure creates.  
If the measure is very demanding and the level of trade restriction is high, despite there 
being a negligible or low level of risk, then on balance the measure is likely to be 
viewed as being disproportionate. 
 
It has also been suggested that weighing and balancing may also be relevant in 
satisfying Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement in cases where there is scant scientific 
evidence and where power-wielding members wish to base their measures on minority 
rather than mainstream scientific opinion.532  In determining whether Member States 
can rely on a minority scientific report, an element of weighing and balancing come into 
play since the dispute settlement bodies will have to take various factors into account.  
These include the subject matter of risk (whether the risk concerns human, animal or 
plant), the nature of the risk (whether the risk is long-term or imminent), disruptive 
effects on international trade, and other alternative means.  This appears to have been 
applied in EC-Biotech where the Panel had to decide whether Austria could rely on 
minority scientific evidence to support its safeguard measure against the importation of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
obligation on the Member States and it is sufficient for them to take the objective of minimising negative 
trade effects “into account” (EC-Hormones (para. 8.166) ).  (See also discussion in Scott (2007), p. 36 
and 156). 
531
 Another requirement under Article 2.2 is that the measure shall not be maintained without scientific 
evidence.  However, this part of requirement has been discussed as part of the means-end rationality 
discussed earlier as part of the Section 6.1.1.1.1.   
532
 Scott (2007), p. 109 onwards. Article 5.7 provides that where relevant scientific evidence is 
insufficient, a Member may put in place a provisional measure based on the available pertinent and 
relevant scientific information.  
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T25 Maize.  As the risks were to the environment and plant health, rather than human 
life and health, and since they were neither imminent nor life-threatening, the Panel’s 
finding was to disallow the minority report and to state that the measures were 
inconsistent with SPS Article 5.7.533   
 
Conversely, if the associated risk relates to human health and if it is clear and imminent, 
for example where the measure relates to the prevention of the spread of highly 
infectious diseases such as Avian Flu or Swine Flu, then the Member State is likely to 
be allowed to base its risk assessment on a minority scientific report provided that it 
stems from a respectable source and that the means-end-rationality and necessity 
requirements have been satisfied.  This appears to have been the reasoning of the 
Appellate in EC - Hormones II where the risk at stake was cancer caused by hormonal 
substances in beef.  In this case, the risk was small and the scientific evidence relied 
upon by the EU in its risk assessment was not from the mainstream.  Nonetheless the 
EU was allowed to rely on a minority scientific opinion, provided that it came from a 
“respected and qualified source”, had been obtained through “scientific and 
methodological rigour to be considered reputable science” and provided that the “results 
of the risk assessments sufficiently warranted  the SPS measure at issue”.534  
 
5.1.1.2 Procedural Standards Which Contain Elements of GAL  
 
A wide range of procedural obligations is laid down and operationalised in the WTO.  
They operate mainly to give effect to the transparency and participation aspects of GAL.  
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 EC-Biotech, (para.7.3044). 
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 Hormones II, (para. 591).   
  
226
These procedural obligations were first laid down in the Understanding Regarding 
Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance initially adopted during 
the Tokyo Round, and later incorporated into various parts of the WTO Agreement 
including, for example, in Articles X and XXII GATT, Article 7 read with Annex B of 
SPS, and in Articles 2.9-2.12 of TBT.  These hard law obligations are now also 
supported by a soft law instrument. 
 
5.1.1.2.1 Duty to Notify and Publish: to inform other members about proposed 
and new trade measures   
 
These obligations are laid down in Article X GATT; Article 7 read with Annex B SPS 
and to some extent is further specified by soft law documents including the SPS 
Committee’s Recommended Procedures, the Secretariat’s Handbook on Transparency 
and the Decision on Implementation and Related Issues and Concerns taken in the 
Fourth Ministerial Conference held at Doha on November 2001.535  They must be 
complied with by power-wielding members prior to the adoption or introduction of new 
trade measures.  This obligation requires not only that measures be notified and 
published, but specifies also how this is to be achieved and the circumstances in which 
the comments of other Member States must be taken into account.  Following the recent 
Panel’s ruling in US-Clove Cigarettes dispute, the significance of this notification and 
publication duty has been affirmed.536 
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 WT/MIN (01)/17. 
536
 It was held that this duty constituted a direct obligation binding upon the US, the power-wielding 
Member, when invoking a measure to ban the sale and importation of clove cigarettes (US-Clove 
cigarettes).  It should be noted that the procedural obligations in this case concern obligations under the 
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There is a “temporal dimension” to this notification and publication duty.  The duty 
arises in three stages throughout the power-wielding member’s decision-making 
processes, each serving to give effect to different GAL criteria.  Furthermore some 
dimensions involve “passive” obligations where it is sufficient for the power-wielding 
members merely to perform the required acts, whereas others involve “active” 
obligations where the power-wielding members are required to engage and interact with 
affected members.   
 
The first temporal dimension concerns several passive obligations that must be met 
early in the drafting stage of the proposed measure.  A designated governmental 
entity537 of the WTO member wishing to instigate a new food safety measure must 
perform the following acts: (i) publish the proposed measure at an early stage to allow 
for comments and amendments,538 (ii) notify other members through the Secretariat of 
the proposed regulation and the products thought to be covered by the proposal, using 
the appropriate form,539 (iii) provide reasons why this new regulation is necessary,540 
and (iv) upon request provide other members with copies of the proposal.541    
                                                                                                                                                                          
TBT Agreement.  However, it has been ruled elsewhere that where there are strong conceptual similarities 
between the SPS and TBT terms, the analogy between them can be made (EC-Sardines, para. 275). 
537
 This is specified in the Secretariat’s Handbook on Transparency, June 2002, (para. 7). 
538
 Annex B 5 (a) SPS.  Publication should be made soon after the draft of the entire text of the proposed 
regulation has been completed.  In general, a 60 day minimum period should be allowed for comments to 
be put forward by affected Members, (para. 8, The SPS Committee’s Recommended Procedures) unless 
urgent.  In such cases, the Member States can temporarily omit the procedural steps concerning prompt 
publication, but must follow suits after the urgency subsides (Annex B 6 SPS).  In US-Clove Cigarettes 
case, the Panel stated that the decision of whether there was urgency rested on the Member State 
instigating the measure (para. 7.507).  
539
 Annex B 5 (b) SPS. In the recent US-Clove Cigarettes case, this Member States’ “passive” duty was 
held to be absolute regardless of whether the information was already in the public domain.  In this case, 
the US was found to be in breach of Article 2.9.2 TBT by failing to notify other WTO members via the 
Secretariat about the proposed technical regulation which prohibited the sale (and also the importation) of 
clove cigarettes (para. 7.541). 
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The obligations arising at this first stage are put in place to enhance transparency.  By 
imposing a duty to notify and publish a proposal, WTO law reduces the affected 
members’ burden of having to constantly search for details of proposed changes.  In 
addition, the designation of one governmental entity to be the sole point of contact for 
information on the proposal helps to reduce the burden further as the information will 
be readily available from one source.  Moreover, the disclosure of the proposal along 
with its objectives and rationale will help affected members to be fully aware of 
potential changes and to understand the reasons underlying the proposal.    
 
The second stage of this duty comes during the drafting stage, which follows early 
publication and notification of the proposed measure, though it occurs before the 
proposal is adopted as law.  During this stage there is an active duty to allow other 
member states to comment.  The power-wielding member must also discuss comments 
made by other members and demonstrate that they have taken these comments into 
account in their decision-making processes.542  Ideally the period for comment should 
be at least 60 days.543  These obligations can be viewed as giving effect to the 
participation criterion as they institute a type of notice and comment procedure that 
                                                                                                                                                                          
540
 That is the Member State must give an objective and rationale for the measures.  Annex B 5(b) SPS. 
541
 (Annex B 5 (c) SPS). This should normally be made within 5 working days when requested (para. 14 
G/SPS/7/Rev. 2). In US- Clove Cigarettes, the Panel decided that such an obligation only arose following 
a  request for the copies made by the affected member (para. 7.545)  
542
 Annex B 5 (b) SPS. In doing so, they should also provide a written explanation of how the comments 
have been taken into account (the Secretariat’s Handbook on Transparency, para. 74). In the US-Clove 
Cigarettes, the Panel suggested that in order to demonstrate that the comments of other Member States 
were taken into account in the decision-making process, the US could present correspondence between its 
key executive figures, for instance, trade minister, committee chairman, ambassador and trade 
representative, which clearly contained a discussion of Indonesian interests and comments (para. 7.617 
and 7.635-42).  
543
 Unless there is an urgency, para.8 G/SPS/7 Rev.2(The SPS Committee’s Recommended Procedures). 
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allows affected members an opportunity to have an input, with the possibility that the 
power-wielding member may make revisions to the measure in view of the comments 
put forward.  
 
Third, there is a passive duty that must be fulfilled when the proposal has been adopted 
and becomes legislation.  Annex B (2) of the SPS Agreement establishes an obligation 
for a Member States to publish promptly any new regulation, and to do so in a way that 
enables governments and traders of other Member States to become acquainted with it 
before it is legally enforced.544  Member States must allow a reasonable period of time 
to lapse between the date of publication and the date of implementation so that affected 
members are given sufficient time to understand the regulatory change and to make 
preparations to comply with the new measure.545  Here, guidance was laid down in the 
Decision on Implementation and Related Issues and Concerns taken in the Fourth 
Ministerial Conference held at Doha on November 2001.  This provides for a time lapse 
of normally at least 6 months.546   In the recent US- Clove Cigarettes dispute, the legal 
validity of this Ministerial Guidance was confirmed,547 and the US was found to be in 
breach of its procedural duties by failing to allow a reasonable interval to lapse between 
the date of publication and implementation of its trade measure.548 
                                                           
544
 Article X (1) GATT 1994 and Annex B (1) SPS.  
545
 Annex B (2) SPS, unless there is an urgency.  
546
 Para 3.2 WT/MIN/01/17- (Forth Session, the Ministerial Conference at Doha).  
547
 This is because the Decision was made by the “highest organ of WTO” which has exclusive authority 
to interpret the covered WTO Agreements, (US-Clove Cigarettes para. 7.572).  The relevant term in the 
guidance uses the word “shall” which infers the clear intention of “the highest organ of WTO” on what 
should be regarded as the “reasonable interval” (Ibid, para. 7.575).  
548
 In this instance, the US only allowed a 90 day period between the date of publication and 
implementation to lapse and it could not identify any “urgent problem” to justify this shorter interval than 
the six-month period specified in the Ministerial Decision (Ibid, para. 7.587 and 7.592).  As a result, the 
US measure was found to be in breach of Article 2.12 TBT (Ibid, para. 7.595).  
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5.1.1.2.2 The Duty to Consult: to provide information and technical support to 
other members  
 
Closely related to the notification obligation, power-wielding members are also under a 
duty to provide adequate information and technical support to affected members.  Under 
Article 7 and in conjunction with Annex B 3 SPS, power-wielding members must have 
a single enquiry point to provide answers to any enquiries put forward by interested 
members.  During the drafting stage, that is prior to the measure being adopted, this 
enquiry point acts as a central point of contact for other WTO members and serves to 
provide and communicate answers provided by relevant national agencies.549  In 
addition, the same national enquiry point operates during the implementation stage after 
the measure has been adopted and enforced, and is required to provide information and 
answers to other WTO members’ enquiries regarding compliance with the SPS 
measure.  It must be able to give information regarding both the regulations and any 
previous and other relevant legislation, together with supplying documents relating to 
inspection, quarantine, risk assessment and approval procedures.  Furthermore, the 
enquiry point must, upon request, be able to advise about the approximate duration of, 
and the factors to be taken into account during, the approval, inspection and control 
procedures.550  
 
                                                           
549
 Secretariat’s Handbook on Transparency (September 2002, para. 12).  
550
 In the EU there is the “export help-desk for developing countries” unit, a specially designated “one-
stop” point of contact and “information bank” for exporters from developing countries.  For more 
information see: http://exporthelp.europa.eu/index_en.html. 
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Fulfillment of this consultation duty also increases transparency.  By introducing the 
requirement for a central enquiry point, the scope or meaning of a proposed or new SPS 
measure may be clarified on the basis of information accessible from one source.  
 
5.1.1.2.3 The Duty to Negotiate: as part of GATT, Article XX – General 
Exception  
 
The duty to negotiate emerged following a series of cases concerning the scope of the 
general exception in Article XX GATT,551 including Tuna/ Dolphin, Shrimp/Turtle, and 
US-Gambling.552  This enhances participation opportunities for other Member States.  A 
WTO member wishing to invoke one of the general exceptions, including for the 
protection of “human, animal, plant life or health”, must comply with the obligations 
contained in chapeau of Article XX.553  In so doing they must ensure that the measures 
taken do not give rise to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between different 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or serve as a disguised restriction on 
international trade.  In Shrimp/Turtle the U.S. measures in question were found to 
constitute unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail554 since the United States had not engaged in serious across-the-board 
negotiations with all its trading partners prior to the implementation of its unilateral 
                                                           
551
 This duty to negotiate is imposed in addition to the requirement to notify and to offer consultation 
opportunities arising from the treaty-based measures explained above.   
552
 This is based on consultation being the least trade-restrictive means that can be employed by power-
wielding members.  
553
 Once the measure is proven to be necessary to protect the life or health of humans, animals or plants, a 
subsequent question to ask is whether the measure is consistent with the chapeau of the general exception 
–  that is whether it could be deemed to be an arbitrary and unjustifiable restriction or a disguised 
discrimination to trade. 
554
 Shrimp/Turtle, (para. 176).  
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regime.555  It should be noted that in Shrimp/Turtle the nature and extent of this duty to 
negotiate was only vaguely defined.  
 
Subsequently, in Shrimp/Turtle II and in US-Gambling, the scope of the duty to 
negotiate was narrowed by the Appellate Body.  Members have to be open to engaging 
in serious negotiation with all potentially affected members prior to the adoption of a 
measure and during its implementation stage.556  There is, however, no obligation to 
arrive at a mutually agreed outcome through negotiations of this kind.557  As the 
Appellate Body observed, to find otherwise would imply that any potentially affected 
members would have a de facto capacity to veto the adoption of regulatory measures by 
other states.558  
 
5.1.1.2.4 Consultation Duty:  as parts of the formal dispute resolution procedures  
 
Article 4 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides a mandatory 
procedure for parties to WTO disputes to consult with each other before the 
establishment of a dispute resolution panel.  This duty arises after the measure comes 
into force and when the affected member decides to raise a dispute against a power-
                                                           
555
 In Shrimp/Turtle, (para.172 ) it was affirmed that in order to comply with the chapeau of Article XX 
the US had a duty to negotiate with all, and not merely some, of the affected members.  
556
 The issue in this case concerns the general exceptions under XIV GATS which concern trade in 
services.  However, it was laid down that decisions concerning Article XIV GATS and XX GATT are 
relevant in both settings since they all concern similar terms of general exceptions (US-Gambling (para. 
291-292)).  
557
 Shrimp/Turtle II (para. 123 and para. 317).  The issue here also concerns the proportionality principle 
and whether negotiation could be considered as a less trade restrictive alternative that could be expected 
to be employed by the US.  The AB held that this was not the case.  
558
 Shrimp/Turtle II (para. 123), this would be unreasonable as it can be open to abuse by the affected 
countries who could refuse to conclude negotiations with the power-wielding member.  
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wielding member.  The DSU also contains provisions regarding time-limits and 
procedures for negotiation.  For example, the power-wielding member has to respond to 
the consultation request within 10 days; the consultation process should commence 
within 30 days 559 and be concluded within 60 days.  Only at this point, and if agreement 
is not reached, should a more adversarial process, involving the establishment of a 
panel, be initiated.560  However, the DSU does not impose a specific obligation on 
parties to settle their dispute in the course of this consultation procedure.  If it is clear to 
both parties that the consultation is failing they can call for the establishment of a panel 
at any time before the limitation period ends.561  
 
Although this procedural standard only operates during a short time-frame prior to the 
full dispute commencing, it nonetheless opens an additional channel through which 
communication between power-wielding and affected members can take place.  During 
these consultations, potentially affected members have an opportunity to seek 
clarification of the measure in question, request explanations, or to raise their specific 
concerns.  In this way the consultation duty can contribute towards enhancing 
transparency and provide opportunities for participation.  The success of this procedural 
duty in closing external accountability gaps between WTO members will be discussed 
when considering this duty as an accountability forum in Section 5.1.2.1 below.  
 
                                                           
559
 Article 4.3, DSU.  
560
 Article 4.7. There is also a special provision for urgency, for example when the subject concerns 
perishable goods. Article 4.8 ibid.  
561
 Article 4(7) ibid, also Article 8(5).  Alternatively they can voluntarily opt for good offices, conciliation 
or mediation processes under Article 5 DSU.  In this event there are then further opportunities to conclude 
the dispute through less adversarial means. 
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5.1.1.2.5 The SPS Committee’s ‘Specific Trade Concerns’ Consultation 
Procedure 
 
The SPS Committee convenes several times each year and all members may participate 
in these meetings.562  During these meetings, WTO members have an opportunity to 
engage in an informal consultation process.563  All affected members are free to raise 
their concerns regarding specific SPS issues, or to share their experiences with regard to 
an SPS measure adopted by another state.564  Each member can also register complaints 
in relation to a particular SPS measure that is proposed or adopted by another member, 
and to pose questions in relation to it.  When an issue or complaint is raised by a 
particular member, other members may enter into the dialogue in order to comment on 
the issue or to support the complaint.   
 
The SPS specific trade concerns procedure is a soft law mechanism which instantiates 
various GAL criteria.  Since questions can be raised in the Committee this procedure is 
particularly effective in realising GAL’s transparency and reasoned decision-making 
                                                           
562
 There is an equivalent procedure performed by the TBT Committee which runs meetings at least twice 
a year. During these meetings the Member States can also raise specific concerns in relation to other 
members’ trade measures which are thought to be inconsistent with the TBT provisions.  The discussion 
in this chapter will only focus on the work by the SPS Committee.  However, it should be noted that some 
concerns that have been raised in the TBT Committees are on health-related aspects of products, although 
they are not regarded as being sanitary or phytosanitary measures.  Such claims include those relating to 
the EU’s REACH Regulation which, to some degree, applies to food contact materials, or on health 
warnings which are required to be affixed to food product packaging (such as Thailand’s health warning 
on Alcoholic Beverages). In addition, some issues relating to ‘other legitimate concerns’ such as 
environmental protection and worker welfare will fall under the scope of TBT. This will be discussed in 
Section 6.3.2 below.  
563
 See further Scott in Lang and Scott (2009).  
564
 For example, Thailand has shared its experience regarding undue delays in relation to Article 5 Risk 
Assessment and interim measures of other members, (G/SPS/GEN/769).  This report was submitted 
during the meeting of 28/02/-01/03/2007.  Other countries that have shared their experiences on this issue 
include Columbia (G/SPS/W/201) and Uruguay (G/SPS/W/160).  
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goals.  Moreover, as WTO members can present their arguments, comments or opinions 
on specific SPS measures that have been proposed, though not yet adopted, this 
procedure provides an opportunity for other WTO members to participate in the power-
wielding members’ decision-making process and to seek to influence the final shape of 
the measures.  Furthermore, as comments can be made regarding existing SPS 
measures, this procedure has been used as an informal way of reviewing existing 
decisions.  Finally, as affected Member States have opportunities to try to persuade 
power-wielding Members to change their existing or future rules, this procedure can 
also help to achieve a degree of proportionality in the definition of SPS measures.  
 
5.1.1.2.6 Procedural standards that shape national administrative processes 
 
WTO law also imposes a range of procedural standards that shape members’ internal 
administrative processes.  In respect of food safety, the main provision is found in 
Article 8 SPS to be read alongside Annex C of the same Agreement.  This concerns the 
control, inspection and approval procedures put in place by a Member State.  There are 
also equivalent provisions contained in the Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, 
Adoption and Application of Standards under Annex 3 TBT Agreement.565   
 
For a long time these procedural standards had not been interpreted by the dispute 
settlement bodies and were therefore considered as being subsidiary to other “main” 
                                                           
565
 For example, to give effect to the proportionality principle Point E of the Code requires power-
wielders to avoid creating further unnecessary trade restrictions in their administrative measures.  This 
will be explained later in Section 6.3.2 regarding private standards ‘obligations on ‘other legitimate 
concerns’. 
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SPS provisions.566  However this changed following the Panel’s decision in EC-Biotech 
where it was held that the EU had breached its procedural obligation under Article 8 and 
Annex C (1) (a) SPS as a result of the  undue delays associated with its de facto 
moratorium and approval procedure relating to the importation of genetically modified 
organisms.  Subsequent to the EC-Biotech ruling and especially following a more recent 
US- Poultry dispute,567 it is clear that the WTO has an important oversight role in the 
way in which food safety regulations are implemented by Member States.  
  
These procedural standards are applied to a potentially broad range of national measures 
that “serve the purpose of checking and ensuring the fulfilment of substantive SPS 
Agreement”.568  They may be imposed on power-welding members over and above the 
substantive standards already discussed.  Thus a national SPS measure that is perfectly 
consistent with the substantive standards laid down by WTO law can still breach the 
SPS Agreement if it is inconsistent with the procedural standards contained in Annex C.  
In order to invoke one of the procedural standards, the measure does not have to form 
part of an SPS measure, nor does it need to be assessed by reference to overall control, 
inspection and approval procedures.  It is sufficient for an affected Member State to 
                                                           
566
 This point came up in Japan-Apples on certification requirements.  However, the issue was decided as 
a stand-alone SPS measure rather than as a control, inspection and approval procedure and therefore was 
ruled under Article 2.2 (whether it was based on sufficient scientific evidence) instead of Article 8 and 
Annex C SPS.  
567
 In US-Poultry dispute the US was found to have breached Annex C and hence Article 8 SPS. This was 
because the introduction of Article 727 of the Agricultural Appropriation Act 2009 caused an undue delay 
in the equivalence approval procedure of China’s poultry exports, normally performed by the Food Safety 
and Inspection Service (FSIS). 
568
 Ibid, para.  7.428.  
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demonstrate one instance of wrongdoing in the control, inspection or approval 
processes.569   
 
The procedural standards contained in Annex C of the SPS Agreement focus on 
preventing a power-wielding member creating unnecessary trade burdens in the 
application of their SPS-consistent measures, and as such these procedural standards 
enhance proportionality.  The main procedural requirement is the avoidance of undue 
delays in national controls, inspections and approval processes.570  This can be seen as 
an attempt to avoid the imposition of unnecessary burdens on affected Member States 
and may be considered to operate in support of the least trade-restrictive means-test 
which constitutes a weak proportionality requirement.  
 
Furthermore, other GAL criteria are also given expression in Annex C.  Apart from the 
provisions to control undue delay, other procedural obligations include the requirement 
that power-wielding members should ensure transparency in respect of their internal 
procedures, including by notification to affected Members of the expected time 
                                                           
569
 EC-Biotech, para. 7.1504. Similarly, an administrative measure can be inconsistent with procedural 
standards and the SPS measure itself can also be inconsistent with other substantive standards laid down 
in the SPS Agreements.  In US-Poultry, Section 727 of the US Agriculture Appropriation Act 2009 was 
found to be in breach of both procedural and substantive standards. In this case, Section 727 provided that 
US Congress funding would not be available to the USDA and its organs (including FSIS) for 
establishing or implementing a rule allowing poultry imports from China.  This resulted in Congress 
prohibiting the FSIS to perform the normal approval processes to consider whether the Chinese poultry 
inspection system could comply with the US standard.  The US approval procedures themselves were 
found to be inconsistent with Annex C (and hence also Article 8 SPS) and Section 727 was found to be in 
breach of several SPS substantive provisions, including Article 5.1 and 5.2 (as it was not based on risk 
assessment), Article 2.2 (as it was maintained without sufficient scientific evidence), Article 5.5 and 
Article 2.3 (as it established arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination). 
570
 Article 8 and Annex C (1) (a) SPS.  Further, this element of avoiding unnecessary restrictions can also 
be seen under Annex C(1)(c) which indicates that the information requested for control, inspection and 
approval should only be limited to what is necessary, and is seen under Annex C(1) (e) which states that  
any requirements for control, inspection and approval of individual specimens of products must be limited 
to what is reasonable and necessary.  
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required.571  Relevant documents must also be made available upon request.  
Furthermore, since Annex C (1) (b) also requires power-wielding members to give 
reasons for any unexpected delay, this provision contributes to the achievement of 
reasoned decision-making in accordance with GAL. 
 
5.1.2 WTO Provisions of Fora, External Accountability Mechanisms 
and Sanctions 
 
The WTO framework not only gives effect to GAL criteria by laying down substantive 
and procedural standards, but also establishes various “fora” in which a power-wielding 
Member State’s compliance with these standards may be raised.572  These fora are 
sometimes closely related to the standards outlined above, and they serve to re-enforce 
external accountability relationships in the WTO.  These various fora also help to secure 
transparency and to create opportunities for participation.  In addition they provide 
opportunities for affected WTO members to seek a review or appeal of other members’ 
food safety measures.  They allow for food safety measures to be challenged, whether 
formally or informally, including through what is in effect a form of judicial review.  
Furthermore, different sanctions also operate in the various fora and can come into play 
where power-wielders fail to adhere to the substantive or procedural standards laid 
down.  The summary WTO framework for enhancing GAL is set out in Table 8.   
 
                                                           
571
 Annex C (1) (b).  
572
 It should be noted that the existence of mechanisms to incorporate GAL criteria into the WTO 
regulatory framework has also been recognised by other prominent academics including Lang and Scott 
(2009) and Stewarts (2009).   
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The nature and operation of the various accountability-enhancing fora associated with 
the WTO will be set out and analysed below.  This analysis will focus on three issues: 
the type of forum, the nature of the accountability mechanism in place, and the nature of 
the sanctioning system in operation.  As will be shown, the term “fora" as used here 
includes those fora that are established as part of the WTO dispute settlement system as 
well as “administrative” fora such as WTO Committees.  Where appropriate, reference 
is also made to the circumstances in which the forum in question has already been used 
to reduce external accountability gaps between WTO Member States in general, and 
more specifically in the area of food safety between the EU as the regulating state, and 
Thailand as the affected state.  
  
240
 
 
Table 8: Summary of WTO Framework of Fora, 
Mechanisms and Sanctions that Enhance the GAL 
 
Forum Operating 
Framework 
Type Accountability 
Mechanism 
Sanction 
Bilateral / 
multilateral 
consultation 
under Article 4 
DSU 
WTO Procedural 
duty: dispute 
settlement 
(prior to panel 
procedures) 
 
Legal 
 
Legal (threat of a 
full panel dispute 
to follow with risk 
of losing the case) 
 
Panels’ and 
Appellate 
Bodies’ 
disputes 
 
WTO Dispute 
settlement 
Legal 
 
Legal (quasi-
judicial review) 
SPS 
Committee’s 
complaint 
procedures 
WTO Administrative Peer / Legal 
 
Peer (being subject 
to constant peer 
pressure, 
disapproval 
Legal (threat of 
legal proceedings 
through DSU) 
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5.1.2.1 Bilateral/Multilateral Consultations prior to Formal Dispute Settlement 
(Article 4 DSU)  
 
Bilateral or multilateral consultation directed towards securing “a positive solution to a 
dispute” is the preferred first option in WTO dispute resolution.573  Consultations of this 
kind enhance transparency and create opportunities for participation as noted above.574  
Additionally on their own, they create an accountability forum.575   
 
This forum is subject to a number of limitations, including a “minimal” duty to enter 
into consultation without there being any requirement regarding the quality or outcome 
of the negotiations,576 and a short-term operational time-frame.577  However it has been 
successful in providing opportunities for affected states to raise concerns about food 
safety regulation adopted elsewhere.  Affected members can raise concerns during the 
consultation stage leading to the establishment of a panel for settlement of any dispute 
in cases where they believe that the power-wielding member has departed from WTO 
standards.  In addition, throughout these consultation processes affected WTO Members 
can seek to obtain clarification of the food safety measure in question. 
 
                                                           
573
 See supra Section 6.1.12.2. Article 3(7), DSU.  
574
 Supra Section 5.1.1.2.4. 
575
 That is, they are an element of procedural standards and are themselves accountability fora. 
576
 In US-Gambling, the Appellate Body narrowed the ground regarding parties’ duty to negotiate (also 
the interpretation regarding the alternative measures in the chapeau of the general exceptions).  This was 
discussed earlier in Section 5.1.1.1.2 (A) in relation to weak proportionality.  
577
 This procedure is to commence within 30 days after the members’ notification and to conclude within 
60 days unless the parties opt to use good offices, conciliation or mediation process under Article 5 DSU, 
in which case there may be room for further consultation between the parties.  
  
242
The accountability mechanism involved in this forum is legal in nature due to the 
connection between these consultations and the formal dispute resolution system, and 
also because the results of the consultations will be binding upon the parties.  The 
sanction that may be applied to the power-wielding member in this forum is the 
commencement of a full dispute resolution process which can be lengthy, and in which 
the power-wielder runs the risk of losing the dispute.   
 
Various outcomes can result from engaging in consultation in this forum, including 
clarification of the trade measure in question or a change in a Member States’ rules and 
SPS determinations.  Approximately one-third of all WTO disputes can be said to have 
been settled in this forum without resort to full dispute settlement.  Since 1995, out of 
418 WTO disputes, 141 have been settled under this process and an additional 20 
disputes have been resolved through consultation commencing after the establishment 
of a WTO panel.578   
 
To a certain degree, some caution should be exercised when considering the extent to 
which this forum helps to increase the recognition of GAL criteria and to enhance 
external accountability between the WTO Member States.  On the one hand, a threat of 
full legal proceedings may encourage the power-wielding member to change its 
measures so as to make them more consistent with WTO standards.  On the other hand, 
the possibility of lengthy and expensive legal proceedings may deter less powerful 
                                                           
578
 As of 1 January 2011. 
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developing country affected members from continuing with legal proceedings and 
encourage them to settle the dispute quickly through this forum.579   
 
The success rate of Thailand in settling disputes in this forum has been low.  Hitherto 
Thailand, as an affected member, has only successfully settled five disputes in this 
forum.580  None of the settled disputes concerned an EU SPS measure.  Thailand has, 
nevertheless, settled two disputes concerning non-SPS measures with the EU,581 and it 
has successfully used this forum to settle an SPS dispute with Egypt regarding a ban on 
Thai canned tuna, a case in which the tuna was alleged to contain genetically modified 
soybean oil.582  In that dispute several potential breaches of GATT and SPS provisions 
were raised by Thailand.583  However, following bilateral consultations prior to panel 
proceedings, Egypt decided to take into account conditions in Thailand, especially the 
capacity of the relevant Thai entities to test and issue certificates attesting that the 
product was GMO-free.584  This, together with Thailand’s affirmation that genetically 
                                                           
579
 See for example Abbott (2007), Shaffer (2008), Evans and Shaffer (2010). 
580
 As a respondent, Thailand has not settled a dispute through these forums.  (Thailand has been directly 
subject to only three WTO disputes, all concerning custom duties (i.e. Thailand - Customs Valuation of 
Certain Products from the European Communities, Thailand- Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes 
and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and Beams from Poland and Thailand - Customs and Fiscal 
Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines) . 
581
 EC  — Duties on Imports of Rice (DS17) which led to new negotiations between the EU and Thailand 
on milled rice duties, which were concluded in 2005.  Two cases were also settled with the EU when 
Thailand acted as a third-party; Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts and Generalized 
System of Preferences in EC — Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners 
from China. 
582
 Egypt — Import Prohibition on Canned Tuna with Soybean Oil. 
583
 These relate to under Article I, Article XI, and Article XIII of the GATT; Article 2, Article 3, Article 
5, and Annex B, Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 5, of the SPS Agreement.  
584
 A DNA laboratory under the DOA was established in 1999 prior to the ban in 2000 and was fully 
operational at the time of the consultation. According to Thailand it had been using an advanced 
technique called the Real Time Polymerase Chain Reaction, a technique used by the EU to detect a 
minute GMO-DNA presence in foodstuffs. The DOA was therefore able to provide certification to 
canned-Tuna manufacturers attesting whether their products were, or were not, GMO free. The laboratory 
was also accessible to the manufacturers at a nominal fee. (See (in Thai): 
http://www.foodmarketexchange.com/datacenter/industry/article_th/8_other/detail_th_43_12_4.htm) also 
  
244
modified soybeans had not been used, eventually led Egypt to withdraw the ban to 
Thailand’s satisfaction.  Here the consultation process led to the closure of an external 
accountability gap in that Thailand was able to call Egypt to account by reference to 
WTO standards without the need for the case to proceed to full Panel proceedings.585  
This forum which is based on consultation prior to adversarial dispute settlement is still 
available to Thailand in its relationship with the EU, and indeed could be used to  more 
actively by Thailand in the future settlement of disputes with the EU.586  
 
5.1.2.2 Formal Dispute Settlement in Panels and the Appellate Body 
 
WTO panels and the Appellate Body hear disputes between Member States 587 and offer 
the possibility of quasi-judicial review of power-wielding Member States’ actions.588  
Since Panel and Appellate Body reports must be complied with by the parties involved 
                                                                                                                                                                          
The Report from Thai Office of Industrial Economics, the Department of Industry  regarding the 
evaluation of  trade measures affecting Thai manufacturing exports (publication date 3/4/2003 can be 
found at www. library.dip.go.th/multim/edoc/08752.doc- in Thai).  
585
 For example this process resulted in Egypt adhering to WTO standards which contain elements of 
GAL, including means-end rationality (as laid down under Article 2.2, SPS, Agreement and (weak and 
strong) proportionality (as laid down under Article 5 as well as publication and notification procedural 
standards  (Annex B 2 and 5)).  
586
 This is especially so since the EU has already used this forum to settle disputes with other affected 
members concerning its SPS measures, for example, European Communities — Measures Affecting 
Imports of Wood of Conifers from Canada and Restrictions on Certain Import Duties on Rice. 
587
 Individuals, business undertakings and NGOs cannot directly proceed in this setting.  However they 
can put pressure on their governments to initiate disputes or become involved indirectly through the 
submission of amicus briefs.  There is, however, controversy about whether private entities should be 
allowed to participate to a greater or lesser extent.  See further, Shaffer (2001).  
588
 The WTO dispute settlement body proceedings amounts to what has been referred to as a “quasi-
judicial review”. It possesses some judicial elements as it encompasses procedures found in traditional 
judicial dispute settlement including appeal to Appellate Body.  However, it also possesses some arbitral 
elements whereby parties have some control over the procedures, for example with their ability to agree 
on the appointment of the panels.  More importantly, it cannot be a “full” judicial review in a traditional 
sense because the Panel and Appellate Body cannot strike the regulating states’ measures down if the 
measures are found to be in breach WTO obligations. They can call the regulating state to bring the 
measures into line with their decisions (unless agreed to the contrary by all the members in the DSU). If 
Membersdo not comply, then retaliatory measures in the form of ‘suspension of concessions’ can be 
taken by the affected members.  There have also been active debates, beyond the scope of this thesis, 
about the nature of WTO legal proceedings.  See further, for example; Bartel (2004), Croley and Jackson 
(1996))   
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in the dispute, and can only be rejected by a consensus of all WTO members, this forum 
constitutes a strong legal accountability mechanism which in practice is binding upon 
power-wielding members.589  This creates a forum for the review of a Member State 
measure.  In the context of the WTO, this is perhaps the most widely known forum for 
holding power-wielding members to account.  
 
Food safety measures adopted by a power-wielding WTO member can be challenged by 
affected members on the basis that they are alleged to be in breach of WTO law, 
including those parts which give effect to GAL.  Where a breach is found well-
established WTO legal mechanisms operate to oblige power-wielding members to bring 
their measures into conformity within a reasonable period of time.590  If they fail to do 
so then legal sanctions can be enforced.  Compensation may be payable, 591 or the 
offending state may be obliged to suffer a suspension of trade concessions by the 
successfully complaining party or parties.592  Whilst in principle suspension of 
concessions should occur in the sector that formed the subject matter of the dispute, or 
if not under the same agreement, in exceptional cases cross-retaliation in a different 
sector or under a different agreement may be allowed.593   
                                                           
589
 Article 16(4) and 17(14) DSU.  This helps to “transform the dispute settlement process from 
diplomatic facilitation to one of reasoned adjudication of a high quality”. (See Stewart and Badin (2009), 
p. 11).  
590
 In other words, they have to be complied with promptly or within a reasonable period of time (Article 
21 DSU). This is the preferred compliance method unless, of course, the decision is rejected by the 
consensus of WTO members.  
591
 Article 22 (2) DSU. 
592
 Ibid. The respondent will have to agree with the successful complainant on payment of satisfactory 
compensation, usually in the form of concessionary grants on specific products of interest.  Alternatively 
if the amount of compensation cannot be agreed, the successful affected members would be allowed to 
retaliate, by temporarily suspending the concessions or other WTO obligations granted to the losing 
power-wielders.   
593
 Article 22 (3) DSU, Ibid.  See further, EC-Bananas III (Ecuador), para. 173 where the complaining 
party was awarded the right to suspend goods and services as well as the TRIPs commitments.  In 
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To date Thailand has participated in seventy dispute settlement cases, both as claimant 
and third party, 594 and respondent.595  However, only seven of these cases concerned 
SPS measures.  Of these seven disputes, two were initiated by Thailand as a 
complainant,596 and five were joined by Thailand as a third party.597  However, there has 
been only one case involving Thailand and an EU SPS measure; namely the EC-Biotech 
case in which Thailand supported the claim as a third party.  In this case, the claims put 
forward were successful in that the EU de facto moratorium on the approval of biotech 
products, as well as the EU’s product specific approval procedures were found to breach 
Article 8 and Annex C (1) (a) SPS.  This was on the basis that they resulted in undue 
delays.  Also  the Member States’ safeguard measures were found not to based on risk 
assessment as required under Article 5.1 and consequently to also be in breach of 
Article 2.2.   
 
It should be noted that WTO dispute settlement system has not been used frequently by 
Thailand or indeed by the majority of developing countries in relation to other 
countries’ SPS measures.  A relatively low number of developing countries have used 
                                                                                                                                                                          
addition, in US-Gambling, cross-retaliation was allowed concerning suspension of the commitments in 
TRIPS although the case was in relation to GATS. 
 
594
 Fifty-seven of which were as a third party and thirteen as a complainant state.  Of these there were 
twelve cases against the EU, four of which were raised by Thailand as the complainant (in EC — Duties 
on Imports of Rice (DS17), Generalised System of Preferences (DS242), Export Subsidies for Sugar 
(DS283) and Customs Clarification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts (DS286)) and the remaining eight 
as a third party against the EU. 
595
 So far there have been only three disputes raised against Thailand; two in relation to its customs and 
one on its anti-dumping duties. (Thailand - Customs Valuation of Certain Products from the European 
Communities, Thailand- Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel 
and H Beams from Poland and Thailand - Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the 
Philippines). 
596
 Shrimp/Turtle, Egypt  –  Canned Tuna. 
597
 In the three Biotech cases, Australia – Fruit and Vegetables where Philippines was the claimant, and  
Australia Quarantine Regime where EU was the complainant. 
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these formal procedures compared with their use by developed countries.598  This has 
given rise to the criticism that there is an imbalance of power between developed and 
developing countries in the WTO.  Although the record of developing countries’ 
participation has improved in recent years,599  and there have been some cases where 
small developing countries have won disputes against large developed countries,600 it is 
undeniable that these formal procedures can impose onerous burdens upon developing 
countries.  In order to engage in formal dispute settlement a developing country has, at 
minimum, to allocate significant human and financial resources which may be stretched 
through the course of lengthy legal proceedings.601  In addition they may also need to 
obtain expert legal or specialist advice when they deal with complex disputes with large 
developed countries.602  Not all developing countries can afford this.  Even those 
developing countries with a good dispute record, such as Brazil, are unlikely to be able 
to apply this adversarial strategy to all of their food industries on a regular basis.   
 
In practice, however, there are “less-known” accountability fora603 that have been more 
frequently exploited by developing countries, including by Thailand.  Despite being less 
formal, these can provide opportunities for Thailand to participate more actively. 
                                                           
598
 In 2009 developed countries started 60% of the disputes.  The US and EU combined have initiated 
41% of all disputes (Evans and Shaffer (2010), p. 2).  
599
 Seven out of the top eleven most frequent complainants are developing countries (including Brazil and 
Thailand).  
600
 For example, Antigua in US-Gambling. 
601
 This can be as long as two years.  In fact it can be argued that a number of disputes that have been 
considered under Article 4 DSU may have been settled a result of lengthy financial and human resource 
constraints.  For further information see, for example, Evans and Shaffer (2010) and Shaffer et al (2008). 
602
 The strategy of using specialist international law firms has been successfully deployed by Brazil (See 
Shaffer et. al, (2008), p. 458.)  For disputes initiated by Brazil the private sector also greatly contributes 
financial support to cover legal costs.   
603
 This fits with the term described by Lang and Scott as “the Hidden world of WTO governance” (See 
Scott in Lang and Scott (2009)). 
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Participation in these fora has often served to encourage power-wielding Member States 
to comply with their WTO obligations.  
 
5.1.2.3 The SPS Committee as a Forum for Achieving External Accountability 
 
The SPS Committee’s complaint procedure is the first “less-known” forum to have been 
used substantially by Thailand as an affected Member State to instantiate the concept of 
external accountability.  As a result, although the work of the SPS Committee has often 
gone un-noticed, it has been observed by Lang and Scott that the Committee’s 
complaint procedure has played a crucial role in enhancing accountability in the WTO 
framework.604  This is because, firstly it gives effect to GAL criteria including 
transparency, participation and reasoned decisions as discussed in Section 5.1.1.2.5 
above.  Secondly it serves as an accountability forum in its own right to enforce 
adherence to WTO law.  Here the Committee’s specific trade complaint procedure 
serves as a forum to elaborate upon the meaning of open-ended WTO standards, and 
also serves to shape the substance of GAL criteria contained in these WTO standards.605   
 
Activities in the Committee rely upon a variety of different accountability mechanisms.  
The first involves peer accountability (amongst Member States) as the driving force to 
make power-wielders comply with WTO-GAL standards.  Both the member raising a 
specific trade concern and those supporting it are in effect passing judgment upon their 
                                                           
604
 See Lang and Scott (2009) p. 607 onwards.   
605
 It should be noted that the SPS Committee operates as a closed-club, where the main players are the 
WTO members themselves.  Limited participation is allowed for non-members including the Codex 
Alimentarius, the OIE and IPPC which enjoy permanent observer status and other international 
organisations which enjoy ad hoc observer status.  As will be explained below, these non-members can 
also perform supporting roles to the affected member states when they raise GAL- type claims under this 
forum.  However, the Committee’s procedure does not allow participation by NGOs. 
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peers.  Specific trade concerns are raised before the entire Committee and are recorded 
in the minutes of the meetings.  After a concern is raised, the Member State initiating 
the measure has an opportunity to respond to the concerns raised.  In doing so they are 
called to give reasons in support of their measure.  Where the concern is unresolved, the 
Committee returns on a regular basis to consider the issues in subsequent meetings.  In 
such cases the power-wielding Member States can once again be criticised by the 
affected member who launched the complaint and by other supporting members.   
 
These activities, which involve repeated condemnation of Member States for their 
failure to comply with their obligations in the WTO, often create pressure for them to 
take additional steps to ensure that their measures are brought into line with WTO 
standards.606 
 
In the Committee, peer pressure can influence and eventually shape a power-wielding 
member state’s regulatory practices.  It can induce them to change those of their trade 
measures that depart from WTO standards.  The sanction that operates here is the 
collective disapproval or condemnation by peers.   
 
Moreover, although less apparent, legal accountability also operates in the SPS 
Committee.  Even though legal sanctions cannot be directly applied to a WTO member 
                                                           
606
 The mechanism of peer accountability operating in this context is somewhat similar to the 
“constructivism” theory of international relations.  This theory implies that states are social entities 
interacting with one another in international communities including those belonging to international 
organisations to which states are party.  As states interact in this way shared norms or values emerge.  
These are considered as appropriate practices to which all states in the EU should adhere.  They would, in 
turn, shape the states’ behaviour and expand their own interests to encompass the interests of other states 
and the internal norms of the international environment to which they belong.  (For further information on 
constructivist theory see, for example, Cohen (2009) and Alkoby (2008)). 
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that has breached its WTO obligations, the possibility nonetheless remains that 
Committee proceedings will serve to highlight the existence of a breach of WTO law 
and hence to provide grounds for a formal challenge to an SPS measure in the WTO 
system for the settlement of disputes.  There have already been numerous occasions 
where Member States, having failed to resolve specific trade concerns in the SPS 
Committee, have proceeded to formal dispute settlement.  In such a situation, the 
information that affected members gather during their interactions with power-wielding 
members in the Committee can be useful in the subsequent formal legal proceedings.   
 
The significance of this was intimated by the Appellate Body in the EC-Sardines 
case.607  The relevant point in this case concerned Peru’s argument that it could not be 
expected to discharge its initial burden of proof because it could not identify what the 
EU’s objectives were in promulgating the contested measure.  However, the Appellate 
Body disagreed and stated that interactions between members operating in a variety of 
fora as part of their transparency obligations, 608 could serve to make available the kind 
of detailed information that Peru, as an affected member, needed to discharge its initial 
burden of proof.609   
 
                                                           
607
 EC-Sardines para. 277.  
608
 Including those contained in Article 2.5 TBT, (to provide enquiry points (Article 10.1 TBT) (para. 
279), and to consult as part of the dispute settlement process leading to the Appellate Body stage (under 
Article 4 DSU) (para. 280).  (Ibid).  
609
 In EC-Sardines the Appellate Body referred to the transparency provisions under TBT and Article 4 
DSU but did not specifically refer to the discussions in the SPS Committee forum.  However, by analogy 
it can also refer to information obtained under other WTO forums, including the SPS Committee’s 
procedures.  
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Similar evidence of this can be seen in the Thailand - Egypt dispute on canned tuna as 
discussed earlier in Section 5.1.2.1.610   The issue was first highlighted in SPS 
Committee before it progressed to dispute settlement proceedings,611  and finally ended 
at the bilateral consultation stage before a panel had been established.612  The 
information regarding Egypt’s measures and its justification for the ban obtained by 
Thailand during the Committee’s discussions would have been useful to Thailand, as a 
complaining member, in discharging its initial burden of proof.  More importantly, 
some information discovered in the Committee forum - that the Egyptian measure was 
only remotely linked to the justification provided - might also have helped Thailand to 
finally persuade Egypt to lift the ban during the consultation process without having to 
resort to the establishment of a full panel.  One of the more convincing arguments put 
forward by Thailand to counter the Egyptian claim was that it was not possible for 
Egypt to detect any GMO presence in the oil as had previously been claimed during the 
SPS Committee’s forum since the final stages of processing canned tuna would, in any 
event, have destroyed the relevant genetic DNA material essential for a GMO check.613   
 
The success of the Committee has led it to be referred to by various academics as a 
“source”,614 “engine” and “agent” of GAL.615  When compared with the dispute 
                                                           
610
 Egypt — Import Prohibition on Canned Tuna with Soybean Oil. 
611
 It was first highlighted in G/SPS/R/19, para. 103-104, 01/06/2000 and has been discussed 
subsequently in Committee forums.  
612
 This dispute was later been settled under the consultation process prior to the establishment of the 
Panel.  See prior discussion relating to this case under the Article 4 DSU forum, see supra, Section 
5.1.2.1.  Other SPS disputes have also commenced in this proceeding and have subsequently moved on to 
the Panel’s establishment.  For example, the GSP issue relating to the EC-Banana dispute arose in 
G/SPS/R/43, para. 40-41 and the concerns regarding the EU approval of Biotech, which was later sent to 
the EC-Biotech Disputes, came up in G/SPS/R/25, para. 102-105. 
613
  G/SPS/GEN/203 para. 116.  
614
 This Committee’s procedures have therefore become successful GAL procedural mechanisms (Stewart 
and Badin (2009) p. 15 referring to Cassese (2005), p. 109).   
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settlement system, this more informal forum constituted by the Committee has been 
used more often and has been more actively resorted to by developing countries than 
has the DSU.616   Moreover the interplay of the two principal accountability 
mechanisms under this forum, peer and legal, creates strong ex ante and ex post 
incentives for power-wielding members to ensure that their SPS measures are in 
accordance with WTO law, including those parts that give effect to GAL.  The constant 
peer pressure imposed by Member States that lodge or support complaints, and to 
certain extent, the prospect of a legal action to follow, can be said to have encouraged 
power-wielding members to re-visit their proposed or actual SPS measures and to try to 
adjust these in the light of the concerns raised.  There are consequently good reasons to 
think that the Committee is an important agent of external accountability, and that it 
serves to give effect to GAL.  Put simply, approximately one-third of all specific trade 
concerns raised in the SPS Committee have been fully or partially resolved to the 
satisfaction of the Member States raising the complaints.617   
 
Both the EU and Thailand have been active participants in this forum.  The EU has been 
particularly active in both raising and defending specific trade concerns.  To date the 
EU has raised sixty-three concerns, twenty-two of which have been either partially or 
fully resolved.618  The EU itself has been the subject to fifty-nine complaints, thirteen of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
615
 Lang and Scott (2009), p.607. 
616
 At the end of 2009, out of 290 concerns developing countries have raised 146.  The peak of the 
number of issues raised was 42 in 2002 following the outbreaks of Mad Cow Disease.  Source: WTO 
news on the overall specific concerns raised through the SPS Committee.  (17 & 18 March 2010). Also 
available at: WTO news:  
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/sps_17mar10_e.htm. 
617
 As of January 2011, out of 290 issues, 79 have been resolved in full and 18 have been partially 
resolved. 
618
 However, none of these were raised in relation to Thai SPS measures.   
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which have been resolved either by revocation or through amendments to the measures 
in question.  Thailand has also been an active and frequent player in this forum in 
contrast to its activity level in the dispute settlement system.  To date Thailand has been 
involved in fourteen complaints; nine specific trade concerns have been initiated by 
Thailand as the complainant, and an additional five complaints raised by other members 
were supported by Thailand.   
 
Of these fourteen complaints, three have been made regarding EU SPS measures, two of 
which were initiated by Thailand on issues regarding the MRL of aflatoxins in 
foodstuffs and import restrictions on soy sauce containing MPCD substances.619  The 
third complaint related to an EU restriction on gelatine imports, a case in which 
Thailand played the role of a supporting member.620  Two of the three complaints 
relating to EU SPS measures have been resolved.  The concerns relating to aflatoxins 
have fully been resolved to the satisfaction of all members and the concern relating to 
gelatine imports has also been partially resolved.  The remaining concern relating to soy 
sauce is on-going and is likely to be revisited by Thailand in the Committee’s 
forthcoming meetings.   
 
It should be noted that the success of the SPS Committee in enhancing the external 
accountability of WTO members is not only measured by the number of complaints that 
have been resolved, but also by the ability of affected members to make power-wielding 
                                                           
619
 The complaint on aflatoxins led to an extended period for resolution; it was resolved in 2004. (see for 
example, G/SPS/R/11, pa 15-19, G/SPS/R/12, para. 11-14, G/SPS/R/33 para. 48-49).  With regard to the 
soy sauce issues, discussions are still on-going.  This issue was raised most recently in 2004 (See 
G/SPS/R22, para. 11-14, G/SPS/R/25, para.106, G/SPS/R/26, para. 134-136, and G/SPS/R/27/para. 132). 
620
 See for example G/SPS/R/10, para. 16 and G/SPS/R/25, para. 34.  The issue was raised in 1999 and 
was resolved in 2001.  
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members adhere to the WTO standards that give effect to GAL.  Even in cases where 
the complaints have not been resolved, and where they are still subject to on-going 
debate, power-wielding members initiating food safety measures can still be called to 
account and are liable to be judged by their peers, who will express their disapproval 
and present them with opposing arguments.  It is clear from the language in the minutes 
and reports of the regular Committee meetings that affected and supporting members 
have exerted pressure upon power-wielding members to demonstrate that WTO-GAL 
standards have been adhered to.   
 
This can be seen from strong statements made by Thailand in this forum in relation to 
numerous SPS measures which are thought to depart from WTO standards, including 
Mexico’s bans on Thai milled rice,621 Australia’s restrictions on prawns from the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 622 and EU import restrictions on 
soy sauce.623  Consequently, until the complaints are resolved, the national 
administrations of the power-wielding members are subject to on-going criticism and 
are judged by their peers in this forum against those WTO procedural and substantive 
standards that contain elements of GAL.  Power-wielding members cannot normally 
remain passive in the face of such criticism and are obliged, by dint of the procedures of 
the Committee and perhaps the prospect of formal dispute settlement proceedings, to at 
least offer reasoned justification for SPS measures in response.  Where there is no 
reasoned justification that could be construed as being consistent with WTO obligations 
                                                           
621
 G/SPS/R/19 para. 4 where Thailand has posed 6 questions to the Mexican authority. 
622
 This is a regional economy organisation, to which Thailand is an active member. G/SPS/R/29 para. 10-
11 (G/SPS/R/21 para. 85).  
623
 G/SPS/R/21, para. 36-40. 
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it is often easier for power-wielding members to amend the offending measure so as to 
achieve greater alignment with WTO standards or, alternatively, for them to withdraw 
the offending measure entirely.   
 
It is also important to note that developing countries that raise specific trade concerns 
can receive assistance from the Secretariat, other international bodies that have observer 
status, or from other WTO members that support them in their complaints.624  Thailand 
has benefitted by obtaining this kind of support in the Committee.  As an example, it 
received supporting arguments from the EU and OIE representatives when complaining 
about Australian measures on cooked chicken meat that specified strict times and 
temperatures needed to cook the product.625  It was argued by Thailand that these 
measures were impractical for manufacturers as they involved cooking at a high 
temperature and for a long time, thereby adversely affecting the texture and taste of 
chicken meat.  The EU agreed with this and made particularly strong arguments to 
support Thailand, demanding justification from Australia as to why these measures 
were necessary.  The EU posed important questions to the Australian representative and 
urged a precise and prompt response from the Australian Authority.626  In the same 
dispute the OIE also expressed its willingness to assist in an arbitration process upon 
                                                           
624
 See the discussion in Scott (2007), p. 53 where WHO representatives used their observer status to 
present supporting arguments in favour of Tanzania’s complaints against the EU’s food import bans that 
were based on the possible contamination of Cholera in four African countries.  In this concern WHO 
representative expressed their supporting opinion that the presence of Cholera was not unique to the 
banned countries but could also be found in at least 50 other exporting countries.  Thus the EU’s outright 
import ban on the grounds of the possibility of Cholera contamination alone would be unjustified 
(G/SPS/R/10, para. 57, G/SPS/204/Rev.5/Add. 3, para. 55.  
625
 G/SPS/R/12, para. 42-45.  For example the meat has to be cooked at 70°C for 95 minutes, 76°C for 30 
minutes or 80°C for 15 minutes (G/SPS/GEN/90). 
626
 The EU demanded an explanations as to why de-boned cooked chicken was allowed whereas boned 
chicken was not, and whether the measures were properly applied and monitored in Australia, et cetera. 
(G/SPS/GEN/96). 
  
256
request from the SPS Committee or from the parties involved in the complaint.627  Here 
the strong supporting arguments made by EU and the OIE’s willingness to assist 
Thailand to settle the issue with Australia helped to enhance the validity of Thailand’s 
claim.  In this instance Australia was subject to disapproval by at least two members 
before the Committee, and was required to present more detailed justification in support 
its measures and to provide scientific evidence drawn from its risk assessment in 
subsequent meetings.628 
 
Thailand has been particularly successful in this forum when it has urged a number of 
power-wielding members to adhere to their external accountability obligations through 
compliance with WTO GAL standards.  With respect to the WTO’s transparency and 
notification obligations, Thailand has regularly been able to require many power-
wielding members, including some developed countries, to provide further explanation, 
elaboration and justification in relation to their food safety measures.  This can be seen 
above in relation to Australia’s temperature requirement for cooked poultry meat, 
Australia’s ban on fresh prawns, 629 Mexico’s ban on Thai milled rice630 and also in 
relation to the EU’s ban on soy sauce containing the substance MCPD.631   
 
Furthermore, through this forum Thai governmental entities have been able to 
participate indirectly in the decision-making processes of power-wielders, or in cases 
where the measures have already been adopted, to call for review of existing measures.  
                                                           
627
 G/SPS/R/12, para. 42-45. 
628
 G/SPS/GEN/204 para. 8-13.  
629
  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev 11. 
630
 G/SPS/GEN/216, para. 6.  
631
 G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11.  
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This has been possible as a result of the deliberations that ensued both from the raising 
of specific trade concerns and as a result of being able to communicate and exchange 
information with the power-wielding Member State.  Although power-wielding 
members are not obliged to amend their measures to reflect Thailand’s concerns they 
will, at minimum, be under pressure to consider the objections presented by affected 
and supporting members since they can be called upon in Committee meetings to 
provide a response.   
 
Moreover, Thailand has enjoyed particularly good success in this forum when raising 
proportionality-based concerns.  These have resulted in power-wielding members 
reviewing, or in some cases amending, their measures to Thailand’s satisfaction with 
the result that Thailand did not need to initiate formal dispute settlement proceedings.  
As an example, Thailand was successful in convincing the South Korean authorities to 
revoke the zero listeria tolerance for uncooked poultry products.632  This was achieved 
on the basis that there was no causal connection between the measures, the risk 
assessment and the results sought by Korea since the Thai products were clearly 
labelled that they should be cooked before consumption.633  This also occurred in 
respect of the Mexican ban on Thai milled rice where Thailand was able to argue on 
similar grounds.  The Mexican authorities finally lifted the ban since the presence of 
Khapra beetle found in Thai milled rice was also found in both domestic rice and in rice 
imported from other countries that had not been subject to such restrictions.634   
                                                           
632
 Here it required that all imported poultry meat (including meat intended for further processing) was 
free of Listeria monocytogenes. (G/SPS/GEN/204/, p. 13). 
633
 Hence the cooking process would kill the microbial substances.  
634
 G/SPS/R/19, para.  4 also G/SPS/GEN/105, para. 4.  
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Even in situations where the complaint proceedings are long, tedious and yet to be 
resolved, Thailand has been able to call for respect of proportionality as it can urge 
power-wielding members to minimise the negative trade effects faced by Thai entities, 
either by giving additional technical assistance or by offering alternative methods for 
compliance.  This is seen following Thailand’s complaint regarding an Australian ban 
on fresh durian.635  Here, Thailand argued that compulsory sampling techniques used by 
Australia were unreasonably complicated and could not easily be conducted on Thai 
durian,636 and that, as such, they did not represent the least-restrictive means of 
achieving their objective.  Although the issue is unresolved and the ban has not been 
lifted, it is hoped that Thailand’s arguments might in the future persuade the Australian 
authorities to allow the use of alternative sampling processes that are more cost-
effective for Thai growers.   
 
In addition, the offer of alternative measures by an importing country can also be seen 
following Thailand’s complaints on the EU’s ban on soy sauce.  Thailand claimed that 
the ban was excessively trade-restrictive and not proportionate on the basis that the level 
of MCPD - the banned substance - was set too low to be detectable by commercially 
viable means.  Although the issue is still on-going, the EU authorities have at least 
agreed to review the existing MCPD level.637   
 
                                                           
635
 G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.3, p.15. 
636
 This is due to seasonal limitations.  Fresh durian is only available for a short period annually and 
waiting for lengthy sampling results can affect the quality and ripeness of fruit that need to be imported 
promptly.  A further reasoning made by Thailand was that the measure was based on an out of date risk 
assessment conducted in 1999 and that had remained unchanged as of 2003.  
637
 G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11 (para. 222).  
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Furthermore, similar results can be seen following the complaints made in relation to 
Australia’s ban on ASEAN’s fresh prawns on the ground that the possibility existed of 
some exotic aquatic diseases being transferred to native species.638  Despite the issue 
being unresolved, in order to mitigate unnecessary trade burdens Australia has offered a 
regular review of its risk assessments and stated that it would welcome the submission 
of evidence from Thailand and other ASEAN countries.  Moreover, following 
discussions in the Committee, Australia also offered technical assistance and agreed to 
consider the possibility of establishing a disease-free zone in Thailand with the prospect 
that exportation of prawns from this area could be resumed.639   
 
To sum up, through this forum Thailand has been able to make power-wielding member 
states adhere to the WTO standards that give effect to GAL.  This forum has brought 
about a significant degree of transparency for Thailand.  It has been able to obtain 
clarification and justification of actual and proposed trade measures.  In many cases, 
although the measures have not been lifted, discussion in this forum has either opened 
the door to further participation or to a review of the measures concerned.  Power-
wielding members often commence bilateral discussions with a view to exploring the 
possibility of introducing a less trade-restrictive measure or to providing technical 
assistance.  Moreover, there have also been opportunities for Thailand, as a member 
launching a complaint, to receive significant support from other WTO members and 
international organisations.  Similarly, there have been situations in which Thailand, as 
                                                           
638
 The diseases in this case concerned White Spot Syndrome and Yellow Head Virus.  Australia argued 
that disease transfer was possible because illegal fresh prawns were used as fishing bait.   
639
 G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11 (para. 35). 
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an advanced developing country, was able to play a leading role in putting forward 
complaints on behalf of other members, as is seen in the complaints made regarding 
Australia’s ban on fresh prawns,640 and the EU’s ban on soy sauce.  In both of these 
cases Thailand raised and presented its own complaints and did so also on behalf of 
other ASEAN countries.    
 
5.2 The Application of GAL as Accountability Standards in the 
Competent Authority “Network” Forum  
 
The concept of the Competent Authority (CA) model was introduced earlier in Part III 
of Chapter 3 which also set out its advantages to Thailand and the EU.  For Thailand, as 
described earlier, the particular advantage of the CA model is its presumed equivalency 
status and its ability to react quickly and effectively to actual or threatened food safety 
outbreaks.  Equally, the CA model allows the EU to assure the quality of imported 
goods and to overcome difficulties in “keeping imports safe”.641  
 
Here I will examine another advantage of CA model, namely its ability to mitigate 
external accountability gaps.  It is argued in this section that GAL criteria have also 
come to be applied as standards of conduct that underpin the relationship between the 
EU and Thailand as a result of the CA model.  In this thesis, the CA model is the second 
“less known” forum whereby Thai entities can call EU regulators to account with regard 
to their actions or decisions that generate cross-border effects for Thai entities.  The 
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 G/SPS/R/30, para. 52-53. 
641
 This is the term described by Bamberger and Guzman amongst others and has been discussed 
previously in Part III Chapter 3.   
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GAL standards applied in this setting are similar to those featured in WTO law.  
However the recognition of these standards in the CA context is not well defined in 
written form, either under treaties or in case law.  On the contrary, they operate mostly 
through “network” co-operation constituted by the CA model.  The findings presented 
in this section are novel and drawn heavily upon my empirical research.  
 
As explained previously in Chapter 4, two types of network have emerged from the 
application of EU food safety regulation in Thailand.642  The first is a network of 
governmental entities in which agencies, high and low-ranking governmental officials 
and national regulators interact with one another.  On the EU side there is DG-SANCO, 
the FVO and the competent authorities of the EU Member States.  For Thailand there 
are the staff and sub-entities of the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives, the 
Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Industry, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their trade representatives in Brussels.  In addition, 
there is the second type of network that is hybrid in nature, involving participation by 
Thai governmental and private entities. 
 
Within each network a variety of activities take place, including information exchange, 
discussions about the basis of food safety legislation and the presentation of 
justifications for food safety measures in place.  These activities occur both as part of 
day-to-day activities and in the course of specific missions.  Depending on the 
circumstances, the activities can be formal or informal.  These network activities play a 
crucial role in providing another forum to re-enforce respect for the criteria established 
                                                           
642
 See supra, Section 4.1.1.2.  
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by GAL.  As stated earlier, although GAL criteria are not laid down as written standards 
in the framework of the CA model, respect for them can be observed from the practices 
and interactions that take place amongst Thai and EU participants in these networks.    
 
In this communications network, peer and legal accountability mechanisms operate in 
the same way as in the SPS Committee.   However, the term “peer” in this context refers 
to those EU and Thai entities whose staff communicate and co-operate with each 
another in the networks concerned.  Staff and entities are able to pass on their comments 
and suggestions to their peers.  If the comments are not taken-up without valid 
explanation the other party may be condemned by their counterparts in subsequent 
communications.   
 
As to legal accountability, since Thailand and the EU are both WTO members there 
always remains the possibility that Thailand can invoke its concern in one of the WTO 
fora.643 Although no legal disputes between EU and Thailand have arisen from 
unsuccessful negotiations in the network forum, the legal significant of network 
activities should not be overlooked.  Already, in the recent US-Clove Cigarettes case, 
network communications between US and Indonesian were relied upon by the US, 
together with US official internal correspondence to demonstrate that it had discharged 
its obligation under Article 12.3 TBT to take Indonesia’s financial, development and 
trade needs into account.  In this dispute, the US relied upon a series of letters between 
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 Either through the SPS Committee’s forum or the dispute settlement procedures. 
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key official figures on both sides.644  By analogy, there is no reason why 
correspondence between EU and Thai government officials in the CA model cannot 
carry similar legal significance if future disputes between the EU and Thailand were to 
arise.  Activities within this framework are summarised in Table 9 below.     
 
Forum Operating 
Framework 
Type Accountability 
Mechanism 
Sanction 
 
Governmental 
networks in 
the CA model 
 
CA Model 
 
Administrative 
/ networks of 
state entities 
 
 
 
Peer / Legal 
 
 
 
Peer (Loss of 
trust / subject 
to constant 
peer pressure 
or 
disapproval) 
 
Legal (Threat 
of legal 
proceedings 
though DSU 
or complaints 
though the 
SPS 
Committee) 
 
Table 9: Summary of “CA-Model” Framework of Fora, 
Mechanisms and Sanctions that Enhance the GAL 
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 US-Clove Cigarettes (para. 7.635).  These include letters between the Indonesian Trade Minister and 
the US Trade representative and between the Ambassador of Indonesia and the US Senate Leader.  
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The existence of governmental network activity can be seen from the results of 
interviews with a number of Thai governmental staff as well as from concrete evidence 
in FVO reports.  It emerged in these interviews that Thai CAs have been able to obtain 
considerable clarification in respect of compliance with EU food safety law as a result 
of their communication with relevant EU entities.  Evidence of network interactions of 
this kind is seen in the “official” advice given by the FVO that is contained in its reports 
with regard to Thailand.  FVO advice is addressed to Thai CAs.  As well as containing 
warnings, the FVO issues clear guidelines and specific recommendations on the exact 
procedures that the Thai CA must adopt in order to demonstrate the equivalence of Thai 
export control systems to those of the EU.  These documents are often issued following 
an FVO inspection or following the triggering of RASFF in relation to Thai products.  
Recent examples include the FVO Report on Pesticide Control and Prevention of 
Microbial Contaminant in Thailand,645 where clear recommendations were made on the 
precise steps that needed to be taken to achieve conformity.  These steps included a 
requirement that the DOA must provide information about the EU MRL to its approved 
farmers, and that the sampling process must be in accordance with Codex Guidelines.646   
In another recent FVO report on Poultry Inspection, 647 clear recommendations were 
given to the DLD that it was required to change its sampling process in respect of 
poultry carcasses in order to comply with relevant EU food safety law.648     
 
                                                           
645
 During 3-11 March 2010 (DG-SANCO 2010-8575). 
646
 Including the Codex’s CAC/GL 27/ 1997, which is referred to in Regulation EC/2073/2005. 
647
 DG-SANCO 2009-8061. 
648
 For example, that the “neck skin” method rather than the “rinsing method” has to be used (p. 7, source: 
ibid). 
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Following such communications from EU staff, Thai CAs have an opportunity to 
submit their comments and are able to communicate to the EU in order to clarify any 
misunderstandings that may have arisen in the course of FVO inspections or during the 
triggering of RASFF.  They can also submit action plans for the implementation of 
recommendations issued by the EU.   
 
In addition to these “official” communications from the FVO and DG-SANCO, similar 
types of interaction are also conducted through informal correspondence between EU 
and Thai governmental staff.  This channel of network communication is invoked more 
often and on a greater scale than that involving official communication.  Such unofficial 
communication takes place during FVO visits, with Thai CAs submitting observations 
to explain any relevant local circumstances.  Exchanges also occur in the intervals 
between such visits on a regular basis.   
 
These networks contribute towards achieving respect for GAL.  This is because, first of 
all, they offer another useful communication channel between EU and Thai entities 
thereby enhancing transparency.  This can be seen from the extent to which the EU 
offers clarification to Thai CA during and after FVO inspections.  The clarification of 
existing laws promotes transparency by helping Thai CAs to understand the essence and 
objectives of EU food safety regulations and to set out appropriate compliance 
measures.  Following clarifications of this kind, Thai CAs are able to pass the 
information on to producers and exporters in the relevant industries during their regular 
or special meetings.  During the interviews, this type of information provided by the EU 
was stated to be “very important” and “always to be taken seriously” by the Thai CA 
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and, where possible, to be “followed word-by-word”.649  Additional information 
received in this way is especially important since, from the CAs’ perspective, many EU 
regulations are “unclear” and the exact compliance procedures “can initially be difficult 
to comprehend”.650   
 
Clarifying information is also exchanged in informal networks where Thai government 
officials, both domestically and in Brussels, often use their contacts with EU 
governmental staff to request detailed information or suggestions regarding compliance 
with specific EU food safety laws.651  During the interviews some specific examples of 
this type of daily network activity were given, including a direct request by  the staff of 
Thai National Bureau of Agricultural Commodity and Food Standards (ACFS) to DG-
SANCO staff for further clarification on Regulation EC/396/2005.  In their 
correspondence the Thai staff specifically requested a full list of pesticide substances 
that would be subject to MRL control.  The list was duly given to them by the EU staff 
via e-mail and so helped to increase transparency by assisting Thai CAs to establish full 
compliance with the EU Regulation.  652   
 
                                                           
649
 In cases where full compliance with the recommendations has not been achieved, work towards 
achieving full compliance is started by the CAs.  Apart from evidence from the interviews, this was also 
demonstrated by the evaluations of the implementation of previous recommendations by the FVO in its 
“follow-on” missions. For example, in the recent mission on the control of pesticide and prevention of 
contaminants (DG-SANCO 2010-8575) the FVO evaluated that out of the eleven recommendations 
previously made, six have been fully addressed and, for the other five, the work has been started.  (p. 13-
14).  
650
 Rakpong J., personal interview with Saowaluck Suppakamolsenee, Policy and Plan Analyst of the 
ACFS, Bangkok, 6/8/2008 and telephone interviews with Dr. Pennapha Mattayomphong, the Director of 
Bureau of Livestock Standards Certification, Bangkok 09/2008.  
651
 Correspondence can be made via telephone call or through email.  
652
 Rakpong J., personal interview with Saowaluck Suppakamolsenee and other Policy and Plan Analysts 
of the ACFS, Bangkok, 6/8/2008. 
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Another example is a verbal request for clarification regarding the EU’s requirement for 
laboratory independence.  In this case, FVO staff suggested to DLD staff that the DLD 
should seek third-party certification to demonstrate compliance.  Once the DLD had 
pursued this course of action, the Thai CA’s compliance with the independence 
requirement was no longer questioned by the FVO. 
 
Other informal network activities that have contributed towards enhanced transparency 
include the EU’s occasional provision of technical assistance and technological transfers 
to assist Thailand in its compliance with EU food safety law.  An example of this was 
seen in relation to the detection and laboratory testing processes for the banned 
substance Nitrofuran.  The MRL of Nitrofuran was set in an EU regulation because of 
its potentially carcinogenic character.653  Subsequent to the “Nitrofuran crisis” of 1999-
2001, a period during which the EU imposed several bans on Thai shrimp and poultry 
products due to the high presence of Nitrofuran in a large number of consignments,654 
the EU provided considerable technical training to Thai CA staff both at home and in 
EU Member States.655  It was observed by a number of high-ranking staff  that the Thai 
CA has “probably learned a lot” about how to comply with the EU Nitrofuran 
regulations, and that the training given by the EU has provided strong foundations for 
appropriate technical procedures that are still used in the Department’s laboratory 
                                                           
653
 Regulation EEC/2377/90 (the main MRL regulation), Annex IV.  
654
 Commission Decision 2002/251/EC of 27 March 2002 which imposed protective measures upon 
fishery and aquaculture products and poultry meat from Thailand. 
655
 One training session was given to the Thai staff who attended the interview at Bristol, UK (Rakpong 
J., personal interview with Chardchai Thiratinnarath, the Director of Bureau of Quality Control of 
Livestock Products, DLD, Bangkok, Thailand, 20/8/2008). 
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today.656  Similar transparency enhancement can also be seen in the context of the EU’s 
training given during 1999-2000 on animal welfare regulations.  It has been suggested 
that knowledge from this training played a significant part in the DLD’s improved 
understanding of the animal welfare procedures required at export abattoirs and has 
contributed to full compliance by Thai poultry exports in respect of EU animal welfare 
rules.657   
 
Transparency is further enhanced through the CA model as information that Thai 
governmental entities receive from the EU is passed down the supply-chain to 
producers and exporters via the activities of “hybrid” networks between Thai 
governmental and private entities.  These network activities emerge as Thai CAs 
communicate with producers and exporters to the EU markets.  During their regular 
exporter meetings, 658 or special meetings should urgent food safety concerns arise, the 
Thai CAs have been able to “pass on” information they have obtained during 
information exchange, training or in correspondence with EU staff.  Likewise, during 
these meetings Thai CAs are able to obtain information about compliance problems 
encountered by producers and exporters and can pass this information on to EU staff.   
 
                                                           
656
 Following the required measures being put in place by the Thai CA, the ban on Thai products was 
revoked (in Commission Decisions 2003/477/EC of 24 June 2003 and 2003/895/EC of 19 December 
2003) and the requested sampling tests at the border were gradually reduced to a normal levels.  Rakpong 
J., personal interview with Dr. Jirawan Yamparyoon, Deputy Director of the Ministry of Fisheries, 
Bangkok, Thailand 9/9/2008. 
657
 This has in fact led to a national law on animal welfare, issued in 1999. Rakpong J., telephone 
interview with Dr. Suphanan Boonyakarn, Staff at the Bureau of Livestock Standards Certification, 
Bangkok, Thailand  09/2008.  
658
 Regular meetings between the CAs and the main exporters occur every 4-6 weeks.   
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Participation, in addition to transparency, has been enhanced through these network 
activities.  Thai governmental entity staff have, on numerous occasions, been able to 
provide explanations in relation to emerging food safety incidents concerning Thai 
exports.  These explanations have played a major part in influencing EU decisions to lift 
or limit import bans.  As a result Thai entities can be considered to have participated in 
EU decision-making.   
 
Given the ability of Thai entities to participate in this way and to persuade the EU to lift 
or limit the scope of its import bans, these network activities can also be thought to have 
enhanced respect for proportionality.  There have been many cases where 
communication between Thai and EU entities has limited the scope of EU import bans. 
 
Examples can be taken from the two case studies, such as the Shigella and Avian Flu 
incidents discussed previously in Chapter 3.659  In these two incidents, once the source 
and the cause of each problem were found, the relevant Thai CA provided explanations 
to the EU’s DG-SANCO.  These explanations were made through the submission of a 
correction of facts and comments following the release of the FVO draft reports, as well 
as through informal communication between the CA and DG-SANCO staff.  It has been 
noted from the interviews that the ability of Thai governmental entities to explain the 
source and the cause of these two food safety incidents, together with their willingness 
to apply additional measures,660 led the EU to limit the scope of the bans.661   
                                                           
659
 See supra Section 3.4.2.2.  
660
 Additional preventive measures include; for example, making sure that all the fresh products exported 
are marked to indicate that the products should be cooked before used since the contaminant can be 
destroyed at high temperature.    
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More recent incidents can be seen in which indirect participation by Thai governmental 
entities led the EU to desist from applying import bans on Thai poultry products in 
2008-2009, and on vegetable produce in early 2011.  In the first incident two RASFFs 
were triggered when laboratory tests revealed poor hygienic conditions in respect of two 
samples taken from Thai cooked and frozen poultry meat.662  However, after 
investigations were conducted by the Thai CA using its own traceability system to 
identify the source and the likely cause of the problem, it discovered and communicated 
to the EU that there were problems with the samples sent but the products themselves 
were safe.663  After this claim was verified, a ban was not in fact introduced by the EU.   
 
The second incident concerns the potential ban on Thai vegetables discussed earlier in 
Chapter 3.664  Following the triggering of a RASFF, the DOA decided to impose an 
export ban on the majority of Thai vegetables destined for the EU market until the 
source of the problem was found.665   Subsequently the DOA found that the source of 
the problem was from a particular group of herb and spice producers, and a long-term 
DOA ban on plant certification continued to be imposed upon this source as a result.666  
In this incident the EU initially communicated to the Thai CA that the introduction of a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
661
 In the Shigella incident the ban continued to be imposed on a particular establishment until such time 
as their products were tested and verified to be “all-clear”.  In the Avian Influenza incident the ban was 
applied only to the particular type of product that continued to be at risk (i.e. uncooked poultry products). 
662
 Notifications dated 18/02/2008 and 2/1/2009.  Explanation in Thai and EU correspondence is also 
recorded in the FVO Mission Report DG-SANCO 2009-8061 p. 7. 
663
 In the first sample there were possible leakages from the foam box containing the samples and in the 
latter case there was a 2 day delay in collection of the sample. Source: ibid  
664
 See supra, Section 3.4.2.2.   
665
 Over 20 types of vegetables were subject to this ban (www.krobkruakao.com, the new reports from the 
Ministry of Agriculture dated 6/1/2011.  See also : 
http://thairecent.com/Business/2011/813630/). 
666
 Even though vegetable exports from other exporters could resume, the DOA continued to carry out 
100 per cent checks on all vegetable consignments to the EU. As of April 2011, these extra checks were 
still on-going.  
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ban on Thai vegetables was possible.  However, when Thailand proffered explanations 
and kept the EU fully informed via regular reports, the EU decided not to issue any 
actual ban.667 
 
It should be noted that to a large extent, this type of network activity has also resulted 
from informal correspondence whereby Thai CA entities can communicate directly with 
EU staff and give first-hand explanations regarding their food safety concerns.  This has 
often occurred during FVO inspections and was mentioned on several occasions during 
the interviews.  In the poultry case study, for example, it was asserted that Thai CA staff 
could occasionally provide first-hand, on-the-spot explanations when EU FVO 
inspectors expressed their concerns.  A specific example given during an interview with 
a number of high-ranking Thai officials was that during one FVO visit; a comment was 
made by a chief FVO inspector regarding the hygiene conditions in a processing factory 
as a result of high condensation occurring in the factory.668  However, a satisfactory on-
the-spot explanation was given to the FVO inspector by the Thai CA staff who were 
responsible for factory quality control.  It was explained that that the condensation 
naturally occurred due to the heat from the sterilised hanger technique669 and since the 
products had already been cooked and the premises sealed-off and sterilised, there was 
                                                           
667
 The reports made by Thai DOA to the related to the cause and source of the incident. The information 
regarding this incident can also be found at www.matichon.co.th (in Thai) (reports dated 6/1/2010 and 
28/1/2010).   
668
 The EU inspector observed that the water vapour produced in the factory could reach the factory’s 
ceiling and drip back onto the meat. 
669
 The weather was particularly hot on the day of inspection. In the hot and humid ambient environment 
in Thailand, the elevated temperature of 97 degrees Celsius used to cook chicken would naturally produce 
this vapour. 
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no hygiene risk to the food.670  Had no such network of communication existed an 
adverse report could have been submitted, or in the worst case Thai poultry exports 
might have been subjected to a total export ban. 
 
5.3 CONCLUSION: MAINTENANCE OF GAL CRITERIA IN THE 
WTO AND CA MODEL FRAMEWORKS  
 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the adverse effects of cross-border EU 
governmental food safety regulations have been substantially mitigated by the existence 
of external accountability enhancing fora that operate under the framework of WTO law 
and as a result of the CA model.  In each of the various fora, GAL criteria have been 
given expression, both by dint of the functioning of these fora, and by virtue of their 
capacity to enhance compliance with GAL standards.  The various fora under discussion 
here operate largely on the basis of peer accountability, with government officials on 
both sides evaluating and probing claims made by their counterparts.  Contrary to what 
might have been expected, the degree to which Thailand, as an affected WTO member, 
has been able to use the “lesser-known” fora of the SPS Committee and the 
governmental network under the CA model, is quite striking.  One of the significant, but 
somewhat unremarked, contributions of these “lesser-known” fora is their ability to help 
Thailand to mitigate the cross-border effects of other countries’ food safety laws. 
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 Rakpong J., personal interview with Mr. Wanchai Polprasertkul and other staff at Bureau of Livestock 
Standards and Certification, DLD, Bangkok, Thailand 9/2008. 
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The above discussion demonstrates that the frameworks put in place by the WTO and 
by the CA model can lend significant support to the quest for external accountability.  It 
is also clear that these frameworks play a crucial role in mitigating the external 
accountability gaps between the EU and Thailand that would otherwise exist.671  
Nevertheless, it is also important that the benefits secured by Thai government entities 
and representatives in these frameworks are passed on to those entities most affected in 
Thailand – that is to the producers and exporters in the relevant food industries. 
 
It is clear that when Thai staff succeed in persuading the EU to change its SPS measures 
it is Thai producers and exporters who will ultimately benefit.  This is because they will 
be subjected to less-restrictive measures and be able to supply more produce to the EU 
market.  However, the pathways for transferring the benefits obtained from 
transparency, participation and reasoned decisions are not always clear.  It has been 
suggested that these benefits will be transferred through “public-private” network 
activities involving both the Thai CA and producers and exporters in the relevant food 
industries.  These activities include exporters’ meetings, training courses and workshops 
that take place at regular intervals.  However, it has also emerged that small producers 
in rural areas have been unable to participate fully  in these network activities, which are 
generally held in Bangkok- the capital city, due to financial and time constraints.  
Although to some extent the information received by government entities can be 
communicated to small producers by local CA staff, or in the case of Thai poultry 
through on-site DLD staff, there can be a long delay in such information reaching small 
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 However, some of the various fora, mechanisms and sanctions have been used more frequently and 
successfully than others.   
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producers in rural areas.  Consequently it is also crucial for Thai governmental entities 
to ensure that the benefits obtained as a result of participation in accountability 
enhancing fora are shared with all producers and exporters.  In addition, this could also 
be a factor that has contributed to the “internal” short-term compliance problem which 
was raised earlier in Chapter 3.672   It is clear that Thailand also needs to strengthen and 
expand its own hybrid network activities further to ensure that the particular needs of 
small producers are addressed.  This can be done, for example, by introducing local 
export helpdesks for small producers, or by conducting exporters’ meetings and training 
events in some of the more remote rural areas. 
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 Supra, Section 3.5.  
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CHAPTER 6:  
PRIVATE STANDARDS AND EXTERNAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY:  A CRITIQUE AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A WAY FORWARD 
 
The previous chapter examined how the external accountability of the EU in relation to 
Thailand has been enhanced through WTO and the competent authority (CA) model.  
The focus of this chapter is to investigate whether similar accountability frameworks are 
in place in relation to bodies adopting private standards.   
 
The significance of private standards as an element of EU food safety law for Thailand 
cannot be overestimated.  As seen from the two case studies in Chapter 3, recent years 
have seen a crucial change in the regulatory landscape for Thai food exports to the 
EU.673  In addition to EU food safety law being enforced through the CA model, there is 
increasing regulation by private bodies as supermarkets in the EU have started to 
request that Thai producers and exporters comply with, and be certified in accordance 
with, various private standards.  Private regulation is initiated by EU supermarkets, 
especially those in Western Europe, who require their suppliers to be certified as part of 
their contractual obligations.  As illustrated by the baby corn and poultry case studies, as 
well as by interviews with exporters to the EU market in other food sectors,674 most EU 
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 See infra, Section 3.2.4 and 3.3.4. 
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 Further interviews were conducted on the impact of private standards on Thai producers and exporters 
in other food sectors.  I joined the field trip organised by the Post Harvest Institution of Chiangmai 
University on capacity building by pomelo producers in Wiang Gaen district, Chiang Rai province, who 
are supplying their produce to EU supermarkets for the first time.  They had to undergo changes in their 
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importers require compliance with various private standards.  Compliance with private 
standards is required so often that it may reasonably be asserted that private standards 
now effectively constitute another layer of transnational food safety regulation for Thai 
exports to the EU.  Official EU regulation and private standards apply cumulatively and 
not as alternatives.  While EU food safety regulation and private standards often cover 
similar issues, evidence from the case studies shows that private standards are 
frequently stricter and more detailed in the requirements they impose.  So pronounced is 
this shift in favour of private standards that further detailed analysis of stakeholders’ 
experience is required.  
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows.  Firstly it will identify the external effects of 
private standard regulation in Thailand, including the benefits of private standards for 
Thai stakeholders and the burdens that they impose.  It will argue that these standards 
impose substantial additional financial costs and are often rigid, impractical and ill-
suited to local conditions.  The concerns expressed by Thai stakeholders during the case 
study interviews will also be noted, and in particular where they raise procedural issues.   
 
The chapter will then turn to consider the external accountability dimension of private 
standards, examining critically the operational practices of standard-setting bodies from 
the perspective of Global Administrative Law (GAL).  Whilst it is acknowledged that 
                                                                                                                                                                          
farm practices in order to comply with the private standards (Rakpong J., personal and group interviews 
carried out during the field trip between 30/6/2008 and 2/7/2008).  In a separate interview with a small 
exporter who supplies a variety of tropical fruit to various supermarkets in the Netherlands, it became 
clear that suppliers have to comply with GlobalGAP as well as the supermarkets’ own standards 
(Rakpong J., telephone interview with the owner of Excelfruit, 8/9/2008).  Similarly, Thai shrimp 
producers have to comply with the specific standards demanded by EU supermarkets (Rakpong J., 
personal interview with Mr. Suniti Ajarawong at his shrimp farm in Sam Roi Yod district, Prachuab Khiri 
Khan province and the leader of the fisheries co-operative at the same location (30-31/7/2008). 
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there is wide variation in the behaviour of different standard-setting bodies, it is argued 
that many, if not all, of these bodies fall short in ensuring that they are externally 
accountable to Thai stakeholders when assessed by the substantive and procedural 
criteria endorsed by GAL.  
 
This chapter will conclude by looking forwards rather than backwards,675 and by 
examining possible avenues for reform.  It will begin by assessing the possibilities 
inherent in the WTO framework.  It will argue that despite the inherent shortcomings in 
this framework, it seems clear that the EU currently fails to fulfil its WTO imposed 
obligation to supervise the activities of the bodies that set private standards.  A recent 
innovation in the UK approach to the control of private standard-setting will be assessed 
and discussed in the context of considering what steps the EU could take to mitigate the 
external accountability gaps which exist in relation to private standards and to comply 
with its WTO obligations.  
 
6.1 EXTERNAL EFFECTS OF PRIVATE STANDARDS IN 
THAILAND  
 
6.1.1 Benefits of Private Standards   
 
In both case studies, Thai exporters accepted that compliance with private standards 
brings them some benefits.  Firstly, the good agricultural practices (GAP) demanded by 
                                                           
675
 In both case studies, regulation by private standards runs alongside governmental regulation under the 
CA model. It has been over a decade since private standards were first introduced by EU supermarkets as 
contractual obligations for Thai exporters.  It would be futile to attempt to revoke the system at this stage 
by simply boycotting private standards altogether. 
  
278
private standards can create positive spill-over effects and better working conditions for 
agricultural workers.  GAP limits the use of chemical and improves worker safety by 
requiring better equipment and training in the field of health and safety.  Improvements 
of this kind would not have been made so quickly in Thailand without the requirements 
imposed by private standards.676 
 
Secondly, private standards can serve to clarify the substance of EU food safety 
regulations, especially those not subject to detailed explication by DG-SANCO or the 
Thai CAs.  Whilst it will often be the case that private standards go beyond what is 
required by EU law, compliance with them serves to reassure Thai producers and 
exporters that they are acting in accordance with EU law.  In certain cases the detailed 
rules laid out in private standards can serve as guidelines to clarify existing EU food 
safety regulations, which themselves are sometimes vaguely written and contain 
“unfamiliar terminologies”.  This was evident from both case studies in relation to the 
introduction of HACCP, 677 where certain Thai exporters were initially unsure about the 
nature of the ‘critical control points’ to be put in place in their establishments.  
Exporters were able to follow amendments to the HACCP regime put in place by 
private standard-setting bodies such as GlobalGAP, BRC and IFS, and to use these as a 
benchmark to establish the critical control points required.  The precision of private 
standards is considered valuable by those poultry exporters involved in large-scale 
                                                           
676
 This was very much the situation in the case of organic baby corn producers in Mae Ta District, where 
Soil Association and GlobalGAP standards were considered as tools to improve their health and safety. 
Another example can be given in relation to small farmers of pomelo in Chiang Rai, as presented in the 
study on Integrated Supply Chain Management of Exotic Fruits from the ASEAN Region conducted by 
the Post-harvest Institution, Department of Agriculture, Chiangmai University, in which I have had 
during July 2008 an opportunity to interview the farmers subscribing to the project in Wiang-gan District, 
Chiangrai Province, Thailand. 
677
 Regulation EC/852/2004.  
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integrated production.  Due to the size of their operations, producers need to plan 
months in advance for updating infrastructure and training additional staff.  By the time 
that governmental guidelines or recommendations are released there is often insufficient 
time for their implementation.  However, the detailed and precise instructions laid out in 
private standards allow the poultry exporters to begin updating their operations without 
having to wait for the release of official guidance. 
 
Another benefit perceived by poultry exporters is that private standards serve as a 
quality guarantee and, together with the governmental measure put in place by the 
CA,678 are believed to have helped Thai poultry exporters regain the trust of EU 
importers following the emergence of food safety incidents, particularly the highly-
publicised Avian Influenza crisis.  Thai producers were among the first in a developing 
country significantly affected by Avian Influenza to regain their status as leading 
suppliers to the EU market.679 
 
6.1.2 How the Financial Burdens on Producers and Exporters are Aggravated by 
the Proliferation of Standards 
 
Despite their benefits, private standards have imposed additional production costs on 
Thai producers and exporters.  Producers and exporters have realised that these costs 
must be absorbed in order to export to the EU.  However, the proliferation of private 
standards has led to a considerable and unnecessary increase in production costs.  EU 
                                                           
678
 See supra, Chapter 3 Part II. 
679
 It should be noted that these have to be done through product diversification from raw to processed 
meat. 
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supermarkets normally require Thai producers and exporters to comply with not just 
one but with multiple standards.680  As Thai producers and exporters may supply many 
EU supermarkets, and with each supermarket imposing its own specific requirements, 
compliance with the resulting plethora of standards has increased costs significantly. 
 
The impact of this increased financial burden is most acute for small and medium-sized 
producers/exporters.  For each private standard with which producers and exporters 
need to comply, extra funding for certification and renewal costs has to be set aside.  
Furthermore, there are also the costs of compliance involved in upgrading or replacing 
facilities, training workers, improving working conditions and so on.681  Beyond this, 
there are also inspection and verification fees to be paid to each certifying body and to 
their inspectors, as well as the costs of each inspector’s visit which includes their fee, 
accommodation and transportation.   
 
These costs are especially onerous for small and medium-sized producers, not only 
because they can be high, but also because they are not simply “one-off” but are 
ongoing.  This flows from the fact that certification is granted for a limited time, usually 
for a period of one year, at which point renewal will have to be paid for and sought.  
Furthermore, additional costs are incurred since it is also common for standards to be 
updated every few years due to the continuous development of “improved” versions for 
each private standard.  For example, at the time of the interviews with baby corn 
                                                           
680
 Arguably, this is not the least trade-restrictive means, since there is no recognition of measures which 
have already been approved and certified by other certification schemes.  
681
 A specific example has been given in the case of baby corn where producers have to regularly apply 
for the certification with the updated version of GlobalGAP.  Some of them are not able to update fast 
enough to be certified with the most recent version. 
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producers and exporters the GlobalGAP standard progressed to Version 3 despite 
certain exporters having just achieved Version 2.682  Each time a standard is revised 
facilities need to be updated and staff need to be trained so as to “catch-up” with the 
requirements of the new version.   
 
Moreover, there is sometimes a duplication in the requirements imposed by different 
standards, yet compliance needs to be certified individually.  For example, HACCP and 
traceability are basic requirements that are incorporated into most private standards.  
Nonetheless, full compliance with HACCP, traceability and other basic food safety 
criteria still has to be tested and approved for each and every certification requested, 
regardless of whether compliance has already been certified by the Thai CA683 or under 
another private certification scheme.  It has been highlighted that this duplication 
exacerbates the financial burden associated with private standards because it leads to an 
unnecessary increase in production costs without a concomitant increase in producers’ 
income.684   
 
To mitigate this duplication there have been some initiatives by standard-setting bodies 
to benchmark different standards schemes.  However, this benchmarking has been 
                                                           
682
 GlobalGAP and BRC, which are essential respectively for fresh and chilled baby corn and poultry 
products supplied to EU supermarkets, are now at Versions 4 and 5 respectively. GlobalGAP used to be 
updated every 3 years.  This frequency of updates led to producer complaints that it does not allow 
sufficient time for producers to adjust to a new system and then prepare for additional upgrades. 
Following GlobalGAP Version 4, the standard-setting body has pledged that from now on upgraded 
versions will be only introduced every 4 years.   
683
 Likewise, Thai governmental bodies do not accept that private standards, even where they incorporate 
more exacting requirements than their own, can be recognised as satisfying the more lenient requirements 
under governmental schemes.   
684
 Usually the inspector’s fee is set as a daily rate.  
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conducted only for a limited number of universal standards685 and is not yet widespread.  
Past initiatives to benchmark in this way will be discussed in Section 6.2.1 below.  
 
Furthermore, the proliferation in different supermarkets’ private standards causes 
business uncertainty since producers and exporters find it difficult to anticipate the 
additional costs associated with compliance.  Given this uncertainty, and the high 
compliance and certification costs, it is often necessary for small producers to seek 
financial assistance.  While this kind of assistance is sometimes available in Thailand, it 
is by no means commonplace.  In most cases small producers need to obtain assistance 
from the Thai government or from non-profit entities.  For example, the group of small 
baby corn producers interviewed in the case study was able to achieve compliance with 
SA and GlobalGAP standards as a result of assistance from the Thai cooperative 
organisation called “Green-Net Foundation”.686  The foundation aims to promote 
sustainable and organic agriculture and has assisted producers in obtaining low-interest 
loans through the local “Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives” (BAAC).  
Others producers were required to obtain loans from commercial banks and were 
consequently discouraged from supplying the EU market due to on-going and high 
production costs as a result of private standards.   
 
                                                           
685
 For example, where the benchmarking between BRC, IFS, SQF and Dutch HACCP has been 
recognised, and also GlobalGAP option 3.  
686
 Or “Saiyai Pandin” in Thai. Rakpong, J. personal interviews with the head of Mae Ta co-operative 
administrative staff, Mae-on sub district, and telephone interview with Greennet foundation, 5/01/2010. 
For further information see : http://www.greennet.or.th/e0000.htm. 
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For small and medium-sized baby corn exporters687 the financial burden brought about 
by having to comply with a number of private standards are relatively more significant 
and represent a large proportion of their production costs.  For example, in relation the 
baby corn producers in Mae-Ta, Chiangmai, it was stated that certification fees for two 
private standards that they needed to comply with and associated costs (such as 
payments for inspectors’ accommodation and transportation) accounted for about 7 
percent of their annual production costs.  This does not include the costs of ensuring 
compliance with these standards.688  Consequently the majority can only afford to 
maintain GlobalGAP certification, as opposed to certification with other private 
standards.  They consider the cost of obtaining GlobalGAP certification to be 
“commercially tolerable” as it is recognised by many supermarkets throughout the 
EU.689  However, they cannot afford to have certification with other private standards in 
place.  It is only when the possibility of winning a contract with a particular EU 
importer emerges, or when specifically requested by their EU business counterparts, 
that these firms will apply for additional certification.  It has been emphasised that the 
difficulty and complexity of complying with various private standards has led some 
exporters to limit the number of EU “customers” supplied, and has led to some being 
deterred from supplying certain supermarkets.690  In some cases the increased financial 
burden brought about by the proliferation of standards has played a significant part in 
forcing small exporters out of business, or in them having to change their crop 
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 Such as P. Prime or Chatchawan Farms. 
688
 It was considered that such compliance costs are difficult to estimate.  Source: Rakpong, J. personal 
interviews with the head of Mae Ta cooperative administrative staff, Mae-on sub district (January 2010). 
689
 Personal interviews with the owner of P. Prime (Mr. Pratom Tankum) and Chatchawan Farm, (Mr. 
Suppakit Rattanasirimontri), Nakornpratom, Thailand 09-10/07/2008. 
690
 Here, the exporters asked to be anonymous.  The interview was conducted in Bangkok during July 
2008. 
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production or having to re-direct sales to the domestic market or to that of neighbouring 
countries.691 
 
The financial burden brought about by the proliferation of private standards is less 
onerous for large exporters who appear to be able and willing to absorb additional costs 
through their economies of scale and to treat these costs as being necessary long-term 
investments to secure large contracts with EU supermarkets.692  The fact that they may 
have to comply with different standards does not deter them since, proportionately, this 
adds little by way of unit-costs given their high production volumes.  In essence they 
are willing to comply so long as they are still able to absorb any increase in production 
costs and to maintain their market share.   
 
For example, the  “big three” Thai baby corn exporting companies, namely KC-Fresh, 
Swift and River Kwai, have always maintained valid and up-to-date certification under 
GlobalGAP, along with certification in relation to a number of other private standards 
frequently requested by EU supermarkets.  Similarly, with their economies of scale, 
poultry exporters, most of which are large-scale, integrated firms, are able to afford 
certification with all of those private standards that could conceivably be requested by 
                                                           
691
 This is because any improvement in prospects resulting from meeting various private standards can be 
very short-term.  In an interview held on 23/06/2008 in Chiang Mai province, Thailand with the owner of 
Lanna Frozen Food, a baby corn broker who had previously supplied her products to a number of EU 
supermarkets , she stated that following the increasing demands of private standards and particularly, with 
standard proliferation, her company switched to supplying products to domestic and other foreign markets 
including Russia, Malaysia and several in the Middle East where private standards (at the time of the 
interview) were not a common condition for market access. 
692
 For example, large exporters in both industries presented in the case studies did express their opinions 
during the interviews that they could accept various EU supermarkets’ requests for private standards as 
being a “licence to enter the EU market place”.  
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EU importers including BRC, IFS and ACP as well as with the supermarkets’ own 
standards.  
 
Despite their different experiences, producers of all sizes clearly expressed the view that 
private standards have become a “common” condition for EU market access alongside 
governmental regulations operated under the CA model.  In fact, the introduction of 
private standards by EU supermarket importers has become so commonplace that these 
standards have become “the rules of the game” and no longer operate to confer a 
distinctive competitive advantage on Thai exporters as against other exporters.693  
However, a majority of the producers and exporters interviewed did not consider the 
continuing proliferation of private standards to be a healthy development for the Thai 
agricultural industry.  During the interviews a number of producers and exporters 
expressed the view that instant recognition, by way of benchmarking or mutual 
recognition between different standards, would be a welcome development and would 
especially help small producers and exporters to stay in the business of supplying food 
exports to the EU.  
 
6.1.3 Impractical Burdens  
 
In addition to the financial burden, Thai producers and exporters to the EU often 
encounter impractical burdens associated with private standards.  Yet there are few, if 
                                                           
693
 Reference: interviews with various exporters 2008 (Rakpong J, personal interview held during meeting 
with the Thai Broiler Processing Exporters Association, Bangkok, Thailand 7/08/2008, personal interview 
held during meeting with staff from GFPT, Bangkok, Thailand 7/08/2008, personal interview held during 
meeting with Mr. Nathsak Pattanachaikul (Chief Operating Officer of Sahafarm) and Mr. Kasem 
Trakoonlerswilai (Deputy director Sahafarm building, Bangkok, Thailand, 2/9/2008. 
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any, ways in which producers can communicate with the private standard bodies located 
in the EU to negotiate alternative equivalent measures that could be easier, cheaper or 
more practical to apply in Thailand. 
 
Below are important observations spelling out of the kinds of impractical burdens 
experienced by Thai producers and exporters in complying with EU private standards.  
These were highlighted by producers and exporters during a number of interviews. 
 
6.1.3.1 The Content of Private Standards: Extends to Cover Other Legitimate 
Concerns  
 
In both case studies, the private standards imposed by EU supermarkets on Thai food 
exports encompassed both traditional food safety concerns and ‘other legitimate 
concerns’ unrelated directly to food safety.694   These included environmental matters, 
wildlife protection and worker welfare.  The regulatory scope of private standards has 
expanded beyond that of the CA model and has made many ‘other legitimate concerns’ 
unrelated directly to food safety, also conditions for EU market access. 
 
                                                           
694
 As previously discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5), the term ‘other legitimate concerns’ in the area of 
food safety have been categorised into two types: (i) those with a strong link to food safety (such as 
animal welfare) which are encompassed within the scope of the EU food safety framework, and (ii) those 
traditionally unrelated to food safety (including environmental protection and worker welfare as cited 
above). In this Section, the term ‘other legitimate concerns’ is used to refer to the second type of 
legitimate concerns.  It should be noted that to some extent the lines between food safety and non-food 
safety issues are blurred.  For example, it can be argued that regulation of GMOs covers environmental 
issues to protect native plant and animal species and prevent them from being exposed to GMO mutation.  
Conversely it can be argued that GMO regulation concerns food safety since their long-term public health 
effects have yet to be scientifically identified.  
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The balance of regulation between food safety and ‘other legitimate concerns’ contained 
in each standard will vary depending on the actual product and the objectives of each 
standard. 
 
6.1.3.2 Private Standards Impose Requirements that are Stricter and More 
Detailed than Official EU Regulation   
 
Private standards often impose requirements that are defined in a way that is highly 
prescriptive.  With regard to food safety aspects, the regulatory scope of private 
standards often overlaps with EU standards enforced under the CA model.  However, 
the private standards are often stricter and more specific than those laid down by the 
EU.  For example, in the poultry and baby corn case studies, both the EU and private 
standards pursue a management-based approach based upon the concepts of HACCP 
and traceability.  Nonetheless, the requirements imposed by private standards are more 
detailed.  With regard to HACCP requirements for example, GlobalGAP specifies not 
only the exact critical control point (CCP), but also the strict and detailed practices that 
need to be performed at each CCP.  For instance, in the product handling of vegetables 
as applied to baby corn producers, detailed specifications have been laid down as to 
how the personal hygiene of workers can be assured.  These include specific provisions 
for workers’ lockers and changing rooms, designated areas for washing hands, for 
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smoking, eating and drinking, the strict admittance of visitors to the working areas, and 
so on.695   
 
As to ‘other legitimate concerns’, the detailed specifications in private standards are 
even more apparent.  For example, environmental protection is heavily regulated under 
GlobalGAP.  In order to obtain GlobalGAP certification, baby corn producers must 
submit documentation relating to sustainable farming practices which in turn includes 
information about soil management and site-history management.  There are also 
detailed “minor-must” provisions,696 on waste and pollution management, including 
submission of a re-cycling and re-use plan and provisions of separate areas for 
recyclable and dangerous products.  Moreover there are provisions on environmental 
conservation including the establishment of wildlife conservation plans.697  Worker 
welfare has also been comprehensively addressed as part of these “minor must” 
requirements, whereby farmers and exporters have to demonstrate that the specified 
requirements on workers’ health and welfare have been followed.  These include the 
training of workers on hygiene practices, the handling of chemical substances, provision 
of first aid and training on the appropriate use of first aid equipment, and the provision 
of rest areas for workers.     
 
Specific requirements on similar issues are also included in supermarkets’ own 
standards. Tesco’s Nature’s Choice, which applies to some baby corn and poultry 
exporters, contains specific regulatory sections on pollution prevention, including the 
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 Source: GlobalGAP checklist for fruits and vegetables (version 3).  
696
 See supra, Chapter 2 Section 2.5.3.1 of which 95 percent have to be complied with.   
697
 Source: Control Point and Compliance Criteria Integrated Farm Assurance of GlobalGAP. 
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prevention of pesticide discharges into groundwater coastal and inland waterways, the 
control plans for odours and greenhouse gases emissions, controls of light and noise 
emissions.  Similar to GlobalGAP, there are requirements addressing wildlife and 
landscape conservation698 and the maintenance of the existing local landscapes, 
footpaths, bridleways or any features or buildings of historical importance.  Detailed 
requirements on environmental protection, recycling and energy conservation have also 
to be followed by Tesco’s suppliers.  These include demands that their energy plan must 
be independently audited and that their water supply must come from a permitted source 
and be used within the permitted quantities, and that their fertilizer usage must be in 
accordance with Tesco’s policies.   
 
6.1.3.3 Private Standards: Problems of Rigidity in Application  
 
As explained earlier in 6.1.1, specific rules on food safety in private standards bring, to 
some extent, benefits to producers and exporters in Thailand.  These can serve to 
interpret EU law or to demonstrate compliance with it.  However, there is widespread 
concern among Thai producers and exporters regarding the detailed nature of the 
manner in which private standards regulate ‘other legitimate concerns’.  They expressed 
concern about rigidity and inflexibility in the application of private standards and 
observed that they appear to have adopted “western practices” without taking local 
conditions in Thailand into consideration.  Whilst Thai producers and exporters 
appreciate the need for including ‘other legitimate concerns’ in private standards, they 
pointed out that the adoption of such rigid requirements will not necessarily bring about 
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 Including a written integrated management plan to protect and encourage diversity of wildlife with 
periodic evaluation for the protection of existing habitats. 
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the intended results.699  In addition, these rigid requirements do not allow for the 
substitution of cheaper local alternatives potentially able to deliver the same, or better, 
results.  
 
By way of example, a GlobalGAP farm requirement to enhance workers’ welfare insists 
on the need to provide a separate rest area for workers within the agricultural site so that 
they can have an appropriate “lunch-break”. 700  In practice, the rest areas are rarely 
used by the local workers as they prefer to take their lunch break at home or in local 
food stalls. 701  With regard to another standard (SA) requirement whereby a wildlife 
buffer zone must be in place, these are respected and complied with by the farmers in 
order to obtain certification.  However, it was pointed out in a group interview that these 
buffer zones are not generally used by local wildlife.702   Nonetheless, in some of the 
baby corn producers’ views, this adds little to local wildlife protection where the 
diversity of local wildlife exists in forests rather than on the farm sites.  They observed 
that rural farm cultivation in Thailand does not have the same adverse impact on 
wildlife species as intensive farms in Europe.703   Here, local baby corn farmers 
observed that it would have been more useful if, for example, the certification 
recognised existing local conservation plans that are conducted collectively amongst 
different producers so as to conserve local wildlife and the environment.  In respect of 
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 Consequently this raises the question of means-end rationality, an issue which I will return to in 
Section 6.3.5 below.   
700
 This is considered to be a “minor-must requirement”.  
701
 Although this is complied with by Thai producers under the certification scheme.  
702
 It has been observed that the requirement for wildlife buffer zones around a plantation has been taken 
from European wildlife protection practice where many important and sometimes endangered species 
remain on farms.  However, it has been claimed by Thai producers that most of the local endangered 
wildlife reside in nearby forests where there is a more comprehensive conservation plan under their 
community forestry project. (Rakpong J., group interview with baby corn farmers, Mae Ta, Mae-On sub-
district Chiangmai 27/07/2008). 
703
 Local farmers wish to remain anonymous in this example.  
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baby corn plantations in the case studies, the local community has already been actively 
involved in community forestry management projects and they consider this to be more 
effective in protecting local wildlife.  However, this local scheme is not recognised by 
the private standard.  Instead, they have to draw up a new and less relevant wildlife 
protection plan at their farms in order to pass the standard’s assessment.   
 
Additional concerns was also raised during the interviews regarding the organic 
standards of the Soil Association (SA) which prohibit post-harvest burning, considering 
it to produce excessive CO2 which can contribute to global warming and thus damage 
the environment.   Local producers claim that post-harvest burning in Thailand is a 
controlled process, that it helps release essential nutrients back into the soil and 
provides more benefits than disadvantages.  
 
In another example, EU supermarkets request Thai exporters to obtain certification 
services from a specific EU-based auditing firm despite the availability of suitably 
qualified and cheaper local auditors.  To attain Tesco’s Nature Choice standard only one 
company, UK-based CMI, is authorised as a certifying body and no alternative local 
certifying bodies may be entrusted with the certification tasks.  In addition, Thai baby 
corn producers are sometimes requested by EU supermarkets to obtain GlobalGAP 
certification from EU-based auditing companies, such as SGS, which is based in 
Geneva thereby saddling the producers and exporters with higher fees and costs than 
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would result from using domestic Thai certifying bodies.704  This is surprising given 
that the capabilities and qualifications of SGS have been subject to detailed scrutiny, 
and it was suspended as a recognised auditor for three months from September 2009 
under the UN Clean Development Mechanism.  It was criticised on the basis that its on-
the-spot inspections “raised concerns regarding the quality of its verification work”.705  
Although this suspension occurred under a different auditing scheme, it does raise 
questions about the reliability of the preferred EU-based auditors and about the 
assumption that they will provide superior services.  
 
6.1.3.4 The Role of Private Standards in Ensuring Compliance with EU Law  
 
It can be argued the EU is using private standards as well as the CAs in Thailand to 
enforce some of its own food safety law.  Post-BSE, many EU regulations have 
encouraged the imposition of private standards on overseas suppliers.  This is because 
they place direct responsibility on EU food business operators to ascertain that 
“reasonable steps” have been taken to ensure that EU food imports comply with EU 
food safety regulation.706 
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 They have to pay the certification fee and other associated fees including transportation and 
accommodation costs.  In the exporter interviews, for a six month contract with a Dutch supermarket, the 
owner of a medium-sized exporting baby corn company was requested to obtain the GlobalGAP standard 
through an auditing company called SGS despite his company having already obtained GlobalGAP 
certification with a Thai auditing company and despite this still being valid in respect of the relevant 
delivery time.  With regards to this incident, the exporters wished to remain anonymous. The interview 
was conducted in July 2008 in Bangkok, Thailand.   
705
 An example is SGS’s certifying work on auditing and certifying “Clean Development Mechanism” 
(CDM) projects under the UN carbon-offsetting scheme. It was suspended for 3 months from September 
2009 because the on-the-spot inspections by the CDM executive board revealed that there were six 
inconsistencies in information submitted by SGS-approved projects. 
706
 There are also other reasons, for example the need to protect their reputation.  Further studies are 
needed to try to understand better the supermarkets’ intents. This is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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For example the EU “General Food Law”, Regulation EC/178/2002, imposes direct 
responsibility on food business operators to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the 
food products they supply are safe.  Under Article 17(1) of Regulation EC/178/2002 
“food and feed business operators…shall ensure that foods or feeds satisfy the 
requirements of food law… and shall verify that such requirements are met”.  Further, 
under Article 19 if a food business operator considers, or has reason to believe, that 
food which it has imported, produced, processed, manufactured or distributed is not in 
compliance with food safety requirements it shall immediately initiate procedures to 
withdraw the food in question from the market, to inform consumers of the reason for 
its withdrawal and, if necessary, recall the product from consumers.  In addition, 
national law generally provides an importer’s defence of due diligence in cases of 
breaches of food safety concerning imports.707    For example, the UK Food Safety Act 
provides a defence of due diligence for food businesses’ breaches (Section 21, Food 
Safety Act 1990 C. 16) and Irish legislation has similar provisions under the Irish 
adoption of the European Communities (General Food Law) Regulation 2007, S.I. No. 
747/2007- Section 5 (3).   
 
Due to their direct liabilities in having to take reasonable steps under this regulation, 
and the fact that in doing so there is a due diligence defence, EU supermarkets are 
proactive in ensuring that “reasonable steps” have been taken to ensure their imports 
comply with relevant EU food safety law.  This is especially important as they may not 
have direct control over their suppliers or may be uncertain about the exporting 
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 Here, they can attempt to demonstrate that reasonable steps have been taken by them to conduct due 
diligence before importation. 
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country’s domestic regulations.  One way to overcome this quality control problem is of 
course to rely on private standards as due diligence, demanding that suppliers comply 
with food safety measures that exceed requirements under EU food safety law.  In this 
way EU law is effectively enforced in relation to overseas suppliers through the 
imposition of private standards.   
 
6.1.4 Governance Problems: Concerns over Lack of Transparency, Participation 
and Opportunity to Appeal/Review 
 
In addition to the financial and operational burdens arising from the need to comply 
with private standards, producers and exporters in the case studies expressed numerous 
concerns about the process of adopting and implementing private standards.  Their 
concerns may be divided into four parts: 
• notification of revisions, 
•  transition periods, 
•  participation, and 
•  contestation. 
 
6.1.4.1 Lack of Adequate Notification of Revisions to Standards  
 
In a number of interviews, one of the most serious concerns expressed by Thai 
producers and exporters was the lack of notification from standard-setting bodies about 
potential or actual revisions/changes made or about to be made to existing standards.  
Actual or potential amendments to existing standards are frequently not notified to the 
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producers and exporters until the standards enter into force and when compliance is 
required.  Furthermore, when producers and exporters are notified, the revisions 
introduced can be difficult to understand.  
 
An example of this problem can be drawn from the baby corn case study when the Soil 
Association (SA) made a proposal for a major change in its standards for organic 
produced in 2007.708  According to the contemplated change, all air freighted products 
would no longer qualify as ‘organic’ under its scheme unless the producers of the 
product could demonstrate that they had sufficiently mitigated their “Carbon Footprint”.  
The discussion within the SA has now been closed and on this occasion the SA backed 
down.  However, small producers in Thailand were not notified about this potential 
change.  They expressed concerns about this and stated that had the proposal been 
communicated to them, they would have attempted to put forward relevant information 
and support for their position.  
 
Meanwhile, although major producers and exporters of baby corn knew about this 
potential change, many of them did not fully understand its implications.  They said that 
the issues arising were complex and involved highly technical issues.  While the large 
producers and exporters knew these issues were being discussed, they did not know 
how to set about seeking clarification of them.  
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 The discussion can be found at:.  
http://www.soilassociation.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=%2Bsuqx5aaMko%3D&tabid=234 
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It is interesting to observe that while these matters were actively debated in several SA 
meetings in the EU, no attempt was ever made to notify, explain or clarify these 
complex issues to the organic baby corn producers in Thailand.   
 
6.1.4.2 Lack of an Adequate Transition Period Pending the Entry into Force of 
New Standards  
 
A closely related issue often raised by Thai producers and exporters is the rapidity with 
which new or amended standards enter into effect.  It is frequently the case that 
revisions to private standards are not communicated to them in a timely manner before 
the standards come into force.  This occurred in the poultry case study when poultry 
exporters were required to respond quickly to an urgent request from EU importers to 
implement Freedom Food, a demanding animal welfare standard.  In similar 
circumstances, as noted previously, the baby corn producers were required to react 
quickly to changes brought about by GlobalGAP Version 3, whilst many smaller 
producers were still struggling to deal with Version 2.    
 
In these cases inadequate transitional periods were allowed for Thai producers and 
exporters to take those steps necessary to comply with the changes.  The producers and 
exporters require adequate time to familiarise themselves with the new criteria – to fully 
appreciate and understand the changes, to update their facilities and train their staff 
before new or amended standards can fully take effect.  When there is an inadequate 
transition period, there can be gaps in certification, leading to a situation in which Thai 
exports are excluded from EU supermarkets for a number of weeks or months.  In such 
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cases producers sometimes have to divert their produce to the domestic market or to 
alternative export markets. 
 
6.1.4.3 Lack of Opportunities for Participation in the Standard-setting Process 
 
Given that the application of private standards raise both financial and practical 
problems for Thai producers and exporters, it is interesting to note that there is no 
permanent or appropriate channel of communication for Thai producers and exporters to 
contact the standard-setting bodies in the EU to voice their concerns, provide 
explanations or challenge impractical requirements. 
 
Thai producers and exporters are concerned about their exclusion from the process 
leading to the adoption of private standards.  For example, in the SA’s proposal to 
revise the conditions for organic produce discussed previously, some farmers from 
developing countries, including Kenya and Nigeria, were informed and consulted.  
However, Thai organic baby corn farmers and exporters certified by the SA were not 
consulted about this potential change at any time during the 18-month long 
discussion.709 
 
Producers and exporters were deeply concerned about the absence of opportunities for 
them to be heard in the process of adopting or revising standards.  They felt that the 
main problem was a lack of communication.  There was a feeling that had better 
channels of communication existed, it would have been possible to mitigate the 
                                                           
709
 Another example concerns participation in GlobalGAP.  GlobalGAP is known to have a small African 
Farmers Working Group whereby representatives of small holders from a number of specific countries in 
Africa are invited to give their views during meetings. No similar arrangement is in place in Thailand.  
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practical and financial problems arising from the rigid application of private standards 
in Thailand.   
 
6.1.4.4 Absence of Opportunities to Challenge or Contest Existing Standards 
 
Because of the lack of communication channels, producers and exporters in the case 
studies often found themselves lacking opportunities to lodge complaints or challenge 
the content of recently adopted standards.  In addition, Thai producers and exporters 
expressed their concerns regarding the absence of adequate opportunities to challenge 
refusals to certify particular operators as being in compliance with the standards in 
question.  Although some standards allow producers and exporters to undergo re-
examination,710 in practice producers and exporters are deterred from doing so because 
the re-examination process can be complicated and expensive.  This is particularly so 
for small producers since the process of finding technical evidence to challenge a 
refusal is often beyond their means.  Moreover, the re-inspection processes impose 
substantial costs on small producers in that they will incur re-inspection fees in addition 
to the costs for inspectors’ transportation and accommodation.   
 
With the plethora of financial and operational problems brought about by rigid 
specifications, lack of transparency, insufficient transitional periods and an absence of 
opportunities for  participation and contestation in the standard-setting processes, Thai 
producers and exporters have little choice but to endeavour to comply with the EU 
importers’ demands for fear of suspension or revocation of their certification.  When 
                                                           
710
 For example, Tesco’s Nature’s Choice allows for a petition to the decision made by CMi, the sole 
certifying body. This has to be made within 21 days (infra Section 6.2.1). 
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suspension does occur it results in significant disruption to their trade and they risk 
losing existing EU market-share in view of strong competition from other producers at 
home and abroad.   
 
6.2 EXTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY OBLIGATIONS FOR 
PRIVATE STANDARD-SETTING BODIES 
 
The sections that follow will turn to exploring the mechanisms and processes in place to 
mitigate the negative external effects of private standards that have been highlighted by 
Thai producers and exporters.  A comparison of private standard-setting schemes with 
those run by the EU shows that they fall significantly short of ensuring external 
accountability in relation to significantly affected Thai entities.  Although the current 
CA model between EU and Thailand is not perfect, and further improvements are 
required to incorporate smallholders’ special needs, at least substantial external 
accountability-enhancing fora and mechanisms exist, both in WTO law and within the 
CA model framework itself as demonstrated in Chapter 5.  It is in light of this that the 
absence of similar accountability-enhancing fora and mechanisms in relation to private 
standards emerges as an issue for concern.711  As seen in the two case studies presented 
earlier in this work,712 private regulators take decisions that are capable of creating spill-
                                                           
711
 The pressing need for enhancing private standards’ accountability has also recently been put forwards 
by Hachez and Wouters (2011), who base their justification on a notion of “public”, rather than “external 
accountability”.  The term “public” used by them refers to “stakeholders” or those who are “affected” or 
“regulated” by private standards, including “consumers, producers, commercial intermediates, retailing 
groups” (Ibid, p.689). By and large, their notion of “public” incorporates the same group of “significantly 
affected entities” used here.  However, their “accountability” concept is narrower, merely incorporates 
“transparency”, “participation” and “reason-giving decision” criteria but not the other two criteria of 
GAL. (Ibid, p.692-695)   
712
 See supra Section 3.2.4 and 3.3.4.  
  
300
over effects in Thailand.  These effects often impose significant burdens upon Thai 
producers and exporters.  However, there is little in the world of private standard-setting 
that operates to give effect to GAL.713   
 
The absence of external accountability mechanisms mean that Thai stakeholders are 
unable to participate on a regular basis in EU private regulators’ decision-making 
processes.  Even were accountability fora to exist, and even if Thai entities were able to 
participate in them, there would be little, if any, opportunity for them to obtain 
assistance from the Thai government.  This is due simply to the fact that Thai 
governmental entities, especially the CAs, view private standards as being outside of 
their remit.  Private standards are considered to be contracts between private entities and 
as falling outside of public law.  
 
The types of problems experienced by Thai producers and exporters in relation to 
private standards are not unique, and have also been reported in other studies on the 
impact of private standards in other parts of the world.714  There appears to be an 
increasingly widespread acceptance that the process of adopting and implementing 
private standards should be subject to some form of regulatory control. However, no 
                                                           
713
 Even where these fora do exist, they do not enhance the power-wielders’ adherence to GAL criteria at 
the level guaranteed by the WTO and CA model frameworks. 
714
 For general studies on the effects of private standards see, for example Bonsi et.al (2008), where the 
authors discuss the long-term effects of private standards in eco-labeling certificates, maintaining that 
they do not increase producers’ competitiveness in long term.  See in particular p. 421, where the authors 
refer to “Kuznets Curve” illustrating that income received from obtaining certification would increase in 
the short term, but in the long term when more producers join the schemes, income would gradually 
decrease.  Other studies have been carried out following the WTO/FAO and UNCTAD workshops and 
were presented on 25/6/07.  See for example specific country case studies in relation to Malaysia, 
Vietnam and Thailand in UNCTAD (2007), and Tam (2005) in relation to Vietnam. 
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consensus has been reached regarding the optimum framework or the nature or extent of 
the regulatory controls that should be applied.715     
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, where the activities of power-wielders create 
significant external effects on stakeholders outside their political or operational 
domains, power-wielders should be susceptible to being held to account.  There should 
be no exception where the power-wielders are private entities.  Consequently there is a 
need for external accountability-enhancing frameworks to be put in place, and for 
standards, mechanisms and sanctions to be established.  It is to this issue that the next 
part of this chapter turns.   
 
As a first step it is appropriate to explore the current situation regarding the external 
accountability of the private standard-setting bodies highlighted in the case studies.  In 
so doing, consideration will be given to each element of external accountability, that is, 
“standards”, “fora” and “sanctions”.  Unlike the situation in regard to governmental 
entities operating in the CA model, in which the WTO and the CA model give effect to 
GAL, there is considerable divergence in the approaches taken by different private 
standard-setting bodies.  Initiatives on the part of private standard-setting bodies are 
voluntary, and therefore the approach that has emerged is both fragmented and variable. 
 
Given the large number of private standards applicable to Thai food exports to the EU, 
it would be unrealistic to attempt to explain in detail the regulatory approach adopted by 
                                                           
715
 Discussions regarding the need to establish frameworks to control private standards have also taken 
place in WTO, FAO and UNCTAD in their 2007 meetings.  The WTO has established a special working 
group on private standards (see infra Section 6.3.4). 
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each and every standard-setting body.  Accordingly, the following discussion presents 
the main GAL elements observed in respect of the main standards that feature in the two 
case studies presented in Chapter 3.  Consideration is given to the question of whether 
these initiatives have achieved respect for GAL criteria or have contributed to the 
closure of external accountability gaps.  
  
6.2.1 Recognition of GAL Criteria as External Accountability Standards 
 
Most private standards are generated in a setting that seeks to ensure respect for at least 
some GAL criteria.  The main focus is on enhancing transparency and creating 
opportunities for participation.  While some standards have used their own codes of 
good practice to promote respect for GAL, others have chosen to join third-party 
regulatory schemes that instantiate some elements of GAL.  Overall there is wide 
variation in the manner and degree to which different standard-setting bodies ensure 
respect for GAL.716   
 
It can be said that GlobalGAP is the leader in giving effect to GAL criteria as external 
accountability standards.  This can be seen, for example, in the availability of its group 
certification option.717  Under this scheme, though subject to certain riders, small and 
medium-sized producers can jointly obtain GlobalGAP certification as a single legal 
                                                           
716
 Self-regulation has been preferred by the majority of private body power-wielders, including for 
example GlobalGAP, Tesco and M&S standards as they can be flexible in setting their own rules and 
laying down their own procedures on how and when these GAL criteria can be invoked and given 
expression. 
717
 Option 2 of GlobalGAP certification. 
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person that in practice comprises a group.718  In this way they can share the overall costs 
of obtaining certification so that the cost per group member is greatly reduced.  This 
option was used by a small group of baby corn producers in the case study.719  The 
availability of this option can be seen as an attempt to inject some element of 
proportionality into the certification process, by bringing about a cost reduction in 
joining the scheme and thereby limiting the trade constraints experienced by Thai 
producers/exporters. 
 
Another example of GlobalGAP seeking to avoid the imposition of unnecessary burdens 
caused by the proliferation of private standards can be found in its benchmarking option 
whereby conformity with other certification schemes’ requirements, whether private or 
governmental, can be deemed to be equivalent to certification under GlobalGAP.720  
Once benchmark status is granted, there is no need for producers to be certified under 
GlobalGAP.  When this benchmarking exercise is completed the costs associated with 
having to obtain multiple certifications are reduced.  So far 11 national GAP schemes 
have been successfully benchmarked against GlobalGAP,721 while benchmarking has 
                                                           
718
 They must be registered and presented as a legal person, i.e. must be registered under a single 
company or a co-operative.  In addition, there must be an effective internal traceability system in place.  
Contractual obligations between individual producers and the registered group are usually in place to 
ensure effective controls and inspections.  Sanctions, ranging from warnings to suspension or cancellation 
of membership, can be imposed within the group to make individual producers comply with GlobalGAP 
standards (Source: Annex I: 1 and Part 3 of the GlobalGAP Version 3).  
719
 Small farmers of Mae-Ta sub-district were able to obtain group certification as a co-operative through 
a tie-up with the larger Greennet co-operative.  
720
 The application for this option falls under Options 3 and 4 of GlobalGAP. 
721
 These include the schemes established in 10 countries including in Austria (AMAGAP), Colombia 
(Florverde), Germany (QS-GAP), Kenya (KFC Silver-standard), Netherlands (MPS-GAP and IKB), New 
Zealand (New Zealand GAP), Spain (UNE 155000), Switzerland (SwissGAP Hortikultur), UK (Assured 
Produce) and recently Thailand (ThaiGAP).  Source: GlobalGAP Annual Report 2010, p. 53).  
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also begun for 16 other schemes.722  Since many benchmarked schemes will be run by 
national governments or hybrid public-private entities there will be an increasing 
number of opportunities for governmental entities to negotiate with the standardising 
body on the behalf of domestic producers and exporters.  In theory, governments should, 
at a minimum, be able to provide producers and exporters with appropriate technical 
assistance.723  It should be noted that in May 2010, ThaiGAP scheme, run by Kasetsart 
University in a partnership with the Chamber of Commerce, was certified as being 
equivalent to GlobalGAP after a 6 year campaign.724  However, the operation of 
ThaiGAP is currently limited to a few trial farms.  It remains to be seen whether and to 
what extent this new GlobalGAP equivalent scheme can contribute towards closing 
external accountability gaps which have arisen from the extensive operation of 
GlobalGAP in Thailand 
 
GlobalGAP has also introduced special projects targeted at enhancing participation in 
its setting of standards.  These include 20 individual “national smallholder schemes”,725 
one of which applies in Thailand.726  In addition, there are special African observer 
                                                           
722
 The benchmarking process has begun - for instance schemes are in place in China, South-Korea, 
Mexico, Chile and Japan.  Source: ibid. 
723
 This option has been applied to the national GAP schemes of Kenya, Mexico, Chile and Japan, which 
are all partly government run.  According to the GlobalGAP report, each of these schemes provides more 
opportunities for small producers/farmers and NGOs to participate, and for small producers to obtain 
some technical assistance from their national governments (Garbutt (2007)).  Despite these positive 
results from its own actions, this GlobalGAP benchmarking option has also been subjected to some 
criticisms, inter alia, that the equivalence concept is restricted, that the process can be time-consuming 
and that there is a need to constantly re-apply for certification with the emergence of each new version 
(Vossenaar (2007) p. 9-15). 
724
 This differs from the DOA’s compulsory GAP scheme for fruit and vegetable exports cited in the baby 
corn case study.  Source: Keeratipipatpong (2011), found at 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/economics/258461/closing-the-gap-in-agriculture-standards, 
http://thaigap.org/th/). 
725
 These include schemes in EU countries such as in Germany and the Netherlands (started in 2002).  
Garbutt (2007).   
726
 The project was first established in 2007.  
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schemes727 for smallholders in African countries.  Under both schemes smallholders’ 
experts, including leaders of the GlobalGAP members,728 moderators729 and a member 
from GlobalGAP’s Committee are invited to participate in roundtable discussions at 
which they can raise their concerns directly with the technical working groups.730  
Subsequently the issues will be passed on to those involved in the standard-setting, 
either to the sectoral Committees or to the Secretariat for presentation to the Board.  
According to GlobalGAP, these unique schemes have provided an increase in 
opportuntities for smallholders to participate  and have increased transparency since 
smallholders are able to request interpretations and guidelines in their local 
languages,731 define their local agenda, and co-operate with other smallholders both 
domestically and internationally.732   
 
Some attempts to give expression to GAL have also been made by other standard-
setting bodies but not to the same extent as GlobalGAP.  For example in Tesco’s 
“Nature’s Choice”, one of the “bespoke” supermarket standards which is applicable to 
all fresh produce supplied to TESCO UK (including fresh baby corn in the case study), 
there is a group certification option that is intended to reduce individual producers’ 
costs and fees.733  However, there are few opportunities for participation available to 
Tesco’s suppliers, including those in Thailand.   There are no specific national or 
                                                           
727
 These are for smallholders from Kenya, South Africa, Ghana and Senegal.  (Source ibid).  
728
 These are farmers or leaders of small communities.  
729
 These can be academics from developing countries.  
730
 UNCTAD (2010). However, it is clear from the case study results that many small producers and 
exporters, located outside Bangkok, the capital, are unaware of this scheme.  
731
 As of 2010 national guidelines have been introduced for the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, France, 
Italy, Colombia, Thailand, Chile, Guatemala and South Africa.  (GlobalGAP Annual Report 2010).  
732
 Garbutt (2007), International Workshop on GlobalGAP Group Certification, Frankfurt (2008).  
733
 Cox’s TESCO presentation (2007) asserts that the cost of auditing per farm is reduced following the 
introduction of the joint certification option. 
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regional discussion groups although some growers may occasionally be invited to 
participate in the “Nature’s Choice” Standard Advisory Committee.734  However, Tesco 
does have an appeal mechanism that enables producers who do not agree with decisions 
made by CMi – the certifying body – to appeal within 21 days against decisions.735 
 
Conversely some standard-setting bodies have subjected their activities to regulatory 
controls administered by third parties.  These can be dubbed as being “umbrella 
standards” where common codes of practice, containing some elements of GAL, must 
be adhered to by all members.  However, membership is optional for the standard-
setting bodies and they can, in theory, leave these schemes at any time.736 
 
Examples of umbrella schemes of this kind include the International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO) family, the International Social and Environmental Accreditation 
and Labeling Alliance (ISEAL) which is applied to social environmental 
certifications,737 the International Federation of Organic Agricultural Movements 
(IFOAM) – for organic standards, and the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) – for 
good manufacturing practice standards.  Nevertheless great variations exist regarding 
the extent to which GAL criteria are given expression, even amongst independent third-
party schemes.   
 
                                                           
734
  According to TESCO, they will be sitting alongside Tesco’s technical experts, CMi (the certifying 
body) and the Registrar.  See further:  http://www.tescofarming.com/tnc.asp. 
735
 Source: ibid. 
736
 Except in situations where some standards, usually ISO, are required to secure certification under 
another schemes.  
737
 These are standards that mainly target regulating issues of ‘other legitimate concerns’.  Members 
include, for example, Fairtrade, Forest Stewardship Council, Marine Stewardship Council, Sustainable 
Agriculture Networks and Rainforest Alliance.   
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An example is the ISO 22000 series that incorporates some GAL criteria in its action 
plans that are intended to be used to achieve good manufacturing practice.  The recent 
action plan for 2005-2010 aimed to achieve increased participation by smallholders 
from developing countries, to establish mechanisms for national and regional training 
designed to improve smallholders’ awareness and capacity, and to deploy electronic 
communication systems.  These initiatives were intended to enhance transparency and 
participation.  Nevertheless, the underlying concepts are set out as a broad framework, 
and the detail is articulated by individual members.  These efforts also fall short in that 
there is no permanent scheme for smallholders similar to that put in place by 
GlobalGAP.    
 
A different approach for injecting GAL criteria is taken by the GFSI, an “umbrella of 
standards” which also runs a benchmarking scheme similar to that of GlobalGAP.  Once 
producers are certified under any one of its listed standards, including International 
Food Standard (IFS), British Retail Consortium (BRC) and Safe Quality Food (SQF), 
they will instantly be recognised has having complied with the other standards on the 
GFSI list.738  This can be seen as an attempt to ensure respect for proportionality 
through the avoidance of unnecessary burdens as it makes achieving certification more 
cost-effective for producers and exporters.  An attempt to create greater opportunities 
for participation can also be seen in the GFSI’s scheme, as a result of their convening 
multi-stakeholder meetings.739  Producers and food experts are invited to discuss GFSI’s 
                                                           
738
 As of 2007, several EU food safety schemes have been benchmarked under the GFSI including IFS - 
Version 4, BRC - Version 4, the SQF, Dutch HACCP Option B and the New Zealand GAP.  Swoffer 
(2007).  
739
 For general information see:  http://www.mygfsi.com/structure-and-governance.html. 
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new proposals for updated versions of their standards and the recommendations of the 
stakeholder meeting are put forward to the technical Committee and also reviewed by 
the Board.  
 
All of these actions by private entities to introduce GAL criteria into their standards of 
conduct are worthwhile initiatives and are desirable insofar as the promotion of external 
accountability is concerned.  However, as seen from the examples above, there is a great 
variation in the approaches taken and in the degree and extent of GAL recognition.  
Even the best of the controlling schemes, namely GlobalGAP, does not provide a 
framework that ensures respect for all elements of GAL.  For example, as is evident 
from the burdens experienced by Thai producers and exporters as set out in Section 
6.1.3.3, GlobalGAP has not yet addressed means-end rationality in a manner sufficient 
to ensure that its requirements can achieve the results desired.  Similarly, it has not yet 
fully addressed the proportionality issue by ensuring that  the least-trade restrictive local 
alternatives are deployed rather than the specifications laid down.740  GlobalGAP itself 
falls short in terms of transparency in that it does not allow an adequate time lapse 
between the date of publication of new requirements and the date by which it is to be 
applied.  Further, it has neither a permanent body that Thai producers and exporters can 
consult on compliance matters, nor a permanent communication channel to permit 
information and comments to be put forward by them. 
                                                           
740
 Supra, Section 6.1.3.3, on exact CCP points, wildlife conservation plans and prohibition of the use of 
fire to clear fields. 
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6.2.2 Accountability-Enhancing Fora and Mechanisms 
 
There is also great variation amongst private standard-setting bodies in respect of the 
existence of fora for external accountability.  As explained previously, they may either 
choose to be governed by their own regulatory schemes or by schemes run by third 
parties of their choice.  However in both cases, limited information about their 
procedures is made available to affected stakeholders, including to those in Thailand. 
 
Furthermore, even where a forum exists to facilitate participation it tends to be possible 
on an ad hoc basis only.  For example, as evident from a number of interviews with 
producers and exporters in the baby corn case study, even where participation was 
possible, only large, but not small or medium-sized, producers and exporters were able 
to participate actively.741  This is due to the relatively high costs associated with 
participation.  Standardising bodies often charge attendance fees and hold meetings and 
workshops outside of Thailand.742  The participation costs are often beyond the means 
of small Thai producers.  In contrast to participation by Thai governmental entities 
under the WTO or CA model frameworks, the costs of participation with EU entities in 
various fora are borne by the Thai government on the basis that government 
representatives are bound, under Thai administrative law, to negotiate with EU entities 
on behalf of producers and exporters.  As previously discussed in Chapter 5, the 
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 Source: interviews with various groups of baby corn producers and exporters.  
742
 For example, one of the key objective of 2009 Asia/Pacific “United on Good Agricultural Practices” 
tour held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, was to have discussions on how to enhance small-scale farmers’ 
participation. However, there was a conference registration fee for individual participants who are 
GlobalGAP members ($US 300) and the conference was held outside Thailand.  
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information and benefits that the Thai government receives from these negotiations will 
be ultimately passed on to the producers and exporters. 
 
Moreover, compared to the wide variety of accountability mechanisms available in the 
CA model and in the WTO, the range of mechanisms for promoting external 
accountability in private standard-setting is much more limited.  It appears that at 
present, only peer, reputational and market mechanisms operate.  There is no effective 
legal mechanism to underpin or support these.  Furthermore, it is also debatable whether 
any of these mechanisms operates effectively.  The most severe sanction that could be 
applied to private entities that depart from the established procedures giving effect to 
GAL is expulsion from the “umbrella of standards”.  They could similarly experience 
the disapproval of their peers or suffer reputational costs.  However, so far no severe 
sanctions of this kind have been reported in relation to EU standard-setting bodies.  
 
Overall, in the current environment private entities are essentially the “masters of their 
own rules”.  They have discretion to frame their own codes of practice, to decide on 
their regulatory frameworks and to choose the “peers” with whom to share a code of 
practice.  There is presently no central regulatory framework to control private 
standards in the EU.  There are no shared “accountability standards” to which all 
standard-setting entities in the EU can be expected to comply, no official permanent 
fora where other bodies, affected entities or the general public can express their 
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concerns, disapproval or condemnation, nor any concrete mechanisms for obtaining 
redress in law.743 
 
There is good reason to believe that the lack of a central regulatory framework and legal 
mechanisms for external accountability in private standard-setting may have contributed 
to the financial and operational problems experienced by Thai stakeholders.  This is 
because there are few, if any, ways in which the problems they experience can be made 
known to the private entity power-wielder, and few opportunities to discuss possible 
alternatives or solutions to problems that arise.  As a result, the top priority to have 
emerged from studying the cross-border effects of EU food safety regulation in 
Thailand is for steps to be taken to increase the external accountability of bodies that set 
private standards.  Although it is clear that something is required in order to mitigate the 
current external accountability gap in the setting of private standards, the optimum 
solution is yet to be found.  In an effort to contribute to the task of articulating a 
solution, the next section will examine the potential role of WTO law.  
 
6.3 SHOULD THE WTO BE A STARTING FRAMEWORK FOR 
REFORM?  
 
At the outset it can be argued that a potential framework for the control of private 
standard-setting activities is already laid down in WTO law.  There, the obligation to 
supervise the bodies that set private standards is not directed at individuals but rather at 
                                                           
743
 Source: Author’s observation of the current operations of various private standards which are 
applicable to the Thai food producers and exporters.  However, there is now a prospect of a UK initiative 
to subject private standards’ operations to the Groceries Supply Code and the adjudicator (See below 
Section 6.5).  
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WTO Member States.  However, on this point existing WTO provisions are excessively 
broad, unclear and are open to many different interpretations. 
 
6.3.1 SPS Control 
 
The SPS Agreement obliges Member States to take steps to oversee the activities of 
private standard-setting bodies.  Article 13 SPS places a tripartite obligation upon 
Member State governments:  
(i) to take “such reasonable measures as may be available to them” to ensure 
that non-governmental entities within their territories comply with the 
relevant provisions of this (SPS) Agreement;  
(ii) not to “take measures which have the effect of, directly or indirectly, 
requiring or encouraging such non-governmental entities to act in a manner 
inconsistent with the provisions of this (SPS) Agreement”;  
(iii) to ensure that they rely on the services of non-governmental entities for 
implementing their SPS measure only if these entities comply with the 
provisions of this (SPS) Agreement.744    
 
It should be noted that the term “provisions” under Article 13 has not been defined.  
However, since the SPS Agreement does not distinguish between voluntary and 
mandatory measures but instead refers to “any measures” to protect human, animal, 
plant life or health,745 Article 13 appears to suggest that Member States should take 
                                                           
744
 Emphasis added.    
745
 Under Annex A (1)(a) it applies to “all sanitary and phytosanitary measures”, in other words “any 
measures” that may directly or indirectly affect international trade.  This is different to the approach taken 
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steps to ensure that private standard-setting bodies comply with the terms of the SPS 
Agreements in full.  In other words, in so far as the SPS Agreement gives effect to 
GAL, Member States must, where reasonably possible, ensure that private standard-
setting bodies respect the terms laid down in SPS Agreement, as discussed previously in 
Section 5.1.1, in relation to both substantive and procedural standards.    These include 
obligations relating to means-end rationality (Article 2.2 and 5.7 SPS Agreement), weak 
and strong proportionality (Article 2.2, 5.6 and 5.7), prompt notification, a reasonable 
time-lapse between publication and implementation (Article 7 read with Annex B(5)), 
provision of information and technical support (Article 7 read with Annex B (3) ), an 
appropriate time-frame for certification and the avoidance of  undue delays  in the 
control, inspection and approval procedures (Article 8 read with Annex C).   
 
Whilst the language of Article 13 makes it clear that Member States, including the EU, 
have a duty to take “reasonable” steps to control the operations of private standard-
setting bodies, it is far from clear what this requires and or even means.   The most 
problematic term is the word “reasonable” in the first part of Article 13.746  Although 
this word has also been used elsewhere in the SPS Agreement, for example in Annex C 
(3),747Articles 4,748 and 5.7,749 the concept of “reasonableness” has not yet been clarified 
by the dispute settlement bodies.  In fact a guideline to assist in interpreting this term is 
                                                                                                                                                                          
under TBT (see below) where a distinction is made between measures with which compliance is 
mandatory (technical regulation) and those that are voluntary (standards).  
746
 It is also an uncertainty as to what kind of action could be construed as being “measures which have 
the effect of, directly or indirectly, requiring or encouraging” non-governmental entities to act 
inconsistently with the provisions of the SPS Agreement.   
747
 Here the SPS provisions will not prevent Members from carrying out “reasonable” inspections within 
their own territories.  
748
 This relates to equivalence, where exporting countries shall allow “reasonable” access to importing 
Members for inspection, testing and other relevant procedures.  
749
 Where Members put in place a provisional measure based on the available pertinent and relevant 
information they should review the measure within a “reasonable” period of time.  
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still being developed by the SPS Committee.750  However, even without further 
clarification from the WTO it is important that content and meaning be given to these 
crucial demands.  
 
6.3.2 TBT Control  
 
In a manner similar to the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement imposes obligations on 
Member States to take “reasonable measures” to control private standard-setting 
activities.  The definition of “standards” under Annex 1 refers to instruments with 
which compliance is “not mandatory”.751  In the area of food safety, this TBT obligation 
will apply to standards that regulate ‘other legitimate concerns’.752     
 
For private standards, Member States are required to take such “reasonable” measures 
as may be available to them to ensure that private standardising bodies accept and 
comply with the TBT Code of Good Practice laid down in Annex 3 (thereafter “the 
Code of Good Practice”).753  Further, and similar to the obligations in the SPS 
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 Infra, Section 6.3.4. 
751
 “Standards” are any “document approved by a recognised body that provides for common and 
repeated use, or rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production 
methods” with which compliance is not mandatory.  This definition varies from technical regulation, 
where compliance is mandatory Annex 1 TBT (2 and 1).  Some academics have called this type of 
standard “voluntary” so as to juxtapose with the term “technical” standard used under Article 2 (see for 
example: Joshi (2004), p.74 and Gandhi (2005). It should also be noted that a Member State’s obligation 
for monitoring “standards” is significantly less than that imposed in relation to “technical regulations” 
where compliance is mandatory.  In the latter case the full TBT obligations apply and the Member State 
must “ensure” that the measures are not “more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil the necessary 
objectives” of, inter alia, “national security requirements, prevention of deceptive practices, human health 
of safety, animal or plant life or health or the environment” (Article 2.2). 
752
 Under TBT Agreement, Article 1.5, TBT provisions do not apply to SPS measures.  This has been 
confirmed by the Hormones II decision (US-Hormones para. 8.29).   
753
 Article 4.1 TBT Agreement.  Likewise, standardising bodies that have accepted and continue to 
comply with the Code of Good Practice will be acknowledged by Members as having complied with the 
TBT Agreement (Article 4.2).  In the case of governmental standards, members must “ensure” that they 
accept and comply with the Code of Good Practice laid down in Annex 3 TBT. 
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Agreement, Member States must not take measures that directly or indirectly, require or 
encourage the standardising bodies to act in a manner inconsistent with the Code of 
Good Practice.754  
 
It can be observed that Member States’ obligation in the TBT Agreement to oversee the 
activities of private standard-setting bodies is limited to ensuring that they comply with 
the Code of Good Practice.  Under the SPS Agreement, Member States have to ensure 
that private standard-setting bodies comply with the Agreement in its entirety.  
 
The provisions in the Code of Good Practice include recognition of GAL criteria as a 
standard of conduct to ensure that external accountability gaps are mitigated.  The Code 
includes a commitment to proportionality, transparency and participation.  Examples are 
given below:   
 
Point E: Standards shall not be prepared, adopted or applied so as to create unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade; this can be viewed as enhancing weak proporitonality 
by subjecting the affected entities to a least-trade-restrictive means test.  
Point F: Preference should be given to existing international standards; this can also be 
viewed as enhancing weak proportionality criteria. 
Point H: Duplication and overlap between standards should be avoided; this also 
contributes further to ensuring respect for weak proportionality.  
                                                           
754
 Article 4.1 TBT Agreement.  In addition, since the obligation is directed at the member states, WTO 
fora in which legal accountability mechanisms and sanctions operate will be relevant here.   
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Point J: Work programmes must contain the name and address of a standardising body.  
Details of standards should be made available every six months.  These requirements 
serve to enhance transparency.  
Point L: The submission of comments by interested parties should be allowed during a 
60 day period prior to the adoption of standards.  This can be viewed as enhancing 
opportunities for participation.  
 
As with Article 13 of the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement is vague in places.  We 
see this in Article 4, where the TBT Agreement places an obligation on Member States 
to take those “reasonable measures as may be available to them” to ensure that private 
standards within their territory adhere to the TBT Code, and not to take measures which 
can encourage standardising bodies to act in a manner inconsistent with this.  
Uncertainty can also be found in the language used in the TBT Code of Good Practice 
itself.  The Code contains some vague terms including “where appropriate”755 and 
“make every effort”.756   
 
                                                           
755
 Point I regarding the specification of standards based on performance, rather than design or descriptive 
characters, and point K which concerns membership of ISONET.  
756
 Point H concerning the avoidance of duplication and overlap between standards. 
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6.3.3 Unclear Obligations under the SPS and TBT Agreement  
 
The lack of clarity characterising the Member States’ obligations in relation to private 
standards relates to use of the term “reasonable” which features in both Article 13 SPS 
and Article 4 TBT Agreement.  Although this term has not been subjected to the dispute 
settlement bodies’ interpretation, an attempt to clarify it is made here.   
 
It may be thought that the term “reasonable” leaves considerable discretion to power-
wielding Member States.  The first reason for this is that when comparing the term 
“reasonable” with the term “necessary”, which appears elsewhere in the same 
Agreement, the term “necessary” appears to convey a more significant degree of WTO 
control over Member States’ actions.  For example, when the term ‘necessary’ is used in 
Articles 2.2 and 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, the principle of (weak) proportionality will 
apply.757  Conversely, the use of the term ‘reasonable’ seems to imply more space for 
member States to make subjective as opposed to objective judgment about what steps 
are required.758   
 
Also, a discretion-enhancing interpretation fits with the principle of “in dubio mitius”, 
the general principle of international law that has been referred to by the Appellate 
Body in EC-Hormones as being a supplementary means of interpretation.  According to 
this principle, when faced with an unclear term in the WTO Agreement, the dispute 
                                                           
757
 See supra, Section 5.1.1.1.2.A. Similar interpretation applies when the term appears under the TBT 
Agreement.  For example, under Article 5.1.2 TBT Agreement, where Member States have to ensure that 
the conformity assessment procedures, belonging to their central governments’ technical regulations or 
standards, shall not be stricter than is necessary so as to give adequate confidence that imported products 
conform to the technical regulations or standards. 
758
 See also Scott (2007), p. 233.  
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settlement bodies should defer to the sovereignty of the Member States and prefer an 
interpretation that causes the least interference with the decisional autonomy of Member 
States. 759  
 
Since this subjective term (reasonable), leaves considerable discretion to Member 
States, inconsistency in interpretation and application is likely to emerge.  On the one 
hand, a Member State may consider it sufficient to publish a code of conduct for all 
standard-setting bodies, stressing that respect for WTO/GAL criteria is required.  On the 
other hand, greater action may be demanded by another Member State which could 
insist, for example, on the setting up of an independent body to review private standards 
on the basis of WTO/GAL.     
 
Further guidelines to clarify what might constitute “a reasonable measure” would be 
useful to those trying to invoke these provisions to encourage Member States to take 
steps to regulate the activities of private standard-setting bodies.  In the absence of clear 
guidelines or clarification from the WTO, these terms are open to abuse and it may well 
be the case that only the most flagrant breaches of the SPS provisions or the TBT’s 
Code of Good Practice will be condemned by Member States or made subject to 
control.   
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 EC- Hormones, para. 165.  In this case, the AB has faced with the task of interpreting the terms “by 
conforming those measures with international standards, guidelines and recommendations”.  It rejected 
the Panel’s interpretation that Article 3.1 imposed an outright obligation on the Member States to comply 
with international standards “in the here and now”. Instead it opted for a more lenient and less onerous 
approach and stated that Article 3.1, merely set a goal for the Member State to realise in the future.  
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6.3.4 WTO’s Initiatives to Clarify Vague Terms 
 
The WTO needs to strengthen its legal framework for enforcing the obligation of WTO 
members to supervise the activities of private standard-setting bodies.  However, for 
this framework to act as an effective starting point for systematic reform, the relevant 
provisions of the SPS and TBT Agreements require further clarification.  Even though 
the objectives of Article 13 SPS and Article 4 TBT are clear in setting out that the 
Member States must “do something” that they consider “reasonable”760 to ensure that 
private standards in their territories comply with the provisions of SPS Agreement and 
the TBT Code, there is a lack of clarity about the type of measure or the intensity of 
intervention that would suffice.  
 
To date, some attempts have been initiated, though not yet concluded, by the WTO to 
clarify the Article 13 SPS obligation.  The SPS Committee’s Working Group on Private 
Sector Standards has been entrusted with this task.  Discussions in the Working Group 
are on-going and significant further work is required.761  In the meeting that took place 
at the end of March 2011, the Member States participating in the Working Group were 
able to agree only on certain basic issues.762  These included confirmation of the 
Committee’s mandate to develop a working definition of “private standards”, the need 
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 As previously discussed, it will likely be for Member States to decide on what actions count as 
reasonable. 
761
 The issue of private standards was first raised in the SPS meeting when St Vincent and Grenadines put 
forward their concerns about the binding effects of EurepGAP certification for bananas destined for EU 
supermarkets. The first special discussion session and establishment of a working group on this issue took 
place in Oct 2006.  
762
 In a more recent SPS Committee meeting, 30 June – 1 July 2011, the discussions and debates on 
Member States’ control over the private sector standards continued but no further issues were agreed.  
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to exchange information with the Committee’s “sister organisations” 763 and the WTO 
Secretariat, the importance of Member States taking steps to help private standard-
setting entities in their territories to understand those issues raised in the SPS 
Committee, and the need to develop material that clarifies and underlines the 
importance of SPS obligations in relation to private standard-setting.  However, 
Member States participating in the Working Group continue to differ in their approach 
on both the nature and the extent of the actions that need to be deployed to discharge 
Article 13 obligations.764   Given this deadlock in Committee discussions it is likely to 
be some time before Members will agree to any concrete clarifications.   
 
6.3.5 Potential Breaches of SPS and TBT Agreement by the EU in Relation to 
Private Standards   
 
It is understandable that many WTO Member States, including the EU, wish to leave 
the nature of their obligations vis-à-vis private standard-setting bodies vague.  The 
conclusions of the WTO’s Working Group could carry some legal significance in 
interpreting those provisions that are currently unclear.  At a minimum,  they could act 
as soft law instruments, helping affected Member States, including Thailand, to suggest 
to the EU that it needs to do more to supervise the standard-setting bodies operating 
within its territory.  They could also serve as a basis for Member State to raise specific 
trade concerns.   
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 Namely the Codex Alimentarius, the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the 
International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). 
764
 In addition, during the June - July 2011 meeting, a consensus on a clearer definition of “private 
standards” under SPS provisions could not be reached.  
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Although there have been no WTO disputes on this point, given current circumstances it 
can be argued that EU is currently in breach of  its obligations under Article 13 SPS and 
Article 4 TBT.   However, in order to establish this it must first be demonstrated that 
private entities operating from the EU are in fact acting in a manner inconsistent with 
the relevant terms under the SPS and TBT Agreements. 
 
6.3.5.1 Standard-setting bodies’ Inconsistency with the SPS Agreement  
 
As shown in various studies by different international organisations and academics,765 
many standard-setting bodies operating in the EU, including those originating from 
supermarket chains, acting in a manner that is inconsistent with the provisions contained 
in SPS Agreement and TBT’s Code of Good Practice.   We saw examples of these 
inconsistencies drawn from the result of EU/Thai case studies earlier in Section 6.1.3.   
 
With regards to SPS obligations, breaches of Article 2.2 may well have occurred, for 
example in relation to the requirements that (i) Thai baby corn producers have to keep 
traceability records for at least two years, instead of 6 months as recommended by the 
Commission766 and, (ii) that they are required to be audited by expensive EU-based 
auditing firms.767   Both measures may well be construed as being in breach of the 
proportionality requirement.768  From the information currently available,  it is difficult 
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 For example, the studies by UNCTAD (2007), Bonsi et al. (2008). 
766
 See supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.3. 
767
 For example, some baby corn producers are required by EU supermarkets to conduct inspections 
undertaken by a company by the name of CMi. (See supra, Section 6.1.3.3). 
768
 See Article 2.2, which is to be read with Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement (Supra, Section 5.1.1.1.2 
A). 
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to see how these demanding requirements are necessary to protect human health.  In 
both cases, less trade-restrictive alternatives that are capable of achieving the same level 
of health protection appear to be available.  In the case of the traceability requirement, 
the Commission recommendation could have been relied upon, while for the auditing 
requirement, the services of local auditors could have been accepted as well.   
 
Furthermore, and as seen from the case studies, the application of certain EU private 
standards in Thailand has fallen short of compliance with the procedural standards laid 
down under Article 7 and Annex B of the SPS Agreement.  Examples can be drawn 
from the earlier discussion of governance issues relating to private standards.769  This 
can be seen in the lack of opportunities for smallholders to participate in the standard-
setting processes, and also in the inadequate transition periods allowed for 
implementing the standards.  Here, there are potential breaches of  Annex B of the SPS 
Agreement, which demands, inter alia, an opportunity for affected parties to comment 
on proposed measures,770 and a reasonable time-lapse between the date of publication 
and the date of implementation of  new SPS measures.771   
 
6.3.5.2 Standard-setting bodies’ Inconsistencies with the TBT Agreement  
 
Some of the rigid requirements imposed by private standards relating to ‘other 
legitimate concerns’ seem likely to breach the TBT Code of Good Practice.  For 
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 This was previously discussed in some detail in Section 6.1.4.  
770
 Annex B 5 (b) SPS  
771
 Annex B (2) SPS, This is subject to the urgency exception.  
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example, the obligation to prepare wildlife protection plans without recognition of more 
effective local conservation schemes,772 could be argued to be inconsistent with Points 
E, H and I of the Code of Good Practice; these Points concern (i) the avoidance of 
unnecessary obstacles to international trade, (ii) the avoidance of duplication in different 
standards, and (iii) the use of performance rather than design criteria.  
 
6.3.5.3 The EU’s Potential Breaches of Article 13, SPS Agreement  
 
It can also be argued that, notwithstanding the vagueness of Article 13 SPS, the EU is in 
breach of its obligation to take those “reasonable measures” available to it so as to 
ensure that standard-setting bodies comply with the terms of the SPS Agreement in full.  
It is possible to make this argument because of the detailed empirical findings set out 
earlier concerning the relationship between EU regulation and private standards.  
 
As previously discussed, 773 the language of this obligation is problematic in that it 
includes the unclear term “reasonable measure” which calls out for urgent clarification. 
However, although Member States may be expected to enjoy discretion in defining what 
counts as a “reasonable measure”, certain procedural obligations may be thought to 
apply as a result of this obligation.  
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 Supra Section 6.1.3.3.  
773
 Supra Section 6.3.3. 
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It is common for the WTO dispute settlement bodies to require that Member States 
demonstrate that certain procedures have been followed in discharging their WTO 
obligation.  We see this in past disputes concerning various WTO Agreements.774   
 
An analogy may be drawn with two past disputes, Japan- Apples and Canada Alcoholic 
Beverages.  In Japan Apples, procedural requirements were imposed by the Appellate 
Body when deciding whether Japan had fulfilled its risk assessment obligations under 
Article 5.1, SPS Agreement.775  In this case, the Appellate Body injected procedural 
requirements into its interpretation of Article 5.1, which had to be satisfied by Japan in 
justifying its measure.   It held that Japan had to demonstrate that it had considered the 
possibility of deploying less-trade restrictive alternative measures.  In so doing, Japan 
would have to show that it had evaluated the likelihood of the entry and establishment 
of the fire-blight disease in relation to each of these alternative measures.  Only after 
this, would Japan be allowed to reject the alternative measures as being incapable of 
delivering the level of protection being sought.776  
 
Another case concerning the establishment of procedural requirements is Canada-
Alcoholic Beverages.  In this case the Panel had to deal with a similarly unclear term in 
Article XXIV: 12 GATT which required Member States to “take reasonable measures 
as may be available” to ensure observance of (the GATT’s) provisions by regional and 
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 For example, in relation to GATT, notably, in Shrimp/Turtle (para. 176), the WTO injected an 
additional duty to negotiate with all affected members in order to discharge the Member State’s 
obligations under the chapeau of Article XX GATT.  (See discussion in supra Section 5.1.1.2.3). 
775
 “To ensure that their measures are based on an assessment…of the risk to …plant life” (taken from 
Article 5.1).  
776
 Since in this case other alternative measures had not been considered, Japan was found not to have 
conducted a proper risk assessment.  Para. 209, ibid.  
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local governments.  In this dispute Canada was required to demonstrate that it had made 
a “serious, persistent and convincing effort to secure compliance” by the provincial 
liquor board with the relevant GATT provisions.777  This case offers a close analogy 
with Member States’ obligation under Article 13 SPS, in that it concerns the 
relationship between a WTO member state and other entities operating within its 
territory.  
 
It is quite conceivable that a similar interpretation would be adopted by the dispute 
settlement bodies when determining the nature and scope of the EU’s obligations under 
Article 13, SPS Agreement.  As such, procedural requirements would be imposed on the 
EU.  It is possible that the EU would, inter alia, have to demonstrate that it had taken 
steps of various kinds.  For example, even without interfering with the EU’s substantive 
discretion, it would be open to the dispute settlement bodies to require the EU: 
• to access what private standard-setting bodies have done to ensure 
compliance with WTO law, 
• to identify potential breaches of WTO on the basis of this, 
• to consider what steps could be taken by it to bring these breaches of WTO 
to an end, 
• to give reasons to justify a decision not to take the steps available on the 
basis that it would not be reasonable to do so, 
• where steps are not rejected as unreasonable, the EU could be required to 
show that it has made a serious, persistent and convincing effort to secure 
compliance on the part of the private standard-setting bodies.  
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 Para. 5.37 
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At present the EU lacks any framework for supervising the activities of private 
standard-setting bodies in the area of food safety.778  The absence of any framework 
attests clearly to the fact that no measures have been taken by the EU and also that no 
explanation of why this is so has been given.  There is then a strong possibility that the 
EU is in breach of the first part of Article 13.  
 
The failure of the EU to take steps to control the activities of private standard-setting 
points is especially unfortunate when placed in the context of the earlier discussion in 
this chapter.  In part 6.1.3.4, it was argued that the EU and/or the Member States may be 
encouraging food retailers to rely on private standards by conferring some authority on 
these standards when it comes to defining the contours of general EU food safety 
regulation and when ascertaining the validity of a due diligence defence.  This is not to 
suggest that either the EU or its Member States are encouraging the use of private 
standards that breach the SPS Agreement, which would itself be a breach of the second 
part of Article 13, SPS.  However, it could be the case that this inter-relationship 
between official food safety regulation and private standards may be thought to make 
the EU’s complete lack of regulatory control over private standard-setting more 
apparent. 
 
More tentatively, it could also be argued that the EU is in breach of the third part of 
Article 13, SPS, which insists that member States must not rely upon the service of non-
governmental entities to implement official SPS regulations unless those non-
governmental entities comply with the provision of the SPS Agreement.   To the extent 
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 For example, there is no concrete evidence of the procedural requirements in points (a) to (d) having 
been followed by the EU.  
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that private standards have come to play an important role in defining what is required 
by the EU’s general food safety law, and in giving a substance to the due diligence 
defence,779  it can at least be argued with some plausibility that the EU is relying 
indirectly on private standard-setting bodies to enforce official EU food safety law.  
 
6.3.5.4 EU’s Potential Breaches of Article 4, TBT Agreement  
 
Having established earlier that a number of private standards relating to ‘other 
legitimate concerns’ may be inconsistent with the TBT Code of Good Practice,780 this 
section turns briefly to consider the EU’s obligation under Article 4, TBT Agreement.  
The relevant part of Article 4 is a positive obligation which requires Member States to 
take “reasonable measures as may be available to them” to ensure that non-
governmental standardising bodies in their territories accept and comply with the TBT 
Code.  As with Article 13, SPS Agreement, this TBT obligation is vague due to the core 
requirement “to take reasonable measures”.   
 
Even if substantial discretion may be expected to be granted to the EU in deciding what 
is considered to be a reasonable measure (or measures) to ensure respect for the Code, 
again the EU is likely to be required to demonstrate that it has discharged certain 
procedural requirements of the kind already set out in Section 6.3.5.3 above.  
 
It is important to stress that as of 2010 most of the main EU private standards presented 
in the case studies, including GlobalGAP, Tesco’s Nature’s Choice, Soil Association 
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 Recall the discussion in supra, Section 6.1.3.4.  
780
 See supra, Section 6.3.5.2.  
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and BRC have not been included in the official list of standard-setting bodies that have 
voluntarily accepted the TBT Code of Good Practice. 781  There is no evidence to 
suggest that the EU has taken any steps to encourage them to do so.   
 
6.4 THE EU’s INITIATIVES TO CONTROL PRIVATE 
STANDARDS   
 
In an ideal world, the SPS Committee would arrive at a clear understanding of the 
nature and scope of Member States’ obligations in relation to private standards.  This, 
however, is unlikely to occur in the near future.  Thus, despite the SPS Committee’s 
initiative, it is important that other entities also take steps to oversee the activities of 
private standard-setting bodies.  In particular, it is crucial for the EU to take steps to 
mitigate the external accountability gap that originates from private standards adopted 
within its domain.  Not only would this benefit third countries and their producers and 
exporters, but it would also benefit the EU itself by ensuring that it has satisfied its 
WTO obligations.   
 
It would be impractical for this thesis to propose a detailed institutional model for the 
EU.  This would need to be the subject of further studies and discussions, and would 
need to take into account the opinions and interests of all stakeholders, including those 
inside and outside the EU.  The views of supermarkets, standardising bodies and 
producers in the EU and third countries would need to be taken into account.  However, 
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 As of 1 January 2010, there are over 170 standardising bodies that accept the code. (Source: 
http://www.iso.org/iso/wto-tbt-scd.pdf). 
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this thesis can provide important data by reporting upon the experiences of Thai 
stakeholders so far.  Also it puts forward GAL as a possible framework for thinking 
about how external accountability can be achieved.  The previous chapter offered 
examples of good practices in this regard, demonstrating in particular the key role that 
informal and “under -the -radar” processes and networks can play.   
 
As a first step in constituting a supervisory framework for private standards, the EU 
should identify the GAL criteria that private standard-setting bodies should respect.  In 
any event, there would need to be initial agreement on minimum standards for 
achieving transparency, participation, proportionality, reasoned decision-making and 
opportunities for appeal/review.  In order to fully discharge the EU’s obligations under 
WTO law, these minimum standards would have to be in accordance with the demands 
of the SPS Agreement and the TBT Code of Good Practice.  Were this approach to be 
followed, private standard-setting bodies would be required to put notice and comment 
type procedures in place, with a view to increasing transparency and gathering feedback 
from stakeholders both within and outside the EU.  They would have to demonstrate the 
means-end rationality of their requirements, to allow for measures that are equivalent in 
effectiveness to be used, and to be prepared to stand before a forum in which affected 
entities in the EU and in other countries could challenge the requirements they impose.  
Sanctions would also have to be available for situation in which the bodies in question 
do not observe the EU legislation or code.  
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In taking steps to supervise the activities of private standard-setting bodies, the next task 
for the EU is to devise a suitable accountability forum to ensure that private standard-
setting bodies are encouraged to comply with GAL criteria.  On the basis that both 
Article 13 SPS and Article 4 TBT give discretion to Member States to take “reasonable 
measure”, it is clear that the EU has considerable freedom to select the kind of 
accountability forum that it sees fit.  In so doing, the EU should be encouraged to strike 
an appropriate balance between effectiveness and flexibility.782 
 
The EU’s regulatory framework for supervising the activities of private standard-setting 
bodies needs to be effective in order to demonstrate to Member States and to the WTO 
that a “serious, persistent and convincing effort” has been made.  On one hand, this may 
be thought to militate in favour of the introduction of an EU directive which compels 
Member States to ensure that standard-setting bodies in their territory, including 
supermarkets, adhere to established standards and do so on the basis of clearly defined 
procedural guarantees.  
 
We already see an attempt of EU law to supervise activities of private entities in this 
way.  For example, in order for private certification bodies to be able to certify 
compliance with the EU’s sustainability criteria for biofuels, these standard-setting 
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 The problems of trying to devise a regulatory framework that strikes the right balance between 
flexibility and effectiveness is not unique in the case of new EU regulatory framework to supervise 
activities of private standards. However, it has been an ongoing problem in other regulatory frameworks 
and subject to many global governance debates by various academics. See further the following works for 
more discussions on this issue; in relation to the EU, see Trubek et. al (2005) and Scott and Holder 
(2006), for international law see, the works by Abbott and Snidal (2000), and for the WTO framework, 
see further the works by Lang and Scott (2009), (2010) and  the work by Footer (2008)). 
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bodies must operate in accordance with some key elements of GAL.  Only private 
certification bodies which meet adequate standards of reliability, transparency and 
independent auditing may be approved by the Commission to perform this verification 
of compliance function in EU law.783  Admittedly, the biofuels example is different 
from the food safety example because in the former private standard-setting bodies are 
directly acting as de facto agents of compliance with official EU law.784  
Notwithstanding this difference, this regulatory option could be further explored.  In so 
doing, it would be important to look closely at the Commission’s practice in supervising 
and approving private entities in relation to the biofuels certifications in order to 
ascertain whether any lessons can be learned from this regulatory framework.785 
 
On the other hand, however,  it is the case that given the large number of standard-
setting bodies operating in the EU and the wide diversity in their procedures and current 
level of GAL recognition,  it may be less controversial and more realistic for the EU to 
adopt a ‘soft law’ approach in their  supervision of standard-setting bodies.786  
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 See Article 17(5) of Directive 2009/28/EC. For an analysis see Lin (2010).  
784
 Recall, however, the discussion at 6.3.5.3 above, where the close relationship between EU law and 
private standards was identified and discussed.  
785
 The Commission has recently approved seven schemes of this kind. For details see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/biofuels/sustainability_schemes_en.htm.  
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 Soft law has been defined as “rules of conduct which in principle are not legally binding but which 
nevertheless may have practical effects” (Snyder (1995) in Trubek (2005), p.1). This term is often used to 
refer to instruments such as guidelines, codes of conduct and declarations (Footer (2008), p. 4).  Soft law 
instruments frequently place considerable emphasis upon procedural instruments although substantive 
outcomes can be included as well.  
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For example, the EU could draw up guidelines for private standard-setting.  These 
guidelines could identify the accountability standards which incorporate GAL criteria 
and urged these to be respected by all private standard-setting bodies.  At the same time, 
they could leave flexibility to individual standard-setting bodies to articulate how the 
respect for these standards can best be achieved.  Standard-setting bodies could also be 
required to report to the Commission about the steps that they are taking to ensure 
respect for these accountability standards.  Furthermore, these reports could be made 
available to both the general public and peers which are other standard-setting bodies in 
this instance.  As more information becomes available over the course of time about 
which procedures and mechanisms are effective in ensuring the standard-setting bodies’ 
respect for GAL, the Commission could update its guidelines and, where appropriate, it 
could further expand and clarify their terms.787  
 
In adopting a soft law approach of this kind, the Commission should consider additional 
steps to be taken to ensure that reputational mechanisms can play an important role.  For 
example, the Commission could follow its current practice regarding the EU Member 
States’ compliance with directives by issuing a “name and shame” report about the 
compliance record of individual standard-setting bodies.788  The Commission could 
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 This suggestion draws upon literature in the tradition of democratic experimentalism. See for a 
discussion Scott and Holder (2006) and Sabel and Zeitlin (2010).  
788
 In relation to directive and Member State compliance, see for example the Lamfalussy league table at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/transposition/table_en.pdf. 
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even introduce a ‘good practice’ logo which could be used by the best-performing 
standard-setting bodies of this kind.789 
 
There has been considerable discussion in academic literature about the capacity of soft 
law to induce changes in the behaviour of states and other actors.790  The findings 
presented in this thesis are of relevance to this debate. It has been argued that both the 
CA Model and the SPS Committee operate as important accountability fora and succeed 
in enhancing respect for GAL criteria.  The operation of peer mechanism in these fora is 
based in significant part upon soft law.  This is especially noteworthy in the case of the 
CA Model, where almost continuous interactions between EU and Thai officials have 
led the EU to adjust its regulatory demands and to provide assistance to Thai 
stakeholders to achieve compliance with EU law, even in circumstances where the EU’s 
legal entitlement to take steps to ensure the safety of imported food is not in any 
doubt.791  Consequently, changes in behaviour have been seen to occur, even in 
circumstances where a threat of legal challenge was absent or at least remote.792 
                                                           
789 For example, the possibility of deploying an EU recognition symbol for “GAL compliance” standards 
similar to what has been done in the case of the “EU-Flower”, a central EU-based eco-label voluntary 
scheme for textiles, could be explored (See further: http://www.eco-forum.dk/textile-
purchase/index_files/Page2303.htm). 
790
 Some of the most interesting literature on the topic is co-authored by legal academics and international 
relations scholars. See especially Finnemore and Toope (2000) taking issue with Abbott and Snidal’s 
famous understanding of legalisation (2000). See also Brunnee and Toope (2008), Cohen (2009), Alkoby 
(2008) and Bush and Reinhardt (2000). 
791
 The question of why informal interactions of this do succeed in inducing behavioural change is outside 
of the scope of this thesis. One argument may be drawn from “constructivism”, which sees governmental 
entities operating in transnational networks as forming part of an international community with shared 
norms. Within this community, transnational learning can occur and also peer pressure can be brought to 
bear in relation to those who depart from these shared norms. See Brunnee and Toope (2008).  
792
 To give one example, the  EU offered a technical assistance to train Thai CA staff following its 
Nitrofuran restriction, this was given voluntarily even without the potential threat of Thailand challenging 
  
334
 
Of course, ultimately, the EU need not make a definitive choice between “hard” and 
“soft” law approaches in order to shape the activities of private standard-setting bodies.  
It may be that in the first instance non-binding guidelines are to be preferred.  These, 
combined with a reporting requirement of the kind set out above, could assist the 
Commission in gathering information, in evaluating a wide range of different 
approaches and practices and, ultimately, in drawing up ‘best practice’ guidelines that 
could over time be incorporated into hard law.793  Either way, as noted above, the 
challenge for the EU is to strike an appropriate balance between effectiveness and 
flexibility.  It is, therefore, crucial for the EU to ensure that its preferred approach is 
kept under continuous review. Only then will it be able to claim that “serious, persistent 
and convincing efforts” to ensure that private standard-setting bodies operate in 
conformity with the relevant WTO obligations have been made.  
 
6.5 THE UK INITIATIVE  
 
Even though there has been no attempt to supervise private standards at the EU level, an 
initiative has been launched at the national level in the UK.  This national initiative has 
the benefit of contributing towards UK fulfillment of its WTO obligations under the 
SPS and TBT Agreements.  However, the UK scheme is still under development and so 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the EU’s entitlement to invoke the SPS measure or to commence a dispute settlement proceeding against 
the EU (see Supra Section 5.2). 
793
 For a very recent example of a transition from soft to hard law in EU law see the Industrial Emissions 
Directive (Directive 2010/75/EU,) which makes BAT (best available techniques) Reference Documents 
binding on Member States. These reference documents were non-binding under the earlier Directive on 
Integrated Pollution Prevention Control (recently codified as Directive 2008/1/EC).  
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far it appears to have achieved somewhat limited results.  Regardless, the EU could 
observe and learn lessons from this UK development.     
 
The UK system comprises a Grocery Supply Code of Practice (thereafter the Grocery 
Code)794 and a Grocery Code Adjudicator System (thereafter the Adjudicator).795  These 
were established in 2010 and updated in May 2011 following the introduction of Draft 
Groceries Code Adjudicator Bill.796 They are intended to become fully operational in 
2012.797  Under the current system, primary supermarket suppliers both within and 
outside the UK and including those in Thailand, can complain to the Adjudicator that 
UK supermarkets have to not adhere to the demands of the Grocery Code.  They can 
also register complaints regarding unfair treatment by supermarkets or by other entities 
in the supply chain.  When fully established,  this UK scheme will create an 
accountabity forum which stakeholders from aboard may use to enhance the external 
accountability of power-wielders further up the supply chain.  
 
The standards of conduct underpinning this system are laid down in  The Grocery Code 
itself.  This applies to UK retailers with a turnover of over £1bn, which includes all 
major UK supermarket retailers.798  In general, the Code requires supermarkets to base 
their operations on good-faith commercial practices, including in relation to provisions 
                                                           
794
 This has been established since 4/2/2010 but is subject to further development by the Department of 
Business.  
795
 This is working under the Office of Fair Trading.  
796
  The draft Bill can be found at: http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/d/11-936-
draft-groceries-code-adjudicator-bill.pdf. 
797
 The full bill is expected to be published during the second parliamentary session, in May 2012 Source: 
http://www.farmersguardian.com/home/business/business-news/clegg-urged-to-push-on-supermarket-
adjudicator-plans/43473.article . 
798
 Source: Section 7 of Draft Groceries Code Adjudicator Bill 2011. These include, Asda, Co-op, M&S, 
Morrison, Sainsbury, Tesco, Waitrose, Aldi, Iceland and Lidl. 
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on offer prices and payments to producers.799  It also introduces some activities that can 
be construed as being directed towards ensuring enhanced respect for GAL.  These 
include a requirement to give reasonable notice of a change in the standard’s 
requirement and an explanation in the event that a supplier is delisted or where changes 
are made to the procedures governing the supply chain.800  These provisions can, of 
course, be considered as contributing towards the reasoned decision-making and 
transparency criteria of GAL.  Meanwhile, the fact that affected entities can raise 
complaints can be seen as offering an opportunity for review of a measure, even though 
the forum in which this review is understood does not take the form of a formal tribunal 
or court.   
 
The operation of this adjudication system as laid down in the Draft Groceries Code 
Adjudicator Bill is currently based on soft law.  An option for incorporating hard law in 
the form of financial penalties is currently being debated.801  Currently however, the 
Draft Bill only provides that the adjudicators can provide advice, recommendations and 
assistance to suppliers and can “condemn” both any departures by supermarkets and 
standardising bodies from the Grocery Code, and any unfair practices conducted by 
domestic or overseas suppliers.  The Adjudicator can add offending supermarkets to a 
“name-and-shame” list, comprising UK entities that have imposed unfair treatment on 
                                                           
799
 Section 8 Draft Groceries Code Adjudicator Bill 2011.  
800
 Section 8 and 9 Draft Groceries Code Adjudicator Bill 2011.  
801
 Section18 of Draft Groceries Code Adjudicator Bill 2011 states that “....where an investigation finds 
that a large retailer has breached the Groceries Code, (the adjudicator may) decide whether to make 
recommendations to the retailer, require it to publish information about the instigation (or if the Secretary 
of State adds a power to do so) impose a financial penalty on the retailer”.  The option of granting the 
Groceries Code Adjudicator with more legal powers is still being debated and during recent parliamentary 
hearings on the issue (as at 24 January 2012) this option is still possible.  (Source: 
http://www.foodmanufacture.co.uk/Regulation/Food-firms-welcome-Groceries-Code-Adjudicator-calls). 
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small producers.802  This can be seen as a mechanism of reputational accountability with 
the potential for sanctions in the form of a threat to public reputation.   
 
This UK move is commendable.  However, in order to fully discharge their WTO 
obligations, the UK and indeed the EU, would have to go further in many respects.   
The elements of GAL contained in the Code, as compared with those given effect by the 
WTO, are fairly minimal.  For example, the Code falls short of recognising 
opportunities for participation in standard-setting and in giving effect to substantive 
standards relating to means-end rationality and proportionality.  Any EU framework to 
supervise the activities of private standard-setting bodies should on the contrary use the 
SPS provisions and the TBT Code as its guide.   
 
It is relevant to stress again that the operation of the UK adjudicator scheme is, at 
present, based only on soft law.  At present the UK scheme is not supported by a legal 
mechanism that would permit the adjudicator to strike-down offending standards or to 
impose legal sanctions on errant supermarket or standard-setting bodies.803   It remains 
to be seen whether the action of naming and shaming alone will constitute an effective 
reputational accountability mechanisms and will be sufficient a driver to achieve 
behavioural change in the standard-setting bodies and the supermarkets concerned.  The 
EU regulators should, in the meantime, monitor the effectiveness of this UK 
development.  
                                                           
802
 Source: Section 18, Draft Groceries Code Adjudicator Bill 2011.  
803
 However, there has been a proposal to inject this scheme with some form of legal mechanisms and 
sanctions, for example by creating a dispute resolution system that allows the adjudicator to strike down 
any unfair acts by UK supermarkets or standard-setting bodies for breach of contract.  However, it is 
likely that the industry will resist such a development. See further: http://www.law-now.com/law-
now/2010/GroceriesCode+AdjudicatorAugust10.htm?cmckreg=true. 
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6.6 CONCLUSION  
 
This Chapter has focused upon analysing the stark differences between the control 
frameworks applicable to EU governmental regulation and EU private standards.  For 
Thailand, both forms of regulation are important parts of the EU food safety regulatory 
framework and are in effect binding upon Thai entities, as was demonstrated by the case 
study results.  However, only EU governmental regulation has been subjected to a high 
degree of external accountability controls by WTO law and by network activities in the 
CA model.  Private regulation, on the contrary, has been subjected to a much lesser 
degree of regulatory control.   
 
Given the great variation in form and level of GAL recognition amongst different EU 
private standard setting bodies, it is difficult to generalise the overall extent to which 
private standard setting bodies respect GAL and mitigate the external accountability 
gaps that may otherwise arise in relation to Thailand.  However, it can be concluded that 
significant external accountability gaps have already been generated by the cross-border 
activities of private standard setting bodies in Thailand, as most of these bodies have 
only been able to achieve a somewhat limited and inadequate level of GAL recognition.  
The main conclusion that can be taken away is that no private standard setting body 
lives up to the various demands imposed by GAL.  While different bodies perform 
better or worse in respect of particular distinct criteria, none ensures adequate respect 
for GAL as a whole.  
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For example, GlobalGAP can be considered as being the “leader” in recognising the 
transparency criterion through the provision of most of its documents in local 
languages.  Regarding participation, GlobalGAP also performs better than the other 
standard-setting bodies because it provides a permanent forum through which national 
smallholders can participate on a regular basis.   Conversely, participation opportunities 
provided by other standard-setting bodies, including Tesco’s Nature Choice and that of 
the Soil Association, are provided solely on an ad hoc basis. With regard to the 
proportionality criterion, several standards, including GlobalGAP and GFSI (which 
incorporates the BRC, SQF and IFS standards), have attempted to achieve compliance 
through their benchmarking options.  Such benchmarking options are not available in 
TESCO’s “Natures Choice” or Marks & Spencers’ “From Field to Fork” standards.  For 
the right to appeal and the opportunity to call for a review, Tesco’s Nature Choice 
performs better than the other standards on the basis that it explicitly provides producers 
with a right to appeal within 21 days against any decisions made by the certifying body 
– CMi. 
 
Even GlobalGAP, the standard setting body widely considered to be a leader in taking 
steps to give effect to GAL, has only managed to achieve a minimal level of GAL 
recognition.  For example, while its decision to provide documentation in local 
languages is commendable, the type of transparency achieved as a result amounts to the 
mere provision of accessible information.  Other important aspects of transparency, 
relating for example to “when” the information should be made available, have not yet 
been addressed by GlobalGAP.  As the results of the case studies have demonstrated, 
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information pertaining to potential alterations to rules often fails to reach many affected 
entities in Thailand sufficiently far in advance of the alterations to allow for the 
participation of affected entities in the decision-making process.  
 
Moreover, the inadequacy of the transitional periods provided before new requirements 
enter into effect has not yet been properly addressed, and inadequate transitional periods 
continue to be set.  Furthermore, in the context of participation, although GlobalGAP’s 
move to establish a participatory scheme for smallholders is commendable, at present 
the degree of participation granted to affected entities in Thailand is fairly limited and in 
reality amounts only to a “notice-and-comment” type procedure.  Similarly, while 
GlobalGAP’s benchmarking options are intended to reduce the burden imposed by 
proliferating standards and to secure proportionality, other key aspects of 
proportionality, such as mean-ends rationality have not been addressed. 
 
Given the wide external accountability gaps still being generated by the introduction 
and application of EU private standards, further efforts are needed to hold power-
wielding private entities to account in relation to significantly affected entities outside 
of the EU.  The EU, as a WTO Member State, has obligations to take reasonable steps 
to control the application of private standards by ensuring that they comply with the 
relevant provisions laid down in the SPS Agreement and in the TBT’s Code of Good 
Practice.  Although any discussion regarding a concrete framework to control EU-wide 
private standards is saved for future studies, this thesis suggests that the EU should, at 
minimum, endeavour to fulfill its obligations under WTO law.  In so doing, it could 
learn from its past experiences in dealing with Thai governmental entities, both within 
  
341
the WTO and CA model frameworks.  These experiences demonstrate that mechanisms 
of peer and reputational accountability can play an important role.   
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       CHAPTER 7:  
CONCLUSION 
 
The findings presented in this thesis rest upon empirical, doctrinal and theoretical 
investigation and analysis.  In essence, the thesis has explored the contours of EU food 
safety regulation, examined its multifarious effects in Thailand, analysed these effects 
from the perspective of global governance and external accountability, and proposed 
outline solutions to the problems that have emerged.  
 
Following a brief introduction, Chapter 2 began by setting out the main elements and 
characteristics of EU food safety regulation in the wake of the BSE crisis.  This charted 
the shift in EU law in the direction of a management-based regulatory approach, 
exemplified by the concepts of traceability and Hazard Analysis and Critical Control 
Points.  It also looked at the emergence and role of the European Food Safety Authority 
and at the increasingly important concept of ‘other legitimate concerns’.  Although 
these core concepts are still evolving, they shape in fundamental ways the complex 
regulatory environment in which Thai entities involved in the food export business 
operate today. 
 
In Chapter 3, this thesis used these doctrinal underpinnings to facilitate empirical 
research.  Chapter 3 is a long chapter and consequently it was divided into three parts.  
The first two parts presented in-depth two case studies on the cross-border application 
and impacts of EU food safety regulation in Thailand, in relation to fresh/chilled baby 
corn and cooked poultry products.  These case studies demonstrated that there are two 
main types of EU regulation which constrain Thai exports to the EU.  The first type of 
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EU regulation takes shape within what was called the “Competent Authority Model” 
(CA Model).  This little known institution emerged as key to an understanding of the 
operation of EU food safety regulation in Thailand.  The second type of regulation was 
by way of private standards, including those set by individual supermarkets and 
standard-setting bodies inside and outside the EU.  Both types of regulation were seen 
to generate significant spill-over effects in Thailand.   In relation to private standards, 
these effects were merely outlined in Chapter 3 and explored in greater depth in Chapter 
6.  
 
The third and final part of Chapter 3 explored and evaluated the CA Model.  It argued 
that this governance framework brings advantages both to Thai stakeholders and to 
regulators and consumers in the EU.  As far as Thai exporters are concerned, the CA 
Model serves to militate against the danger of the EU imposing costly and damaging 
food import restrictions or bans.  For the EU, the CA Model serves to ensure that the 
safety of Thai food is significantly secured even before the food export reaches the 
border of the EU. 
 
These case studies leave no doubt as to the significance of the spill-over effects 
generated by EU food safety regulation.  It was particularly striking that the CA Model 
gives rise to frequent and intense interactions between EU and Thai regulators and that 
these interactions are capable of bringing about fundamental institutional change in 
Thailand.  While there was certainly evidence of positive spill-over effects, including an 
improvement in the level of food safety of some products made available for sale in 
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Thailand, negative effects were seen to arise as well.804  For example, in relation to the 
CA Model, the regulatory change introduced by the Thai CA in the course of pursuing 
Thai export compliance with EU food safety demands can be costly and can leave small 
producers and exporters struggling to comply.  
 
The most serious negative effects in Thailand were experienced as a result of the 
introduction of private standards.  It became clear in Chapter 3, and again in Chapter 6, 
that many diverse standards of this kind are being applied.  The standards are often rigid 
and inflexible and sometimes not at all suitable for the circumstances in which they are 
being applied and the environment in which they operate.  There is evidence that they 
sometimes impose unnecessary financial burdens on Thai producers and exporters and 
that they create a variety of operational problems.  This was apparent both in relation to 
standards which concern mainstream food safety issues, such as on food production 
hygienic conditions, animal disease control, and in relation to standards that address 
issues closely related to ‘other legitimate concerns’.  
 
It became especially apparent in relation to private standards that their negative effects 
for Thai stakeholders arise in part as a result of their substantive contours and in part as 
a result of the procedures in place for adopting and enforcing them.  Stakeholders 
commented upon the lack of transparency surrounding private standards, the irregularity 
and lack of notice for changes in standards’ requirements, and upon the absence of 
                                                           
804
 These positive and negative external effects which emerged from the CA model were laid down in Part 
III of Chapter 3 whereas those concerning private entity regulation were discussed in Chapter 6 (Section 
6.1). 
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meaningful opportunities to participate in the adoption of private standards or to 
challenge new requirements that emerge.  
 
In contrast with official EU food safety regulation, which operates in accordance with 
the CA Model, it became clear that there are few, if any, pathways that Thai producers 
and exporters can exploit to assist them in achieving compliance with private standards, 
and to influence the content of the standards set.  While private standards operate as de 
facto conditions for EU market access, they nonetheless fall outside of the scope of the 
CA Model at the current time.  
 
While the thesis presented its empirical findings in Chapter 3 (and in relation to private 
standards also in Chapter 6), it turned in Chapter 4 to focus upon the theoretical context 
in which EU food safety regulation operates.  It argued that this context can best be 
understood by reference to the concept of global governance, in view of the increasingly 
important role that private actors play and in view of the multi-level and transnational 
interactions which occur as a result of EU food safety regulation.  Particularly striking 
and important in this respect was the role that transnational networks comprising EU 
and Thai entities play in the regulation of food safety and this is a dimension which has 
in the past been largely overlooked.  As we will see below, these transnational networks 
play a crucial role in mitigating and resolving the negative effects of EU food safety 
regulation in Thailand, particularly as a result of the operation of the CA model.  
 
Having explored the concept of global governance as a way of shedding theoretical light 
on the operation of EU food safety regulation, Chapter 4 then turned to examine the 
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related concept of external accountability.  As other academics have pointed out, global 
governance situations frequently generate external accountability gaps.  This is because 
those regulating and those subject to regulation operate in different regulatory spaces; 
whether in different countries or different organisational domains.  Thus, for example, 
regulators in the EU operate in a different polity than the Thai stakeholders to whom the 
regulations are addressed and affected.  In keeping with Robert Keohane’s work, 
accountability gaps of this kind are captured by the language of ‘external accountability 
gaps’.805 
 
Chapter 4 went on to argue that it is important to evaluate existing mechanisms and 
procedures for inculcating external accountability and, where necessary, to propose 
improvements to mitigate or close external accountability gaps.  In order to do so, the 
concept of external accountability had first to be more fully explored.  It was suggested 
that three features form indispensable elements of an accountability relationship, 
including standards, accountability fora and sanctions.  The shift from internal to 
external accountability, and from unitary to pluralistic conceptions of accountability, 
means that these elements may be instantiated in less familiar forms.  Thus, for 
example, while courts can constitute an external accountability forum and legal redress 
operate as a sanction, where external accountability deficits arise, additional types of 
fora and sanctions may well be required.  Chapter 4 argued, for instance, that peer 
review can also serve as an effective accountability forum and that peer condemnation 
and reputational loss may operate as effective sanctions. 
                                                           
805
 Grant and Keohane (2005), supra, Section 4.1.2.  
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Still building on Keohane’s work, and in a bid to give further content to the concept of 
external accountability, Chapter 4 turned to increasingly influential scholarship in the 
new area of Global Administrative Law (GAL).  It argued that this scholarship provides 
a framework for identifying accountability standards that sometimes do apply, and at 
any rate should apply, in global governance settings.  Looking to the over-lapping 
operational practices of a wide range of international and transnational organisations, 
GAL scholars have succeeded in articulating a range of accountability standards that 
can be used to underpin external accountability relationships in global governance 
settings.  Among the most important criteria they identify are; transparency, 
participation, reasoned decision-making, proportionality and opportunities for appeal or 
review.  
 
Having set out a theoretical framework for thinking about external accountability and 
about possible mechanisms for promoting this, the thesis then turned to evaluate EU 
food safety regulation from this perspective. 
 
Chapter 5 focussed upon external accountability in the context of official EU food 
safety regulation.  It established that a number of external accountability-enhancing 
mechanisms already exist in this sphere.  These mechanisms offer Thai stakeholders 
support in calling EU power-wielders externally to account.  Here, the CA model and 
the WTO were seen to play an all important role, including crucially in a number of 
lesser known fora established by the WTO, including its SPS Committee.  While room 
for improvement was identified, in many respects the CA model and the WTO serve to 
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instantiate external accountability relationships between different states.  This claim was 
substantiated by examining respect for each of the GAL accountability criteria in the 
WTO and CA-model framework in turn.  
 
Chapter 6 then turned to examine external accountability relationships between the EU 
and Thailand in relation to private standards.  It should be recalled that it is in relation to 
private standards that the most pressing operational problems were identified and in 
respect of which the most vociferous complaints were made.  Chapter 6 made clear that, 
by comparison with official EU food safety regulation, private standard setting bodies 
are less accountable to external stakeholders and that fewer mechanisms exist to ensure 
respect for the accountability standards identified by GAL.  Even the sector leaders, in 
particular the GlobalGAP standard, fail by some distance to emulate the achievements 
of the WTO and the CA Model.  
 
The final substantive part of Chapter 6 then focussed upon exploring ways to enhance 
external accountability in relation to private standards, in particular as between Thailand 
and the EU.  It took WTO Law as its perhaps counter-intuitive starting point.  It argued 
that the TBT and SPS Agreements already establish a framework for enhancing the 
external accountability of private standard-setting bodies and that they do so by 
requiring WTO’s Member States to take reasonable steps to ensure that these bodies act 
in accordance with the specified substantive obligations these agreements lay down.  It 
recognised that the term ‘reasonable’ is unclear, and that it is unlikely that Member 
States will be able to reach agreement about its meaning any time soon.  This, 
notwithstanding the efforts of the SPS Committee in this regard.  
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Nonetheless, and notwithstanding this lack of clarity, Chapter 6 argued that the EU does 
incur some obligations to control its private standard-setting bodies under WTO law, 
and that as things stand the EU is in clear breach of these obligations.  EU private 
standard-setting bodies regularly breach WTO norms and yet the EU does nothing at all 
to oversee or to constrain the activities of these bodies.  While the EU may enjoy wide 
discretion in deciding what is to count as a reasonable measure, there is no evidence that 
the EU has turned its mind to this question or that it has actively considered and rejected 
any particular options.  
 
As such, Chapter 6 argued that the EU is required, as a matter of WTO law, to take 
some concrete steps to regulate or at least to consider regulating, the activities of private 
standard-setting bodies that operate in its domain.  While this chapter stops short of 
providing a blueprint for what the EU must do, considering this to be the tasks of future 
research.  It draws upon earlier analysis in relation to official EU food safety regulation 
in making possible future action.  The chapter concludes by examining a recent UK 
initiative to strengthen the accountability relationship between UK supermarkets and 
those from whom they get their supplies.  It is suggested that this initiative can provide 
a starting point in thinking about what steps the EU could take to enhance the external 
accountability of private standard-setting bodies operating within it domain.    
 
Overall, it is suggested that this thesis makes an original and important contribution to 
existing literature on the global governance of food safety, with particular reference to 
Thailand and the EU.  Particularly important in this respect is the empirical research that 
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was carried out.  It was as a result of this that the impact of EU food safety regulation in 
Thailand could be accurately gleaned.  This empirical research revealed material of 
considerable interest.  Perhaps the most important findings that emerged relate to the 
operation of the CA Model and to the significant and growing impacts of EU private 
standards on Thai stakeholders. 
 
The thesis also brought together and developed different bodies of academic literature, 
concerning global governance, external accountability and global administrative law.  It 
used this literature to understand and evaluate existing accountability relationships 
between entities operated in different polities or states and to put forward a critique of 
the current situation in relation to official EU regulation and private standards which 
operate as market entry conditions for access to the EU.  
 
Here, the concept of network governance also emerged as being key.  This is 
particularly apparent in relation to the CA Model, where transnational interactions 
between EU and Thai officials served to create and strengthen external accountability 
relationships and to mitigate and sometimes overcome concrete food safety 
problems.  The CA model and the SPS Committee, both serve as “lesser known” but 
effective fora for achieving external accountability and, from this, important lessons 
may be learned.  These lessons are most obviously relevant in thinking about how to 
reform the practice of private standard-setting bodies, but they are relevant also for 
other developed and developing countries.  The “CA Model” serves not only to ensure 
that imported food is safe, but that the burden imposed on producers and exporters is 
considerably reduced.  
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• Rakpong J, personal interview with Mr. and Mrs. Nikorn (the fruits and 
vegetable brokers), Lanna Frozen Co., Chiangmai, Thailand, 23/06/08 
• Rakpong J., personal interview with Mr. Supamit, the Vice Dean of Agricultural 
Departments, Chaingmai University, Chaingmai, Thailand 23/06/08  
• Rakpong J, interview held during meeting with Mrs. Sriprea Duangkaewruean, 
Head of administrative staff of Mae Ta Cooperative, Mae-on sub-district 
25/06/2008 (followed with several telephone correspondence)  
• Rakpong J, interview with Assistant Professor Vitcha Sardsud, Wieng-Gan 
District, Chiangrai, 30/06/2008-01/07/2008 
 
July 2008 
 
• Rakpong J., group interviews with pomelo farmers/exporters, Wieng-Gan 
district, Chiangrai 01/07/2008 
• Rakpong J, personal interview held during meeting with the Thai Broiler 
Processing Exporters Association, and the staff from GFPT, Bangkok, Thailand 
07/08/2008 
• Rakpong J., personal interviews with Mr. Rattanasirimontri, Chatchawan Import 
Export and Packaging, Nakornpratom, Thailand, 08/07/2008 
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• Rakpong J., group interview held during meeting with the Thai Fruit and 
Vegetable Producer  Associations’ representative, Mr. Pratom Tankum and two 
baby corn exporters, Nakornpratom, Thailand, 10/07/2008  
• Rakpong J., personal interview held during meeting with the Thai Fruit and 
Vegetable Producer  Association, Nakornpratom, Thailand and two owners 
exporting companies 10/07/2008, Nakornpratom and Bangkok, Thailand. 
• Rakpong J., personal interview held during meeting with Mr. Namjan the leader 
of Mae Ta cooperative, Mae-on sub district  21/07/2008  
• Rakpong J., group interview with baby corn farmers, Mae Ta, Mae-On sub-
district Chiangmai 27/07/2008  
• Rakpong J. personal interviews with Mr. Pat Apaimool, Mae Ta, Mae-On sub-
district Chiangmai 21/07/2008 27/07/2008 
• Rakpong J., personal interviews with Mr and Mrs. Ajarawong,  Shirmp farmers, 
Pranburi, Prajuab-kirikhun, Thailand, 07/2008  
• Rakpong J., personal interviews with Khun “Hia-di”, a small shrimp farmer, 
Pranburi, Prajuab-kirikhun, Thailand 07/2008  
•  Rakpong J., personal interviews with a group of shrimp farmers/exporters, The 
Shrimp Farmers’ Association of Pranburi River Delta , Pranburi, Prajuab-
kirikhun, Thailand, 07/2008  
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August 2008 
 
• Rakpong J., personal interview with Saowaluck Suppakamolsenee,  The Policy 
and Plan Analyst of the ACFS, Bangkok, 06/08/2008 
• Rakpong J., personal interview with Mr. Prayoon Leelangamwongsa, Class 8 
Official Veterinarian, ACFS, Bangkok,Thailand 06/08/2008 
• Rakpong J., group interview held during meeting with the Thai Broiler 
Processing Exporters Association, and the staff from GFPT, Bangkok, Thailand 
7/08/2008.  
• Rakpong J., personal interview with Mr. Anan Sirimongkolkasem, the President 
of Thai Broiler Processing Exporters Association, GFPT, Bangkok, Thailand 
7/8/2008 
• Rakpong J., personal interview with Mr. Kukrit Arepagorn and Ms. Vimonrat 
Premsiri, Associate Manager and legal technicians of a poultry company- GFPT 
exporting company, Thailand, Bangkok, Thailand, 7/8/2008 
• Rakpong J., personal interview with Director Cherdchai Thiratinnarat, Director 
of Bureau of Disease Control and Veterinary Service Bangkok, Thailand 
20/08/2008. 
• J. Rakpong, personal interview with Mrs. Tippawan at the Ministry of 
Commerce, Department of Foreign Trade, Nontaburi Thailand 21/08/2008. 
• J. Rakpong, telephone interview with Ms Supamas, trade staff at the Europe 
Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand, 27/08/2008  
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• J. Rakpong, telephone interview with “Khun Koog”, staff at the Department of 
Agriculture, MOAC, Bangkok, Thailand 27/08/2008  
 
September 2008 
 
• Rakpong J., telephone interview with the Director of One-stop-service, the 
Department of Agriculture, MOAC, Bangkok, Thailand, 01/09/2008 
• Rakpong J., personal interviews held during meeting with Mr. Nathsak 
Pattanachaikul, Chief Operating Officer of Sahafarm, Bangkok, Thailand, 
2/09/2008 
• Rakpong J., personal interviews held during meeting with Mr. Kasem 
Trakoonlerswilai, Deputy Director of Sahafarm, Bangkok, Thailand, 2/09/2008 
• Rakpong J., personal interviews with “Khun Jui”, staff at Coastal Fisheries 
Research and Development Bureau, Department of Fisheries, Ministry of 
Agricultural and Cooperatives, Bangkok, Thailand, 04/09/2008 
• Rakpong J., telephone interviews with  Ms. Orawan (“Khun Eed”) the owner 
and manager of Excelfruits Thailand (suppliers to Excelfruits International 
(Netherlands), Bangkok, Thailand, 08/09/2008  
• Rakpong J., telephone interviews with Dr. Pennapha Mattayomphong, the 
Director of Bureau of Livestock Standards Certification , Bangkok 09/2008 
• Rakpong J., personal interview with Dr. Jirawan Yamprayoon, the Deputy 
Director of the Ministry of Fisheries, Bangkok, Thailand 09/9/2008 
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• Rakpong J., telephone interview with Dr. Suphanan Boonyakarn, Staff at the 
Bureau of Livestock Standards Certification, Bangkok, Thailand September 
2008 
• Rakpong J., personal interview with Ms. Kritsana Kukumpanitch, staff at Fish 
Inspection and Quality Control Division Department of Fisheries, Department of 
Fisheries, MOAC, Bangkok, Thailand 18/9/2008  
• Rakpong J., personal interview with Mr. Wanchai  Polprasertkul,  the staff at 
Bureau of Livestock Standards and Certification , DLD, Bangkok, Thailand 
September 2008 
• Rakpong J., personal interview with Mr. Sasi Chareonpoj,  the staff at Bureau of 
Livestock Standards and Certification, DLD, Bangkok, Thailand September 
2008  
• Minutes from two exporters meeting with the Department of Agricultural, 
MOAC prior to the FVO’s visits under its mission on Phytosanitary checks , 28-
29  August 2008  
• Rakpong J., personal interview with the Director of One-stop-service, the 
Department of Agriculture, MOAC, 29/09/2008 
• Minutes from exporters’ meeting at the Thai Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, 
Thailand, 29/09/2008  
 
2010  
 
• Rakpong J, telephone interview with Ms. Peerajit, Organic Agriculture 
Certification Thailand or ACT, Chaingmai, Thailand, 21/12/2009  
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• Rakpong, J. personal interviews with the administrative staff of Mae Ta 
Cooperative, Mae-on sub district,  January  2010  
• Rakpong J., telephone interview with Green-Net foundation, January 2010. 
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APPENDIX III: TABLE OF CASES  
 
UK Cases  
 
• Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service (1985) AC 374. 
 
EU Cases  
 
• Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council of the European Union (2002), T-13/99, 
ECR II -3305.  
• Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft mbH & Co., S. Spitz Kommanditgesellschaft v. 
Land Baden-Württemberg, Intervener: Federal Republic of Germany (2004) 
ECJ 14-12-2004, ECR I-11763.  
 
WTO Cases  
 
• Australia—Salmon 
Australia — Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18/9, adopted 23 
February 1999. 
• Brazil—Tyres 
Brazil— Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (AB-2007-4), 
WT/DS332/AB/R 3, adopted December 2007.  
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• Canada —Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC) 
Canada — Import, Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by Canadian 
Provincial Marketing Agencies, L/6304-35S/37 1989, adopted 22 March 1988. 
• EC — Asbestos 
European Communities—Measures Affecting Aspects and Asbestos-Containing 
Products (AB-2000-11), WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 12 March 2001. 
• EC— Bananas III (Ecuador) 
European Communities— Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas (AB-1997-3), WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 9 September 1997.  
• EC—Biotech  
 European Communities- Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, adopted 29 
September 2006. 
• EC— Frozen Chicken  
European Communities—Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken 
Cuts (AB-2005-5), WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R, adopted 12 September 
2005 
• EC—Hormones 
European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones) (AB-1997-4), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 16 
January 1998. 
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• Hormones II  
United States/Canada—Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-
Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/AB/R, WT/DS321/AB/R, adopted (14 November 
2008) 
• EC—  Generalised System of Preferences  
European Communities—Generalized system of Preferences, Request to Join 
Consultations, WT/DS242/2, adopted 20 December 2001  
• EC — Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners 
from China, WT/DS397/13, adopted 14 September 2011.  
• EC — Duties on Imports of Rice, WT/DS17/1, adopted 11 October 1995.  
• EC—  Sardines 
EC— Trade Description of Sardines (AB-2002-3), WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 
26 September 2002.  
• Egypt— Canned Tuna 
Egypt— Import Prohibition on Canned Tuna with Soybean Oil, 
G/SPS/GEN/203, adopted 27 September 2000.  
• Korea —  Beef 
Korea— Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and frozen Beef, (AB-
2000-8), WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 11 December 2000. 
• Japan — Apples 
Japan— Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples (AB-2003-4), 
WT/DS245/AB/R, adopted 26 November 2003.  
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• Japan— Varietals  
Japan— Measures Affecting Agricultural Products (AB-1998-8), 
WT/DS76/AB/R, adopted 22 February 1999. 
• Shrimp/Turtle  
United States— Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 
(AB-1998-4), WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 12 October 1998.  
• Shrimp/Turtle II  
United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia (AB -2001-4), 
WT/DS58/AB/RW, adopted 22 October 2001. 
• Thailand — Customs Valuation of Certain Products from the European 
Communities, WT/DS 370/1, adopted 30 January 2008.  
• Thailand-Steel 
Thailand—   Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or 
Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (AB-2000-12), WT/DS 112/AB/R, 
adopted 12 March 2001.  
• Thailand —  Cigarettes 
Thailand— Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines, 
(AB-2011-1), WT/DS371/AB/R, adopted 17 June 2011. 
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• Tuna/Dolphin 
United States— Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS 21/R-39S/155, and adopted 
3 September 1991.  
• United States — Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and sale of 
Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS 381/R, circulated 15 September 2011.  
• US —  Gambling 
United States— Measures affecting the Cross- border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Service (AB-2005-1), WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 7 April 2005.  
• US— Clove Cigarettes 
United States— Measures Affecting the Production and the Sale of Clove 
Cigarettes, WT/DS406/R, adopted 2 September 2011. 
• US—Poultry  
United States — _ Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China, 
WT/DS392/R, adopted 29 September 2010 
• US—  Section 337 
United States—   Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and Amendments 
Thereto, WT/DS186/1-3., adopted 18 January 2000. 
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APPENDIX IV: TABLE OF LEGISLATION 
 
International Legislations   
 
• Recommended International Code of Hygienic Practice for Processed Meat and 
Poultry Products, Codex, CAC/RCP 13-1976, rev. 1 (1985))  
• Codex Alimentarius’s Guidelines for the Application of the Hazard Analysis 
Critical Control Point (HACCP) System (CAC/GL 18-1993).   
 
WTO 
 
•  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(The Dispute Settlement Understanding, DSU)  Article 3.7, 4.3, 4.7, 4.8, 5, 8.5, 
16.4, 17.14, 21, 22.2 
• General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): Article X, XX (b),  
• General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): Article, XIV (b) 
• The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement): Article 2.2, 5.4, 5.6, 5.7, 7, 8, 13 Annex B, Annex 
C 
• Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), Article 2.5, 4.1, 
Annex 1, 3 
• Ministerial Conference (Fourth Session), Doha, 9-14 November 2001: 
Implementation and Related Issues and Concerns (WT/MIN (01)/17)  
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• SPS Committee’s Recommended Procedures for Implementation the 
Transparency Obligations of the SPS Agreement (Article 7), (G/SPS/7/Rev.2, 2 
April 2002)  
• Secretariat’s Handbook on “How to Apply the Transparency Provisions of the 
SPS Agreement” (September 2002) 
 
Regional Legislations (EU)  
 
• Commission Decision 74/234/EEC of 16 April 1974 relating to the institution of 
a Scientific Committee for Food (OJ L 136/1, 20/05/1974)  
• Council Decision 78/923/EEC of 19 June 1978 concerning the conclusion of the 
European Convention for the protection of animals kept for farming purposes  
(OJL 323/12, 17/11/1978) 
• Council Regulation (EEC) No 2377/90 of 26 June 1990 laying down a 
Community procedure for the establishment of maximum residue limits of 
veterinary medicinal products in foodstuffs of animal origin  (OJ L 224/1, 
18/08/1990 ) 
• Council Directive 90/496 of 24 September 1990 on nutrition labelling for 
foodstuffs (OJ L 276/40, 03/10/1990)  
• Council Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91 of 24 June 1991 on organic production 
of agricultural products and indications referring thereto on agricultural products 
and foodstuffs (OJ L 198/1, 22/07/1991)  
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• Council Directive 91/628/EEC of 19 November 1991 on the protection of 
animals during transport and amending Directives 90/425/EEC and 91/496/EEC  
(OJ L 340/17, 11/12/1991)   
• Council Directive 91/630/EEC of 19 November 1991 laying down minimum 
standards for the protection of pigs (OJ L 340/33, 11/12/1991) 
• Council Directive 93/43/EEC of 14 June 1993 on the hygiene of foodstuffs (OJ 
L 175/1, 19/07/1993)   
• Council Directive 93/119/EC of 22 December 1993 on the protection of animals 
at the time of slaughter or killing (OJ L 340/21, 31/12/1993) 
• Commission Decision 94/85/EC of 16 February 1994 drawing up a list of third 
countries from which the Member States authorize imports of fresh poultry meat 
(OJ L 44/31, 17/02/1994) 
• Commission Decision 94/984 of 20 December 1994 laying down animal health 
conditions and veterinary certificates for the importation of fresh poultry meat 
from certain third countries (OJ L 378/11, 31/12/1994) 
• Council Directive 95/29/EC of 29 June 1995 amending Directive 90/628/EEC 
concerning the protection of animals during transport  (OJ L 148/52, 
30/06/1995) 
• Commission Decision 95/273/EC of 6 July 1995 relating to the institution of a 
Scientific Committee for Food (OJ L 167/22, 18/07/1995) 
• Council Directive 97/2/EC of 20 January 1997 amending Directive 91/629/EEC 
laying down minimum standards for the protection of calves (OJ L 25/24, 
28/01/1997) 
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• Commission Decision 97/4 drawing up provisional lists of third country 
establishments from which the Member States authorise import of fresh poultry 
meat (OJ L 002/6, 04/01/1997)  
• Commission Decision 97/134/EC of 31 January 1997 laying down certain 
detailed rules concerning on-the-spot checks carried out in the veterinary field 
by Commission experts in third countries (OJ L 051/54, 21/02/1997) 
• Commission Decision No 97/404/EC of 10 June 1997 setting up a Scientific 
Steering Committee (OJ L 169/85, 27/06/1997) 
• Commission Decision 97/579/EC of 23 July 1997 setting up Scientific 
Committees in the field of consumer health and food safety  (OJ L 237/18,  
28/08/1997)   
• Commission Decision 98/140/EC of 4 February 1998 laying down certain 
detailed rules concerning on-the-spot checks carried out in the veterinary field 
by the Commission experts in third countries ( OJ L 38/14, 12/02/1998) 
• Council Directive 98/58/EC of 20 July 1999 concerning the protection of 
animals kept for farming purposes (OJ L 221/23, 08/08/1998) 
• White Paper on Food Safety, Com (1999) 719 final  
• Commission Regulation (EC) No 730/1999 of 7 April 1999  laying down the 
marketing standard for carrots (OJ L 93/14, 8/04/1999) 
• Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999, laying down the procedures for 
the exercise of implementation powers conferred on the Commission (OJ L 
184/23, 17/07/1999)  
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• Council Directive 1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999 laying down minimum standards 
for the protection of laying hens (OJ L 203/53, 03/08/1999) 
• Council Regulation 1804/1999 supplementing Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91 on 
organic production of agricultural products, and indications referring thereto, on 
agricultural products and foodstuffs to include livestock production (OJ L 222/1, 
24/08/1999) 
• Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food 
law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down 
procedures in matters of food safety (OJ L 31/1, 01/02/2002)  
• Commission Decision 2002/251/EC of 27 March 2002 concerning certain 
protective measures with regard to poultry meat and certain fishery and 
aquaculture products intended for human consumption and imported from 
Thailand  (notified under document number C(2002) 1319)  (OJ L 084/77, 
28/03/2002)  
• The Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on Animal Welfare Legislation on farmed animals in Third Countries 
and the Implication for the EU. Com (2002) 626 final. Brussels (18/11/2002) 
• Treaty Establishing the European Community (C 325/33, 24/12/2002) 
• Commission Decision 2003/477/EC amending Decision 2002/251/EC to revoke 
the protective measures with regard to the fishery and aquaculture products 
imported from Thailand of 24 June 2003 (OJ L 158/61 , 27/06/2003)  
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• Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1304/2003 of 11 July 2003 on the procedure 
applied by the European Food Safety Authority to requests for scientific 
opinions referred to it (OJ L 185/6, 24/07/2003) 
• Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
2of 2 September 2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed (OJ L 268/1, 
18/10/2003)  
• Commission Decision 2003/895/EC of 19 December 2003 amending Decision 
2002/251/EC to revoke the protective measures with regard to certain 
consignments of poultry meat imported from Thailand 
(OJ L333/88, 20/12/2003)  
• Commission Regulation (EC) No 85/2004 of 15 January 2004 laying down the 
marketing standard for apples (OJ L 13/3, 20/01/2004)  
• European Union Commission Regulation (EC) No 86/2004 of January 15, 2004 
laying down standards for pears (OJ L 13/19, 20/01/2004)  
• Commission Regulation (EC) No 843/2004 of 28 April 2004 amending the rates 
of refunds applicable to certain products from the sugar sector exported in the 
form of goods not covered by Annex I to the Treaty (OJ L  127/65, 29/04/2004)  
• Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
29 April 2004 laying down specific hygiene rules food of animal origin (OJ L 
139/55, 30/04/2004) 
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• Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
29 April 2004 laying down specific rules for the organisation of official controls 
on products of animal origin intended for human consumption (OJ L 226/83, 
25/06/2004) 
• Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 
April 2004 on the hygiene of foodstuff (OJ  L 139/1, 30/04/2004) 
• Commission Directive 2004/62/EC of 26 April 2004 amending Council 
Directive 91/414/EEC to include mepanipyrim as active substance  (OJ L 
125/38, 28/04/2004) 
• Regulation 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance 
with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules (OJ L 191/1, 
28/05/2004) 
• Commission Decision 2004/478/EC of 29 April 2004, concerning the adoption 
of a General Plan for Food and Feed Crisis Management (OJ L 212/30, 
16/06/2004) 
• Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 of 22 December 2004 on the protection of 
animals during transport and related operations and amending Directives 
64/432/EEC and 93/119/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1255/97 ( OJ L 3/1, 
05/01/2005)  
• Commission Recommendation 2005/108/EC of 4 February 2005  on the further 
investigation into the levels of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in certain 
foods (OJ L 34/43, 08/02/2005) 
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• Regulation 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
February 2005 on maximum residue levels of pesticides in or on food and feed 
of plant and animal origin and amending Council Directive 91/414/EEC (OJ 
L70/1, 16/03/2005)  
• Commission Regulation (EC) No 411/2009 of 18 May 2009 amending 
Regulation 798/2008 laying down a list of third countries, territories, zones or 
compartments from which poultry and poultry products may be imported into 
and transit through the Community and the veterinary certification requirements 
(OJ L 124/3, 20/05/2009) 
• Council Decision 2006/512/EC of 17 July 2006 amending Decision 
1999/468/EC laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing 
powers conferred on the Commission (OJ L 200/11, 22/07/2006) 
• Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 20 December 2006 on nutrition and health claims made on foods (OJ L 404/9, 
30/12/2006)  
• Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 18 December 2006 (OJ L 396/1, 30/12/2006) 
• Commission Regulation 327/2007 of 27 March 2007 derogating for 2007 from 
Regulation (EC) No 1445/95 as regards the dates of issue of export licences in 
the beef and veal sector (OJ L 87/5 , 28/03/2007) 
• Council Directive 2007/43/EC, laying down minimum rules for the protection of 
chickens kept for meat production (OJ L 182/19, 28/06/2007) 
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• Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 of 28 June 2007 on organic production 
and labelling of organic products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91 
(OJ L 189/16),  (OJ L 189/1, 20/07/2007) 
• Commission Decision (EC) No. 2007/777 laying down the animal and public 
health  conditions and model certificates for imports of certain meat products 
and treated stomachs, bladders and intestines for human consumption from third 
countries and repealing decision 2005/432/EC (OJ L 312/49   30/11/2007)  
• Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007 (OJ 
L 2007/C 306/01, 17/01/2007)  
• Directive 2008/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
January 2008 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control ( OJ L 
24/8, 29/01/2008) 
• Commission Regulation 597/2008, of 24 June 2008 amending Regulation (EC) 
No 372/2007 laying down transitional migration limits for plasticisers in gaskets 
in lids intended to come into contact with foods (OJ L 164/12, 25/06/2008). 
• Commission Regulation (EC) No 798/2008 of 8 August 2008 laying down a list 
of third countries, territories, zones or compartment from which poultry and 
poultry products may be imported into and transit through the Community and 
the veterinary certification requirements ( OJ L 226/1, 23/08/2008) 
• Commission Regulation 889/2008 of 5 September 2008 laying down detailed 
rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 on 
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organic production and labelling of organic products with regard to organic 
production, labelling and control (OJ L 250/1, 18/09/2008)  
 
• Commission Regulation 1235/2008 of 8 December 2008 laying down detailed 
rules for implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 as regards 
the arrangements for imports of organic products from third countries (OJ L  
334/25, 12/12/2008) 
• Commission Regulation (EC) No 411/2009 of 18 May 2009 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 789/2008 laying down a list of third countries, territories, 
zones or compartments from which poultry and poultry products may be 
imported into and transit through the Community and the veterinary certification 
requirements (OJ L 124/3, 20/05/2009) 
• Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and 
amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2011/77/EC and 2003/30/EC 
(OJ L 140/16, 05/06/2009) 
• Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union  (C 83/47), 30/03/2010) 
• Commission Decision of 30 November 2010 amending Decisions 2005/692/EC, 
2005/734/EC, 2006/415/EC, 2007/25/EC and 2009/494/EC as regards avian 
influenza (notified under document C(2010) 8282) (OJ L 316/10, 02/12/2010)  
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• Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010 on industrial emission (integrated pollution prevention and 
control) (OJ L 334/17, 17/12/2010)  
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• Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning 
mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of 
implementing powers (OJ L 55/13, 28/02/2011)  
 
National Legislations (Thai) 
 
• Plant Seed Act B.E. 2518 (1975), 
• Fertilizer Act B.E. 2518 (1975),  
• National Food Act B.E. 2522 (1979),  
• Consumer Protection Act B.E. 2522 (1979) 
• Dangerous Substance Act B.E. 2535 (1992),  
• Department of Agriculture Notification on 18 August 2005 
• Agricultural Standards Act B.E. 2551 (2008)  
• Plant Quarantine Act 1964 (amended 1 March 2008)  
• Ministry of Commerce Announcement (of 23 February and 4 August 2009 and 
of 11 April 2003) specifying commodities which need to obtain a health 
certificate prior to exportation.   
 
National Legislation (EU Countries)  
 
• The Food Hygiene (England) Regulation 2006 
• Food Safety Act 1990, (UK) Section 21 
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• The European Communities (General Food Law) Regulation 2007, S.I. No. 
747/2007, (Ireland) Section 5(3)  
 
National Legislation (Others)  
 
• (USA) Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point 
(HACCP) Systems of 25 July 1996 
• (USA) The Bio-Terrorism Act 2002 (Section 306)  
 
List of Private Standards Mentioned  
 
• Assured Chicken Production  
• British Retail Consortium  
• EU-Flower 
• GlobalGAP 
• Global Food Safety Initiative  
• Grocery Supply Code of Practice 
• International Food Standards 
• International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance  
• RSPCA’s Freedom Food Standards  
• Safe Quality Food 
• Soil Association’s Standard  
• Mark and Spencer’s From Field to Fork Standard  
• TESCO’s Nature’s Choice   
